Intergroup Contact Avoidance in Indonesia

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section describes the position of this study in relation to relevant theories in the field of conflict studies, including studies on ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia and on avoidance of intergroup contact in Western countries. The second section sheds light on how avoidance of intergroup contact is related to latent conflict, ethno-religious identification and majority-minority relations. Section three provides a description of the research sites in the Indonesian cities of Yogyakarta and Ambon, including a historical view of the political, economic and socio-cultural developments in both places. The fourth and final section of this chapter presents several research questions, both descriptive and explanatory, which guided research and analysis. The main question we attempt to answer in this dissertation is to what extent ethno-religious identification affects avoidance of intergroup contact between Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta, taking into account several individual and intermediate determinants.

1.1 Position of the thesis

Communal violence between ethno-religious groups has been a common occurrence in certain regions of Indonesia, particularly in the period between 1990 and 2003. Fourteen provinces were affected by these kinds of violent conflicts, resulting in the deaths of more than ten thousand people (Varshney et al., 2004:26). Communal violence between religious groups (Islam and Christianity) claimed the largest percentage of victims at 57%, while violence stemming from conflicts between ethnic groups was responsible for 30% of the deaths. The remaining 13% of deaths are

attributed to violence against people of Chinese descent. Western and Indonesian scholars have conducted several studies to analyze why and how an increase in communal violence took place after the economic crisis and political reforms of 1998. Bertrand (2004:7-9) uses an institutional historical approach to theorize that inter-communal violence is a specific characteristic of transitional periods.[1] Similarly, Van Klinken (2007) relates violence in Indonesia to the power relations between political elites.[2] Other research on conflict in the Northern Moluccas by Wilson (2008:195) demonstrates that macro-structural forces and changes in those structures play a role in conflict. These studies emphasize that local elites attempt to make use of ethno-religious identities in order to realize their political claims, and to acquire political positions and access to resources.

However, most studies on conflict in Indonesia do not make the link between the contextual and individual processes of interaction between members of ethno-religious groups who are involved in communal violence (Gismar, 2000:44-50). Despite many studies on conflict, empirical studies of the way that conflict unfolds at the individual level remain scarce (Adam, 2010a:43). More broadly, there is a disjuncture in the literature between those studies of conflict that pay most attention to the political, economic and social bases for ethno-religious conflicts, and those that focus more on prejudice, discrimination and attitudes (Green and Seher, 2003:510). The former approach is apparent in the studies by Brubaker and Laitin (1998) and Williams (1994). The latter approach can be found in the research of Fiske (1998) and Krysan (2000). This study is an effort to bridge this disjuncture in conflict studies by investigating conflictual relationships between groups at the level of the individual. This research addresses to

1 In the period of transition to democracy, state institutions were weakened when the processes of contesting and allocating power between groups were more publicly observable than previously. This encouraged ethno-religious groups to renegotiate the structure of the state's institutions because of the unfair distribution of power and resources during the New Order regime (1966 - 1998).

2 Van Klinken argues that democratization and decentralization has weakened the national government, encouraging local elites to mobilize ethno-religious groups in bids for regional control.

what extent processes of ethno-religious identification among individuals relate to, and affect, their support of exclusionary attitudes towards members of other ethno-religious groups.

This study, however, does not focus on the enactment of communal violence. Referring to Deutsch's (1973:14) typology of conflict, this study focuses on latent conflict, which he describes as an unconscious form of conflict, because it is not directly observable in individual and group behaviours. Based on Merton's concept of latent dysfunction (1968:117), latent conflict can be viewed as the unintended and unrecognized consequences of individual and group behaviours that lead to social disintegration. Latent conflict may transform into communal violence if at least one of the following conditions is met: there is a mass mobilization undertaken by elites; one group is stereotyped through the framing processes of the media; and structural opportunity develops. Communal violence, in turn, is likely lead to latent conflict because it is grounds for the cultivation of hostility and hatred (De Jonge and Nooteboom, 2006:472). This study focuses on the avoidance of intergroup contact between different ethno-religious groups, utilizing cognitive and emotional mapping of differences between ethno-religious groups, and the extent to which members of certain ethno-religious group allow interactions with members of other ethno-religious groups (Sterkens, 2009:6). The implication of intergroup contact avoidance is the absence of social interaction between groups, either formally or informally, which in turn tends to feed into communal violence and conflict (Varshney, 2002:9).

Research on intergroup contact avoidance by ethno-religious groups is a major topic of social scientific research, covering many and various aspects of the phenomenon, as will be described further in section 1.2. Previous research in this field can be divided into three major topics. The first topic is research on social avoidance, which has been investigated by Bogardus (1925a), Coenders et al. (2007), Semyonov et al. (2007) and Schuman et al. (1997). They emphasize that intergroup contact avoidance

is generally associated with ethnocentrism and out-group hostility. The second topic is represented by studies conducted by Clark (1992), Walter (1986), Postlewaite and Silverman (2004), Waterman and Kosmin (1988) and Sanders (2002). Their studies focus on how support for residential segregation is related to ethnic, religious and racial identification. The third topic, researched by Sean and Murdock (1998), Iceland and Wilkes (2006), Tolsma et al. (2008) and Shimahara (1983), pays attention to how support for residential segregation, opposition to inter-ethnic marriage and segregated social interaction are related to the relationship between the majority and the minority.

In contrast to those studies, this research employs a theory of ethnic group conflict that guides the research methods and analysis applied to data on contact avoidance at the individual level. Consequently, this study emphasizes the importance of ethno-religious identity in relation to exclusionary reactions. In combining both quantitative and qualitative methods with triangulation analyses, findings from surveys are enriched by findings from in-depth interviews, providing more fully comprehensive data. Another significant distinction between this research and previous studies on contact avoidance is that this study investigates religious groups in Indonesia, while most studies on social avoidance focus on racial or ethnic groups in Western countries. In this thesis, I also argue that prejudicial and discriminatory attitudes can also be found in relationships between religious groups. Finally, while previous studies have focused on either attitudes to avoid out-group members, or on preferences to live in residential segregation, this study focuses on both of these practices, classifying them as intergroup contact avoidance.

Intergroup contact avoidance is considered to be a dimension of ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 2002:18). This attitude is related to the social construction of boundaries through identification with ethno-religious groups across four domains: economic, political, social and cultural. Group identification is a process by which individuals are bound

to their groups and become aware of their group identity (Billig, 1976:322). It is a process dependent on a historical context that exists at a definite time. This particular form of identification takes place in every society that is characterized by competition for material resources, power, and status (Coser, 1956:8).[3] In this study, I use the term ethno-religious group to emphasize both ethnic and religious identity, since both identities are often intermingled in Indonesia.[4] This study is supported by evidence from fieldwork in the region of Yogyakarta in Central Java, and in the city of Ambon in the Moluccas.

1.2 Research Issue

Exclusionary attitudes include various ethno-religious group attitudes, from prejudice (Jones, 1972; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Coendors et al., 2001; cf. Coenders et al., 2007: 217-244) to the rejection of equal treatment (Schuman et al., 1997) and discriminatory attitudes towards out-group members (Coenders et al., 2007: 217-244). Referring to Bogardus (1925a), contact avoidance is sociologically rooted in social distance. The concept refers to the grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy that are characterized in personal and social relations (Park, 1923 cf. Bogardus, 1925a; Wark and Galliher, 2007:389). Following Bogardus, this study defines avoidance of intergroup contact as the individual attitudes leading to the avoidance of religious out-group members as friends, classmates, board mates, neighbours and elected officials, as well as to an individual's preference to live in a separate area inhabited by people from the same religion.[5]

3 However, the actual competition analysed in this study is on the contextual level, where power struggles between ethno-religious groups take place in the political field, and are influenced by social structure and agency. In addition, the kinds of resources that I refer to in this study include economic, social, cultural and symbolic resources (Harker, 1990:13).

4 For example, Adenay-Risakotta (2005) dissertation describes that the identity of both Muslim and Christian groups in Northern Moluccas are still deeply based in connections to the land and rooted in local traditions (2004:349).

5 Board mates in this study refers to dormitory friends.

1.2.1 Intergroup contact avoidance as latent conflict

Exclusionary reactions have several dimensions, namely prejudice, anti-locution (gossip), contact avoidance, discrimination and physical attacks (Allport, 1958:15). Prejudice, for instance, can be described as a pattern of hostility directed against an entire group or against its individual members (Ackerman and Jahoda, 1950:4).[6] Contact avoidance, the exclusionary reaction focused on in this study, refers to how Bogardus calculates social distance, incorporating individual attitudes that support the avoidance of engaging with out-group members as spouses, close friends, neighbours, colleagues and fellow citizens (Bogardus, 1925b cf. Wark and Galliher, 2007; Hagendoorn, 1995:203). Nevertheless, contact avoidance has many links with other exclusionary reactions. Prejudice can develop as contact avoidance if it is driven by ethnocentrism, which is a combination of favourable attitudes toward in-group members and unfavourable attitudes toward out-group members (Adorno et al., 1950; Sumner, 1906/1959 cf. Coenders and Scheepers, 2003:313-343).[7] Also, ethnocentrism that contains prejudice can lead to contact avoidance (Coenders and Scheepers, ibid.).[8] Another factor related to contact avoidance is intergroup hostility, which can be stimulated by competition over scarce resources and by conflicts over values. Here, contact avoidance can be viewed as latent conflict because it is essentially rooted in prejudice, ethnocentrism and intergroup hostility, representing a dysfunctional aspect of the social structure. Most studies consider prejudice to be the result of intra-group processes that displace aggression from powerful, frustrated groups onto a powerless minority (Freud, 1930:114-115, Stroebe and Insko, 1989:3-37).

6 Prejudice is a product of situations, particularly historical and political situations; it does not solely present in individuals (Schermerhorn, 1970:6).

7 Prejudice is also commonly associated with a view that one's own group is the centre of everything, and all other groups are assessed with reference to it (Sumner 1906:27).

8 Prejudice may lead to hostility if prejudice is mainly based on stereotypes towards out-groups members (Eagly and Diekman, 2005:19). Ethnocentrism tends to create and preserve prejudice against out-group members (Cunningham et al., 2004:1333).

Contact avoidance can be observed in daily interactions. Semyonov et al., (2007:439) describes how individuals prefer to live in racially or ethnically homogenous environments because they want to avoid sharing residential space and interacting with out-group members in daily life. In his study, contact avoidance is rooted in ethnocentrism, which entails a combination of favourable attitudes toward in-group members and unfavourable attitudes toward out-group members. Similarly, Krysan and Farley's (2002:941) work on the relationship between residential segregation and ethnocentrism explains that an individual's motivation to live in residential segregation is to avoid out-group members, because they would experience prejudice and discrimination by the dominant group in an unsegregated area. Another study by Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996:903) says that ethnocentrism and intergroup hostility explains the preference to live in residential segregation. A study by Patchen et al. (1977: 55-75) on racial avoidance among students of a public school in Indianapolis (USA) describes how social avoidance is related to personal characteristics that consist of personal aggressiveness, individual racial attitudes and the racial attitudes of peers and family members.

Avoidance of intergroup contact may turn out to be an option to prevent the manifestation of violent conflict. Jacobson's research (1977:1012) into contact avoidance between black, white and Latino students in the United States shows that contact avoidance can function as a peaceful way of avoiding the implementation of policies of racial assimilation. Another study by Tabory (1993: 148) on contact avoidance between Jewish groups in Israel points out that avoidance works as an exit option or as a way to reduce hostility by cutting social interaction. Other studies point out, however, that contact avoidance also has the potential to incite communal violence (Deutsch and Coleman, 2000:143). Although the practices and attitudes of contact avoidance are not always in conflict (and sometimes function as an aspect of social cohesion), we look at intergroup contact avoidance as a dysfunction. Referring to Merton (1968:117), we argue that

contact avoidance has unrecognized and unintended consequences that can disturb social order.

1.2.2 Intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification

Ethno-religious identification refers to an individual's processes of social categorization, identification and contra-identification with certain groups, as well as how they situate themselves in the comparison between groups. On one hand, ethno-religious identification can be perceived as an individual's need to conserve their values and to search for complete knowledge (Allport, 1954:13-18). On the other hand, it refers to how individuals recognize their reference group and externalize their knowledge of inter-group relations (Berger, 1967:3-28; Durkheim, 1993:90-99).

Some theoretical propositions mention that in most cases ethno-religious identification is likely to induce some exclusionary attitudes. Weber (1978:342 cf. Vertigans, 2007:304) claims that certain ethno-religious groups employ their identities in an exclusionary manner to maintain and enhance their position in intergroup relations. Group identities are employed to exclude out-group members when the degree of identification with a group, or salience of social identity, is very high; both in-group and out-group compete intensively in the same field, and also compete when the dimensions of intergroup comparison are related to differences in intergroup status, and when out-group statuses are shaped by the particular comparative judgment (Turner,1999:6-34).

Here, I will summarize several arguments about how ethno-religious identification leads to contact avoidance at the individual level. First, individuals who possess strong religious identification tend to support exclusionary reactions because the extrinsic values of their religious convictions may contribute to creating intergroup bias (Allport, 1966:456).[9] In addition, some religious practices and doctrines of particularism are

9 This view is criticized by Harek (1987:6), who points out that some religious values are also intrinsically capable of creating prejudice against out-groups.

related to prejudicial attitudes towards minority groups (Scheepers et al., 2002a:242-265). Finally, Sanford (1969:220) argues that the acceptance of religion as an expression of submission to parental authority is a condition favourable to ethnocentrism, which in turn leads to contact avoidance.[10]

In terms of ethno-religious identification being related to both social avoidance and residential segregation, Tabory's study on the relationship between religious and non-religious Jews in Israel shows that religious identification leads to social avoidance and support for residential segregation (1993:160). He explains that ethno-religious groups live in closed communities to prevent their lifestyles from being impinged upon. Other research by Waterman and Kosmin (1988:79) on the residential patterns of Jews in London explains that the motivation to live in residential segregation is to maintain ethno-religious values and to live separately from the general population.

Contact avoidance and support for residential segregation also takes place in countries where ethno-religious identification is not very significant. Residential segregation is often associated with social separation, which is defined as non-participation in a social institution resulting from individual voluntary choices (Barry, 1998 cf. Postlewaite and Silverman, 2005:2). Clark's study on the behaviour of racial groups in the United States explains that racial avoidance plays an important role in the making of neighbourhoods (1992:451-466). Avoidance behaviour between racial groups can strengthen the already existing residential segregation. A study by Walter (1986:131-146) on Irish residential segregation points out that residential clustering of Irish-born people in Luton (England) is a product of a distinctive ethnic background (1986:144). Another study by Sanders (2002:328) shows that segregation can be explained by a group member's self-identification and the out-group acknowledgement of intergroup distinction. These conditions

10 The need to maintain a positive distinction between the in-group and the out-group may lead to attitudes that are in favour of the in-group and against the out-group. Prejudiced, intergroup conflict and stereotyping arises from the struggle to maintain positive social identity (Wolfe and Spencer, 1996:177).

tend to lead to limited interactions, ignorance about other group members, rising levels of prejudice and negative stereotypes against the out-group.[11] Based on these studies, I find that group identification, including ethno-religious identification, is likely to lead to contact avoidance or support for residential segregation. This study, therefore, focuses on the avoidance of intergroup contact in relation to ethno-religious identification.

1.2.3 Intergroup contact avoidance and group size

Actual competition and conflict is often related to relative group size.[12] We define majority or minority groups from the quantity of their members or followers that can be differentiated along ethnic or religious lines (Robertson, 2000:177). The positions of majority and minority groups in competition are related to differences in power and status. Power refers to social power, defined here as "*the degree of control that one group has over its own fate and that of out-groups*" (Jones 1972 cf. Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991:3), while status is defined as the relative positions of groups across valued dimensions of comparison (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:19). Differential access to power between ethnic groups is the most important determinant of ethnic discrimination and stratification[13] (Barth and Noel, 1972:345; Marger 1985; Schermerhorn, 1970 cf. Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991:2). In contrast, status distinction between groups is considered to be an implication of different levels of power in a stratified society.[14] However, in this study, I focus only on group size (between majority and minority) because we can use more

11 Racial and territorial segregation are not necessarily fundamental elements of ethnic boundaries, yet they are important when one or both of these elements of social organization play a role in the reconstruction of ethnic identity.

12 Competition is defined as a continuous and impersonal struggle between individuals or groups who are not necessarily in contact and communication. Meanwhile, conflict is competition that is personal and intermittent, between those who are in contact and communication (Park and Burgess, 1921:574-575 cf. Olzak, 1992:29).

13 Ethnocentrism, intergroup competition and differential power between groups serve as a basis for the prediction of ethnic stratification (Noel, 1968:157).

14 The creation of groups arises from the exercise of power through differentiation, stratification and constraint. Power contributes to the potential for conflict both as a field for ethnocentrism and as a basis for visible differences between groups (Mack, 1965:395).

empirical methods of measuring and identifying these categories based in quantitative observations, methods which are less applicable to assessing observations of power and status differences.

Minority groups are likely to avoid contact with majority groups due to being discriminated against by the majority. A study of Willmore (1997:1) points out that discrimination often leads to exclusionary reactions. If majority members discriminate against minority members, the discrimination will be internalized and institutionalized by the majority group. As a consequence, exclusionary reactions become inevitable. Another explanation is that differences in power and status between groups correspond with objective positions in fields of competition through which dominant groups control subordinated groups. The field is an arena of struggle, where both groups compete for the distribution of resources (Bourdieu, 1991:14). Power depends on the ownership of resources and influences objective positions (status). In this field, the dominant groups or the higher-status groups support discriminatory behaviour to exclude the subordinated groups or the lower-status groups (Bonacich, 1972; Cummings, 1980 cf. Semyonov et al., 2002:416). Here, contact avoidance and support for residential segregation can be viewed as a strategy to exclude the minority or the subordinated groups from competition and access to resources.

The following studies explain contact avoidance, the support of residential segregation and opposition to interethnic marriage between majority and minority groups. The work of Sean and Murdock (1998:489) on contact avoidance between the white majority and non-white minorities in American suburbs shows that the minority groups are concentrated in the more affordable suburban areas. Meanwhile, the white majority that has access to more resources tends to live in urban areas. Iceland and Wilkes (2006:268) describe how differences in socio-economic status leads to support for residential segregation in the United States, although the support for residential segregation is stronger among Asian and Hispanic

groups than among Anglo-American groups. Semyonov et al. (2007:448) also describe how support for residential segregation among Europeans tends to be more salient in countries where competition in the labour and housing markets are more intense.[15]

Another study by Tolsma et al. (2008:215-230) analyses ethnic competition and opposition to interethnic marriages in the Netherlands. They find that religious affiliation is a strong predictor for opposition to ethnically mixed marriages, more specifically to marriages of native Dutch people with Moroccans, Turks, or Surinamese (2008:227). Moreover, a deteriorating socio-economic status increases opposition to interethnic marriage. Competition between ethnic groups can develop into exclusionary attitudes and turn into opposition to heterogamous marriages. If ethnic competition results in antagonistic attitudes, economic competition and increases in the size of minority groups can lead to opposition to interethnic marriage. Another study by Shimahara (1983:109-130) explains that avoidance of interaction among students in high school is caused by racially-based residential segregation (1983:130). Differences in race are likely lead to the creation of neighbourhoods that are separated from the white majority with the racial status stratification being a stronger factor than class stratification.

1.2.4 Research setting

This research focuses on contact avoidance between ethno-religious groups in the cities of Yogyakarta in Java and Ambon in the Moluccas. Many ethno-religious groups inhabit both Ambon and Yogyakarta because the cities are centres of provincial government, education and economic activity. Previous research shows that Yogyakarta has always been a relatively harmonious

15 The relationship between group size and support for residential segregation also came to the attention of Pooley (1977:378-380). He explains that the socio-economic structure of migrant communities, their cultural cohesion and their experiences with urban life affects residential segregation between Irish, Scottish and Welsh inhabitants of Liverpool in England.

and peaceful city (Selosoemardjan, 1962:211-212; Sumartana et al., 1999:241). For example, at the beginning of the political reforms in 1998, demonstrations in Yogyakarta by students and community groups were peaceful, in contrast to demonstrations in many other cities in Indonesia. It also appears that Yogyakarta has low levels of contact avoidance between ethno-religious groups. However, fundamentalist and radical Islamic groups have recently become active in the city, which sooner or later might influence the existing situation (Fox, 2004:16-17; Umam, 2006:9-15). Ambon stands in sharp contrast to Yogyakarta. Communal violence and religious segregation between Muslim and Christian communities has been the order of the day since the colonial period (Chauvel, 1990:1-23; Yanuarti et al., 2005:82-85). Although contact avoidance is relatively strong in Ambon, there are nevertheless still spaces where both communities interact, such as at some markets and particular schools, and in public offices.

1.2.4.1 Yogyakarta

In this study, Yogyakarta refers to greater Yogyakarta, which consists of the city of Yogyakarta and the adjacent regencies of Sleman and Bantul.[16] Yogyakarta is located in the southern part of Central Java between Merapi volcano and the Indian Ocean.

16 Greater Yogyakarta is not an official administrative entity, but people usually mean this bigger area when they speak about Yogyakarta.

Map 1.1 *Yogyakarta Special Region*[17]

The city of Yogyakarta was originally the capital of the principality (*vorstenland*) with the same name that together with the principality of Surakarta was created by the Dutch in 1755 out of the remainder of the Mataram kingdom. Since Indonesia became independent, it is the provincial capital of the Yogyakarta Special Region (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*, *DIY*). Yogyakarta was also the capital of the Indonesian Republic between 1945 and 1949. Since that time, the ruling sultan combines his traditional position with that of the provincial governor. The present provincial governor is Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, a direct descendent of the first Sultan of Yogyakarta. During British colonial rule (1812-1816), part of the original principality was given to a son of the second wife of the first sultan, and that region is still headed by his descendants who bear the title *paku alam* (Selosoemardjan, 1962:12-14). Nowadays, *Paku Alam* IX occupies the position of vice-governor. Traditionally, the sultan is highly esteemed

17 Source: http://petapembelajaran.blogspot.nl/2012/01/provinsi-di-indonesia-bagian-2.html (accessed 23 September 2014).

by the people of Yogyakarta. He is widely accredited for the absence of violence in the area after the Dutch recognized Indonesian independence in 1949. Although progressive intellectual groups in Yogyakarta have recently criticized as undemocratic the appointment of these traditional leaders as governor and vice-governor as undemocratic, these complaints have not undermined the authority of the sultan. Despite the fact that the sultan's position has become politicized, he still knows how to bring together the different populations in the region and how to protect the region's minority groups.

In 2010, greater Yogyakarta had 2,393,240 inhabitants: 388,627 in Yogyakarta proper, 1,093,110 in Sleman and 911,503 in Bantul (BPS DIY, 2011:181). 90.72% of them were Muslims, while Protestants and Catholics made up respectively 3.23% and 5.75%. Hindus and Buddhists consisted of 0.17% and 0.10%. Compared with data from 1980, the percentage of Muslims has decreased slightly, dropping 2.54% (BPS DIY, 1981:48). In the same period, the percentage of Protestants and Catholics has increased slightly by 1.32% and 1.22% respectively (see table 1.1). Despite the fact that Christians are a minority in Yogyakarta, in terms of national religious demographics, they constituted the second largest local Christian community in Indonesia in 2010. Unfortunately, the religion of students in the city who originated from outside greater Yogyakarta is not included in the census, as those students are registered in their home areas. This implies that between one half to two-thirds of the total number of students (246,703) in Yogyakarta may not be included in the statistics above (Syamsuddin et al., 2004:3). The religious composition of the population in greater Yogyakarta differs slightly from the religious composition at the provincial and national level. At the provincial level, the 2010 census recorded 91.95% of the provincial population as Muslim, 2.73% as Protestants, 4.79% as Catholics, 0.15% as Hindus and 0.10% as Buddhists. At the national level, the population was composed of 87.18% Muslims, 6.96% Protestants, 2.91% Catholics, 1.69% Hindus and 0.72% Buddhists (BPS DIY, 2011:181).

Table 1.1 *Religious composition of greater Yogyakarta 1980 – 2010*

Religion	Year					
	1980		2000		2010	
	Number	**%**	**Number**	**%**	**Number**	**%**
Muslim	1,590,614	93.26	1,911,493	90.64	2,171,173	90.72
Protestant	32,670	1.91	66,450	3.15	77,223	3.23
Catholic	77,211	4.53	122,552	5.81	137,571	5.75
Hindu	2,299	0.13	4,333	0.20	4,061	0.17
Buddhist	1,940	0.11	3,951	0.19	2,419	0.10
	1,705,540	100.00	2,108,896	100.00	2,393,240	100.00

Sources: BPS DIY, 1981:48; 2001:184; 2011:181.

Yogyakarta has an even greater variety of ethnic groups. The first official census of 1930 shows that the population of the city (143,909) consisted of 88.38% Indonesians, 6.30% Chinese, 3.88% Europeans and 0.11% Other Asians (Department van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, 1931a:24). No information on the ethnic composition of the native population at the provincial level was included, but without a doubt, the greater part of Yogyakarta's population consisted of Javanese. Subsequent censuses conducted between the nation's independence and the year 2000 did not include ethnic categories. Only since the turn of the last century was the ethnic identity of inhabitants included in the census again. In 2010, the Javanese made up the majority (96.54%) of Yogyakarta, while the remaining population consisted of a great number of minorities that even when added together did not exceed more than 3.50% (see table 1.2). The 'main' ethnic minorities in the urban conglomerate were Sundanese, Malay, Chinese, Batak, Madurese, Minangkabau, Dayak, Papua, Balinese, as well as people from Nusa Tenggara Timur (Eastern Sunda Islands) and Lampung. Almost all the main ethnic groups of Indonesia are present in Yogyakarta, although their percentages differ substantially from the ethnic profile at the national level.[18]

18 In 2010, the seven biggest ethnic groups in Indonesia were the Javanese (40.22%), the Sundanese (15.5%), the Bataknese (3.58%), the tribes of Sulawesi (3.22%), the Madurese (3.03%), the Betawi (2.88%) and the Minangkabau (2.73%) (BPS, 2011a).

Table 1.2 *Ethnic composition of Yogyakarta Special Region in 2010*

No.	2010		
	Ethnic group	**Number**	**%**
1.	Javanese	3,331,355	96.54
2.	Sundanese	23,572	0.68
3.	Malay	15,430	0.45
4.	Chinese	11,545	0.33
5.	Batak	9,858	0.29
6.	Madurese	5,289	0.15
7.	Minangkabau	5,152	0.15
8.	East Nusa Tenggara	4,238	0.12
9.	Dayak	3,790	0.11
10.	Other south Sumatra	3,629	0.11
11.	Papua	3,567	0.10
12.	Balinese	3,495	0.10
13.	Others	29,924	0.87

Sources: BPS, 2011b: 34

Since independence, Yogyakarta has attracted a continuous stream of migrants. Between 1980 and 1990, the positive net yearly migration in the special region of Yogyakarta doubled from 25,923 people to 40,963 people (BPS, 2011c).[19] In 2005, the positive net migration reached 102,149 people. These numbers are in absolute terms higher than in other provinces of Java with the exception of West Java, as can be seen in table 1.3. In 2010, almost one third of the greater Yogyakarta population consisted of people born elsewhere: 44.07% in Yogyakarta city, 34.39% in Sleman and 21.67% in Bantul (BPS, 2011a).[20] Similar to the profile of the city's religious demography, the ethnic diversity of Yogyakarta's population is likely not fully represented by these numbers, as students who came from outside Yogyakarta were not counted in the census.

19 www.bps.go.id/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=12&notab=9 (accessed 22 October 2014). Census data from 1980 demonstrates that the majority of the migrants came from Central Java (48.5%) and Eastern Java (15%). Others were from Sumatra (11.3%), Bali and Nusa Tenggara (2.3%), Kalimantan (2.4%), Sulawesi (1.6%) and Moluccas and Papua (1.5%) (Nagib, 1986: 43).

20 *Sensus penduduk 2010*, Retrieved from http://sp2010.bps.go.id (accessed 22 October 2014)

Table 1.3 *Net migration in Java 1980-2005*

No.	Provinces	Net migration					
		1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005
1.	Yogyakarta Special Region	25,923	9,878	40,963	54,305	67,056	102,149
2.	Central Java	-724,541	-436,059	-774,941	-380,474	-663,290	-334,589
3.	East Java	-367,380	-170,446	-318,741	27,837	-343,071	-94,111
4.	Jakarta	384,037	285,264	-160,348	-228,503	-148,141	-159,411
5.	West Java	83,519	210,386	854.869	668,836	465,268	287,839

Source: BPS, 2011c.

The political situation

The present-day city of Yogyakarta is the administrative, political, economic and educational centre of the special region, with the same status as a province. All provincial branches of national governmental institutions are based in the city. Since independence, the sultan and *paku alam* hold the positions of governor and vice-governor, respectively. Until 2008, the occupation of these gubernatorial positions had never been under discussion. In that year, the national government proposed that these positions were no longer to be automatically granted to the ruling sultan and *paku alam*. This proposal was, however, not well received by the population of Yogyakarta at large. Only a few intellectuals from the University of Gadjah Mada (*Universitas Gadjah Mada, UGM*) and the Islamic University Student Association (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, *HMI*), supported the idea that the governor and vice-governor should be democratically elected. All religious organizations in the region, including *Muhammadiyah*, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and the Indonesian Communion of Churches (*Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia, PGI*) rejected this idea, because elections would separate the ruling sultan from the people of Yogyakarta. After four years of debate in the national parliament, the national government eventually enforced a law that strengthened the existing situation.[21]

As a part of the political decentralization that took place after President Soeharto stepped down in May 1998, since 1999 governors have shared their

21 See Law no. 13/2012 on the status of Yogyakarta Special Region, Chapter 18 verse 1.

power with a provincial parliament consisting of elected representatives of political parties. During the Soeharto regime, there were only three political parties: *Golkar*, the political machine of the regime (*Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar*), the Unity Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP*) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI*). From these parties, only *Golkar* and PPP still exist, and both now have to compete with many new political parties, including religion-based and nationalist parties which have been founded since political reform started. The most important new political parties represented in the provincial parliament are the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P*), which replaced the former PDI; the Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat,* the party of incumbent President SB Yudhoyono); the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanah Nasional, PAN*)*;* the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS*); and the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB*). *Golkar* and *Partai Demokrat* are nationalist-oriented parties, whereas the PDI-P is a nationalist-oriented populist party; that is to say, the latter is a nationalist party that explicitly aims to reach lower socio-economic groups with popular measures. The PDI-P promised for instance to allow pedicabs (*becaks*) to operate all over Jakarta, and campaigned for the distribution of land to landless people (Suryadinata, 2002:93). PKS, PAN and PKB are progressive Muslim parties. In the 2009 election in greater Yogyakarta, the PDI-P won 25% of the total number of parliamentary seats, while *Partai Demokrat* and PAN got 17% and 15%. *Golkar* and PKS got 12% each, and PPP and PKB 6% each. The remaining seats went to other, smaller parties (BPS DIY, 2012:48). The progressive Muslim parties have many supporters among pious Muslims.

The economic situation

Once predominantly a centre for agricultural distribution, over the years Yogyakarta has developed a fairly diversified economic centre. Although the city has no big factories, there are a huge number of small and medium-scale enterprises. Most of them operate in the trade, services and tourist sectors. In 2010, 31.86% of the city's population worked in the trade sector, 9.40% in manufacturing, 9.19% in hotels and restaurants, 7.31% in education, 4.49% in transportation, 3.34% in construction and 32.80% in other small sectors combined (BPS 2011a). Only in rural parts of the regencies surrounding the city, Sleman and Bantul, is agriculture still important. In the same year, the minimum wage in Yogyakarta was IDR 750,490 per month (BPS, 2010:26). The cost of living in Yogyakarta is considerably cheaper than in other Indonesian cities (Tambunan, 2006:4).[22] Although the standard of living has improved over the years, poverty and unemployment are high. In 2010, 13% of the population of greater Yogyakarta lived under the poverty line, with a monthly income per capita of IDR 224,258, and 10% of the working age population was unemployed (BPS 2011a).

In almost all economic sectors, a variety of ethnic groups are represented – although some sectors are dominated by members of one or two ethnic groups. The restaurant sector, for example, is dominated by Javanese, Minangkabau and Chinese. Security jobs are typically occupied by Javanese and people from East Nusa Tenggara. The food industry (in particular milk and bakeries), inter-regional transportation, cell-phones and computer shops are often owned by Chinese (Susanto, 2008:140). Street trade and home industries, such as furniture and batik production, are dominated by the Javanese (Brata, 2008:9). Since 2000, an increasing number of business activities have been established for Muslims only, such

22 Based on a survey on cost of living implemented by *Bank Indonesia* and *Universitas Pembangunan Nasional* (UPN), the National Development University, Veteran, quoted in *Radar Yogyakarta* (Radar Yogya, 26 September 2012).

as Islamic fashion, Islamic banking, halal foodstores and restaurants. Quite a few real estate businessmen try to attract Muslim customers only, and as in other cities in Indonesia, businesses that use religious symbols are booming in greater Yogyakarta.

The socio-cultural situation

Yogyakarta started to become an educational centre during the revolutionary period. In 1948, the first state university, Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), was founded on the premises of the palace (*kraton*) of the sultan. In 1958, it moved to its present location in Sleman. Nowadays, there are ten state and 120 private higher educational institutes in greater Yogyakarta. In 2009, 246,793 students studied in greater Yogyakarta; 74,707 at state and 172,086 at private higher educational institutes (BPS DIY, 2011:129,159). About one fifth of them (53,275 persons) studied in Yogyakarta City, the rest in Sleman and Bantul (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, 2011:48). A large number of students are member of religious student organizations, such as the Islamic University Students Association (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, *HMI*) or the Catholic Union of University Students of the Republic of Indonesia (*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, PMKRI*). Students, especially those coming from other regions, are sometimes also member of ethnic student organizations, such as the Organization of Aceh Students in Yogyakarta (*Taman Pelajar Aceh Yogyakarta, TPA*) and the Papua Association of School and University Students (*Ikatan Keluarga Pelajar dan Mahasiswa Papua, IKPM Papua*). In 1998, fundamentalist-oriented Muslim students founded the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Union (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI*). This organization has been influencing relations between students of different religions, although it is officially forbidden by the University council to operate on campus.

In recent years, ethnic and religious identities have become more salient among the student population. Before 1999, students from different ethno-

religious groups maintained tolerant relations with each other (Sumartana et al., 2009:241). Recently, however, students from different ethnic and religious groups have tended to avoid each other, which is not always that easy, as many of them take courses together and live together in private dormitories. As a matter of fact, many regional governments outside Java provide dormitories in Yogyakarta for students from their areas, although not enough to house all the students hailing from these regions (Mas'oed et al., 2001:126). Some regional dormitories have become so exclusive that people from other ethnic groups are afraid to visit them. According to Zudianto (2008:82), dorms have become places of people from one culture, instead of places of cultural interaction between ethnic groups. The wish to live among 'equals' is most prominent among fundamentalist Muslims and Chinese. Fundamentalist Muslim students prefer to live together in separate houses or dormitories to preserve their religious beliefs and traditions, while Chinese students prefer to do the same primarily for reasons of security. The lifestyles of both groups also differ drastically from other groups. For example, the fundamentalist Muslim students dress themselves according to the prescriptions of their religion and mix their Indonesian with Arabic terms in daily life. The Chinese students typically dress in Western style and use the common dialect of people living in Jakarta.

1.2.4.2 The City of Ambon

The city of Ambon is located on the Leitimor Peninsula, in the southern part of Ambon Island. Ambon Island, together with the adjacent Lease Islands of Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut, is the centre of the Moluccan Archipelago, which is more commonly known as the Spice Islands. The city originates from a settlement that existed outside the walls of a fortress founded by the Portuguese in 1576, after they were expelled from Ternate. After a series of attacks between 1600 and 1605 by Dutch forces (assisted by Ternatese, Javanese soldiers and people from Hitu), the Portuguese had to surrender the fortress to their European rivals (Knaap, 1991:105-

106; Ricklefs, 2008:27-30). The city of Ambon subsequently became the centre of the Dutch East Indies Company or the *Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC). After the VOC made Batavia the capital of its activities in the Indonesian archipelago in 1618, Ambon became the administrative centre of the Moluccas.[23] In 1866, Ambon became the seat of residence for Amboina, which consisted of the Central and Southeast Moluccas (from 1828 to 1949 it also included West Papua). During World War II, the city was bombed and occupied by the Japanese. After the recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949, the city became the provincial capital of the Moluccas. In 1999, the area was divided into two provinces: the North Moluccas with Ternate as the provincial capital, and the Moluccas proper, encompassing the central and southeastern part of the islands, with Ambon as the provincial capital.

Map 1.2 *the Island of Ambon*



Source: http://www.websitesrcg.com/ambon/maps.htm, accessed 29 September, 2014

23 The Moluccas at that time consisted of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan Jailolo, Seram, Ambon and Lease, Buru, Banda, Kei and other islands in Southeast Moluccas.

During the Portuguese period, people from Ambon and the neighbouring islands had settled outside the Portuguese fortress, which was called *Nossa Senhora da Anunciada (Our Lady of the Annunciation)*. After the Dutch took over the fortress, which they called *Victoria*, the population of the settlement gradually increased. In 1694, about 50% of the 5,487 inhabitants of the city consisted of people of Malay-Indonesian origin, mainly members of the Moluccan ethno-linguistic groups, while 25% of the inhabitants were Europeans and 15% were Chinese. Less than 5% of the Malay-Indonesians came from the island itself (Knaap, 1991:119). Due to the flourishing spice trade, the population grew steadily. In 1860, the city had 9,586 inhabitants: 81.30% Ambonese, 8.12% Europeans, 6.73% of other "Indonesian" origins and 3.85% Chinese and other Asians (Leirissa, 2000:625). After Ambon had become the administrative centre of the residence of Amboina, the population increased further. In 1930, the population of the city had 17,078 inhabitants: 78.11% Indonesians, 12% Europeans, 5.39% Chinese and 4.39% other Asians (Department van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, 1931b:26-48). Between 1971 and 2010, the population increased from 79,280 to 331,254, a growth of 318% (BPS Kota Ambon, 1984:19; BPS 2011a). During the religious violence that occurred between 1999 and 2004, between 108,000 to 129,000 inhabitants, approximately half of the population, left the city temporarily or permanently (Tomagola, 2007:1).

The continuous increase in the number of inhabitants of the city of Ambon was mainly the result of migration, both from inside and outside the Moluccas. In particular, after independence, the number of migrants from other Indonesian islands increased drastically. One stream of migrants consisted of the great number of Indonesian soldiers and policemen that were sent to Ambon during the Old Order (the Soekarno regime), the New Order (the Soeharto regime) and in recent years to prevent tensions and to quell unrest in the area. Spontaneous migration from South and Southeast Sulawesi, beginning in the 1970s, also accounted for the increase in the

migrant population. Many people from Java also migrated to the Moluccas, although they mainly opted to settle in northern Seram and Buru Island through government-organized transmigration projects. Some of these Javanese transmigrants, however, later moved to the city of Ambon. Between 1971 and 1990, the proportion of migrants from outside the Moluccas residing in the city of Ambon increased from 5.20% to about 30.00% of the population (ICG, 2002:1). From the beginning, the migrants in the city, mainly Buginese, Butonese and Makassarese (commonly called BBM), have dominated petty trade, the service sector (mainly small shops and restaurants), local transport (pedicabs and motorbike taxis) and, as labourers, building construction; Moluccans themselves dominated the wholesale business of agricultural products, the hotel and restaurant sector and the financial services. As we will see later, the continuous influx of migrants contributed heavily to the tensions and conflicts that have characterized the area in the last decade of the 20th century. In 1999, the pent-up tension exploded into large scale violence when a Christian Ambonese attacked a Muslim migrant. The fighting escalated into a huge religious conflict that spread across the whole of the Moluccan archipelago between 1999 and 2003.[24] At least 4,840 people died, 1,907 of them in the city of Ambon (Varshney et al., 2004:30-34). During these years, many migrants left the city permanently or temporarily. In the years after the unrest, the number of migrants in Ambon soon reached pre-conflict levels again. In 2010, migrants made up 34.05% of the city's population, more than ever

24 In 2011, Ambon again saw serious outbreaks of religious violence. The first incident erupted in September 2011, after a Muslim motorcycle driver died in a traffic accident in a Christian village. In riots following this accident, three people were killed and hundreds of houses were burned down. The second incident was in December 2011, after a Christian shuttle-bus driver was stabbed in a Muslim area. The troubles erupted only in the city and did not spread to rural areas, because many Muslims and Christians felt that these incidents were instigated by political elites. Apparently, military officers and political elites profited from the violence, which erupted before the 2011 mayoral election, and again before the 2013 gubernatorial election. For that reason, some people argue that these incidents were engineered to promote the idea that the governor-elect should be a figure with a military background. Others argue that the incidents cemented religious identifications among Muslims and Christians in order to influence the mayoral election (ICG, 2011:6-7).

before (BPS, 2011a). Many newly returned and new migrants found jobs in sectors that were previously dominated by Christian Moluccans.

The migration process after independence led to changes in the religious composition of the population of the Moluccas, as most migrants came from provinces that were mainly inhabited by Muslims, such as Southeast Sulawesi and South Sulawesi. For centuries Islam and Christianity have been the main religions practiced in the Moluccas. In 2010, the population of the province of the Moluccas (1,533,506) consisted of 50.61% Muslims, 41.40% Protestants and 7.90% Catholics. Muslims constituted the majority in the regencies of West Seram (*Seram Barat*) (60.31%), Central Moluccas (*Maluku Tengah,* including Central Seram, Banda, rural Ambon and the Lease Islands) (61.85%), East Seram (*Seram Timur*) (95.01%), Buru (84.85%), South Buru (*Buru Selatan*) (65.27) and in the city of Tual (74.91%). Protestants made up the majority in the city of Ambon (57.99%) and in the regencies of Aru (59.84%), West South East Moluccas (*Maluku Tenggara Barat*) (61.16%) and South West Moluccas (*Maluku Barat Daya*) (97.69%), while most Catholics lived in the regency of Southeast Moluccas (44.18%) (BPS, 2011a). On Ambon Island itself, most Muslims lived in the northern part of the Leihitu Peninsula, whereas most Protestants inhabited the southern part of the Leihitu Peninsula and the whole of the Leitimor Peninsula.

Table 1.4 *Religious composition of Ambon city in 1980, 2000 and 2010*

Religions	Years					
	1980		2000		2010	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Muslim	85,405	41.12	48,997	26.22	128,417	38.77
Protestant	114,383	55.07	131,936	70.59	192,105	57.99
Catholic	6,846	3.30	5,769	3.09	7,943	2.40
Hindu	356	0.17	121	3.06	435	0.13
Buddhist	144	0.07	70	0.04	120	0.04

Sources: BPS Provinsi Maluku, 2001; BPS 2011a*;* Sarluf and Umarella, 1983:14.

The religious composition of Ambon city differs from the religious composition of inhabitants at the provincial level. Of the 331,254 inhabitants of Ambon city in 2010, 38.77% were Muslims and 60.39% Christians (57.99% Protestant plus 2.40% Catholic) (BPS 2011a). In comparison with the religious composition of the city in the 1980s, the percentage of Protestants increased by 2.92%, while the percentage of Muslims and Catholics decreased by 2.35% and 0.90% respectively (see table 1.5). Due to the flight of huge numbers of Muslim migrants after the 1999-2004 conflict broke out, already in 2000 the number of Muslims had decreased drastically. However, by 2004, the number of Muslims living in the city had not only returned to previous levels, but began to exceed them. Between 1980 and 2010, the number of Muslims living in Ambon increased by 43,012 persons. In the same period, the number of Protestants increased by 77,722 persons. This figure is however misleading, as the greater part of the growth is the result of the inclusion of 25 Christian and four Muslim border *kampongs* (quarters) in the city of Ambon (BPS Kotamadya Ambon, 1984:13-15). This expansion of the city border to villages in Southern Leihitu and Leitimor Peninsula, which were mainly inhabited by Christians, was part of the national government's response to the rapid population growth and ongoing urbanization of the wider region of the city of Ambon.

The continuing process of migration to the Moluccas has led to a more varied ethnic population. Table 1.4 gives the ethnic composition of the population of the present province of Moluccas based on data from the 2010 census. The inhabitants of Ambon, Kei, Seram, Saparua, Aru and Yamdena are called the "children of the soil" (*anak negeri*) by the Moluccans themselves. Although they are recorded as distinct ethnic groups in the census, they are in fact closely related ethno-linguistic groups. The Javanese, Sundanese, Buginese, Butonese, Madurese and Minangkabau are members of ethnic groups from outside the Moluccas. In 2000, 83.47% of the provincial population consisted of *anak negeri* and 16.53% of the

population were migrants (Suryadinata et al., 2003: 28). In 2010, 75.00% of the provincial population were *anak negeri* and 25.00% were migrants, mainly from Sulawesi and Java.

Table 1.5 *Ethnic composition of the province of Moluccas in 2010*

No.	2010		
	Ethnic groups	**Number**	**%**
1.	Moluccans	1,127,148	74.95
2.	Other ethnic groups from Sulawesi	247,266	16.44
3.	Javanese	79,340	5.28
4.	Nusa Tenggara Timur	8,624	0.57
5.	Makassarese	6,414	0.43
6.	Chinese	4,556	0.30
7.	Sundanese	4,457	0.30
8.	Papua	3,751	0.25
9.	Foreigners	3,300	0.22
10.	Minahasa	2,867	0.19
11.	Buginese	2,549	0.17
12.	Bataknese	1,775	0.12
13.	Balinese	1,616	0.11
14.	Other ethnic groups from Kalimantan	1,418	0.09
15.	Minangkabau	1,358	0.09
16.	Others	7,374	0.49

Source: BPS, 2011b: 34.

The political situation

Since independence, politics in the Moluccas has always been influenced by religion. Christian parties such as the Love to the Nation Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, PDKB*) and the Catholic Party (*Partai Katolik*) have always defended the interests of their Christian supporters, while the Islamic parties such as PPP, the Crescent and Star Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang,* PBB), PKB, and PAN, furthered the interests of their

Muslim followers (Bertrand, 2002:66-69; Tomsa, 2009:4-6). In addition, secular political parties know that they must account for the interests of religious groups in order to please their followers and to attract voters. Both *Golkar*, PDI, PKP and PDI-P have taken into account the objectives of both Christian and Muslims. The political struggle aggravated along religious lines in Ambon after the violent conflict between 1999 and 2004. In the 1999 election for a city parliament, which took place six months after the violence broke out, the PDI-P won 52.45% of the votes, *Golkar* 19.45%, PPP 17.00% and PDKB 3.47% (Ratnawati, 2005:15). The remaining votes were distributed among six other parties. At the time of the election, Christian Ambonese constituted the majority in the city (60%), as many Muslim migrants had already left the city. By voting en masse for the PDI-P, Christians succeeded in defeating the ruling party *Golkar* which was dominated by Muslims (van Klinken, 2001:20-22).

The political situation changed after the 2009 city parliament election. In this election, no political party received a clear majority of votes. Some parties, such as PDI, PKP, PBB, PDKB and the Catholic Party were excluded, because the number of votes they received was lower than the national electoral threshold. To receive seats in the city parliament, this national threshold had to be met. PDI-P won the city parliament election again, but this time with only 20% of the votes. *Golkar* and *Partai Demokrat* got 19% and 11% of the votes respectively. PKS and PPP got 10% and 8% respectively, while a new nationalist party, the People's Conscience Party (*Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura*) got 8%, and a new Islamic party, the Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi, PBR*) got 6%. The remaining votes were distributed among the Great Indonesian Movement Party (*Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra*) (5%), the Democratic Nationhood Party (*Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan, PDK*) (4%), PAN (4%) and PDS (4%) (BPS Kota Ambon, 2011:32). Nationalist parties which were popular among both Christians and Muslims were *Golkar, Partai Demokrat, Hanura, Gerindra* and PDK. Together, they got more votes than parties popular only

among Muslims (PKS, PPP, PBR and PAN) and parties popular only among Christians (PDI-P and PDS).

To achieve a workable local government acceptable to both communities, one that would be able to overcome the tensions in the city, some parties with different religious orientations or religious followers formed temporary political coalitions. This strategy was used for the first time in the election campaigns for a governor in 2008 subsequently for a city mayor in 2011 (Pariela, 2007:107). To achieve their goals, parties or coalitions nominated a pair of candidates, one Muslim and one Christian, for the position of governor and vice-governor as well as for the position of mayor and vice-mayor. In 2008 the gubernatorial elections were won by a coalition of PDI-P, *Partai Demokrat*, PDK, PKB and PBB, defeating PKS (which collaborated with PAN), PPP (which allied with PDS, and *Golkar* which did not enter into a coalition.

In the mayoral and and vice-mayoral elections in 2011, a Christian candidate became the mayor and a Muslim candidate became the vice-mayor via the same strategy of coalition. The elected candidates were nominated by a coalition of *Golkar*, PPP, PBR, PDS and *Gerindra*. The defeated coalitions were *Partai Demokrat* (who collaborated with *Hanura*, PDK and PKPI), and PKS (who allied themselves with PAN and PBB). In this election, the PDI-P did not join a coalition.

In the gubernational elections of 2013, a Muslim and Christian nominated by a coalition of *Golkar*, PKS, PPP and PAN were elected as governor and vice-governor. In this gubernatorial election, *Hanura* allied with *Gerindra*, PBB, PBR and PKB. PDI-P and *Partai Demokrat* proposed candidates without entering a coalition.

Some parties also wanted to balance the number of Muslims and Christians working for the city administration, both with regard to the top officials and the lower echelons. In 2006, 84.07% of civil servants in the city administration were Protestants, while Muslims and Catholics comprised

14.48% and 1.30% respectively. These percentages do not reflect the city population; for example, Protestants comprised about 60% of the city's population in the same year, (Tomagola, 2007:27-28). No information on the religious affiliation of civil servants in 2011 can be found, but it is likely that Christians still comprised the majority. Of the top twenty-two city officials in 2012, only two were Muslims, and the rest were Christians. This question of accurate religious representation has extended to other areas; for example, allocation of the city budget for Muslim and Christian education is being sought.

In contrast to religious representation, ethnic representation had never been a point of discussion. 75.86% of the civil servants in the city were Moluccans from Ambon and the Lease Islands, and 15.76% consisted of people from West Seram, Buru and Southeast Moluccas Islands (Tomagola, 2007:27-28). 8.33% consisted of migrants from outside the province of the Moluccas (e.g. Sulawesi, North Moluccas and other islands).

The economic situation

The tensions between Muslims and Christians have also influenced economic spheres. Many business premises, such as shops and markets, were destroyed in the course of the conflict between 1999 and 2004. Prior to the conflict, Christians bought goods from Muslim traders at Pasar Mardika. However, during the conflict period, both groups visited temporary, religiously segregated markets. Muslims went to markets located at the back of Ambon Plaza and Pasar Mardika, whereas Christians went to markets at Batu Meja, Batu Gadjah and Belakang Soya. As the harbour is located in the Muslim area, food supplies like fish and vegetables were easily available to Muslims. These commodities were very expensive at Christian markets, however, because Christian traders were forced to buy them in secret and had to pay soldiers to accompany them for protection (Adam, 2008b:6-7). During the troubles in 2002, there was only one market, Pasar Mardika,

where both groups were engaged in economic transactions, but this place was destroyed by intergroup violence in the same year.

Many people lost their jobs in those turbulent years, and poverty increased. Muslims lost their jobs in areas numerically dominated by Christians, and Christians lost their jobs in areas numerically dominated by Muslims. Consequently, they became displaced in their own city and dependent on their savings, family support and on petty trade.

Despite the fact that the unemployment level was still high, the economy of Ambon began to redevelop when stability increased from 2004 onwards. Between 2003 and 2010, the monthly minimum wage increased from IDR 370,000 to IDR 840,000 (BI, 2004:271; 2010:174). The number of people living under the poverty line, identified by a monthly per capita income equal to or lower than IDR 305,245, decreased sharply from 29% in 2001 to around 8% in 2010. The percentage of unemployment declined in the same period from 31% to 16% (Pariela, 2007:105; TNP2K, 2011:7,9). Unemployment levels among the local Ambonese remained high, however, since migrants from outside the Moluccas that re-opened businesses rarely recruited local people. Since 2004, business has been growing mainly in Muslim dominated areas (e.g. Pasar Mardika, Ambon Plaza, Batu Merah, Jalan Baru and Silale-Waihaong). The original inhabitants of Ambon have been left behind in this renewed economic development. Recent migrants dominate the market and restrict opportunities for Ambonese businessmen. People from other islands in the Moluccas have migrated to the city in search of better jobs because their traditional work in agriculture and fishing in their places of origin is no longer profitable. Another factor contributing to high unemployment levels is that both domestic and foreign investments have decreased due to security concerns. In the past a lot of Ambonese depended to a great extent on government jobs and small-scale government-initiated projects with limited work potential. As a result, many Ambonese now work in informal sectors or are unemployed. While there is economic division along ethnic lines, religious distinctions

no longer matter for choice of profession. Since the 1999-2004 conflicts, Christians now work in sectors that were previously dominated by Muslims, such as transportation (pedicabs and motorcycle taxi drivers) and shop keeping. Entrepreneurship has increased among the Christian Ambonese, and medium-sized business activities have grown in Christian areas. Likewise, Muslim Ambonese and migrants also work in sectors that used to be dominated by Christians, such as education and government. However, both Muslims and Christians tend to work within their own religiously segregated areas, except for people who work in hotels, shops and offices in the city centre and on the borders of Muslim and Christian neighbourhoods. Although religious segregation is clearly visible in terms of work location, there is more religious diversification within economic sectors than before. In 2010, 26% of the city's inhabitants worked in the informal sector, 22% in trade, 12% in transportation and warehouses, 10% in the educational services sector, 7% in construction and 7% in agriculture and fishery (BPS, 2011a). Government jobs at the provincial level were shared equally between Muslims and Christians, while those at the city level were still dominated by Christian Ambonese. Religious segregation is still apparent in security industries, with the police force employing mostly Christians, and the military dominated by Muslims.

The socio-cultural situation

Although there have been tensions in the Moluccas between Muslims and Christians since the middle of the 16th century, until the end of last of the century, members of both groups lived relatively harmoniously side by side in villages and neighbourhoods. After the period of conflict in the beginning of the 21st century, daily interaction became distorted and the tendency to avoid members of other religious groups became stronger (Pariela, 2007:104; Yanuarti et al., 2005:82). In the city of Ambon, the conflicts led to the resettlement of a huge number of inhabitants. Increasingly, people

decided to live in quarters with people exclusively from their own religion.[25] Religiously segregated residential areas became the norm for the city, as was already common in the village structure for centuries (Chauvel, 1990:4-7). Muslims no longer wanted to stay in predominantly Christian areas, while Christians did not want to live in predominantly Muslim areas. Ambon city now consists of twenty urban villages and thirty rural villages. Only in two of these villages, Wayame and Suli Atas, do Muslims and Christians live together.[26] Both residential segregation and contact avoidance have aggravated rivalry and competition between Muslims and Christians.

Segregation between Muslims and Christians is not restricted to patterns of residence, or to the political and economic fields as described above. It is also visible in the field of education. Since the conflict, Muslims and Christians in the city try to avoid each other in educational institutions at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. Most schools and universities have been religiously segregated since 2004. Primary and secondary school pupils go to Protestant, Catholic or Muslim schools within their 'own' religious area, with the exception of a few public schools that attract pupils from different religions. Most Muslim students study at Muslim universities and higher educational institutes located in Muslim areas, such as the State Islamic Institute (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN*) and Darussalam University (*Universitas Darussalam, Unidar*). Christian students tend to study at Christian universities and higher educational institutes located in Christian areas such as the Indonesian Christian University in the Moluccas (*Universitas Kristen Indonesia di Maluku, UKIM*) or the Trinity Institute of Administrative Science (*Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Administrasi Trinitas, STIA*). Only at Pattimura University (*Universitas Pattimura, Unpatti*) and the

25 In 2008, 1,050,764 of the 1,200,000 inhabitants of the Moluccas lived in religiously segregated residential areas (Subair et al., 2008:186).

26 In several villages, such as Latta, Nania and Waiheru, inter-religious interactions still exist but the two groups live separately. This residential segregation led to personal differentiation of language. Before the conflict, the terms '*bung*' and '*usi*' were used for men and women regardless of religious identity. However, after the conflict, Muslim groups developed words such as *abang* (older man) and *caca* (older women) that indicated the referent's religious affiliation.

State Polytechnic School of Ambon (*Politeknik Negeri Ambon*) are both religious groups more or less equally represented.

In 2009, 33,980 students were registered in Ambon: 25,427 at the four state higher educational institutes and 8,553 at the five private higher educational institutes (BPS/Bappeda Provinsi Maluku, 2011:131-156). Many of these students participate in religious student organizations that were founded during the New Order, such as the Islamic University Students Association (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI*) and the Indonesian Christian Students Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, GMKI*). After the conflict ended in 2004, several ethnic student organizations were founded, such as the Students Association of Southeast Moluccas (*Ikatan Mahasiswa Maluku Tenggara, Immimalra)* and the Butonese Students Association (*Ikatan Pelajar dan Mahasiswa Buton, IPMB*). Most of these student organizations have connections with government officials and political parties. The student groups often use these contacts to defend their group interests, such as seeking to redress the imbalance of religious or ethnic representation within the university. In turn, government leaders and political parties use the students to further their own goals.

1.3 History of Yogyakarta and Ambon

In both Ambon and Yogyakarta, religious identities are more salient than ethnic identities, and attitudes that encourage individuals to avoid contact with members of other religious groups have intensified over the years. To understand this development better, it is necessary to pay attention to the main political, economic, religious and socio-cultural changes that took place in the past, and how they strengthened the significance of ethnicity and religion in daily life.

1.3.1 Yogyakarta

Political changes

Before the Dutch arrived in the Indonesian archipelago, the kings (*susuhunan*) of Mataram had almost absolute power in their territory, stretching from Cirebon in West Java to Madura in East Java. After 1705, the Mataram Kingdom started to shrink and the main parts of its territory fell to the Dutch. Due to internal disputes and conflicts among the nobility, the Dutch had to intervene in the internal affairs of the kingdom several times. As compensation for this interference, the kings had to cede portions of their territories to the Dutch, such as Cirebon and Madura in 1705, and the North Coast of Java and Eastern Java in 1743 (Ricklefs, 1974:39; 2008:105). In 1755, the remainder of the once powerful Mataram Kingdom was divided in the two principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta which were governed by the sultan and the *susuhunan*. Each new sultan in Yogyakarta or *susuhunan* in Surakarta entered into a contract with the Dutch. With every new signing of a contract, their authority was further restricted. In 1785, for example, the Sultan of Yogyakarta had to accept the presence of a Dutch Resident and Dutch troops to inhabit the newly built fort *Vredeburg* located near the palace (Suhatno, 2006:1-2; Marinhandono, 2008:16-17). Between 1755 and 1940, nine contracts between the ruling sultans and the Dutch were signed in this principality. Through this process, the sultanate lost, for example, the right to appoint high officials, to have an army and to grant amnesty (Selosoemardjan, 1962:14-15; Kurniadi, 2009:194). And as mentioned earlier in the chapter, at the beginning of the 19th century, part of the principality was given over to another descendent of the Mataram dynasty, who took the title of *paku alam*.

After the proclamation of Indonesia's independence by Soekarno and Hatta in August 1945, the Sultan and the *Paku Alam* immediately took the side of the new republic. Out of gratitude, President Soekarno granted Yogyakarta the status of a special territory, while the position of

governor and vice-governor were reserved for the sultan and the *paku alam*. Besides serving as a traditional ruler and the provincial governor, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX also became minister of defence in several cabinets during the Soekarno regime (1945-1965) from 1950 until 1953. During the Soeharto regime (1965-1998), the sultan even functioned as coordinating minister of economic affairs between 1966 and 1967, and as vice-president between 1973 and 1978. After he passed away in 1989, his eldest son succeeded to the position of sultan and the national government appointed *Paku Alam* VIII as the Governor's caretaker of Yogyakarta (he had previously held the title of vice-governor since 1945). After *Paku Alam* VIII died in 1998, Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, who later also became the provincial chairman of the political party Golkar, succeeded his father as governor, although the automatic conferral of this position shortly became discussion matter for debate in the provincial parliament and in national government circles. Under pressure from the people of Yogyakarta, this 'hereditary' right was respected. Initially, the national government did not appoint *Paku Alam* IX, the son of *Paku Alam* VIII, as vice-governor of Yogyakarta because there was apparently no legal basis that stipulated this position. In 2003, however, the position of vice-governor was reactivated by the provincial parliament, and *Paku Alam* IX was appointed as Vice-Governor of Yogyakarta.

Since the Indonesian population was given the right to vote, secular parties have received the majority of votes in the national elections, as well as in the special region of Yogyakarta. In the first national election in 1955, the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI*) got 26% of the votes in the special region of Yogyakarta. The Indonesian Nationalist Party (*Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI*) received 25%, and the Great Indonesia Movement (*Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerinda*) received 14%. The Islamic parties, *Masyumi* and *Nahdlatul Ulama* (*NU*), received 19% and 15% respectively (Luthfi and Soetarto, 2009:236). PKI attracted voters mostly from the nominal Muslims referred to as *abangan* (as nominal

Muslim were called)), while PNI and *Gerinda* attracted voters mainly from both the *abangan* and the higher grades of civil servant (*priyayi*). Masyumi and NU were particularly popular among the pious Muslims (known as *santri*) (van Bruinessen, 2002:141-144). Christian parties such as *Partai Katolik* and the Indonesian Christian Party (*Partai Kristen Indonesia, Parkindo*) did not get many votes in Yogyakarta.

During the New Order period between 1971 and 1998, only three political parties were allowed to run: *Golkar*, the political machine of the regime; the National Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP*), a union of Islamic parties; and the Indonesian Democracy Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI*), a union of Christian and nationalist parties. In all national elections held during the New Order, *Golkar* always received between 60% and 75% of the votes, numbers partially attributable to bribery and intimidation tactics (Suryadinata, 2002:32; Liddle and Mujani, 2007:834).

As described earlier in this chapter, after the process of political reform in 1998, several new political parties were founded. These parties were both nationalist (PDI-P and *Partai Demokrat*) and Islamic-based (PAN, PKS and PBB). In the 2004 local election in greater Yogyakarta, PDI-P won 32% of the votes, and PAN took 20%. *Golkar* and PKS received 14% of the votes each, while PKB and *Partai Demokrat* won 11% and 7% respectively (BPS DIY, 2008:48). Christians from different ethnic groups and many *abangan* supported the PDI-P, while many *santri* voted for the Islamic parties (PPP, PAN, PKS and PBB). A great number of *santri* and *abangan* also voted for nationalist parties, particularly *Partai Demokrat* and *Golkar* (Baswedan, 2004:672-675; Barton, 2010:133-135). One-fifth of the voters consisted of young people between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one. Several student organizations were affiliated with political parties and mobilized their followers to vote for alumni who had become candidates for parliament. For example, the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Union (KAMMI) affiliated with PKS, while the Islamic University Students

Association (HMI) sided with *Golkar* and *Partai Demokrat* (Machmudi, 2006:6-7; van Bruinessen, 2002:142). The Indonesian Christian Students Movement (GMKI) and the Indonesian National Students Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, GMNI*) worked together with PDI-P.

In short, religious orientations have influenced politics after independence through confessional political parties. These religiously affiliated political parties stress religious issues and regularly use religious language and symbols to attract voters. However, the degree of their political influence has varied between periods. Before the New Order, pious Muslims voted for *Masyumi* and NU, nominal Muslims voted for PKI and PNI, while Christians often voted for *Parkindo* or *Partai Katholik*. During the New Order, the government eliminated religious orientations from politics by restricting nationalist and Islamic parties. Nevertheless, religious orientation continued to influence political preference to a certain extent, in particular with PPP, which received most votes from Muslims, and with PDI, which found relatively strong support among Christians. After the fall of the New Order in 1998, Muslim votes tended to go to confessional parties such as PPP, PAN, PKS and PKB. Many pious Muslims living in rural areas traditionally supported PPP and PKB, while those living in urban areas predominantly voted for PAN and PKS. However, the influence of religious orientation gradually declined, as witnessed in elections held in the period between 1999 and 2009, although it still exists.

Economic changes

Until the beginning of the 20th century, the city of Yogyakarta was a court city, a city based around the royal court of the sultan. The court dependent on revenue from taxes in kind and labour from the peasant population. Peasants had to pay two-fifths of the rice harvests twice a year to so-called apanage holders, i.e. members of the royal family and court officials, and

one-fifth of the harvest yield to village heads. Both apanage-holders and village heads were given these rights to extract revenues by the sultan. In turn, the apanage holders had to give two-fifths of their share to the sultan or *paku alam* (Wasino, 2005:32; Margana, 2007:97). During the British Interregnum (1811-1816), the Land Rent System was introduced to the greater part of Java, but not to Yogyakarta and Surakarta. This system forced the population to pay annual monetary taxes to district collectors instead of paying a variety of levies and duties (Carey, 1986:76-80). In 1830 the Dutch introduced the Culture System, or *Cultuurstelsel*, in several regions of Java, forcing the population to cultivate products for export on one-fifth of their land. This system was not imposed in the principalities, but colonial interference in the agricultural system in Yogyakarta started about the same time, when lands given as prebends to apanage holders were leased to private entrepreneurs for the cultivation of crops such as coffee and indigo (Hugenholtz, 1986:142-143; Houben, 2002:66-67). The plantation holders obtained all the rights over these lands for a maximum period of 20 years (Selosoemardjan, 1962:33,262).[27] Thus, in Yogyakarta, peasants did not enter into contracts with the plantation holders themselves as they did elsewhere (Suhartono, 1986: 178). Plantation holders consisted of Europeans and Indo-Europeans; Chinese and other foreign Asians were not allowed to lease land. In 1918, the apanage system was abolished, and peasants in Yogyakarta were granted ownership of their lands (Selosoemardjan, 1962:34). Instead of taxes in kind or in labour, they were obliged to pay a poll tax and a land tax, which amounted to 10% of the harvest yield (Stock quoted in White, 2004:4).

As a result of the abolition of the apanage system, the cultivation of commercial products by peasants increased. Parallel with this development, Yogyakarta changed from being primarily a court city into a predominantly

27 Although the *apanage* holders had leased out their prebends since 1830, the colonial government only legally allowed the leasing system in Yogyakarta and Surakarta as of 1857. The maximum duration of the lease was expanded to 30 years in 1918 (Selosoemardjan, 1962:262-263).

commercial city. By 1920, it had become a relatively modern city with wide streets and Western-style buildings. On the border of the city, batik and other handicraft industries started to grow. In 1930, 163,397 people, about 9% of the population of the principality, worked in batik making, silversmithing and other home industries (Sitsen quoted in Haryono, 2009:104). The Javanese who owned and worked in these home industries and trades came mostly from villages inhabited by pious Muslims (Surjomiharjo, 2008:40). Among the owners of these kinds of business in Yogyakarta were also some Chinese.

Indeed, in this period the economic activities undertaken by the Chinese had become more diversified. After the founding of the city of Yogyakarta, Chinese inhabitants worked as heads of gambling houses, artisans, painters and carpenters. At the end of 19th century, they also worked as moneylenders, business brokers, tax farmers and rice traders (Bosma, 2007:73-94; Susanto, 2008:28-29). In the 1930s, many Chinese residents began to open hotels and restaurants, as well as drugstores, pawnshops and home-industries, and started to produce various kinds of food, drinks, household equipment and furniture (Susanto, 2008:48-49). At that time, the Chinese also dominated batik manufacturing. In 1939, however, the Javanese started to dominate this home industry, after they founded the Union of Native Batik Companies (*Persatuan Perusahaan Batik Bumiputera, PPBBP*). During the Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945, Chinese businesses were stymied because the new administration only supported Javanese businesses and organized them under the Progress of Indonesian Economy (*Kemajuan Ekonomi Indonesia, KEI*) scheme (Kwartanada, 2005:6-14).

After the Japanese occupation, economic development deteriorated, and this trend continued during the independence struggle between 1945 and 1949. When the Dutch recognized Indonesian independence in 1949, many people in Yogyakarta had lost their jobs and lived in poverty. The Indonesian government had little money to jumpstart the economy or

generate employment. Only batik production was subsidized by national government funds. Former aristocrat families ran batik and jewellery factories and profited from renting rooms to the increasing number of civil servants and migrants in the region. The Sultan himself tried to create employment opportunities by re-establishing the tobacco plantations, a sugar factory and a machine workshop that had been destroyed during the war. He also opened his palace to foreign tourists to increase provincial income (Dahles, 2001:62-64). Between 1955 and 1965, the national government launched several affirmative action programs for the development of native entrepreneurs, facilitating services for importing goods and providing access to low interest credit. Many small and medium-sized industries and cooperatives were established, but they did not develop well due to inefficiency and the interference of political interests (Selosoemardjan, 1962:240).[28]

During the New Order, tourism, manufacturing and the educational sector flourished. In the 1970s, Yogyakarta became the second top tourist destination in Indonesia after Bali, with the city's historical monuments, including temples and palaces, attracting an increasing number of domestic and foreign tourists. Tourism also influenced the local economy by driving the manufacture of souvenirs, the construction of new hotels and the development of other tourist services. In the same period, home industries such as weaving, batik, drying tobacco, printing and the production of wooden furniture grew (Kano, 1981:357). Moreover, by 1971, Yogyakarta was home to 22.5% of the state and private higher educational institutes in Indonesia, which was even higher than the percentage of educational institutions in Jakarta (12.5%). Newly founded universities and higher educational institutes attracted students from all over Indonesia, and local inhabitants as well as migrants opened businesses catering to the student population such as dormitories, restaurants and photocopying shops.

28 At the provincial level, the economy of Yogyakarta therefore was dependent on agriculture, mainly rice production. Peasants also cultivated sugar cane, maize, cassava, peanuts and soybeans (Selosoemardjan, 1962:240).

Since 1980, the sectors of construction, transportation and finance in the region developed as well. In short, between 1969 and 1997, the economy of Yogyakarta grew, diversified and flourished. After the economic crisis in 1997, the manufacturing industries declined, but trade and services increased.[29] Many labourers who worked in manufacturing industries lost their jobs and found new employment in the informal and service sectors (i.e. street trade and local transport)

Javanese, Chinese and migrant populations contributed in different ways to the economic development, and profited from it in varying degrees. Large-scale enterprises mostly belonged to the Chinese, while the Javanese and migrants from outside the region owned small and medium-sized enterprises. After 1965, the New Order regime gave more opportunities to Chinese-owned businesses. It gave the Chinese community a significant hand in the construction and transportation sectors. In the 1980s, the community expanded into businesses in computer assembly, food processing and medicine. The economic crisis at the end of the New Order did not prevent the Chinese from setting up and eventually dominating the information technology industry in the region. Tensions between Chinese and native entrepreneurs was avoided at the urging of the local government officials, who encouraged the Chinese community to help native-owned businesses. One impediment to the growth of Chinese-owned business is that since 1975, the government has prevented Chinese from owning land and opening businesses in and around the palace and Kota Gede (Susanto, 2008:67-70).

The role of migrants in the regional economy increased after the economic crisis in 1997, when people from surrounding provinces came to work in some of the city's informal sectors. In 2008, about 29% of the

29 The 1997 Asian economic crisis, however, changed the economic structure at the provincial level, facilitating the replacement of agricultural and manufacturing industries with trade and service industries. Between 1969 and 2010, the contribution of agriculture decreased from 38.9% to 17.19%, and manufacturing fell 20.60% to 13.28%. However, trade industries increased from 12.80% to 20.79%, and service industries from 8.50% to 17.04% (Hill and Mubyarto, 1978:30; Bank of Indonesia, 2011:11).

street vendors in Yogyakarta and Sleman were migrants from Central Java (Brata, 2008:9).

Religious changes

Islam was introduced to the Indonesian archipelago during the 12th and 13th centuries. In the 14th and 15th centuries, the religion spread gradually along the northern coast of Java. Muslim traders and Islamic preachers from the Middle East, Persia and coastal India played an important role in the spread of Islam (Geertz, 1968: 9-13; de Jonge, 1997: 94-95; Ricklefs, 2008: 3-8). From the 17th century on, Islam gained increasing followers in inland Java, particularly after the king of Mataram embraced Islam. Islamization occurred more rapidly in the last quarter of the 19th century, when contacts with the Arab world increased after the opening of the Suez Canal.

According to Geertz (1960:5-6), Muslims in Java can be divided into two categories: *santri*, devout Muslims who adhere to Islamic traditions, and *abangan,* nominal Muslims who practice a syncretic religious tradition consisting of elements from Islam, Hinduism and traditional indigenous beliefs. *Santri* were originally found among traders in urban areas, and *abangan* mainly among peasants in rural areas (Ibid:5-6). In contemporary society, however, *santri* can be found at all social levels, although they still dominate in urban areas. Some authors have criticized Geertz's depiction of the duality of Java's Muslim population. According to De Jonge (1993), the Indonesian Islamic community from the beginning has shown much more differentiation than this.[30]

At the beginning of the 20th century, two Muslim organizations were established that had a great influence on the religious and societal emancipation of the population of the Indonesian archipelago: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. NU was very popular in the countryside. In Yogyakarta, the villages of Krapyak (Bantul) and Mlangi (Sleman)

30 Islam is popular among the main ethnic groups in Indonesia, such as the Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Malay, Buginese and Makassarese.

remain traditional centres of NU-teachings. Both villages have several *pesantren* or Islamic boarding schools that attract many students every year, mainly from Central Java. Muhammadiyah, which tries to purify Islam of pre-Islamic influences and emphasizes prescribed ritual patterns, tends to flourish in urban areas (de Jonge, 1993:104). Muhammadiyah organizations supported Indonesian emancipation by founding hospitals, modern schools and orphanages (Fuad, 2002:133-135; van Bruinessen, 2004:5-11). In the course of time, in particular after independence, other Muslim organizations were founded, such as the Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII*) and the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI*). DDII focuses on improving the level of *dahwa* (preaching) by opening study centres, publishing books and sending students to Islamic schools in Middle Eastern countries. ICMI organizes Muslim scholars to drive economic empowerment and lead community-based education programs. In the last decade, Islamic communities (*Jama'ah*) that are more fundamentalist in orientation and that are connected to a global network of Muslims have also flourished in urban areas (van Bruinessen, 2003:11-15). These organizations and congregations have a large number of followers among the student population in Yogyakarta.

Christianity was introduced in the Indonesian archipelago by the Europeans. Portuguese missionaries started to spread Catholicism in the Moluccas at the beginning of the 16th century. The Dutch abrogated the proselytizing efforts of the Portuguese after they replaced them and introduced Protestantism in the same area. In Java, however, the Dutch only allowed Protestant and Catholic missionaries to spread their faiths from the beginning of the 19th century, although there were already quite a number of converts in the big cities.[31] Protestantism started to take hold

31 In line with the policy of Napoleon during the French occupation, Governor-general Daendels helped the Catholic missionaries by appointing them to the position of civil servants. Nuns from the Netherlands arrived in Java in 1856, and priests arrived in 1862. The first bishop was appointed in Batavia in 1842 (Muskens and Vriens, 1972:64).

in Central Java in the middle of the 19th century, and Catholicism at the end of the 19th century. In Yogyakarta and the surrounding environment, Protestantism was introduced in 1859, and Catholicism in 1865[32] (Vriens, 1972:51; Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:674). The intensive training of indigenous ministers in Central Java was a crucial factor in the initial spread of Protestantism between 1860 and 1870.[33] In the early 20th century, Jesuit missionaries who had already founded schools and churches in Muntilan also settled in Yogyakarta, and made the city a centre of their missionary activities in Java.[34] Christian converts were primarily made among the more syncretic *abangan*, and among the Chinese

Unlike the case with Islam, Christianity spread more systematically through missionary orders and organizations. The colonial administration also allowed missionary organizations to start education and healthcare programs in local communities. In 1936, Protestant and Catholic missions controlled 35% of the village schools in Yogyakarta; most of their students in that year were nominal Muslims (Steenbrink, 2007:393). The schools and hospitals run by missionaries could not be matched by Islamic organizations in terms of numbers and quality, but nevertheless, such activities increased the amount of Christian converts (Noer, 1973:22-24). Between 1930 and 1932, the number of Catholics grew from 10,000 to more than 30,000 (van Klinken, 1996:97). In the same period, the number of Protestants increased from 2,208 to 3,148 (Sumartana, 1991:105). From the beginning, the colonial government was not always pleased with missionary activity, as it caused friction with the Muslim population, and even stimulated Muslim fanatism (Hefner, 1993:99-100; Aritonang, 2004:84-85).

32 However, this religion was introduced to Yogyakarta people through the court photographer, Kassian Cephas (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:673).

33 For example, indigenous ministers such as *Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung* and *Sadrach Surapranata* in 1860-1870. Although Dutch missionaries tried to change local Christians into Dutch Christians, *Tunggul Wulung* resisted by educating his followers to become Javanese Christians. Meanwhile, *Sadrach* established the independent Christian communities in Bagelen (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:673).

34 In Yogyakarta, few Javanese converted to Christianity. The religion is popular among individuals from minority ethnic groups such as the Ambonese, Papuans, Timorese, Torajanese and Manadonese.

After independence, Indonesian priests and ministers gradually replaced their European colleagues. Between 1945 and 1949, some of the Protestant churches established by the Dutch split along ethnic lines, resulting in for example the Council of Chinese Christian Churches in Indonesia (*Dewan Gereja-Gereja Kristen Tionghoa, DGKT*) and the Protestant Evangelical Church in Timor (*Gereja Masehi Injili di Timor, GMIT*) (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:826-831). At the same time, Protestant missionaries from Germany and the United States of America introduced new denominations, such as the Indonesia Evangelical Communion (*Persekutuan Injili Indonesia, PII*) and the Union of Pentecostal Churches in Indonesia (*Persekutuan Gereja Pentakosta di Indonesia, PGPI*), (Ibid:867-868). In the early 1960s, the Catholic Church began to establish new dioceses and parishes in several cities in Indonesia. After the Indonesianization of Christian churches in the region, Indonesian churches continued to receive financial support from their fellow denominations in Europe and America from the 1960s on (Steenbrink, 2010:107-109).

After the coup d'état in 1965, the anti-communist Soeharto regime forced the population to choose one of the five approved monotheistic religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism.[35] This led tens of thousands of *abangan* and Chinese inhabitants to convert to Christianity (Aritonang, 2004:412-414; Mujiburrahman, 2006:28-29). Among the *abangan* were many PKI members who tried to protect themselves through conversion, while many of the Chinese who were oriented towards the Chinese homeland opted to convert to Christianity for similar reasons. Converting to Islam was not a popular option among the Chinese, because several Muslim groups cooperated with the Indonesian military in killing huge numbers of PKI members in 1965 and 1966 (Hefner, 1993:113-114; Bertrand, 2004:74-75). In some rural areas many *abangan* also converted to Christianity because missionaries provided them with basic services that

35 According to the resolution of the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara* (MPRS), the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, XVII/1966, every Indonesian citizen is obliged to embrace one of the religions recognized by the state.

government failed to provide, such as education and healthcare (Willis, 1977:159). As a result, on the national level, the total number of Christians in Indonesia increased from 2.80% in 1933, to 7.50% in 1971 (Ricklefs, 1993:294). These conversions also led to an expansion of Christianity in Yogyakarta, although part of this increase is also attributable to the increase of Christian students from outside Yogyakarta, inter-religious marriage and natural growth. Between 1974 and 2010, the number of Protestants and Catholics in Yogyakarta increased from 81,342 to 114,794 people (see table 1.1).

Cultural changes: a growing distance between Muslims and Christians

During the colonial period, political conflicts often had ethno-religious dimensions. The most telling example in Java before 1900 is the Java War that took place between 1825 and 1830, disrupting the whole of society. Muslim Javanese considered this war to be a symbol of their resistance against the Christian Dutch (Carey, 1984: 1-3). After the war ended, prejudicial relationships between the Dutch Christians and Muslim Javanese remained. On the one side, Muslim Javanese referred to the Dutch as infidels to indicate their hatred (Noer, 1973:21). On the other side, the Dutch perceived Islam to be a religion used by the Javanese to instigate rebellion (Arifianto, 2009:77). The prejudicial relationship became stronger at the end of the 19th century due to the missionary activities of Dutch missionaries and Muslim preachers. The Dutch supported missionaries in encouraging the spread of Christianity, hoping that the Christian Javanese would support the Dutch colonial state and consider the Dutch as their brothers (Ibid.). Muslims leaders responded by consolidating their religious teachings and founding a number of modern religious organizations, such as Muhammadiyah (1912) and NU (1926).

After independence, especially between 1950 and 1965, political conflicts between pious and nominal Muslims became more intense than those between Muslims and Christians. Political conflicts with religious

dimensions broke out in several provinces. The most visible conflict was the rebellion of armed groups that proclaimed the Indonesian Islamic State (*Negara Islam Indonesia, NII*) in the 1950s. In Yogyakarta, this rebellion found little or no support because Muslims in this region were strong supporters of the new Indonesian state proclaimed by Soekarno and Hatta. Another political conflict with religious dimensions in recent Indonesian history was the failed 1965 coup d'etat by a group of armed forces personnel who apparently conspired with leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

The Indonesian military used Muslim organizations to provide support for their anti-communist campaign in Java. As Yogyakarta was a stronghold of PKI, tensions between members of communist organizations and Muslim organizations frequently erupted in the city (Harnoko et al., 1966:43-44). Many members of the PKI were imprisoned or executed by the Indonesian military in 1965-66, with the implicit and sometimes explicit support of Muslim organizations. In 1966, the national government dissolved the PKI and forced all ethno-religious groups to live in harmony by imposing security measures.

In the first half of the New Order period, the government made extensive efforts, not always in a peaceful manner, to suppress religious and ethnic antagonism and unrest. In Yogyakarta, the sultan himself was heavily involved in promoting tolerance among religious and ethnic minorities and majorities in Yogyakarta. As a result, people from different religions and ethnicities lived together peacefully and engaged in a number of strategies to facilitate contacts. Tensions between Christian missionaries and Muslim organizations in greater Yogyakarta were largely resolved. In short, religious differences were seldom problematic in daily life during those years.

During the second half of the New Order period, however, the distance between Muslims and Christians gradually became wider. Between 1970 and 1990, the government marginalized Muslim organizations and appointed to

government positions more Christians and nominal Muslims than pious Muslims. The old Islamic parties were banned, and the new founded Islamic party, PPP, was controlled by the government and restricted in its activities. Muslim organizations restricted themselves almost completely to religious affairs, and as a result, Muslim society underwent a process of Islamisation or *santrinisasi* (Hefner, 1987:551). The distance between Muslims and Christians grew and harmonious relations between them gradually eroded as modernist Islamic beliefs spread in the region. For example, in 1980, the Religious Scholars Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI*) issued a decree that prohibited Muslims from mixing their beliefs and practices with those of non-Muslims (Steenbrink, 1998:331). This decree discouraged Muslims from attending Christian ceremonies, including funerals (Mujiburrahman, 2006:284). Islamisation also entered the university environment during this period. Several Islamic preaching institutes, called *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (LDK), were founded on campus in the 1980s. They organized common prayers and lectures on Islamic culture, and encouraged engagement with Islamic practices (Rahmat, 2003:23-24; Nashir, 2007 cf. Wahid et al., 2009:24).

In the 1990s, processes of Islamisation made inroads into government institutions, as the New Order regime courted the *santri* (pious Muslim) population for political support. President Soeharto appointed more *santri* to parliament and cabinets, and used the ICMI to channel his political interests.[36] The government also began to allow female Muslim students to wear veils in public schools (van Bruinessen, 2002:134-135; Bertrand, 2004:83-84). Several Islamic preaching centres that spread modernist Islamic beliefs were founded in Yogyakarta, and the LDK became more popular among Muslim students in state universities.

36 President Soeharto was prone to accommodating those who joined the Indonesian Muslim Scholar Association (ICMI). The DDII, ICMI and other Muslim organizations such as HMI supported the regime, while traditional Muslim and Christian organizations remained silent.

Despite the fact that religious differences were becoming more apparent in Yogyakarta, efforts were made to maintain religious harmony through the establishment of religious-based NGOs and other groups. Organizations like Interfaith Dialogue or interfidei (*Dialog Antar Iman*, *DIAN*) and the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies *(Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial, LKiS)* were created to address the state of inter-religious relations.[37] The potential of such initiatives was realized when religious violence broke out between Muslims and Christians in Surabaya, Tasikmalaya and Situbondo in 1996, violence which heightened tensions in Yogyakarta as well. Religious leaders in Yogyakarta immediately implemented a program of interfaith dialogue, including discussions on sensitive topics such as church burnings and missionary activities in Muslim communities. In 1997, as a follow up to the dialogue, they established the Forum of the Brotherhood of Faithful People (*Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman, FPUB*).

In the last twenty years, Muslims have become more aware of their religious identity than ever before, and as a result, the distance between Muslims and Christians has become greater. After the political reforms in 1998, the Islamic Brotherhood Forum (*Forum Ukhuwah lslamiyah, FUI*) was founded by Muslims in Yogyakarta to coordinate local Islamic organizations. Apart from the coordination of preaching activities, the FUI also tried to prevent Muslim pupils from studying in Christian schools, and campaigned against pornography and drug use.[38] Muslim organizations knew how to thwart the activities of Christian missionaries in *abangan*

37 In 1992, on the initiative of some Christians, DIAN *Interfidei*, an institute for interfaith dialogue, was founded to create religious harmony and to develop an open and democratic society (Steenbrink, 1988:334, Mujiburrahman, 2006:284). Moreover, on the initiative of some Muslims, LKIS was established to develop tolerant and democratic Islamic ideas (Masóed, et al., 2001:131).

38 *Aliansi Pemuda Islam* (API) Yogyakarta or The Islamic Youth Alliance, *Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia* (MMI), KAMMI, *Gema Pembebasan* and others supported the FUI demonstrations. They also supported the 2003 law on education, which provided students with courses according to their individual religious identifications (Subhan, 2007:110-115).

communities. For example, they founded mosques and Islamic boarding schools in areas close to where Christian missionaries worked. In state universities, new Muslim groups affiliated with international organizations such as *Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizbut Tahrir* and *Salafi* groupings were popular among students, in part because these were facilitated and supported by the LDK. These groups sparked discussion of religious values and norms on campuses, and criticized the government for ignoring religious values (Sidqi, 2008:57). A large number of students joined these groups because the older Islamic student organizations (HMI, IMM and PMII) were perceived as only being concerned with seeking access to power (Machmudi, 2006:112). In daily life, these students created distance between Christians and Muslims outside of their groups by wearing specific Muslim dress, living in exclusive houses and avoiding interaction.

As well as a growing distance between Muslims and Christians, another effect in Yogyakarta of the political reforms was the founding in the year 2000 of some militant Muslim organizations. These groups were the Jihad Force (*Laskar Jihad*) and the Indonesian Mujahiddin Assembly (*Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia, MMI*). Unlike other Muslim organizations, these groups sent thousands of militants to fight against Christians in Ambon and Poso between 2000 and 2002. Also, both groups demanded the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia (Hasan, 2002:145-146). After the religious conflict in both cities ended in 2002, the *Laskar Jihad* was dissolved by its leader, while the MMI still exists but is not very active. A militant group based in Jakarta, the Islam Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam, FPI*) opened a branch in Yogyakarta a few years after the decline of the *Laskar Jihad* and the MMI in Yogyakarta. This group is known for its anti-vice raids against bars, casinos and gambling businesses. In 2012, some members of *Laskar Jihad* even attacked the office of the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (*LKiS)*, which was conducting a discussion with an American liberal feminist. With actions like these, this group disturbs the harmonious relationship between Muslims and Christians in this region.

Christians also acknowledge the growth of some fundamentalist oriented groups, of charismatic denominations, which have operated in increasingly exclusive ways. These groups reportedly adopted the same techniques used by fundamentalist Muslims to promote their beliefs in urban areas (van Bruinessen, 2003:17-19). Although a charismatic Christian denomination had already founded a branch in Yogyakarta by 1980, its membership only increased (slowly) after the political reforms of 1998. In 2004, its church in Yogyakarta claimed to have around 2,500 members (Koning, 2011:26). Many Chinese professionals in particular converted to charismatic Christianity, as they feel threatened by the increase in numbers of fundamentalist Muslims. But with the growing popularity of charismatic Christianity, Muslims regularly force their churches to close, sometimes because of seemingly superficial reasons, such as the complaint that the services are too noisy (Koning and Dahles, 2009:14-27). Although the number of charismatic churches has increased, they are nevertheless relatively few in number and small in size compared with mainstream Christian denominations such as the Javanese Christian Church (*Gereja Kristen Jawa, GKJ*) and the Indonesian Christian Church (*Gereja Kristen Indonesia*, *GKI*). This explains why there have not been significant conflicts between Muslims and charismatic Christians in Yogyakarta.

Nowadays, some Christians feel obliged to display their religious identity in daily life, e.g. by wearing religious symbols or by praying in public, in response to growing Islamisation. In social media forums, they have expressed their critical opinions about violence conducted by Muslim militias. They seldom take resort to violence to defend their Christian identity. There are only occasional instances in which Christian groups are involved in violent Incidents in Yogyakarta – in 2007, for example when Christian students from Eastern Indonesia interfered in problems between local Christians and villagers.[39]

39 See "Mahasiswa Papua dan Warga Yogyakarta Bentrok." Tempointeraktif, 9 June 2007, http://r.infoanda.com/?lh=BF1TBwAFUVMD (accessed on 22 October 2014).

1.3.2 Ambon

Political changes

Upon the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indonesian archipelago, four sultanates competed for power in the Northern Moluccas: Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo. Halmahera and the Western coast of Papua fell under Tidore's influence, while Ambon and the adjacent islands in the Central Moluccas fell within Ternate's sphere of influence. However, the interference in local affairs in Ambon was minimal. The *negeri* or village, the main political unit on the island, had a relatively high degree of autonomy. It was governed by a *raja* or village head who was assisted by the council of elders (*saniri*) and the heads of the clan (*kepala soa*). The villages in Ambon belonged either to the Wemale tribe or the Alune tribe. Villages belonging to the Wemale tribe entered into associations, called *ulilima*, while villages of the Alune tribe formed associations called *ulisiwa* (Cooley, 1962:13-18). The *ulilima* were associations of five villages; the *ulisiwa* were associations of nine villages. Villages in the northern part of Leihitu Peninsula on Ambon belonged to the *ulilima*, and villages in the southern part of the island belonged to the *ulisiwa*. In the southern Leitimor, all villages were part of the *ulisiwa*.

When the Portuguese arrived in 1512, the Sultan of Ternate welcomed them as political allies, and agreed to an exclusive trading alliance with the Portuguese. The Portuguese helped the sultan to defeat his rivals in the archipelago, which gave Ternate the opportunity to extend its political influence to northern Sulawesi, the southern Philippines and the central Moluccas (Abdurrachman et al., 1973:58). However, in the middle of 16th century, hostilities between the Portuguese and Ternate broke out as the Portuguese behaved arrogantly and looked down on Muslims. In 1575, after four years of skirmishes, the Portuguese were forced to surrender their fortress in Ternate and relocate their operations to the city of Ambon (Nanulaitta 1966:18; Widjojo, 2007:13).

After their arrival in the Moluccas, Portuguese ships often landed for replenishing in Hitu before continuing their journey to Banda or Ternate. In the beginning, the Portugese had good relationships with the Hituese, but for reasons similar to their later (and previously mentioned) expulsion from Ternate, in 1524 their ships were forced to land on the southeastern coast of Leihitu. The *ulisiwa* villagers on the southern coast welcomed the Portuguese as new trading partners and saw them as protectors in their already fierce rivalry with the Hituese. After the Portuguese introduced Catholicism in this area, conflicts between villages in the north and the south of Ambon developed into religious hostilities. Muslim *ulilima* villages under the kingdom of Tanah Hitu, which was founded in 1470, allied with Ternate, while Christian *ulisiwa* villages allied with the Portuguese. At the end of the 16th century, the Hituese, assisted by soldiers from Ternate, Java and Makassar, and later by Dutch troops, attacked the Portuguese and their Christian allies (Widjojo, 2007:11-12).

After the Portuguese surrendered to the Dutch in 1605, Christian villages in Ambon and Lease came under control of the Dutch East India Company, known as the VOC (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*), while Muslim villages stayed within the influence of Ternate through the installation of a governor in Hoamoal. In 1605 and 1607, the VOC entered into contracts with the Muslim rulers of Hitu, Banda and Ternate, stipulating that they had to sell their spices to the company at a fixed price. However, in 1620, the Governor of Ternate and the Muslim rulers of Banda and Hitu no longer felt obliged to honour this contract, because the market price of spices had increased (Widjojo, 2008:23-29). To enforce the trade monopoly, between 1621 and 1651 the VOC sent troops to conquer Banda, Hitu and Hoamoal (Bartels, 1978:115-123, Ricklefs, 1981:59-61). After the company had control over the area, it tried to monopolize both the trade and the production of spices.[40] The Ambonese village heads were forced

40 In 1621, almost the entire population of Banda was brutally killed by VOC troops. Of around 3,000 inhabitants, only 150 people were spared and moved to the Kei archipelago. Europeans, foreign Asians and their slaves were then assigned by the company to cultivate nutmeg and mace on Banda.

to mobilize villagers for cultivating cloves on the island and for rowing the VOC-vessels of the *hongi-tochten*, military expeditions conducted to destroy cultivation of cloves outside Ambon (Cooley, 1962:83-90; van Fraassen, 1983:18; Chauvel, 1990:8).[41]

After the Dutch colonial state was established in 1800, the Netherland's monopoly over spices, including the use of compulsory labour, continued. During the British Interregnum (1810-1816), however, the Resident in Ambon ended compulsory labour in clove production and rowing services. When, the Dutch re-established control in 1817 and wanted to reintroduce forced labour, a rebellion broke out in the Lease Islands (van Fraassen, 1983:32-33). After the Dutch regained power on the islands in 1824, they reformed the insular colonial administration, including the nature of the relationship between the village heads and the villagers. The village head was considered to be a representative of the Dutch colonial state at the local level. His role became the enforcement of Dutch instructions, rather than facilitating the aspirations of his subjects. The Dutch depended on village heads to keep social order in Muslim villages especially, since there were no Dutch institutions such as churches and schools as there were in Christian villages. After the abolition of the spice monopoly in 1864, the village heads were assigned to collect taxes, arrange compulsory workers and enforce law and order (Chauvel, 1990:8).[42]

During the Dutch colonial state's rule, the distance between Muslim and Christian Ambonese became wider as result of issues of citizenship and recruitment of civil servants. The Dutch divided the Moluccans into villagers and citizens (*burgers*); citizens received certain privileges, such as exemption from compulsory labour. Villagers could obtain the status of citizen by entering into professional jobs that were useful for the Dutch,

41 As compensation, village heads received 4% of the sales from their villages (Braithwaite and Dunn, 2010:148). Villagers were not allowed by the VOC to leave their villages, as they had to work for clove production and rowing services. The only opportunity for leaving was to work as soldiers for the company (van Fraassen, 1983:17-19).

42 In 1920 these compulsory services were replaced by tax payments to the government (Chauvel, 1990:11).

such as civil servant, soldier, carpenter and boatman. In the middle of 19th century, the number of citizens in Christian villages was far greater than the number in Muslim villages in Ambon and the Lease Islands. In 1868, 42% of Ambonese in the city of Ambon (19,116) and 25% of those in Saparua (11,436) were considered to be citizens (Leirissa,1995:4). The Dutch favoured Christian Ambonese because they did not trust the Muslim Ambonese. In their turn, Muslims were reluctant to work for the colonial government because of concerns about being converted to Protestantism.

The Dutch also needed soldiers and civil servants for other areas in the colony. A substantial part of this labour force was recruited in Ambon, mainly from among the Christian Ambonese. According to Sidel (1999:12), in 1930 or thereabouts, around 16% of the Christian Ambonese lived in better circumstances outside their home island.[43]

Between 1920 and 1942, the rise of nationalist political parties promoting ideas of political and economic reform threatened the position of the colonial government and its accomplices, such as the village heads. Educated Ambonese returning from Java founded the *Nationale Indische Party* and the Association of Ambonese (*Serikat Ambon*). Both political parties opened branches in the villages and made an effort to reform village political structures. With the establishment of these new political parties, village heads were pressured into furthering the interest of their villagers instead of those of the Dutch (Chauvel, 1990:88-94). In those days, opposition against the village heads was stronger in Christian areas than in Muslim areas, because Protestant ministers, teachers and educated people followed the call for political reform and did not refrain from challenging the village power structures (Chauvel, 1990:99-100). In particular, the succession of village heads by family members often created tensions

43 For reasons such as this, the Christian Ambonese identified themselves with the Dutch. In contrast, more Muslim Ambonese left the Moluccas for pilgrimage activities, trading, or shipping. Their interactions with their fellow Muslims created a strong Muslim identity and helped form the Indonesian identity during the period of colonization (Chauvel, 1980: 53, Sidel, 2008:36-38).

between villagers and village heads' families Despite this pressure, the village heads, following government officials, still supported the colonial system (van Fraassen, 1983:36-37). And when the Dutch granted village heads the right to ban political parties in 1934, they were better able to secure their autonomous positions in their villages.

When Indonesia declared independence in 1945, the Ambonese were divided along political and religious lines. People who benefitted from colonialization, such as the village heads, government officials and soldiers of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (*Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger*, *KNIL*), had supported the Dutch. In contrast, most of the Muslim villagers had apparently supported Indonesia's independence (Chauvel, 1990:211-214). Many Christian Ambonese however resisted the Indonesian state because they believed that the Javanese and the Muslims, who were considered inferior in Ambon, would dominate the new nation and usurp their privileges in government (Bertrand, 2002:62-63; Ricklefs, 2008:270). In contrast, most Muslim Ambonese considered that independence would pave their way to further emancipation in the archipelago. In 1949, the Dutch officially recognized the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS*). The Moluccas became part of the East Indonesian State (*Negara Indonesia Timur, NIT*). In 1950, the RIS was dissolved and replaced by the Republic of Indonesia, a unitary state in which the Moluccas became a province, called Maluku. However, former KNIL troops stationed in Ambon rejected this unitary state, and fought for an independent Republic of the Southern Moluccas (*Republik Maluku Selatan,* RMS), which was proclaimed by former government officials of NIT in the city of Ambon (Bartels, 1978:11, Chauvel, 1990:355-358). To consolidate their positions, former KNIL troops attacked several villages with Muslim populations that had supported the integration with the Indonesian state. Even today, Muslim Ambonese have never forgotten these attacks, and remain deeply suspicious of the Christian Ambonese, whom they consider to be supporters of the RMS (Bohm, 2006:15-16; Azra, 2008:116).

Although the rebellion was defeated the same year by the Indonesian military, Christian Ambonese still succeeded in securing positions in administrative and educational institutions in the Moluccas because of their higher levels of education as well as other privileges they had received during the Dutch period. In the 1955 national election, the Indonesian Christian Party *(Partai Kristen Indonesia, Parkindo)* got 49.36% of the votes in the city of Ambon, defeating *Masyumi*, an Islamic political party, and the Indonesian Nationalist Party *(Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI),* which got 24.10% and 7.89% of the votes respectively (van Klinken, 2006:141). The appointment of representatives from political parties in the city parliament in 1957 was based on the local results of the 1955 national election. Christian Ambonese dominated the city parliament through *Parkindo* between 1957 and 1971.

During the six national elections between 1971 and 1997, *Golkar* dominated in Ambon as elsewhere in Indonesia, winning between 67% and 75% of the votes, while the rest of the votes were divided between PPP and PDI (Bertrand, 2002:63-64). During the New Order, the national government appointed all governors and city mayors; the positions were mostly taken by military officers. In the Moluccas, the position of governor was generally given to a (Javanese) Muslim, while the position of mayor of Ambon city went to a Christian Ambonese. However, ethno-religious divisions were not as salient during this period, because the government suppressed religious tensions. Only in the 1990s did religious divisions become an important issue. When President Soeharto started to use the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (ICMI) to channel his political interests, the growing influence of ICMI in national politics also extended to local politics in the Moluccas. Christian Ambonese felt that their domination over local government was threatened (ICG, 2000:3). In 1992, the national government appointed Akib Latuconsina, a chairperson of Moluccan branch of the ICMI, as governor. He was the first Muslim to occupy this position, and the first Ambonese governor in twenty-four

years, as most of the previous governors had been Javanese (van Klinken, 2001:18). The new governor decided not to reappoint the mayor of Ambon, a Catholic Javanese, because 90% of the employees he hired were Protestants (Bertrand, 2002:69).

The political reforms of 1998 created anxiety among Muslims and Christians. Both sides believed that the others would break the law (van Klinken, 2005:87; 2007:94). Six months before the national election in 1999, communal violence erupted in the city. Both groups of believers made use of their religious symbols to justify their aggression against members of the religious out-group. People also clearly identified with their religions for reasons of safety (Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009:58-59). The violence stopped temporarily during the election in June, but flared up again in the year 2000, due to the presence of militant Muslim groups like *Laskar Jihad* and *Majelis Mujahidin*. The incidents that took place were responsible for 4,840 deaths in the Moluccas, including 1,907 deaths in Ambon (Varshney et al., 2004:30,34). In 2002, Muslim and Christian leaders signed a peace agreement but the communal violence did not come to a halt until 2004.

After the violent conflicts came to a halt, both groups hesitantly took steps to reconcile with members of other religions. Over time the capacity to distinguish between religious values and political interests increased. When violence erupted again in 2011, fewer Muslims and Christians supported it, considering it to be politically engineered violence. Although both sides now live in religiously segregated neighbourhoods, they seem to have realized that further communal fighting will only cause suffering. Both religious groups work together now in gubernatorial and mayoral elections. Christian candidates for governor or mayor will appoint Muslims as their candidates for vice-governor or vice-mayor, and vice versa. Another example of reconciliation is the establishment of organizations, often initiated by students from middle-class backgrounds, consisting of Muslim and Christian members campaigning for peace and mutual understanding. The most popular student-based organizations which directly or indirectly

contribute to mutual understanding are *Kopi Badati,* communities of photography and music groups.

Economic changes

Before the 16th century, on the islands of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, Halmahera, Moti and Makian cloves were cultivated, while the Banda Islands in the Southern Moluccas produced nutmeg and mace. However, only Ternate and the Banda Islands served as centres of the spice trade. Between the 13th and 15th centuries, it was mainly Javanese, Makassarese, Chinese and Arabic traders who bought spices in Ternate and Banda (Andaya, 1993:110-112). They exchanged the spices for clothes, porcelain, metals and other commodities (van Fraassen, 1983:1-2). In those days, Ambon and the Lease Islands were peripheral areas compared to Ternate and Banda. After the founding of a Portuguese fort in Ternate 1523, Javanese, Makassarese, Arab and Chinese traders were forbidden by the Sultan to buy spices in the North Moluccas. He granted a trade monopoly to the Portuguese, as they supported him in dominating the North Moluccas, so that they were the only group allowed to purchase cloves in Ternate. In response, the people of Hitu in Ambon and of the Hoamoal Peninsula in Ceram started to cultivate cloves, which were sold to Asian traders. When the Portuguese moved to their new base in Ambon in 1575, they asked the Christian Ambonese to cultivate cloves in the Leitimor Peninsula and on the Lease Islands, but without much success (van Fraassen, 1983:6-9).

As mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the 17th century, the VOC monopolized the spice trade through contracts (including price agreements) with the Muslim rulers of Ternate, Banda and Hitu. The Moluccan inhabitants now had to sell their spices to the VOC, and to buy their commodities from the company. However, when the market prices increased and the contracts were not adjusted, producers tried to circumvent these agreements. The same happened when the VOC was unable to provide commodities, such

as textiles, porcelain and rice. When the Muslim rulers of Banda, Hitu and Hoamoal broke their contracts, it led to a series of wars with the VOC. After the VOC had defeated its enemy in the Moluccas in 1651, it increased its monopoly over the spice trade and extended its power into other areas of the Moluccan archipelago.[44] Now, Ambon and the Lease Islands became more important for the spice trade than Ternate and Banda. All spices from the Moluccas were collected in Ambon before being shipped to Batavia. The VOC established a well-organized monopoly for the purchase and transportation of spices to Europe via Batavia (Reid, 1990:10-12).

Beside the trade of spices, the production of spices in the Moluccas became monopolized as well. From 1651, the inhabitants of Ambon, Lease and the Banda islands were forced by the company to plant at least 10 clove trees in their gardens, and to sell their harvest to the company for fixed prices. The inhabitants of the other islands were prohibited from cultivating spices. The VOC enforced this policy by *hongi-tochten*: punitive expeditions to villages that resisted the spice and production monopoly (Bartels, 1978:69; Chauvel, 1990:20-21). In those days, both Muslims and Christians were not allowed to leave their villages, except those who were assigned for VOC expeditions (Cooley, 1962:86-87; Chauvel, 1990:4-7). As mentioned earlier, they were forced to work in clove cultivation and rowing services. Villagers who cultivated cloves did not always receive payment as stipulated in the contracts, because many company officers and village heads were corrupt. This made the villagers suffer under the monopoly system. Corruption in the VOC, here and elsewhere, contributed to its dissolution at the end of 18th century.

After the VOC was dissolved in 1799, the spice monopoly was continued by the Dutch colonial state. However, in 1824, the monopoly was weakened by the London Agreement between the Dutch and the British that allowed spice production in the Northern Moluccas. With increased clove

44 In 1652, the sultans in the Northern Moluccas signed new contracts with the VOC on clove eradication. As compensation for the loss of revenue, the sultans and their officers received annual payments.

production in the archipelago and an undermining of the monopoly, prices decreased gradually (Leirissa, 1995:1). They decreased even more after the British started to cultivate cloves in their own colonies as well, such as in Zanzibar. In 1864, the Dutch put a formal end to the spice monopoly – which actually had disappeared already. As a result, the prices for spices fell sharply on the international market (Hospes, 1996:30-31).

By the end of 19th century, Ambon had become an economic backwater. The Ambonese still cultivated spices, but in much smaller quantities than during the VOC period. The Dutch introduced some new commercial crops in Ambon, such as indigo and cocoa, which fetched higher prices than spice crops on the international market. However, the attempt to cultivate these crops failed and the greater part of the population in the countryside became heavily dependent on subsistence activities (Chauvel, 1990:14).

In the early part of the 20th century, inter-island transportation services improved and seaports all over the Indonesian archipelago were modernized. Shipping between Makassar, Batavia and Surabaya to the city of Ambon with steamboats became more frequent. This stimulated traders from outside the Moluccas, such as Chinese, Buginese and Javanese, to come to Ambon to trade. They sold rice and manufactured goods and bought spices, copra and wood from the Moluccans (Asba, 2007:47-48). In this period, transportation between Ambon and other Moluccan islands also became easier. People from Christian villages all over the Moluccas came to the city for education, while people from Muslim villages came to become petty traders. Both migrants and Moluccans in Ambon city lived in ethnically and religiously segregated areas at that time.

After independence, Ambon remained the trading centre for commodities in the Moluccas, although the Chinese, Buginese, Javanese and other Indonesians replaced the Europeans as wholesale traders. Between 1970 and 1998, many Butonese, Buginese and Makasarese came to trade and to start transport service businesses. During the New Order, certain economic sectors in Ambon were linked to particular ethno-

religious groups. Small and medium-sized businesses were dominated by the predominantly Muslim Butonese, Buginese and Makasarese groups. Large-scale businesses were controlled by the Chinese, who were mostly Christian. In villages surrounding the city, peasants, fishermen and petty traders were generally Muslim Ambonese, Muslim Butonese and Christian Ambonese. Positions in governmental and state educational institutions were mostly occupied by the Christian Ambonese. Regular salaried jobs in the private sector were usually shared among different ethno-religious groups (Bertrand 2002:73). At the end of the 1990s, problems arose when Muslim migrants started competing for jobs as civil servants and in the higher levels of government. The Christian Ambonese were pressured to leave positions that they traditionally held in education and government. Christian Ambonese felt that the Muslim migrants, who already dominated the private sector, threatened their political, cultural and economic existence (HRW, 1999:6). This political and economic rivalry is identified as one of the roots of the communal violence that occurred between 1999 and 2004.

Religious changes

Similar to the spread of Islam in other parts of the Indonesian archipelago, Muslim traders and Islamic preachers were responsible for introducing Islam to the Moluccas. Islam reached the Spice Islands in the 13th century and became popular after the kings of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo converted to Islam around 1460 (Pires, 1944:212-214; Chauvel, 1990:16-17). In the 16th century, Islam gained more followers in Ambon and the Lease Islands. People who lived in the *ulilima* villages of northern Leihitu converted to Islam, while people who lived in the *ulisiwa* villages of southern Leihitu and the Leitimor Peninsula retained their animistic beliefs (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:32-35). There was a similar evolution on the Lease Islands: inhabitants of Hatuhaha in northern Haruku and of Iha in northern Saparua converted to Islam. The introduction of Islam to Hitu by Muslim traders exposed the Ambonese, who before the 16th century lived in isolation and were considered to be less civilized than people in the northern

Moluccas, to external influences (Chauvel, 1980:43-45). In the middle of the 16th century, Europeans – first the Portuguese who brought Catholicism, and later the Dutch who introduced Protestantism – challenged the spread of Islam.

In the 17th century, Islam spread gradually from the northern to the southeastern regions of the Moluccas, although Islamic beliefs and practices were still mixed with traditional beliefs. During the VOC period, Muslims in the Moluccas were relatively isolated from the rest of the global Islamic community because they were prevented from leaving their villages, and because Asian spice traders were eventually banned from visiting the Moluccas in order to protect the VOC's trade monopoly (Chauvel, 1980:53; Leirissa et al., 1982:246). At the beginning of the Dutch colonial state, influential Muslims from outside the Moluccas (e.g. Prince Diponegoro and Tengku Imam Bonjol) became political prisoners and were forced to live in Ambon. They hardly had any contact with the island population. Restrictions imposed by the Dutch made it impossible to teach Islamic religion systematically in the Moluccas. At the end of 19th century, advances in inter-island transportation allowed Muslims to go on pilgrimage and to study outside the Moluccas; while Islamic preachers from outside the Moluccas also arrived, introducing modernist Islamic beliefs – but overall, Islam in the region remained relatively isolated. In the 1930s, a branch of Muhammadiyah was set up in Ambon. However, most Muslim Ambonese rejected the new Islamic ideas promoted by this progressive organisation, as they felt their traditional beliefs were being attacked (Bartels, 2010: 248-249). It wasn't until after independence (particularly during the New Order), when migration increased in the 1980s and 1990s, that the pace of Islamisation in the Moluccas speeded up. Among the migrants were Islamic preachers who brought the Muslims of Ambon into contact with different interpretations of Islam. After several years, many of the younger Islamic preachers who adhered to modernist Islamic beliefs replaced religious leaders who had a more syncretic belief system.

The Portuguese were the first to bring Catholicism to the Moluccas. They introduced it in the villages in southern Leihitu, and later in Leitimor Peninsula and the Lease Islands. By the middle of the 16th century, most native communities in southern Ambon and the adjacent islands of Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut had nominally converted to Catholicism.[45] Between 1575 and 1605, Catholicism was the main religion in the city of Ambon. However, when the Portuguese left in 1605, the indigenous Catholics had to convert to Protestantism, as the Dutch declared all Christian villages to be Protestant villages (Bartels, 2010:241). Between 1605 and 1800, Catholic missionaries were forbidden from spreading their faith in the Indonesian archipelago. Only from 1912 were Catholic missionaries allowed to undertake activities in Ambon again. However, Protestant clergy and government officials in the city prevented the establishment of a Catholic Church and school until 1925 (Steenbrink, 2007:221-226).

Initially, the VOC did not pay much attention to religious education and to the pastoral care of the Christian Ambonese (van Fraassen, 1983:13-14). From 1605, the company sent religious ministers to serve only the Dutch. However, in 1633, ministers started to provide lessons on Protestantism in confessional schools to the Christian Ambonese, and trained a few of them to become religious teachers, sacristans and church guardians. In 1633 there were 32 schools with 1,200 pupils, rising to 54 schools with 5,190 pupils by the year 1700 (Aritonang and Steenbrink, 2008:105). Between 1625 and 1775, the VOC sent 41 Protestant ministers to Ambon, Lease, Ternate and Banda, where they served as both religious clergy and teachers (2008:103). During the British Interregnum (1810-1816), the British Resident sent more missionaries to Ambon to work in churches and schools. This practice was continued by the Dutch colonial state (van Fraassen, 1983:35). From the beginning of the 19th century, Dutch

45 Three villages of Ambon Island accepted Catholicism in 1538, and the prominent Spanish Jesuit father, Franciscus Xaverius, was part of missionary activities in Hatiwe, Tawiri, Nusaniwe, Killang, Ema, Halong and Soya in 1546. The Christian villages regarded these conversions as challenges to the power of Ternate; while Ternate perceived that these villages had switched their political loyalty to the Portuguese (Alhadar, 2001:13)

missionaries, funded and controlled by the colonial government, managed the spread of Protestantism more systematically. For example, missionaries founded schools for local Protestant ministers to introduce Protestantism across the archipelago. The language used in churches and schools was Malay-Ambon, which gradually led to the loss of local languages in many Protestant villages (Chauvel, 1990:6-7).

In the middle of the 19th century, all Protestant churches in the Moluccas merged into the State Church (*Staatskerk*) of the Moluccas.[46] In 1935, these churches were united under the autonomous synod of the Protestant Church of the Moluccas *(Gereja Protestant Maluku, GPM)*. This synod is now the biggest religious organization in the area, and its hierarchical structure is parallel with the structure of the provincial administration.[47] As previously mentioned, Christian Moluccans succeeded in securing positions at all levels of the insular bureaucracy due to their higher levels of education and the privileges they had enjoyed under the Dutch. They also profited from this elevated station after independence, as many Christian Moluccans obtained prominent positions in education and politics. Although new Christian denominations, such as Pentecostal and charismatic churches, appeared in the city, the vast majority of Protestants are still affiliated with the GPM. New denominations attract younger generations in particular, mainly through their varied and modern liturgy.

Cultural changes: traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution

Traditional cultural relationships dating back to pre-colonial times are still relevant, even when villages do not share the same religion anymore.

46 In 1814-1864, The Rotterdam Missionary Society (*Rotterdamsche Zendelingen Genootschap)* got authority to carry out missionary activities. The most famous minister was the so-called *'Apostle of the Moluccas'*, J.C. Kam. All missionary activities were controlled by the Committee of Affairs of the Protestant Churches in the Netherlands-Indies (*Commissie voor de Zaaken der Protestantsche Kerken in Nederlandsch Indië)*.

47 In 2010, the GPM had 575,000 followers, spread over 27 branches and 725 churches (http://profilgereja.wordpress.com/2010/05/11/gereja-protestan-maluku/, accessed 29 September 2014).

Among the traditional forms of inter-village relations, the *pela* – a form of alliance and cooperation between two or more villages – was the only one that was to a certain extent respected by the Dutch. Entering into new *pela* relationships was even permitted, but only under the supervision of the Resident. As a mutual mechanism for cooperation, three types of *pela* (lit. blood) can be distinguished: *pela keras*, *pela tempat sirih* and *pela gandong*. *Pela keras* ('hard' pela) is established when leaders from participating villages swear an oath to unite as brothers and to help each other. This strong bond is symbolized by the ritual of drinking blood together. *Pela tempat sirih* ('soft' pela) is based on friendship between villages. *Pela gandong* ('kinship' pela) is a form of brotherhood between two or more villages claiming common ancestry (Bartels, 1978; Adam, 2008a:228; Bartels, 2003:133-135; Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009:67).

These three kinds of *pela* are mechanisms that bind and create peaceful relationships between villages of either the same or different religions. In the past, *pela* consisted of rules, customs, prohibitions and punishments that had to be observed by the villagers involved. For example, marriage between men and women from the villages participating in *pela gandong* was strictly prohibited (Huwae, 1995:78-79). People in villages participating in a *pela* relationship were considered to be related by blood, and had to help each other at all times, during both war and peace. The villagers of participating villages were brothers and sisters, and although members of *pela* eventually had different religions, their relationship was based on a long history of trusted social interactions (Coolley, 1962:71). Thus, *pela* minimized the threat of aggression between Muslim and Christian villages, while it strengthened common interests and shared values between them (Lowry and Littlejohn, 2006:410-411). Besides *pela*, *adat* (customary law) also minimized religious rivalries, since regional and cultural identification was stronger than religious identification (Bartels, 2010:246-247). Despite having many similarities, *pela* is distinguished from *adat,* as *adat* includes all traditional values and laws within a specific community (Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009:69).

After independence, both government policies and the activities of preachers from outside the Moluccas contributed to the erosion of these traditional cultural bonds (Lowry and Littlejon, 2006:410-411). During the New Order era, the government imposed law No. 45/1979 on village government, changing traditional villages into administrative units that had to adhere the new national state ideology. Consequently, it discouraged local leaders from maintaining the *adat* system and the traditional local bonds between villages. At the same time, many preachers, who were among the wave of new migrants to the Moluccas, were members of global religious communities or denominations. They introduced Islamic beliefs that reduced the significance of local cultural bonds and customs. For example, in the 1980s, attendance of religious celebrations with people from different religious groups was prohibited. By the time of the recent conflicts (1999-2004), *pela* had already lost its meaning and had become an ineffective method for preventing violence (Pariela, 2007:104; Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009:67). Another reason that *pela* was ineffective in preventing violence was that the bond only applies to participating villages (Iwamony, 2010:104-106).

After the conflict ended in 2004, decentralization became a spearhead of political reformation, with village heads and the regional government trying to reactivate *pela* to prevent further religious violence. This has seen little success to date, as migrants and younger generations showed little enthusiasm for the reestablishment of this traditional institution. *Pela* is understandably ineffective in preventing or resolving conflicts when migrants are involved: on the one hand, they are excluded from traditional cultural bonds, and on the other, they do not feel obliged to practice to these forms of solidarity (Iwamony, 2010:108-109). The younger generations of Moluccans that stick to modernist religious beliefs also question *pela* because it is a traditional cultural bond instead of a religious one. Nevertheless, the reactivation of *pela* has encouraged Christians and Muslims to attempt a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation that is central to *pela* practices.

For example, during the National Quran Recitation Festival (*Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran, MTQ*), in 2012, Christians were involved by providing accommodation to the participants of the festival. And during the national church choir festival, some Muslim schools participated and had their choir teams perform traditional Moluccan songs.

Furthermore, village heads and the regional government paid attention to activating the *adat* system; it had functioned well before it was undermined after independence (particularly during the New Order period). Traditional *adat* laws were explicitly brought back to people's attention in 2002, when Moluccan village heads established a provincial cultural organization called The Assembly of Kings (*Majelis Latupati*) to promote peace between Muslims and Christians. It also initiated discussions on land rights and cultural relations. As a part of the peace building process, the assembly reactivated *adat* laws to restore villagers' access to land and other resources. However, in reality, some village communities use the *adat* laws to support religious segregation, preventing displaced persons from reclaiming their property (Adam, 2010b: 401). Nowadays, almost all regencies, including the city of Ambon, have regulations that confirm the existence of the traditional *negeri*: villages with clear territorial borders determined by hereditary identity and with leaders whose authority to rule based on genealogy. Consequently, villages have a relatively higher degree of autonomy than before independence (Adam, 2010b:404-405). As in the past, indigenous clans own land collectively, and the land is allotted to clan members by the council of elders. In contrast, in villages inhabited by migrants, the so-called *negeri administratif*, land is owned individually.

Economic and political changes in the Moluccas have also spurred changes in the educational system, characterized by a polarization between Muslims and Christians. After the VOC arrived, Protestant churches developed confessional schools in many Christian villages. In 1860, these schools became state schools (*volksscholen*) providing pupils with a practical education (Chauvel, 1990:27). Consequently, these schools no

longer provided religious education. In 1874, the colonial government also established training schools for teachers, medical assistants and other professions. In line with the tenor of the Ethical Politics, at the beginning of the 20th century the Dutch also started to introduce modern education in the Moluccas. In 1920, primary schools (*Hollands Inlandsche Schools, HIS*) and secondary schools (*Middelbaar Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs, MULO*) were founded in Ambon and the Lease Islands. After six years, these schools had 2,846 Christian pupils. The graduates of these schools filled the lower and middle ranks of the colonial bureaucracy. In 1920, the Dutch also established state schools in six Muslim villages on Ambon Island. However, by 1930, only one of these remained. Muslim children did not attend these state schools because their parents worried their children would lose their culture and religion by studying under the Dutch (Chauvel, 1990:25-38). Unlike in other parts of Indonesia, there were only a few traditional Islamic schools (*pesantren*) in Ambon. In 1930, the literacy rate in Ambon reached 44.50%, while the Indonesian national average was only 6.40% (Timmer, 1961:40).

After independence, more and more Muslim Ambonese attended education in government schools. And both Muslim and Christian students from the Moluccas continued their higher education in the city of Ambon. In 1962, the government founded *Universitas Pattimura* (Unpatti), the first public university in Ambon. When this University opened, the Christian lecturers and administrative staff clearly outnumbered the Muslim staff. So much so, that Muslim students felt discriminated against at the university. The larger proportion of Christian staff was a result of the higher educational level of Christians compared to Muslims at that time. In 1965, the biggest Protestant synod in the Moluccas, the Moluccas Protestant Church (*Gereja Protestan Maluku, GPM*), founded the Theological Seminary (*Sekolah Tinggi Teologia*, *STT*) of GPM; this developed into the Indonesian Christian

University in the Moluccas *(Universitas Kristen Indonesia di Maluku, UKIM)* in 1985.[48]

Only in 1980 did the State Islamic Institute (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri*, IAIN) Sultan

Alauddin Makassar open a branch in Ambon to accommodate Muslim students in state-run higher education. In 1997, this branch became the State Islamic Academy of Ambon (*Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Ambon, STAIN*), which developed into the State Islamic Institute (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN*) Ambon in 2007.

The higher education institutes in Ambon are seriously affected by interreligious tensions. In 1992, when Muslims dominated the provincial government, the governor tried to fire the rector of Unpatti because he was accused of favouring Christian lecturers for promotions and scholarships. In the end, however, the governor's effort did not succeed due to strong protests from university staff and students (Bertrand, 2002:63). Another controversy started when the governor appointed a Muslim Butonese as head of the local education office, and increased the number of Muslim teachers by hiring them from Sulawesi, since qualified Muslim teachers could not be found in the Moluccas.

During the violence between 1999 and 2004, higher educational institutes both contributed to and suffered from the conflict. Muslims burnt down buildings on the Unpatti and UKIM campuses because they represented the hegemony of Christianity; Christians burned down Islamic schools in the city. The Muslim groups set up defences centered in STAIN Ambon and the surrounding areas. After these violent clashes, pupils and students went to schools and higher educational institutions in religiously segregated neighbourhoods. As mentioned before, these days there are only

48 UKIM was originally rooted in a Christian teacher training school called STOVIL (*School tot Opleiding van Inlands Leraars*) founded in 1885 by Dutch missionaries. After recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949, STOVIL changed into the Theology School of Maluku Protestant Church (*Sekolah Teologia-GPM*).

a few schools and higher educational institutions where students of both religious groups are present. Unpatti and Polytechnic Ambon are the only institutes of higher education where both groups are represented.

1.4 Research Questions

The research questions for this study are divided into two categories: descriptive and explanatory. After the descriptive questions are addressed, explanatory questions are used to explore the proposed relations between variables. This study therefore presents descriptive and explanatory questions at the individual level, which are outlined below.

1.4.1 Descriptive questions at the individual level

One objective of this research is to study whether there is ethno-religious identification, and avoidance of intergroup contact, among Muslims and Christians in Yogyakarta and Ambon. Moreover, this objective also includes an investigation of the ways in which ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance are present in daily life. As shown above, these cities have different histories that might play a role in either group identification or intergroup contact avoidance. The descriptive questions on the individual level are:

> *To what extent is ethno-religious identification present among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta? (Question 1a)*
> *To what extent is avoidance of intergroup contact present among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta? (Question 1b)*
> *In which ways is ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians observable in their daily lives? (Question 1c)*
> *In which ways is avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims and Christians observable in their daily lives? (Question 1d)*

1.4.2 Explanatory questions at the individual level

The relation between intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification has been studied in the framework of so-called social identity theory (Tajfel, 1970). Social identity theory explains how reference to group membership can lead to prejudice, hostility and discriminatory behaviour against out-group members. Reference to group membership is sufficient to create favourable attitudes toward in-group members and prejudice and hostility toward out-group members. Therefore, we formulate our explanatory research question as follows:

> *To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta, and avoidance of intergroup contact? (Question 2a)*

Ethnic group conflict theory explains that the stronger the actual competition between ethnic groups, and the stronger the perceived ethnic threat, the stronger will be social identification, which will induce exclusionary reactions (Gijsberts et al., 2004). Many studies provide evidence that these reactions affect certain groups more than others, as the level of actual competition might be different between groups. Referring to previous research by Coenders and Scheepers (2003), people with lower education levels support in-group favouritism more than those with higher education levels. Scheepers et al. (2002) mentions that ethnic exclusionism tends to be supported by individuals of majority groups from less educated levels, lower income brackets, manual workers and by those who are unemployed. In another study of social distance by Coenders et al. (2007), avoidance of social contact with immigrants strongly prevails amongst those with lower education levels, manual workers, the self-employed and people in rural areas. In this research, we include social characteristics such as gender, parents' religion, the education level of parents, social class or household income, parents' occupational status and the subject's occupational status. The research question is:

To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta, and avoidance of intergroup contacts, considering other individual-level determinants such as gender, parents' religion, household income, parents' education, parents' occupational status and parents' occupation status? (Question 2b)

Based on relevant previous studies, the relationship between intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification is neither direct nor deterministic. This means that social identity theory alone cannot explain all practices of intergroup contact avoidance as dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. Studies of Duckit (2006), Bobo (1988), Schneider (2008), Schlueter and Scheepers (2010), Duriez and Roggen (1999), Doherty and Poole (1997), Iceland and Wilkes (2006), Coenders (2001), Tropp et al. (2006) and Sidanius and Pratto (1999) point out that many variables may relate to ethnic exclusionism and social identification. These variables are the salience of identity, perceived threats, intergroup contact, religiosity, individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, nationalistic attitudes, distrust and social dominance orientation. Therefore, my research question is formulated as follows:

To what extent can we explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta, and avoidance of intergroup contacts, in relation to particular intermediate determinants such as salience of identity, perceived threats, intergroup contact, religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, interpretation of sacred writing, perceived discrimination, memory of violence, nationalistic attitudes, distrust and social dominance orientation? (Question 3)

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH MODEL

This chapter describes theories on intergroup contact avoidance, conceptual and research models, and hypotheses. The research models used are derived from theories on intergroup contact avoidance. Furthermore, we come up with a set of variables, namely intergroup contact avoidance, ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, perceived threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, religiosity, perceived discrimination, individual memory of violence, nationalism, distrust, and social dominance orientation. Then, from the research model, we formulate a set of hypotheses, before going on to provide a brief description of the structure of the thesis. This chapter therefore consists of three sections: the first section describes the theoretical frameworks employed, the second section explains the formulation of the research model and the hypotheses, and the third section illustrates the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Theories on intergroup contact avoidance

In this research, intergroup contact avoidance between ethno-religious groups will be conceptually analyzed from the perspective of three main theoretical frameworks, namely realistic conflict theory, social identification theory, and ethnic group conflict theory. Realistic conflict theory locates intergroup contact avoidance as part of the conflict between social groups due to competition over scarce resources and over values. It has developed from both sociological and psychological approaches to intergroup relations. Social identification theory attempts to explain

that ethno-religious identification either directly or indirectly influences intergroup contact avoidance. Ethnic group conflict theory adds a new aspect to realistic conflict theory and social identification theory, putting intergroup contact avoidance into a broader perspective and including the position of individuals in the social system.

In addition to these three main theories, this study also looks at other theories and standpoints, by considering factors such as salience of identity, actual intergroup contact, religiosity, individual memories of violence, perceived discrimination, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation. Overall, the aim is to incorporate all these theories into one overarching framework that will be rigorously tested. This study also evaluates the application of these theories, which have largely been developed in and for Western societies, in the analysis of societies in Southeast Asia.

2.1.1 Realistic conflict theory

Realistic conflict theory explains that limited resources can lead to conflict between groups, resulting in an increase in prejudice and support for discrimination. This theory assumes that social conflict is rational; that is, conflict against out-groups aims to realize the real objective of an in-group due to competition over scarce resources, power, and status (Coser, 1956; Sherif, 1967; Le Vine and Campbell, 1972; Austin and Worchel, 1979).[1] The importance of intergroup competition as a determinant of the social conflict is also articulated by Sumner (1906), Davie (1929), Bernard (1957), Boulding (1962), and Newcomb (1960) (Levine and Campbell, 1972:29). This theory has two dimensions of explanation drawn from both sociological and social psychological perspectives. In sociological

1 Although the assumption of rationality is relevant to the groups themselves, it is extended to include the group members. If it is rational for the groups to compete, it must also be rational for the group members to do so. In many cases, this theory is viewed as an economic theory that considers people as selfish and always seeking to maximize their own rewards (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1987: 34; Bornstein 2003: 129).

theory, the explanation is derived from Coser's argument that conflict, like cooperation, has a social function. He refers to Simmel's concept that social conflict can be perceived as a form of socialization. Coser (1956:35) states that the function of social conflict is to establish and maintain group identities and boundaries: the distinction between the in-group and the out-group is constructed through social conflict. Conflict serves a social function, promoting the formation of social groups, defining and maintaining group boundaries, and strengthening social cohesion as well as social solidarity (Coser, 1956; cf. Mack, 1965).

Coser (1956:49) distinguishes between realistic and non-realistic conflicts. Realistic conflict refers to a conflict stemming from frustration related to specific demands and the estimated gains of the participants. This kind of conflict is often directed at the source of the frustration. Meanwhile, non-realistic conflict is a conflict arising from the need to release tension, and is not related to achieving specific results. Realistic conflict has functional alternatives for resolution. This means that the conflict can be put to an end when the participants find satisfying alternative ways to accomplish their objectives. Non-realistic conflict has functional alternatives only in the choice of rivals (1956:49).

Like Coser, Blumer (1958) also proposes a point of view stressing the relationship between conflict and social identity formation. In the racial prejudice of dominant groups, three feelings are always present: feelings of superiority that the dominant group or race is intrinsically different from others, feelings about proprietary claims to certain privileges and advantages, and feelings of fear and suspicion that the subordinated race intends to usurp the prerogative of the dominant race (Blumer, 1958: 4; Coenders, 2001: 28). Therefore, racial prejudice strongly exists in the sense of a group's position, rather than in feelings of in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. The dominant group defines and redefines its identity, and the subordinate group's identity, through interaction and communication. In short, racial prejudice is a defensive reaction to subordinate groups perceived to be challenging the sense of a group's position.

Referring to Coser (1956:54), every social system has sources of realistic conflict, in that people compete over conflicting claims to scarce resources, status, and power. Coser's concept of realistic conflict corresponds with Blumer's ideas about prejudice and group position, although they use different terminology (Coenders 2001:29). Ethnic groups have contradictory claims over status, power, and scarce resources. Each group holds beliefs that they have the right to own these scarce resources, and holds judgments about the proper distribution of power and privilege. Increased in-group cohesion, solidarity, and feelings of superiority are supported by conflicts of interest between ethnic groups, as well as increased hostile and prejudicial attitudes towards out-group members. According to Blumer, challenges against the prerogative of the in-group can be considered a threat from the out-group. Nevertheless, realistic conflict between groups does not only relate to material resources, but is also associated with struggles for the existence of the in-group's values (Allport, 1954 [1958]; Coser, 1956:4; Blalock, 1967). In a different way, Allport (1954) also argues that ideological conflict between religious groups may take place if the conflicting religious groups claim that their religion or beliefs are the only true religion.

The central hypothesis of realistic conflict theory is that "real conflict of group interests causes intergroup conflict" (Campbell, 1965:287). This theory is based on the rationale that human nature is selfishly oriented and attempts to maximize rewards (Gijsberts et al., 2004: 6). In comparison, realistic conflict theory in psychology, pioneered by Sheriff and associates (1966, 1969, 1979)and based in experimental research on the relationships between social groups, concludes that competition between social groups tends to create wider social distance, to increase in-group favouritism, solidarity, and group pride, and to create prejudice and disputes between social groups (Gijsberts et al., 2004:8).[2] As a consequence, intergroup

2 Galinsky (2002:91-92) explains the decisive role of groups in the creation of a competitive spirit. First, a group provides social support that justifies behaviours promoting self and group interest. Second, group membership decreases the ability of opponents to level accusations against the self. Third, the mere presence of a group on the other side activates a schema built of fear and distrust.

hostility and competition are considered realistic, instrumental in character, and motivated by rewards that are extrinsic to the intergroup situation. In summary, the conflicting interests that develop into social conflict through intergroup competition will create antagonistic intergroup relations, and strengthen identification, including the attachment to a positive image within the in-group (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:8).[3]

Levine and Campbell (1972:29-42) comprehensively explain the logic of realistic conflict theory. First, they theorize that real conflict of interest between groups will lead to intergroup conflict. Furthermore, real conflict of interest, intergroup conflict, and the presence of hostility may become a real threat to the in-group, as well as create perceptions of threat. Secondly, real threat will turn into hostility towards the sources of conflict, increasing in-group solidarity, awareness of one's own in-group identity, and the tightness of group boundaries. Threat will also reduce defection from the group, intensifying the punishment and rejection of deviants within the group, and strengthening ethnocentrism. Finally, the weakest group in a local cluster is likely to be the most ethnocentric.

In contrast to the approach of social psychology, sociological literature stresses socio-economic factors. For example, Blalock (1967:49) emphasizes economic and status factors as the major determinants of minority discrimination. Economic, political, and cultural competition can be identified as actual competition, related to a part or whole strata between ethno-religious groups (1967:74). Competition between groups can be either actual or perceived (Blalock, 1967:102).[4] The recent development of realistic conflict theory includes perceived threat as an intermediate factor

3 However, this proposition seems to undermine the rational and material basis of realistic conflict theory. When group conflict operates on a psychological level, it is far from rational due to the involvement of biased decision making (Monroe et al., 2000:433)

4 Actual competition can be seen in relation to differences in average standard of living, unemployment levels, discrimination policy in the recruitment of civil servants, and the growth of population caused by migration. Meanwhile, perceived competition is the personal evaluation of social conditions related to ethno-religious groups.

between intergroup competition and group identification (or hostility).[5] Bobo (1988:95-96) differentiates between three motives of group conflict: perceptions of incompatible group interests, perceptions and evaluation of group standing, and perceived threat or challenges to group interests. According to Bobo (1988:97), *perceived threat* is a determinant factor in racial policy attitudes.[6] Bobo and Hutchings (1996:955) explain that intergroup hostility does not rise simply from objective conditions or from negative feelings against an out-group. In their estimation, feelings of perceived competition and hostility derive from historically and collectively developed judgments of group position in the social order that in-group members feel they should rightfully occupy, rather than members of an out-group.

This theory argues that resource tension and the significance of a potentially competitive out-group can result in the perception of group competition for resources (Dovidio et al., 2005:488). Perceived competition is thought to be based on propositions of zero-sum belief. That is, the more the other group obtains, the less is available for one's own group. This model is often referred to as an *instrumental model of group conflict* due to the rational and instrumental attitudes and behaviours toward the out-group competitors that are hypothesized to remove the source of competition by including out-group derogation, discrimination, and avoidance of the other group (2005:488).

2.1.2 Social identity theory

Theories about sources of group conflict are contrasted with psychological

5 The original realistic conflict theory has been expanded to include the perception of the conflict (Esses and Amstrong, 2002:701). The theory does not require that actual competition exists, because the perception of competition will lead to conflict and intergroup hostility.

6 Larsen et al. (2009:117) says that perceived threats produce prejudice and discrimination against minorities by majority groups. Competition between groups over limited resources and economic insecurities may create frustrations that result in aggression towards minority groups (2009:128).

theories that propose intergroup conflict as projective expressions of problems that are essentially intra-group or intra-individual in origin (Levine and Campbell, 1972:29). As mentioned by Tajfel and Turner (1986:7), this theory is different from much of the work in social psychology that emphasizes intra-individual or interpersonal psychological processes that create prejudiced attitudes or discriminatory behaviour. For example, experiments conducted by Billig and Tajfel (1973:27-52) point out that conflict is not necessarily always conflicts of interest between groups. Tajfel and Turner (1979[1986]) and Tajfel argue (1970:96-102) that competition between groups, or conflicts of interest, are not a necessary condition for discrimination, but are merely social categorizations.

Every society consists of social categories, defined as divisions of people that are based on nationality, race, class, religion, and occupation which stand in power and status relations to one another (Abram, 1990:13). Social categories do not exist in isolation, so they naturally lead to the creation of a distinctive social structure. This point of view from social psychology is in line with the sociological theories of structuralism from Weber (1930), Durkheim (1893 [1933]), Parsons (1951), and Merton (1957). The social identity approach in social psychology attempts to explain the representation of individuals in one's group. Psychological processes create identity and behaviour, including group behaviour. These theories date back to Sumner (1906[1960]:27) who emphasizes the differentiation between the in-group, or "us," and the out-group, or "others." The former refers to peaceful relations, and the latter refers to war relations. Sumner considers ethnocentrism to be group behaviour. His theory is the basis for the further exploration of social identity in the literature of sociology and social psychology.

The rise of social identity theory begins from critiques of realistic conflict theory, by saying that theories of identity should pay attention to the processes underlying the development of group identity, and to the subjective aspects of group membership (Tajfel and Turner, 1986:8). Social

identity theory attempts to explain attitudes and behaviour between social groups through psychological processes that emphasize the development and maintenance of a group's identity, and the impact of group identification on behaviour between groups (Gijsberts et al., 2004:8). Differing from Barth's idea that identification and collectivity are constructed through transaction and negotiation,[7] Tajfel says that group membership is sufficient in itself to generate identification with that group and to channel behaviour toward in-group favouritism and discrimination against an out-group (Jenkins, 1996:7).[8]

Based on experimental research, conflict of interest between groups is not sufficient or necessary to produce conflict and discrimination (Turner, 1981).[9] Therefore, the central assumption of this theory is that in-group bias is an omnipresent characteristic of intergroup relations.[10] Tajfel and associates provide evidence that social categorization is sufficient to create intergroup discrimination and behaviour favouring the in-group.[11] In terms

7 Collective identity is never frozen, and is constantly in flux. Consequently, social boundaries are built through a combination of many varieties of elements and can always be contested. The membership in a collectivity is socially constructed and based on continuous social interactions that share certain features of similarity (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995:97).

8 Huddy (2001:131) questioned this proposition. Social identity theories regard social identity as an all or nothing phenomenon. When the group is salient, the group identity will be the main identity. When it is not salient, individual identity will be paramount.

9 Like Marxist theory, social identity theory holds that the basis of all human groups is found in members' recognition of a common plight. Differing from Marxist theory, this theory considers the psychological processes that translate social categories into human groups, and the creation of a psychological reality from a social reality (Hogg 1988:16 cf. Herring et al., 1999:365).

10 Jelen's study (1993:178-179) on religious group attitudes explains that ethno-religious group identification is one of the most important predictors of political attitudes among religious and political elites, as well as among the public masses. However, Rubin and Hewstone (2004:823-830) criticize social identity theory for overemphasizing in-group favouritism and underemphasizing out-group favouritism, and also for its inability to explain institutional discrimination.

11 Brewer (1999:442) says that in-group favouritism and identification do not directly correlate with discriminatory perception and behaviour against an out-group. He argues that the need to justify in-group values is related to forms of moral superiority, sensitivity to threat, social comparison processes, the anticipation of interdependence under conditions of distrust and power politics can bridge in-group identification to create hostility against an out-group.

of in-group favouritism, Tajfel and Turner (1986:14) say that maximum difference (MD) is more essential than maximum in-group profit (MIP).

According to this theory, individuals' evaluation of self is a function of both personal and social identity (Herring et al., 1999). If personal identity depends on individual accomplishment, it is also a product of group membership. In order to maintain a positive self-evaluation, individuals make favourable references to the in-group, which they identify with, and unfavourable ascriptions to out-groups. This theory assumes that individuals categorize their world into them and us. Identification is a motivational need to create positive distinctions, which are fulfilled by social comparisons between groups. Comparisons between the in-group and out-groups are signified by perceptual overstatements favouring the in-group (Greene, 1999: 394). Therefore, social categorization will lead to this kind of perceptual contrast (Turner et al., 1987; cf. Greene, 1999:394). Social identification, social categorization, and social comparison will produce biased perceptions of the in-group towards out-groups.

As previously mentioned, social identity theory has four important concepts: social categorization, social identification, social comparison, and psychological group distinctiveness. (Tajfel, 1978a; Gijsberts et al., 2004:9). Social categorization, as defined by Tajfel (1978b:61) "*can be understood as the ordering of a social environment in terms of groupings of persons in a manner which make sense to the individual*." It is considered a system of orientation that helps to define the individual's position in society. The difference between the in-group and the out-group is created by social categorization, a cognitive instrument that systematizes the complexity of information a human organism receives from their environment. Social categorization takes place when information about social groups is organized so that the similarities and differences between categories are emphasized.[12] Therefore, the difference between categories

12 If the negative out-group orientation is not a strong element of group identity, social categorization may not be accountable for how someone relates to his or her reference group members. Therefore, culture may be one way that individuals find out the meaning

within the in-group is perceived as peripheral, while similarities between categories within the in-group become central. Out-groups are defined as groups with members who uniformly share values, conceptions, and feelings; meanwhile, the characters of the in-group are regarded as more diversified.

Tajfel (1978a:63) says social identification is understood as part of an individual's self-concept, which derives from knowledge of his or her membership in social groups, along with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.[13] Every individual obtains his or her image of self from his or her knowledge of membership in a social group that is attached to a sense of value and emotion in regards to that membership.[14] Social identity can only be defined through the effect of social categorization that segments individuals' social environment into in-groups and out-groups. Social identity can be either positive or negative, depending on the evaluation by the social group that contributes to the formation of the social identity of individuals. This assumes that individuals strive to acquire or maintain a satisfying image or concept of self, or a positive social identity.

Meanwhile, individuals perceive the features of their own in-group as having higher moral values via the social comparison process. This is rooted in Festinger's (1954) hypothesis, which states: (i) "there exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate his opinions and his abilities; (ii) to the extent

and value of the group, and may contribute to collective identity formation (Herring et al., 1999:379).

13 A politicized collective identity occurs when individuals regard themselves as self-conscious group members in the midst of a power struggle (Sears et al., 2003:421), so in-group favouritism is linked to collective self-esteem but not to personal self-esteem. Political mobilization makes ethnic identity stronger and more salient. Participation can be perceived as rational in that it is undertaken to obtain desired outcomes or as a means of reaching valued goals (Klandermans, 1984).

14 Image making is the redefinition of group boundaries, since the boundaries define collective identity (Pitchford, 2001:48). While boundary markers such as religion and language are subject to negative evaluation by the dominant groups, the out-group (subordinate) may influence the redefinition of their meaning and group identity in a more positive way (Taylor and Whittier, 1992 cf. Pitchford, 2001:48).

that objective, non-social means are not available, people evaluate their opinions and abilities by comparing them respectively with the opinions and abilities of others" (Tajfel, 1978:64). Social comparison happens when we make comparisons between others and ourselves. According to Turner (1978:236), to achieve positive social identity, comparisons between the in-group and the out-group must be perceived as differences that favour the in-group. Festinger suggests that the difference between individuals in an evaluative dimension of performance can be conceptualized as status difference (Turner, 1978:237). This social comparison paves the way for creating and maintaining distinctive psychological groups.

If social systems contain hierarchically structured social categories, individuals cognitively simplify and order their perceptions and experiences in order to understand their experiences and to behave accordingly. Individuals categorize others on the basis of their similarities and differences to the self, by which they perceive others as members of the same category as the self (in-group members), or as members of a different category (out-group members) (Abram and Hogg, 1990:19). Furthermore, individuals identify with their in-group, with this social identification representing the extent to which the in-group is incorporated into the sense of self and, at the same time, the self is experienced as an integral part of the in-group (Brewer, 2001:111). Social identification does not produce group behavior because it only creates a positive image of the in-group. Both social categorization and social comparison however operate together to generate a specific form of group behavior involving intergroup differentiation and discrimination, in-group favouritism, stereotypical perception, conformity to group norms, and affective preference for the in-group over the out-group (Abram and Hogg, 1990: 22). has Although they are both part of social identity formation, there are important differences between social categorization and social comparison. While social categorization leads to stereotypical perceptions of the in-group and out-group, and stresses intergroup differences, social comparison explains the selectivity of the

accentuation effect, and the magnitude of the exaggeration of intergroup difference and similarities (Abram and Hogg, 1990:22). [15]

Social identity theory answers questions about why people like their in-group, and dislike out-groups (Coenders, 2001:24). Social identity is part of an individual's self-concept, which comes from the processes of social categorization and social comparison. The basic standpoint of the theory is that individuals struggle for a positive social identity, and determine the relative status and value of their in-group through social comparison with out-groups. Finally, individuals struggle for positive in-group distinctiveness, and have positive attitudes toward their in-group and negative attitudes towards out-groups.

2.1.3 Ethnic group conflict theory

Social identity theory fails to address both the context and consequences of prejudice and discrimination, particularly in regards to group differences in power (Sidanius et al., 2004:846). According to realistic conflict theory, out-group rejection derives from intergroup conflict over real issues such as jobs, power, and economic benefits. Meanwhile, social identification theory shows that unfavourable attitudes towards an out-group flow from the social comparisons that maintains one's self esteem, self-worth, and social identity (Insko et al., 1992:273-4). Ethnic group conflict theory comprehensively addresses aspects of intergroup contact avoidance. Referring to previous studies, avoidance of intergroup contact between ethno-religious groups is one dimension of ethnic exclusionism in the framework of ethnic group conflict theory. Upon further inspection, this theory appears to be a combination of realistic conflict theory and social

15 Social self-identification occurs when someone falls into a relatively separate subsystem of self-conception, namely social identity, which comes from membership within social categories (Abram and Hogg, 1990: 22). Due to the fact that social self-identification is essentially social self-categorization, it is not difficult to generate a principle that determines the salience of social identity. Essentially, within any given social frame of reference, those social categories will become salient.

identity theory (Scheepers et al., 2002:18), whereby both theories are complementing each other. Both theories emphasize realistic conflict and the social processes of identification of ethno-religious group members. Furthermore, both theories can be seen as "ethnic group conflict theory" or "ethnic competition theory," which we will explain in detail below.

Ethnic group conflict or competition theory has two basic assumptions. First, competition between social groups over scarce resources becomes the main catalyst of antagonistic intergroup behaviour. Sociological perspectives emphasize that such competition has always existed in every society (Coser, 1956). Psychological perspectives explain that competition between groups improves solidarity within the in-group and increases hostility between groups (Sherif and Sherif, 1969). The second assumption refers to social identity theory, in which individuals have a fundamental need to perceive their in-group as superior to out-groups. This pertains to favourable characteristics that they perceive among members of the in-group and apply to themselves through a mental process called social identification.[16] Moreover, they estimate out-group characteristics negatively through the mechanism of social contra-identification.

Experimental research conducted by Jetten et al. (2001 cf. Coenders et al., 2007:217-44) shows that threats to social identity can increase in-group identification under competitive conditions, as explained by realistic conflict theory. The more that participants perceived discrimination against their group, the more that the meaning of group membership was primarily based on collective dissimilarity. Consequently, Coenders et al. emphasize that social identity theory can be complementary to propositions from realistic conflict theory. Both theories constitute ethnic group conflict theory. Furthermore, in respect to competition, Coenders et al. (2007:217-44) provide an explanation that the competition takes place at a contextual

16 Social identity theory was developed to analyze group behaviours when social comparison is cognitively salient. It is applicable to behaviours through which individuals pay attention to intra-group structure. Yuki (2003:177) explains that cognitions at both the intergroup and intra-group level may affect an individual's group behaviours.

and individual level that is both observable and measurable. The competition at the individual level often refers to the perceived threat of competition that mediates effects of social identity on different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

A comprehensive argument for regarding the importance of perceived threats in mediating between intergroup competition and ethnic exclusionary attitudes is provided by Olzak (1992, cf. Scheepers et al., 2002:30). Olzak (1992:35) says that whenever ethnic threats increase, whether it is due to macro or meso-social conditions, a majority group will react with exclusionary measures in response to the threat. In this sense, perceived threat enforces a mechanism of social identification, providing a theory of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism under certain individual and contextual conditions.[17] The theory contains this crucial proposition: "*the stronger the actual competition between ethnic groups at an individual as well as a contextual level, and/or the stronger the perceived ethnic threat, the more the mechanisms of social (contra-) identification will be reinforced, inducing stronger nationalist attitudes and exclusionist reactions"* (Coenders et al., 2007, Gijsberts et al. 2004:18). Figure 1.1 describes more completely the theoretical discussion on ethnic group conflict theory. This figure is an adaptation of the theoretical synthesis in Gijsberts et al. (2004:18)

17 Schneider (2008:54) differentiates the economic interpretation of ethnic competition theory from a cultural viewpoint, analysing the pattern of social relations between majority and minority groups involving conflict over values rather than conflict over material resources.

Figure 2.1 *Ethnic competition theory: theoretical-conceptual model*



Source: Gijsberts et al. (2004: 19).

The terms of ethnic exclusionism and narrow forms of nationalism are strongly rooted in ethnocentrism, and relate to social (ethno-religious) identification, intergroup competition, and power difference. Both can result in a set of perceptions, individual attitudes, and social practices that are characterized by in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. Ethno-religious identification as derived from social identity theory seems to contribute directly to ethnic exclusionism based on prejudice and perceived ethnic threat (Allport and Kramer, 1946; Blalock, 1967; Hood et al., 1996 cf. Capucao, 2009:6). Moreover, the social positions of individuals are rooted in actual competition. In reality, the level of competition varies between social categories of conflicting groups. The rationale behind this is that members of the dominant group who share a position with, or live near, members of the minority group tend to display more widespread participation in ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 2002: 19).

In this theoretical framework, intergroup contact avoidance is an intentional social practice explained by ethno-religious identification at the individual level, intermediated by perceived ethnic threat; and actual

competition and power difference are at the contextual level, affecting intergroup contact avoidance either directly or indirectly through perceived threat.

However, those main theories are complemented by other relevant theories on adaptation within the complexity of social realities. The relation between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance is intermediated by salience identity, actual intergroup contact, religiosity, perceived discrimination, individual memories of violence, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation. Intergroup contact avoidance is viewed as a dimension of ethnic exclusionism closely related to the social structure (actual competition and history of intergroup relation) and to the individual (ethno-religious identification). As mentioned earlier, intergroup contact avoidance is also positioned as latent conflict.

1.1.4 Other theories

If intergroup contact avoidance as a dimension of ethnic exclusionism is placed within the scope of wider social processes, it is undoubtedly true that the avoidance of intergroup contact is connected to an individuals' identity formation as a member of a group. It is important to find out the position of theories of identity formation in the conceptual map of socio-scientific theories.[18] The most important debate concerns why identity theory often fails to provide explanations as to why actors make certain utterances and why certain actions happen (Martin, 1995:5; Malasevic, 2006). Jenkins (1996:6) explains that identification and behaviour motivation seem to be connected. However, our system of classifications of the self and others are

18 Wimmer (2008:985) explains the intellectual genealogy of defining ethnicity in terms of three traditional theoretical lines. The first conceives of ethnicity as a mode of drawing boundaries between individuals, towards the making of a social group. The second identifies ethnicity as the outcome of political and symbolic struggle. The third is an emerging institutionalist tradition in ethnic political studies. However, the central debate on identity formation processes is whether social boundaries are social constructions or primordial sentiments (Banks, 1996:179-184).

multidimensional and not likely to be consistent.[19] Referring to Brubaker et al. (2004:31-36), Jenkins (1996:9) says that identity is an open-ended identification process. This means that it is possible for group membership and identity to have an influential role, yet without determining everything. This is due to that fact that individual behaviour is complex and influenced by worldviews, habits, and knowledge. The following description considers other theoretical propositions to explain intergroup contact avoidance. These explanations consider factors such as actual intergroup contact, religiosity, individual memories of violence and perceived discrimination to further investigate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance.

1.1.4.1 Salience of identity

The concept of salience of identity is linked to the classical debate over whether strong group identification is generally associated with unfavourable attitudes and hostility towards an out-group. Sumner (1906:27) and Adorno et al. (1950) explain that both of them are closely related either within the group or at the individual level. However, Allport (1954[1958]:40-41) argues that these characteristics may be not related. In line with Allport, Brewer (1979[1986]:100) says that the distinction between two conflicting groups can be minimized if both sides have some arenas for interaction and share a common physical or political environment. Research by Brewer and Campbell (1976:141-146) provides evidence that positive in-group favouritism is not related to social distance in relation to out-groups. Brewer and Miller (1996:48) say that the consequences of in-group favouritism may be manifest in the absence of hostility toward an out-group, if in-

19 Brewer (2001:117-119) divides identities into the following categories: person-based social identities refer to definitions of social identity that are set within an individual's self-conception. Relational social identities are those in which the self is classified in relation to others, deriving from interpersonal relationships. Group-based social identities refer to the perception of self as an integral part of a larger group. Collective identities involve shared representations of the group based on common interests and experiences.

group identification does not depend on the presence of an out-group. This means that a favourable attitude towards the in-group and an unfavourable attitude towards out-groups is only one dimension of intergroup relations. This research introduces the question as to why group identification can be a source of out-group hostility or social distance. One answer is salience of identity.

Salience of identity refers to the salience of ethno-cultural group attachment. Duckitt (2006:154) defines it as "*how aware individuals were of their ethnic categorization and identity and how important this ethnic differentiation was to them*." In other words, salience of identity is viewed as an individual's acknowledgement, consciously and intentionally, that he identifies himself as member of a certain ethno-religious group, and understands all of the consequences stemming from that membership. This term can also be found in a study by Phinney and Rotheram (1987:13) stating that group identification may consist of many dimensions, such as ethnic awareness, ethnic self-identification, ethnic attitudes, and ethnic behaviours. The importance and meaning of ethnic identity will be more salient in certain situations. Of course, this salience of identity may come from both ethnic as well as religious memberships. Therefore, salience of identity can be a mediating factor in ethno-religious identification and in avoidance of intergroup contact.

1.1.4.2 Intergroup contact

Ethnic group competition theory is also complemented by intergroup contact theory. Ethnic group competition theory proposes out-group size as a proxy of actual competition. This theory assumes that a larger out-group size increases economic competition and cultural conflicts over norms and values. However, contact theory provides the explanation that a larger out-group size not only increases competition, but also increases contact opportunities. Larger out-group size may reduce negative attitudes against

an out-group (Schneider, 2008:54). Those who do not have any contact with out-groups will feel threatened culturally. However, a larger out-group size may increase the possibility for interaction with out-group members. Intergroup contact typically reduces prejudice against out–groups, as it turns out, based on a comprehensive meta-analysis of many previous studies (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006:766). Consequently, intergroup contact may link relative out-group size to intergroup attitudes, which is a predictor of decreasing prejudice in relation to increasing out-group size (Wagner et al., 2006; Schlueter and Wagner, 2008; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2009).

The research of Brown et al. (2007:701) points out that contact with members of an out-group is associated with favourable intergroup attitudes. This is in line with Allport's hypothesis (1954[1958]) that contact with out-group members can improve intergroup attitudes. However, according to that research, the intergroup contact will have stronger and more beneficial effects if contact is with someone who is identified to be typical of his or her in-group. Similar studies that were conducted by Eller and Abrams (2004), Hamilton and Bishop (1976), and Maras and Brown (1996) also provide evidence that contact has beneficial effects on intergroup attitudes. However, contact leads to negative attitudes when the conditions are sub-optimal (Gerard and Miller, 1975; Schofield, 1979 cf. Brown et al., 2007:693). One method to induce favourable attitudes from intergroup contact is by preserving some categories as salient in contact situations (Hewstone and Brown, 1986:231). Therefore, the out-group members will be seen as typical of the in-group, and any change in attitude towards them will be related to the group as a whole. In this study, actual intergroup contact mediates between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance.

1.1.4.3 Religiosity

In certain cases, there is some evidence to suggest that religions have contributed to interethnic violence in places like Russia, India, Nigeria, and

United Sates ("In God's name," 2007 cf. Inzlicht et al., 2009:285). Some religious beliefs may encourage tolerance, such as the doctrines of election and revelation (Allport, 1966:447). However, religious particularism may lead to prejudice when followers regard their religion as the only true religion (Eisinga et al., 1990:56; Scheepers et al., 2002). Referring to social identity theory, Sterkens and Anthony (2008:35) mention that religions have a tendency to produce religiocentrism, because religions establish their own identity. According to them, religiocentrism can be defined as the combination of favourable attitudes towards the in-group and unfavourable attitudes towards out-groups. However, religiocentrism is sometimes also associated with religiously based sentiments of exclusiveness – the belief that one should prefer members of one's own religion above others (Ray and Doratis, 1971:170). Some believers hold to the absolute truth of their own religion in exclusion to the idea of there being any truth in other religions (Abu-Nimer, 2004:497). Religiocentrism tends to contribute to exclusion and to discrimination towards other religious groups while regarding one's own religious group as superior.

In this study, the general term 'religiosity' refers to religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality, and a literal interpretation of sacred writing. As mentioned above, religiocentrism is the combination of favourable attitudes toward the in-group and unfavourable attitudes toward out-groups. Religiocentric attitudes represent an evaluation by individuals regarding their own religion and other religions. Meanwhile, attitudes towards religious plurality indicate individuals' interpretations of different religions as sources of truth and values (Anthony et al., 2005:154-86). These attitudes entail inclusive monism, exclusive monism, commonality pluralism, differential pluralism, and relativistic pluralism. Finally, interpretation of sacred writing, i.e. the dynamics of intra-textual fundamentalism versus hermeneutic interpretation, refers respectively to a literal or contextual interpretation of Holy Scriptures. Research by Duriez et al. (1999) explains that exclusive truth claims (exclusive monism) and

literal interpretations in general (here specified as religious intra-textual fundamentalism) closely relate to discriminatory behaviour. Both believers and non-believers who have literal ways of thinking are associated with ethnocentrism (Hutsebaut, 2007:177). Therefore, religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality, and the way believers interpret sacred writings are all part of the broad dimension of religiosity that mediates the relationship between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance.

1.1.4.4 Individual memory of violence

In analysing the relationship between social identification and ethnic exclusionism, experience of violence may play a pivotal role as an intermediary variable, as it often connected to the strengthening of social boundaries and solidarity within an in-group. Coser's (1956) propositions on social conflict mention that high intensity and hard social conflict can reconfirm social boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, increase the social solidarity of an in-group and produce increased perceptions of difference within an in-group. A social identity in terms of who "we" are depends on who "they" are at moments of violent conflict (Connerton, 1989; Tilly, 2002; Whiteley, 1988 cf. Novak and Rodseth, 2006:3). Several studies provide evidence that the experience of violence or the memory of violence can reconfirm social boundaries and intensify ethnic exclusionism. Both individual and collective memories of violence can be important, since the psychological consequences of intergroup violence can persist among victimized groups for generations after peace is restored (Cairns and Lewis, 1999; Wohl and Branscombe, 2005 cf. Sahdra and Ross, 2007:385). For example, studies by Novak and Rodseth (2006:17) on the trauma of collective violence, point out that memories of violence make people draw and redraw social boundaries. In addition, Waterston (2005:43) in his auto-ethnographic writing, sheds light on how the memory of violence and its narrative can encourage people's hatred as well as acts of destruction, ethnocentrism, and the worst kind of nationalism.

Other research by Doherty and Poole (1997) and Anderson and Shuttleworth (2003) explain how religious violence between Catholics and Protestants in Belfast, Northern Ireland in the 1970s caused residential segregation according to religious denomination. In this city, apparently ethno-religious violence and spatial segregation are strongly related over time and space (Doherty and Poole, 1997:533). This does not solely mean that ethno-religious violence has an impact on spatial segregation, but also that the latter facilitates ethno-religious attacks. However, Sahdra and Ross (2007:393) explain that differences in in-group identification are closely related to the accessibility of historical memories, including memories of violence. The lower and higher in-group identifiers do not differ significantly in remembering in-group victims. The higher identifiers recall less of the violence conducted by their own group. Group membership provides the materials for memory, and stimulates individuals in recalling particular events (Halbwachs, 1992:38). In this research, individual memories of violence intermediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance.

1.1.4.5 Perceived discrimination

The activation of social boundaries can encourage discrimination against other ethno-religious groups. Social boundaries are defined as "*any contiguous zone of contrasting identity, rapid transition, or separation between internally connected clusters of populations and/or activity for which human participants create shared representation*" (Tilly, 2005:134). Consequently, social boundaries include relations between individuals within one group (in-group), relations between individuals within the other group (out-group), relations between in-groups and out-groups, and shared representations that belong to both groups. Eisenstadt and Giessen (1995:98) also pay attention to how social boundaries and solidarity are constructed, maintained, contested, changed, and reconstructed. They explain that three ideal patterns can be used to identify collective identity: primordial

identities, civic identities, and transcendental patterns (religion). Collective identity is created through the social construction of social boundaries and solidarity. Both of them are constructed by the processes of differentiation between "us" and "the other" (Eisenstadt, 1995:97).[20]

The formation of collective identity[21] has consequences for the allocation and distribution of resources within a collectivity, as well as for access to those resources (Eisenstadt, 1995:99). Referring to Tilly (2005:134), social boundaries can change through four kinds of processes. They can change through *formation, transformation, activation,* and *suppression*. In practice, the formation and changing of social boundaries can lead to the activation of political identity, economic exploitation, social category discrimination, democratization, and communal violence. Sander (2002:348) also argues that the construction of social boundaries is marked by conflict due to competition and exploitation (or perceptions of competition and exploitation). Fox (2000:427) emphasizes that ethno-religious identification contributes to discrimination against minority groups. Unfair daily treatment and discriminatory experiences result in perceived discrimination through an internalization process that is experienced by individuals. Conversely, a study from Iceland and Wilkes (2006:269) provides evidence that discrimination and racial residential preference play a pivotal role in determining residential patterns. Moreover, Rosenbaum (1992:468) demonstrates that ethnic preference for seclusion, and experience with external forces, including discrimination, imposes isolation on a group. Discrimination as well as perceived discrimination may tend to increase hostility toward out-groups and strengthen in-group

20 This results from the social construction of social boundaries, creating the line of demarcation between insiders and outsiders. The meaning of boundaries is emphasized due to a collective identity that results from the social construction process, a collective identity that gives attention to the definition of difference between "us" and "them" (the "other").

21 Collective identity is rooted in classical sociological theories, such as Durkheim's collective conscious, Marx's class-consciousness, Weber's *verstehen*, and Tonnies's *gemeinschaft*. They describe the "we"-ness of a group, emphasizing the similarities or shared attributes of group members (Cerulo, 1997:386-387).

identification. Allport (1954:160) refers to this as extropunitive and intropunitive factors. In this study, perceived discrimination is added as an intermediate variable between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance.

1.1.4.6 Nationalistic attitudes

A nationalistic attitude has two dimensions, namely patriotism and chauvinism (Coenders 2001:64). If the former refers to the degree of attachment to the national in-group or country, as well as the love for and pride in one's own country, the latter refers to the view that one's own country is unique and superior. Chauvinism, therefore, implies a downward comparison with other countries. This definition is strongly rooted in the writing of Adorno et al. (1950:107) in reference to the concepts of genuine patriotism and pseudo-patriotism. The former is an attitude that stands for love of one's country. Meanwhile, the latter is a "*blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and the rejection of other nations as out-groups*" (Ibid.) Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993:21) explain that nationalism and patriotism are ordered on the continuum of rejecting out-groups. Another argument by Todosijevic (1998:18) explains that chauvinism and romantic nationalism (patriotism) correlate significantly with authoritarianism, particularly authoritarian aggressiveness values in the former Yugoslavia states. In addition, Latcheva (2010:209) provides evidence that chauvinism and nationalistic pride positively correlate with ethnic exclusionism and intolerance toward national minorities in Bulgaria. Coenders (2001:202) notes that the more restrictive the notions of the national in-group, the more strongly ethnic minorities are excluded.

On the other hand, ethno-religious identification also can relate to nationalistic attitudes. Most studies refer to Ernest Gellner's (2006) seminal work that argues nationalism replaces religion with more powerful symbols

of national identity. Anderson (1991:19) also mentions that the increase in nationalism usually marks the decline of the influence of religion. Research by Lozides (2000:13) proves that religions in the Balkan Peninsula have no strong effect on ethno-nationalism, but that markers of ethnic identification such as language contribute to ethno-nationalism there. Rieffer (2003:237) offers a framework for understanding the role of religion in the origins of nationalism, and for considering how religious nationalism frequently leads to discrimination and violence. In this context, religions function as an instrument to unify different groups of people. Consequently, if religious identification has a relatively positive influence on ethno-nationalism, it will potentially lead to discrimination and violence.

However, nationalism in the Indonesian context is different than nationalism in the Western and Eastern European contexts. Indonesia has more than 300 ethnic groups with their own languages and cultures. After the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, decentralization was implemented. Major ethnic groups in certain provinces such as Aceh, Riau, and Papua claimed that they were sons of the soil and should have privileges – political, economic, and socio-cultural privileges – in their provinces. We identify these claims as regiocentric attitudes or regiocentrism. In this study, chauvinism, patriotism, and regiocentrism represent nationalistic attitudes. Therefore, the stronger the ethno-religious identification, the more likely it is to find nationalistic attitudes (chauvinism, ethno-nationalism, and regio-centrism), which increase intergroup contact avoidance between religious groups.

1.1.4.7 Distrust

Classical sociological theories argue that trust is a basic element of a society, since societies would disintegrate without it. Trust functions as a force of social integration as well as influencing the practical conduct of individuals (Simmel 1990:178, cf. Mollering 2001:405). Modern studies

on trust emphasize trust as mutual faithfulness, on which all relationships in society eventually depend, and see it as fundamental for the creation of social solidarity (Parsons, 1969:351; Tropp et al., 2006:771; Tam et al., 2009:46). Trust can exist either in a social system as an inter-subjective force for binding society together, or within individuals as a psychological construct. In a pluralistic society, low levels of trust will likely lead to social disintegration, because there would not be enough social capital to bridge and bind all the various groups comprising the society. In that scenario, relationships between groups at the individual level are characterized by stereotyping, prejudice, and exclusionism. For example, the support of residential segregation is generally stimulated by lower intergroup trust. In short, high trust is likely to encourage harmonious intergroup relationships, while low trust tends to stimulate conflict between groups.

The research by Tropp et al. (2006:789) on trust and acceptance in intergroup interactions concludes that "*group members may have different expectations for cross-group interactions, depending on the way in which their group membership is introduced in the contact situation*." In their research, respondents had less trust in and acceptance of out-groups that made reference to their group membership in cross group-interactions. Another study on trust by Tam et al. (2009:57) describes the Northern Ireland case: direct and extended intergroup contact with out-group members may eliminate distrust against out-groups. Another study on trust in Bosnia and Russia by Ward et al. (2007:33) shows that respondents who do not articulate ethnic pride, and who make friends with people from various ethnic backgrounds, tend to trust people of different national backgrounds. In this context, group identification is related to how people express trust or distrust against out-group members. Based on these three studies, it is clear that distrust and trust are related to group prejudice. However, distrust and trust are also related to group identification. In this study, we situate distrust as an intermediate variable in relation to ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance between ethno-religious groups.

1.1.4.8 Social dominance orientation

Social dominance theory is a synthesis of authoritarian personality theory, Blumer's group positions theory, Marxist and neoclassical elite theories, and social identity theory. This theory elaborates on social identity theory's perspective that group conflicts tend to be minimized when both the superior and inferior groups recognize the legitimacy of status distinction (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999:19). The theory is based on the basic observation that all human societies are likely to be structured as systems of group-biased social hierarchies, which consist of a small number of dominant and hegemonic groups at the top, and a number of subordinate groups at the bottom. The dominant group owns a large share of the positive social value, or all of the material and symbolic things that people strive for, while the subordinated groups possesses a large share of the negative value, such as lack of power and social status (ibid., 1999:1-2). One of the theoretical assumptions is that "*social systems are subject to the counterbalancing influence of hierarchy enhancing forces, producing and maintaining ever higher levels of group-based social inequality, and hierarchy-attenuating forces, producing greater levels of group-biased social equality*" (ibid., 38).

Social dominance theory states that group-based oppression is driven by systematic institutional and individual discrimination. Many social institutions (like schools, organized religion and marriage) and powerful individuals disproportionately allocate desired goods (prestige, wealth and power) to members of dominant groups, while directing undesirable things to the less powerful groups (Sidanius et al., 2004:843). Institutional discrimination is one of the major forces producing and reproducing systems of group-based hierarchy. Group discrimination is systematic due to how social ideologies work to coordinate the actions of individuals and institutions. The acceptance of ideologies that legitimize inequality, and of practices that produce inequality, is determined by people's desires for group-based dominance, called social dominance orientation (ibid., 848). Research based on this theory, carried out by Dru (2007:882) shows

that social dominance orientation relates to prejudice when competitive memberships are salient. Another study by Pratto et al. (2000:403) explains that the psychological capacity to receive and transmit social dominance is likely essential to how the culture and ideologies of dominance are maintained and combined with institutional arrangements to produce and reproduce a culture of dominance. Therefore, in this study, we situate social dominance orientation as an intermediate variable between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance.

1.1 Research model

Based on previous research, and considering the research questions and the proposed theoretical frameworks for analysis, this study comes up with a research model that consists of ethno-religious identification, avoidance of intergroup contact, and individual and intermediate determinants.

1.1.1 The formulation of the research model

Based on the three main theoretical frameworks identified at the beginning of this chapter, and the additional theories discussed above, the basic concepts utilized in this research are as follows: avoidance of intergroup contact, ethno-religious identification, perceived threat, salience of identity, intergroup contact, religiosity, individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, nationalistic attitude, distrust, social dominance orientation, and social position of individuals. Each concept is developed into variables that will be measured in this research as dependent, independent, intermediary, and control variables. The main dependent variable is intergroup contact avoidance and the main independent variable is ethno-religious identification. The control variables are the social positions of individuals that we label as *individual determinants*. Intermediary variables are *salience of identity*, *perceived threat*, *intergroup contact*, *religiocentrism*, *attitudes toward religious plurality*, *interpretation*

of sacred writing, *individual memory of violence*, *nationalistic attitudes*, *perceived discrimination*, *distrust*, and *social dominance orientation* (SDO). The following table gives a description of the conceptual definitions of each type of variable based on the theoretical framework.

Table 2.1 *Conceptual definitions of variables*

Variables	Conceptual definitions
Avoidance of intergroup contact	The degree to which people avoid interactions with out-group members, both intimate and official subjects in daily lives.
Ethno-religious identification[22]	Ethno-religious awareness, self-identification, and behaviours that individuals derive from their membership of a religious or ethnic group, with attached values and emotions.
Individual determinants	Social categories of individuals (i.e. gender and household income) that may influence them to avoid intergroup contact avoidance
Perceived threat	Social perceptions of ethno-religious groups related to threats in the field of political, economic, and socio-cultural competition.
Salience identity	The extent to which individuals are aware of their ethnic categorizations and identity and how important these ethnic differentiations are to them.
Intergroup contact	The degree of social interaction between members of different ethno-religious groups in public spaces.
Perceived discrimination	Social perceptions of exclusion and discrimination of all members of the in-group that are internalized.
Individual memories of violence	Individual memories or experiences related to direct or indirect communal violence in the past.
Religiocentrism	Combination of negative attitudes towards religious out-groups and positive attitudes toward religious in-groups.
Attitudes toward religious plurality	Individuals' interpretations of different religions as sources of truth and values. These attitudes entail feelings about religious monism, pluralism, and relativism.
Interpretation of sacred writing	The way believers interpret sacred writings, which can be distinguished into intratextual fundamentalism and hermeneutic interpretation.
Nationalistic attitude	Attachment to one's own nation or country based on critical understanding, and feelings of national superiority based on uncritical attachment to the group and country.
Distrust	Mutual lack of the faithfulness on which all relations in society eventually depend, being fundamental for the creation of social solidarity.
Social dominance orientation	People's desire to accept ideologies that legitimize inequality and practices that produce inequality within group-biased social hierarchies.

22 A set of beliefs and practices of individuals, particularly varieties of spirituality such as praying and church going, that supports a sort of faith (Geertz, 1968:1).

Following the ethnic group conflict theory and theoretical propositions from other theories, this study proposes a set of relations between ethno-religious identification, avoidance of intergroup contact, and individual and intermediate determinants, as follows. According to social identity theory, ethno-religious identification is likely to have a positive influence on avoidance of intergroup contact because group membership is sufficient to generate discrimination against out-group members (Turner, 1981). Social categorization and comparison tend to induce exclusionary attitudes in intergroup relations (Brewer, 2001). Therefore, we come up with a proposition that ethno-religious identification tends to induce intergroup contact avoidance. Also, previous studies on social distance (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Tolsma et al., 2008) suggest that certain social positions allegedly affect avoidance of intergroup contact in a negative direction. The higher the social class is, the lower will be the intergroup contact avoidance. Consequently, individual determinants are proposed to have negative effects on avoidance of intergroup contact.

Several studies suggest that the following intermediate determinants are likely to have influences on contact avoidance. Ethnic group conflict theory says that perceived threat is the most important determinant of exclusionary attitudes toward out-group members. Referring to ethnic group conflict theory, we expect that ethno-religious identification will probably result in the avoidance of intergroup contact due to perceived threat. Moreover, studies on salience identity demonstrate that ethno-religious identification does not directly tend to increase exclusionary behaviour toward ethno-religious out-group members. The meaning and importance of ethno-religious identity are more salient than the meaning and importance of ethno-religious identification (Phinney and Rotheram, 1987). Therefore, we propose that the salience of identity will likely induce the avoidance of intergroup contact. In addition, according to intergroup contact theory, contact between groups tends to reduce prejudicial attitudes toward out-group members if intergroup contact has a stronger effect

on favourable attitudes towards the out-group (Pettigrew, 1998). Ethno-religious identification therefore is expected to have a negative influence on the avoidance of intergroup contact via actual intergroup contact.

Research on religiosity provides the explanation that religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, and interpretation of sacred writing, are likely related to exclusionary attitudes toward religious out-group members (Anthony and Sterkens, 2005; Williamson, et al., 2010). We consequently propose that ethno-religious identification induces avoidance of intergroup contact via religiosity. Also, the activation of social boundaries is likely to increase discriminatory attitudes toward out-group members. Support of ethno-religious identification is expected to have positive influences on the avoidance of intergroup contact via perceived discrimination. Studies on experiences of violence provide evidence that memories and experiences of violence are likely related to residential segregation, avoidance, and conflict between religious groups (Doherty and Pooley, 1997). Consequently, we propose that ethno-religious identification likely affects avoidance of intergroup contact positively via individual memories of violence.

Research on nationalistic attitudes points out that both romantic nationalism and chauvinism tend to increase ethnic exclusionary and intolerant attitudes toward ethnic minorities (Coenders, 2001; Latcheva, 2010). So, we propose that ethno-religious identification appears to have a positive influence on the avoidance of intergroup contact via nationalistic attitudes. Studies on trust (Mollering, 2001; Tropp et al., 2006) suggest that trust is a basic element of society. Low levels of trust tend to reinforce social identity, which in turn will increase intergroup contact avoidance. Distrust therefore is expected to have a positive effect on intergroup contact avoidance. Finally, several literal sources on social dominance theory say that superior groups are likely to legitimize their domination over subordinated groups, while the subordinated groups are likely to support equality between groups (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Therefore, social dominance orientation is likely to mediate the relationship between group

identification and avoidance of intergroup contact. The relation of all these intervariables can be seen in detail in the following charts.

Figure 2.2 *Research model: the relations between variables*



In summary, the conceptual model shows that ethno-religious identification is proposed to induce avoidance of intergroup contact, even after controlling for several individual determinants (i.e. gender and household income). We expect that people from higher social statuses are less likely to avoid contact with the out-group. The relationship between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance can be explained by the following intermediate determinants: perceived threat, salience of identity, religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, fundamentalism, individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation (SDO) – these are expected to have positive effects on intergroup contact avoidance, and moreover reduce the initial relationships between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance. In contrast, actual intergroup contact is proposed to have a negative influence on avoidance of intergroup contact.

2.2.2 Hypotheses

Based on research questions as mentioned earlier in chapter 1, the theoretical framework of intergroup contact avoidance (i.e. ethnic group conflict theory and other theoretical propositions), and based on the research model, this study proposes a set of preliminary hypotheses, as follows:

1. Among Christians and Muslims in Yogyakarta and Ambon, the stronger people's ethno-religious identification is, the higher will be the level of avoidance of intergroup contacts.
2. Among Christians and Muslims in Yogyakarta and Ambon, the stronger people's ethno-religious identification is, the higher will be the level of avoidance of intergroup contacts, even after controlling for other individual-level determinants (such as gender, parents' religion, household income, parents' education, occupational and occupation status).

3. Among Christians and Muslims in Yogyakarta and Ambon, the relationship between ethno-religious identification and the avoidance of intergroup contact can be explained by particular intermediate determinants:
    - 3a. Perceived threat
    - 3b. Salience of identity
    - 3c. Intergroup contact
    - 3d. Religiocentrism
    - 3e. Attitudes toward religious plurality
    - 3f. Interpretation of sacred writing
    - 3g. Individual memories of violence
    - 3h. Perceived discrimination
    - 3i. Nationalistic attitudes
    - 3j. Distrust
    - 3k. Social dominance orientation (SDO).

These hypotheses are rooted in previous theoretical insights, addressing the research questions, particularly the explanatory questions at individual level. Hypothesis 1 is intended to answer research question 2a and test the relationship between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance. Hypothesis 2 aims to respond to research question 2b, which examines the relationship between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance while controlling individual level determinants. Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 3h, 3i, 3j and 3k have the objective of answering research question 2c and testing the relationship between ethno-religious identification and intergroup contact avoidance by using intermediate variables.

2.3 Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 provided a description of the introduction of the study, consisting of the position of the thesis, research

issues, history of intergroup contact avoidance in Yogyakarta and Ambon, and the research questions. Chapter 2 explains the theoretical framework of intergroup contact avoidance and the formulation of the research model and the hypotheses of the thesis. Chapter 3 largely explores data collection and measurement techniques, including research approaches, data collection procedures, and the representativeness of the samples, measurements, and *uni-variate* analyses. Chapter 4 employs *bi-variate* analyses to analyse the findings, including intergroup contact avoidance by ethno-religious identification, individual, and intermediate determinants. Chapter 5 primarily employs multivariate regression analyses covering and testing the theoretical model. Chapter 6 provides a description of crucial questions, empirical answers, innovation and progress, and new research issues. The results of interviews conducted will be described and analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5. ●

CHAPTER 3
DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENTS

In this chapter, we shall present the data collection and the measurements used in the course of this study. The first section describes the data collection methods employed in the research. The second section describes the types of measurements used, illustrating how the survey questions and the description of the survey in general were derived from the conceptual and operational definitions of each variable. Also in this section, we present the results of the univariate analysis conducted on the answers to each question in the survey. The last section describes the development of the topic list and focuses on the qualitative aspects of this study.

3.1 Data collection

Referring to Van de Vijver and Leung (1997:1), this study can be classified as a cross-cultural comparative study, because it compares the behaviours and attitudes of two different ethno-religious groups in different research sites. To support this study, we use both qualitative and quantitative methods as approaches to gathering and analysing data. Most of the observed phenomena discussed here are quite complicated, and will be interpreted with comprehensive theoretical perspectives from religious studies, sociology, and anthropology. Triangulation, defined by Denzin (1978:291) as "*the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon,*" suggests that quantitative and qualitative approaches should be viewed as complementary. Webb et al., (1966), Jick (1979), and Olsen (2004), strongly advocate the use of triangulation. For example, Olsen (2004) argues that triangulation tends to support interdisciplinary research rather

than one strongly bounded discipline of sociology. Referring to Newman (1997:29), the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches is more appropriate for this study as we are trying to describe the phenomenon of contact avoidance among ethno-religious groups in great detail, and to explain it in relation to a number of variables.

3.1.1 Data collection procedures

The data collection methods employed in this study included surveys, interviews, literature studies, and observations. A survey was conducted among university students in both Ambon and Yogyakarta. There are several reasons why we chose students as our research population. Students in Indonesia are part of the middle class, generally having sufficient knowledge and experience to utter analytic statements and to determine their attitude consciously and logically. University student unions organize demonstrations, rallies, and training for activists against unpopular government policies. The fall of authoritarian regimes in 1966 and 1998 were related to rising student movements. After 1998, the process of electing leaders of student unions often became a matter for political contest between religious or ethnic organizations. In conflict areas, student unions are politicized groups but are not necessarily affiliated with groups that are allegedly responsible for violence, or with politicized ethno-religious organizations. Student groups have also been involved in conducting peace activities, promoting reconciliation between ethno-religious groups that have been involved in conflict (Sterkens, 2009:3). A description of our sample and sampling procedures for these surveys of student attitudes can be seen in section 3.1.2.

Specifically, the qualitative approaches employed in this study were semi-structured interviews and literature studies. We describe our interview procedures in section 3.3. Literature studies were carried out to search for information on the history of ethno-religious formation. Media sources were also used to provide information on contextual factors, such as political contestation and conflictual relationships between ethno-religious groups.

3.1.2 Representativeness of sample

Surveys were conducted among students at the undergraduate level with a minimum of second year standing from six universities in Ambon and Yogyakarta. We chose students from the second year onwards because they have had sufficient time to engage in social interactions with classmates, board mates[1] and neighbours from different ethno-religious groups. The surveys were carried out at the beginning of the academic year in September 2011.

The universities chosen were purposely selected by considering the representation of religions at each institution. The universities selected were University of Gadjah Mada, (*Universitas Gadjah Mada, UGM*), State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga (*Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN Sunan Kalijaga*), and Christian University of Duta Wacana (*Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana, UKDW*) in Yogyakarta; and University of Pattimura (*Universitas Pattimura, Unpatti*), State Islamic Institute of Ambon *(Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN Ambon),* and Indonesian Christian University in Maluku (*Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku, UKIM*) in Ambon. The main reasons that we chose these six universities are that two (UKDW and UKIM) house a majority of Christian students, two (UIN Yogyakarta and UIN Ambon) house a majority of Muslim students, and the others (UGM and *Unpatti*) possess a heterogeneous population of students from various religious groups. UGM and *Unpatti* were also selected because of their roles as centres of education with secular orientations in their areas. Both UGM and *Unpatti* are also arenas of political contestation for religiously-based student organizations.

Pilot survey

Before conducting the surveys, we distributed a pilot questionnaire to test the validity and reliability of the measurements. In some cases, questions in the pilot survey were not used in the definitive stages of data gathering,

1 'Board mates' refer to dormitory friends.

for instance, when the answers to the survey questions did not have a normal distribution or had a very skewed distribution, or when a question proved too difficult to understand or did not clearly relate to context of the interviews.

The pilot survey was conducted in Yogyakarta and Ambon in May 2011, using second-year students and above who were selected randomly from the undergraduate enrolment lists (with exception of the first year students) of the six chosen universities. The following steps were used in this systematic random sampling. First, we identified the number of students in each university, using the list of ordered student identification numbers. For example, *Unpatti* has 14,198 students distributed across eight faculties. Second, we decided on the number of respondents at both the university and faculty levels. The number of respondents taken from each university was fifty students, and the number of students taken from each faculty was proportional to the faculty's percentage of all students at the university. For example, looking at *Unpatti's* 50 respondents, the faculty of Agriculture has 3 respondents (representing 6% of the sample of 50), because the faculty's 959 students represent 6.75% of the total university population. Third, we calculated the interval number by dividing the amount of undergraduate students with the number of respondents taken from each faculty. For instance, the interval number for the faculty of Agriculture is 160, which is the result obtained from dividing the population of 959 students by six respondents. Finally, from the list of ordered student identification numbers in every faculty, we then selected a random number between 1 and 160 (for example, the 5th student)and selected every 160th student from the fifth student in the sequential list: for example, the 165th student, the 325th student, the 490th student, and so on.

After the pilot survey was conducted, we evaluated the questionnaire based on the following criteria. First, we reviewed the descriptive statistics and correlations between questions. We eliminated questions that had no correlation with other questions of the same latent variable, or had

correlations that were too high. Second, we evaluated how respondents answered certain questions. Third, we added some minor information that was later included in survey questions. Therefore, we improved some of the survey questions based on our evaluation of the pilot survey.

Definite survey

The definite survey was carried out in three universities in Ambon (*Unpatti*, IAIN Ambon, UKIM), and three universities in Yogyakarta (UGM, UIN Sunan Kalijaga, and UKDW) from September to December of 2011. The overall goal of the sampling procedure was to collect a random sample from students in their second and third years of the BA program, in order to present a generalization of the student population. In each university, 250 students were selected by systematic random sampling. The following steps were carried out when conducting the survey in Ambon. First, we collected a list of students from every faculty to serve as the sampling frame.[2] We then conducted a systematic random sampling based on the proportion of the student population in every faculty within the university. The interval number was found by dividing the population of each faculty with the number of respondents. An invitation was sent to respondents with the assistance of university staff or the student union in each faculty. After that, respondents were gathered in one place to fill out the questionnaires under the supervision of the researcher.[3]

2 During religious violence in Ambon on the 15th of July 2011, the registration office of *Unpatti* was burnt down; and in communal violence on September 11th, 2011, the administration building of UKIM Ambon was destroyed. Consequently, the newest student enrolment lists for *Unpatti* and UKIM were destroyed. We used enrolment lists from the second semester of 2010 as a sample frame for these institutions.

3 This manner of inviting respondents was applicable in Unpatti (in the Agriculture, Technology, Education, and Economy faculties). However, at IAIN Ambon and some faculties in Unpatti (Law, Fisheries, Science, and Social Science) we used a different approach. Student executive boards identified respondents from a random list and distributed questionnaires. The next day, they collected the questionnaire from the respondents. In UKIM, university staff members distributed questionnaires to respondents, and respondents filled these out at home. After one week, these respondents submitted their questionnaire to the university staff.

The survey procedure in Yogyakarta was similar to the procedure in Ambon.[4] First, a list of the students attending the three universities was obtained in the form of a digital file. The data in Yogyakarta was gathered at the university level, rather than at the faculty level as in Ambon. Second, we implemented random sampling directly by using a set of random numbers obtained by a computer program. Third, we sent invitation letters that were distributed by the department heads to the respondents, asking them to gather in particular places within their universities. Finally, the surveys were conducted in the classrooms referred to in the invitation. These procedures were applicable at both UGM and UIN Sunan Kalijaga. However, at UKDW, several research assistants visited respondents in their dormitories to distribute the questionnaires. The number of respondents and the response rate can be seen in more detail in Table 3.1.

The table shows the number of respondents per department and university, resulting in 1,500 respondents in total. Two hundred and fifty respondents were selected by systematic random sampling from each university. The proportion of respondents we took from each faculty was similar to the proportion of total faculty students within the total university student population. For example, the proportion of total student population in the faculty of Agriculture at *Unpatti* is 7%, and the proportion of our respondents is 7%. This is a result of using stratified random sampling at the faculty level. In the case of UGM, UIN Yogyakarta, and UKDW, there is a slight difference between the proportions, because random sampling was done at the level of the population of the university as a whole.

The response rates to the survey are provided in table 3.1. The response rates at *Unpatti* (65.45%) and IAIN Ambon (64.43%) were relatively high, while the UKIM rate came in slightly below those rates (59.38%). The response rate at UIN (60.82%) was relatively high, with slightly lower rates at UGM (54.70%) and UKDW (51.97%). In short, the response rate of respondents in Yogyakarta was slightly lower than in Ambon.

4 Tri Subagya managed the survey distribution during his fieldwork in Yogyakarta from September to December 2011.

Table 3.1 *Sampling frame and response rate at six universities in Ambon and Yogyakarta*

University	Faculty	N of students (P)	% of students	N invited respondents (A)	Actual sample (B)	Response rate N (%) (B/A)	% of actual sample
Unpatti	Agriculture	959	6.75	24	17	70.83	6.80
	Technique	541	3.81	15	10	66.67	4.00
	Law	1203	8.47	31	21	67.74	8.40
	Economic	1781	12.54	49	32	65.31	12.80
	Social and political sciences	1490	10.49	37	26	70.27	10.40
	Natural science	1273	8.97	28	22	78.57	8.80
	Fishery	1147	8.08	31	20	64.52	8.00
	Education	5804	40.88	167	102	61.08	40.80
Total		**14198**	**100.00**	**382**	**250**	**65.45**	**100.00**
IAIN Ambon	Islamic philosophy	2467	62,81	66	32	62.12	59.60
	Islamic law	499	12,70	98	61	61.22	16.40
	Islamic education	962	24,49	224	157	66.52	24.00
Total		**3928**	**100.00**	**388**	**250**	**64.43**	**100.00**
UKIM	Theology	494	23.20	81	46	56.79	18.40
	Technique	389	18.27	101	56	55.45	22.40
	Economics	651	30.58	91	56	61.54	22.40
	Social sciences	312	14.65	70	43	61.43	17.20
	Public health and nursery	283	13.29	78	49	62.82	19.60
Total		**2129**	**100.00**	**421**	**250**	**59.38**	**100.00**

UGM	Economics and business	2035	7.05	24	8	33.33	3.20
	Social and political sciences	2556	8.85	30	20	66.67	8.00
	Cultural science	2137	7.40	42	34	80.95	13.60
	Philosophy	230	0.80	6	5	83.33	2.00
	Geography	954	3.30	12	6	50.00	2.40
	Law	1449	5.02	31	7	22.58	2.80
	Psychology	858	2.97	11	8	72.73	3.20
	Agriculture	1731	5.99	39	23	58.97	9.20
	Agricultural technology	1209	4.19	11	5	45.45	2.00
	Forestry	1021	3.54	16	9	56.25	3.60
	Biology	824	2.85	14	8	57.14	3.20
	Veterinary science	708	2.45	9	4	44.44	1.60
	Animal science	921	3.19	15	14	93.33	5.60
	Mathematics and natural sciences	2842	9.84	34	22	64.71	8.80
	Medicine	1907	6.60	28	13	46.43	5.20
	Pharmacy	830	2.87	9	6	66.67	2.40
	Dentistry	883	3.06	19	7	36.84	2.80
	Engineering	5783	20.03	107	51	47.66	20.40
Total		**28878**	**100.00**	**457**	**250**	**54.70**	**100.00**

UIN Sunan Kalijaga	Islamic letters (adab)	1467	13.39	77	46	59.74	18.40
	Islamic preaching	1147	10.47	35	33	94.29	13.20
	Islamic philosophy	862	7.87	52	42	80.77	16.80
	Islamic education	2250	20.53	59	43	72.88	17.20
	Islamic law	2057	18.77	67	37	55.22	14.80
	Science and technology	2236	20.41	93	42	45.16	16.80
	Social and humanism	938	8.56	28	7	25	2.80
Total		**10957**	**100.00**	**411**	**250**	**60.82**	**100.00**
UKDW	Business	629	20.78	103	60	58.25	24.00
	Theology	300	9.91	60	57	95	22.80
	Technology of information	1396	46.12	224	80	35.71	32.00
	Architecture and design	408	13.48	68	28	41.18	11.20
	Biotechnology	121	4.00	26	18	69.23	10.00
Total		**2854**	**5.72**	**481**	**250**	**51.97**	**100.00**

Considering the random procedures we used, the relatively high response rates at the universities, and the match between the distribution of students in faculties and samples, we propose that this database provides us with the ability to generalize the student populations of these universities from this sample.

During the period when the surveys were conducted, from September to December of 2011, there was a series of incidents of communal violence between Muslims and Christians in Ambon. A large-scale incident erupted in September, after a Muslim motorcycle driver was murdered in a Christian village. During the subsequent communal violence, three people died and hundreds of houses were set on fire. Another incident occurred in October 2011, but on a smaller scale. However a second large-scale incident erupted in December 2011, when a Christian mini-bus driver was murdered in a Muslim settlement. A number of terror-bombings occurred in both communities in the days following this incident, which led to public transport becoming religiously segregated. This recent violence may have affected the opinions of respondents in Ambon who answered the questionnaire.

1.2 Measurements

In this study, we divided the variables into four categories: dependent, independent, individual determinants, and intermediate. The dependent variable is intergroup contact avoidance, and the crucial independent variable is ethno-religious identification. Individual determinants consist of gender, parents, religion, household income, parent's education, occupation, and occupational status. Intermediate variables are salience of identity, perceived threat, intergroup contact, religiosity (religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, and interpretation of sacred writing), perceived discrimination, individual memory of violence, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation (SDO). All of these

variables have clear definitions containing specific indicators, which are operationalized in specific survey questions.

3.2.1 Avoidance of intergroup contact

Intergroup contact avoidance is represented by social distance (Park, 1923 cf. Bogardus, 1925a; Wark and Galliher, 2007) and the preference to remain residentially segregated (Clark, 1992; Tabory, 2007; Semyonov et al., 2007). The operational definition of intergroup contact avoidance, based on Bogardus (1925b) and Wark and Galliher's (2007) work on social distance, is an individual's intention to reject or avoid out-group members as spouses, close friends, classmates, board mates, neighbours, housemaids, civil servants, town mayors, and police, as well as an individual's preference to live in residential segregation. Residential segregation is an individual's preference to stay in housing inhabited by religious in-group members, rejecting religious out-group members as neighbours.

Contact avoidance

For the purposes of measurement, intergroup contact avoidance consists of two main indicators, namely social distance and a preference for residential segregation. The indicator of social distance builds on the measurements by Bogardus (1925b), Coenders et al., (2007), and Wark and Galliher (2007).. Coenders et al. emphasize the opposition to interethnic marriage in some European countries, and add the willingness to accept or avoid a boss from a migrant group in the social distance scale. Wark and Galliher place their emphasis on opposition to having contact with migrants as spouses, close friends, neighbours, colleagues, and fellow citizens. Since the root of these two inventories build on Bogardus's concept of social distance, this study uses the questions developed by Bogardus as the main inventory.

The first measurement is derived from Bogardus's social distance scale. The original question is "*According to my first reaction, I would*

willingly admit members of each race to one or more of the classifications under which I have placed a cross." Because this study measures social distance between Muslim and Christian students.[5] the subject of social distance has been changed to adapt to the student environment, referencing board mates and classmates. We also added the category of housemaid in order to represent lower status individuals in society. In addition, this question measures social distance in the realm of politics, referring to civil servants, city mayors, and police officers, because the desire to avoid religious out-group members can extend to interactions with government officials. Therefore, we changed the question to : "*To what extent would you accept or avoid having a Christian (or Muslim) as your future spouse, close friend, board mate, classmate, neighbour, civil servant, city major, police officer, and housemaid*?"

Table 3.2 *Contact avoidance by Muslim and Christian respondents*

To what extent would you accept or avoid having a Christian/Muslim as your	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=368)	Christian (n=351)	Muslim (n=474)	Christian (n=253)	Muslim (n=841)	Christian (n=604)
164/173. city/town mayor?	M: 2.86 SD: 1.12	M: 2.28 SD: .94	M: 2.93 SD: 1.20	M: 2.11 SD: .68	M: 2.90 SD: 1.17	M: 2.21 SD: .85
165/174. civil servant?	M: 2.43 SD: .87	M: 2.06 SD: .69	M: 2.26 SD: .81	M: 2.06 SD: .66	M: 2.33 SD: .84	M: 2.06 SD: .68
166/175. police officer?	M: 2.55 SD: .97	M: 2.18 SD: .79	M: 2.22 SD: .77	M: 2.04 SD: .54	M: 2.36 SD: .88	M: 2.12 SD: .70
167/176. neighbour?	M: 2.61 SD: 1.00	M:2. 01 SD: .68	M: 2.08 SD: .67	M: 1.94 SD: .54	M: 2.31 SD: .87	M: 1.98 SD: .62
168/177. classmate?	M: 2.43 SD: .99	M: 1.87 SD: .57	M: 2.00 SD: .64	M: 1.91 SD: .52	M: 2.19 SD: .85	M: 1.89 SD: .55
16 9/178. board/dorm/house mate?	M: 2.84 SD: 1.13	M: 2.03 SD: .67	M: 2.16 SD: .79	M: 1.94 SD: .57	M: 2.46 SD: 1.01	M: 1.99 SD: .63
170/179. houseboy/housemaid?	M: 3.51 SD: 1.15	M: 2.24 SD: .89	M: 2.64 SD: 1.07	M: 2.01 SD: .66	M: 3.02 SD: 1.18	M: 2.14 SD: .81
171/180. close friend?	M: 2.89 SD: 1.17	M: 2.00 SD: .69	M: 2.27 SD: .91	M: 1.94 SD: .59	M: 2.54 SD: 1.08	M: 1.97 SD: .65
172/181. future spouse?	M: 4.37 SD: 1.01	M: 3.35 SD: 1.39	M: 4.00 SD: 1.19	M: 3.54 SD: 1.27	M: 4.16 SD: 1.13	M: 3.43 SD: 1.35

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree).

5 Although our independent variable is about ethno-religious identification, this research focuses on avoidance of intergroup contact between religious groups rather than between ethnic groups. This is because religious groups are considered to be of primary concern. It does not mean that there is no contact avoidance among ethnic groups in research sites. It is hard to account for conflict experience in Ambon without examining how religion played an important role in political mobilization.

In our sample, Muslim respondents are more likely than Christian respondents to avoid contact with out-groups. The mean values of answers provided by Muslim respondents are higher in terms of contact avoidance, the lowest being 2.19 for the question pertaining to classmates, and the highest being 4.16 for the question pertaining to future spouses. The answers of Christian respondents to those same questions were 1.89 and 3.43. However, Muslim respondents in Ambon showed higher levels of contact avoidance than those in Yogyakarta. The mean value of Muslim respondents in Ambon to the questions about classmates and civil servants was 2.43, and 4.37 for the question about future spouses. Meanwhile, the mean value of answers given by Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta for the question about classmates was 2.00, and 4.00 for the question regarding future spouses. The answers from Christian respondents also have the same pattern: Christian respondents in Ambon displayed greater support for contact avoidance than those in Yogyakarta.

From table 3.2 we can extract the order of contact avoidance on a scale from high to low in the answers from Muslim respondents: future spouse, housemaid, city mayor, board mate, close friend, police officer, civil servant, neighbour, classmate. For Christian respondents the order on a scale from high to low is: future spouse, city mayor, housemaid, police officer, civil servant, board mate, neighbour, close friend, and classmate.

Standard deviation measures to what extent the value deviates from the mean in reference to particular data. The standard deviation of contact avoidance for Muslim respondents for each item ranges from .84 to 1.18, while the the standard deviation for Christian respondents lies between .55 and 1.35. As seen in Table 3.2, the variation in the answers from Muslim respondents in answering this question is relatively higher than the variation in the answers from Christian respondents.

Table 3.3 *Barriers of contact*

150. Do you believe there are major barriers between …?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	191	25.50	308	41.10	499	33.30
Yes	526	70.10	432	57.60	958	63.90
Missing	33	4.40	10	1.30	43	2.90
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
151. If yes, what do you think is the primary barrier between them?	**RESPONDENTS**					
	AMBON		**YOGYAKARTA**		**TOTAL**	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Religion	194	36.90	143	33.10	337	35.20
Attitude	159	30.20	149	34.50	308	32.20
Language	8	1.50	6	1.40	14	1.50
Values	86	16.30	103	23.80	189	19.70
Others	44	8.40	22	5.10	66	6.90
Missing	35	6.70	9	2.10	44	4.60
Total	526	100.00	432	100.00	958	100.00

63.90% of respondents (both Muslim and Christian) believe there are major barriers in relations between Muslims and Christians, as demonstrated in Table 3.3.

Support for residential segregation

The second measurement employed in this study explains the relationship between religious identification and the preference to live in segregated areas. This second indicator builds on the measurement developed by Tabory (2007). We have made changes and additions to one of the model questions, simplifying it to be more easily understood by Indonesian respondents. The first question [*I prefer to live in neighbourhoods inhabited by person of similar religiosity level*] has been adjusted to say, "*I prefer to live in a neighbourhood inhabited by people of the same religion*." A negative statement has also been added to the first question, "*I prefer to live in a neighbourhood inhabited by people of the different religion*." The third and fourth statements are "*For the good of the city, people should reside in separate communities according to their religion,"and "There should be separate neighbourhoods where Muslims and Christians can live separately."*

Table 3.4 *Preference for residential segregation*

	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (N=364)	Christian (N=356)	Muslim (N=475)	Christian (N=254)	Muslim (N=838)	Christian (N=611)
182. I prefer to live in a neighbourhood inhabited by persons of the same religion.	M: 4.28 SD: .92	M: 3.55 SD: 1.11	M: 3.65 SD: 1.08	M: 2.93 SD: .97	M: 3.93 SD: 1.06	M: 3.29 SD: 1.09
183. I prefer to live in a neighbourhood inhabited by persons of different religion.	M: 2.65 SD: 1.10	M: 3.26 SD: .96	M: 3.01 SD: .93	M: 3.42 SD: .86	M: 2.85 SD: 1.02	M: 3.33 SD: .92
184. For the good of the city, people should reside in separate communities according to their religion.	M: 3.05 SD: 1.16	M: 2.41 SD: 1.05	M: 2.42 SD: .95	M: 1.97 SD: .77	M: 2.69 SD: 1.09	M: 2.22 SD: .97
185. There should be separate neighbourhoods where Muslims and Christians can live separately.	M: 3.02 SD: 1.25	M: 2.26 SD: 1.06	M: 2.43 SD: 1.02	M: 1.91 SD: .84	M: 2.68 SD: 1.16	M: 2.11 SD: .99

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

Muslim respondents prefer to live in neighbourhoods inhabited by people of the same religion (M= 3.93), with Muslim respondents in Ambon scoring higher (M=4.28) than Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta (M=3.65). Christian respondents have a higher preference than Muslims for living in neighbourhoods inhabited by persons of different religions, scoring (M=3.33) to Muslim respondents' (M=2.85). Muslim respondents (M=2.69) also show more support than Christians (M=2.22) for the idea that, for the good of the city, people should reside in separate communities according to their religion. Muslim respondents (M=2.68) also show a higher level of agreement than Christians (2.11) with the statement that there should be separate neighbourhoods for Muslims and Christians.

The standard deviation of answers from Muslim respondents lies between 1.02 and 1.16, while for Christian respondents it ranges from .92

to 1.09. The heterogeneity of the responses from Christians is lower than the heterogeneity of responses from Muslims.

3.2.2 Ethno-religious identification

Ethno-religious identification includes three primary dimensions reflected at the individual level: cognitive (knowledge), evaluation (value), and affective (emotion) (Tajfel, 1981; Gijsberts et al., 2004). The term refers both to religious identification and ethnic identification. Questions regarding these variables were taken from the models provided in Tuti's (2007) and Handi's (2008) questionnaires, which focus on ethnic and religious identification in Indonesian society. In addition, we added some questions from the European Social Survey (ESS 2008,) since these questions touch on conscious self-identification.

3.2.2.1 Religious identification

According to Phinney and Rotheram's concept of ethnic identity (1987), we define religious identification as an individual's sense of belonging to a religious group and the part of an individual's thinking, perceptions, feelings, and behaviours that relate to their religious group membership. Religious identification is a process in which individuals obtain their image of self from their knowledge of having membership of a religious group, including the value and emotional significance of the group (Tajfel, 1981; Gijsberts et al., 2004). Based on this definition, religious identification consists of religious self-definition, attendance at religious practices and ceremonies, friendship by religion, membership and participation in religious organizations, and political orientation.

Religious self-definition

Based on interpretations drawn from previous research, religious self-definition is an individual subjective feeling, acknowledgement, and

recognition through verbal statements about an individual's membership in a certain religious group that represents their religious identity. Therefore, the question of religious self-definition is "*What religion do they consider themselves to belong to*?" Religious self-definition will be measured by asking respondents whether they consider themselves to be Muslim, Christian, Catholic, Hindu, or Buddhist. As an historical record and in support of religious self-definition, this research also asks respondents whether they had a different religion during secondary school (about 12-17 years), or if their parents practice a different religion to them. This question is necessary to find out the history of religious affiliation and religious socialization in respondents' families, which is how individuals learned religious knowledge as children.

Table 3.5 *Religion*

21a. To what religion do you consider yourself to belong to?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Islam	373	49.70	480	64.00	853	56.90
Catholic	19	2.50	59	7.90	78	5.20
Christian/ Protestant	355	47.30	196	26.10	551	36.70
Buddhist	0	.00	6	.80	6	.40
Hindu	0	.00	3	.40	3	.20
Others	0	.00	2	.30	2	.10
Missing	3	.40	4	.50	7	.50
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00

In our sample, 56.90% of respondents consider themselves to be Muslim, 36.70% consider themselves to be Christian, and 5.20% consider themselves to be Catholic. However, the composition of religious populations differs between Ambon and Yogyakarta. The majority of respondents in Yogyakarta consider themselves to be Muslim (64%), with almost all the remainder identifying as Christian (26.10%) or Catholic (7.90%); there were small numbers of Buddhists (0.80%) and Hindu (0.40%) . In Ambon, 49.70% of the respondents identified themselves as Muslim, 47.30% as Christian, and 2.50% as Catholic; there were no Buddhists or Hindus. Most respondents

(83.60%) answered that they did not practice a different religion in high schoolbut 29 respondents in Yogyakarta and 10 respondents in Ambon did. Respondents reported that overall, their parents shared their religious identity.

Religious practices

Religious practices refers to the degree to which individuals identify themselves as part of a certain religious group, as reflected in their participation in regular religious activities, like attending religious services, reading and reciting their Holy Scriptures, and praying. The more frequently respondents engage in religious practices, the higher his/her degree of religious identification. The measurement of religious practices can be divided into two categories: reading Holy Scriptures and attending religious services. Questions about religious practices refer to the measurement by Handi (2008). However, the first question in Handi's model from *[How often do you read in the Holy scriptures of your own tradition]* has been changed to "*How often do you read or recite the Holy Scripture (Bible or Koran)?"* The second question has been changed from *[How often do you go to normal religious services in mosque or church]* to "*How often do you go to religious services in mosques, churches, or other places of worship*?' The third question is "*How often do you pray*?"

Table 3.6 *Praying*

38. How often do you pray?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=355) (%)	Christian (n=367) (%)	Muslim (n=463) (%)	Christian (n=254) (%)	Muslim (n=815) (%)	Christian (N=621) (%)
Never	.60			1.20	.20	.50
Only on feast days or special holy days	3.70	.50	1.50	1.60	2.50	1.00
At least once a month	1.40	1.60	.70	2.00	1.00	1.80
Once a week	1.70	1.60	2.00	2.80	1.80	2.10
More than once a week	11.00	8.20	5.40	6.70	7.90	7.60
Once a day	13.00	15.00	7.20	16.90	9.70	15.80
Several times a day	68.70	73.00	83.30	68.90	76.90	71.30

More Muslim respondents answered that they pray more than once a day (76.90%) than Christian respondents (71.30%) are. In Ambon, the percentage of Christian respondents who pray several times is slightly higher than the percentage of Muslims who do. In Yogyakarta, the percentage of Muslim respondents who answered that they pray several times a day is higher than percentage of Christian respondents who do.

Table 3.7 *Attendance at religious services*

39. How often do you go to religious services?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=355) (%)	Christian (n=366) (%)	Muslim (n=463) (%)	Christian (n=253) %%)	Muslim (n=818) %	Christian (n=619) (%)
Never	.30	.30	1.30	.80	.90	.50
Only on feast days or special holy days	40.00	12.30	21	8.70	29.20	10.80
At least once a month	6.80	3.30	12.70	7.50	10.10	5.00
Once a week	12.10	29.50	16	50.20	14.30	38.00
More than once a week	9.90	40.20	19.40	31.20	15.30	36.50
Once a day	5.40	2.50	7.10	.40	6.40	1.60
Several times a day	25.60	12.00	22.50	1.20	23.80	7.60

More Muslim respondents attend religious services several times a day (23.80%) than Christian respondents (7.60%). Some Muslim respondents attend religious services only on feast days (29.20%), while others attend religious services several times a day (23.80%). Some Christian respondents attend religious services once a week (38.00%), and others more than once a week (36.50%).

Table 3.8 *Reading the Holy Scripture*

57. How often do you read or recite the Holy Scripture (Koran or Bible)?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=358) (%)	Christian (n=340) (%)	Muslim (n=470) (%)	Christian (n=248) (%)	Muslim (n=828) (%)	Christian (n = 588) (%)
Never		1.80	1.10	3.60	0.60	2.60
Only on feast days or special holy days	5.60	4.10	7.90	11.70	6.90	7.30
At least once a month	5.60	3.50	10.90	6.00	8.60	4.60
Once a week	10.60	14.10	10.90	24.60	10.70	18.50
More than once a week	20.10	27.60	20.40	23.40	20.30	25.90
Once a day	24.90	22.90	25.50	22.60	25.20	22.80
Several times a day	33.20	25.90	23.40	8.10	27.70	18.40

Table 3.8 shows that a larger percentage of Muslim respondents (27.70%) read Holy Scriptures once a day, while a larger percentage of Christian respondents (25.90%) read the Holy Scriptures more than once a week.

Friendship by religion

Friendship by religion refers to the number of an individual's close friends in everyday life, from the same religionand from other religions. This represents the degree to which individuals identify with a religious group, and also serves as a means for people to distinguish themselves from other religious groups. This variable measures the number of close friends an individual has from both the religious in-group and out-groups. A high number of religious in-group friends and a low number of religious out-group friends indicates a high degree of religious identification. This measurement is derived from Handiwitanto's questionnaire (2007) on friends of the same religion. The original question in the survey, "*How many of your best friends consider themselves members of the same religion as you*," has been revised to ask "*How many of your close friends are… (Muslim, Christian, or Catholic*)?"

Table 3.9 *Muslims as close friends*

274. How many of your close friends are Muslims?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=366) (%)	Christian (n=330) (%)	Muslim (n=476) (%)	Christian (n=253) (%)	Muslim (n=842) (%)	Christian (n=583 (%)
None	.50	5.50	.60	2.40	.60	4.10
Some	1.60	56.10	1.30	31.60	1.40	45.50
Relatively many	14.20	33.90	12.60	49.80	13.30	40.80
Almost all	22.10	1.50	63.20	14.60	45.40	7.20
All	61.50	3.00	22.30	1.60	39.30	2.40

Table 3.10 *Catholics as close friends*

275. How many of your close friends are Catholics?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=314) (%)	Christian (n=325) (%)	Muslim (n=435) (%)	Christian (n=253) (%)	Muslim (n=749) (%)	Christian (n-578) (%)
None	51.60	4.30	16.10	.40	31.00	2.60
Some	36.60	57.80	61.60	28.10	51.10	44.80
Relatively many	9.90	28.60	20.50	58.50	16.00	41.70
Almost all	1.30	4.00	1.60	10.30	1.50	6.70
All	0.60	5.20	0.20	2.80	.40	4.20

Table 3.11 *Protestants as close friends*

276. How many of your close friends are Protestants?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=321) (%)	Christian (n=337) (%)	Muslim (n=430) (%)	Christian (n=253) (%)	Muslim (n=751) (%)	Christian (n=590) (%)
None	42.10	.60	17.00		27.70	.30
Some	34.30	1.50	60.50	7.50	49.30	4.10
Relatively many	19.60	17.80	19.30	46.20	19.40	30.00
Almost all	2.80	41.50	3.00	35.20	2.90	38.80
All	1.20	38.60	.20	11.00	.70	26.80

In our sample, a good number of Christian respondents have some Muslims (45.50%) as their close friends. More than half of Muslim respondents also have some Catholics (51.10%) and less than half of Muslim respondents have some Christians (49.30%) as their close friends. A larger percentage of Christian respondents in Yogyakarta claimed that "almost all" of their close friends were Muslim (49.80%). A larger percentage of Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta claimed that they have "relatively many" Catholics as close friends (58.50%).

Participation in religious ceremonies

This variable indicates an individual's participation in religious rituals and ceremonies. It measures the frequency of attendance. The more frequently a respondent attends religious ceremonies, the higher his or her degree of religious identification. In measuring this variable, we modified one of the questions drawn from the Tuti questionnaire on ethnic attitudes in Indonesia

(2007) ("*Regarding the traditional ceremonies of your own ethnic group, could you indicate whether you have no knowledge about it or you know about the traditions but you do not perform it? Or whether your family still carries them out and you participate in the activities*?") so that the term "ethnic ceremony" is changed to "religious ceremonies in Islam and Christianity." The question is also changed to read, *"Could you indicate whether you participate or not in the religious ceremony/rituals in….* (*types of religious ceremony*)?"

Table 3.12 *Participation in religious ceremonies*

Could you indicate whether you participate or not in the religious ceremony/rituals in…	**RESPONDENTS**					
	AMBON		**YOGYAKARTA**		**TOTAL**	
	Muslim (n=353)	Christian (n=343)	Muslim (n=472)	Christian (n=248)	Muslim (n=827)	Christian (n=591)
Circumcision/Baptism	M: 3.32 SD: .98	M: 3.72 SD: .56	M: 3.18 SD: .98	M: 3.67 SD: .73	M: 3.24 SD: .98	M: 3.70 SD: .64
Marriage	M: 3.23 SD: .93	M: 3.45 SD: .78	M: 3.44 SD: .74	M: 3.41 SD: .84	M: 3.35 SD: .83	M: 3.43 SD: .80
Funeral	M: 3.43 SD: .89	M: 3.57 SD: .68	M: 3.58 SD: .78	M: 3.48 SD: .77	M: 3.51 SD: .83	M: 3.53 SD: .72
Fasting	M: 3.87 SD: .51	M: 2.78 SD: 1.33	M: 3.87 SD: .53	M: 2.85 SD: 1.29	M: 3.87 SD: .52	M: 2.81 SD: 1.31
Idul fitri / Christmas	M: 3.88 SD: .49	M: 3.80 SD: .45	M: 3.89 SD: .49	M: 3.79 SD: .56	M: 3.89 SD: .49	M: 3.80 SD: .50
Idul adha/Easter	M:3.88 SD: .50	M: 3.79 SD: .47	M: 3.88 SD: .48	M: 3.80 SD: .55	M: 3.88 SD: .49	M: 3.80 SD: .51
Maulud Muhammad	M:3.81 SD:.60	-	M:3.67 SD:.83	-	M:3.73 SD:.74	-
Isra mi'raj celebration	M:3.83 SD:.56	-	M:3.68 SD:.82	-	M:3.74 SD:.73	-

Likert scale 1-7 (from never to several times a day), Muslim respondents only answered questions about Islamic religious ceremonies (question 24 to 31) and Christian respondents only answered questions about Christian ceremonies (question 32 to 37). Both groups answered questions about marriage, funerals, and fasting.

In this question, we distinguished between religious ceremonies for Muslim respondents and those for Christians. The religious ceremonies listed for Muslim respondents are fasting (*Ramadan), Idul Fitri, Idul Adha, Isra Mi'raj, and Maulud.* The religious ceremonies listed for Christian respondents are *baptism, Christmas, and Easter.* However, both Christian and Muslim respondents were asked to respond about ceremonies for marriage, funerals, and circumcision. A large percentage of both Muslim and Christian respondents attend almost all of the religious ceremonies listed. This is clearly demonstrated by the high mean values of attendance at a variety of religious ceremonies, from 3.24 (circumcision) to 3.89 (*Idul Fitri*) for Muslims, and from 2.81 (fasting) to 3.80 (Christmas) for Christians. Idul Fitri is the religious ceremony that the largest number of Muslims indicated that they attend, while Christmas is the religious ceremony that the largest number of Christians indicated that they participate in. The standard deviation for Muslim respondents is between .49 and .98, and the standard deviation for Christian respondents is between .50 and 1.31. There is more variety in the responses provided by Christian respondents than Muslim respondents.

Membership and participation in religious organizations

This measurement describes an individual's affiliation to and participation in a certain school or community-based religious organization, representing the degree to which individuals identify themselves with a certain religious group, and distinguish themselves from other religious groups. We theorized that respondents who are members or affiliates of a religious organization would more intensely identify with their religion: the more frequently respondents participated in the activities of their religious organization(s), the higher their degree of religious identification. Questions about membership in religious organizations are drawn from Handi's questionnaire (2007). In this study, we modified the first question *[Please indicate if you belong to one of the organizations below]* into two questions: "*Are you a member or*

a supporter of any religious organization?", and "*If yes, please specify the name of the organization (school based, community based, or other)*?" We modified the second question *[How often are you involved as a volunteer in mosque or church]* to be more focused and clear: "*On average, how often did you participate in the activities of your religious organization in the past year*?"

Table 3.13 *Participation in religious organizations*

254. On average, how often did you participate in the activities of your religious organization in the past year?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=171) %	Christian (n=192) %	Muslim (n=175) %	Christian (n=217) %	Muslim (n=346) %	Christian (n=230) %
Never	6.40	10.40	13.70	10.50	10.10	10.40
Only on special days	49.10	32.20	39.40	36.80	44.20	33.00
At least once a month	11.10	5.70	9.70	7.90	10.40	6.10
Once a week	15.80	22.40	9.70	28.90	12.70	23.50
More than once a week	17.50	29.20	27.40	15.80	22.50	27.00

In our sample, some respondents were members and participated in campus-based student organizations, such as the campus preaching institutes KAMMI, HMI, GMKI, and PMII. The percentage of Christian respondents who are active once a week or more than once a week (50.50%) is higher than the percentage of Muslim respondents (35.20%) who are. Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta are more active in religious organizations compared to Muslim respondents in Ambon, while Christian respondents in Ambon are more active in religious organizations compared to Christian respondents in Yogyakarta.

Political orientation

This measurement provides an explanation of an individual's preference for a political party, representing their political and religious orientations. Geertz (1960) conducted work on Indonesian students' affiliation to political

parties and their religious orientations. He said that four political parties generally represented the categorizations of the religious orientations of Javanese people: the Communist Party (secular, common people), two Islamic parties (*Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Masyumi*), and the Nationalist Party (secular upper class group). In the post-New Order period, there are some Muslim groups based in political parties, such as the Welfare and Justice Party (PKS), the National Awakening Party (PKB), the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Development Unity Party (PPP). The questions used to measure political party affiliations are: (i) "*Did you vote in the last national election?"* (ii) *"If no, why did you not vote?* (iii) *If yes, which political party did you vote for in the last election?"* (iv) *"If you were not able to vote, which political party would you have voted for?* After the pilot survey, the third and fourth questions were merged into one question, asking, "*If you voted, which political party did you vote for in the last national election? If you did not, which would you have voted for*?"

Survey results show that the majority of respondents voted in the 2009 national election (64.50%). The main political parties respondents voted for were Demokrat (23.20%), PDIP (9.30%), Golkar (8.30%), PKS (5.70%), PKB (2.20%), PAN (2.10%), and Hanura (1.20%). These survey figures correspond fairly closely to the results of the actual election in 2009, in which the votes were distributed Demokrat (20.85%), Golkar (14.45%), PDIP (14.03%), PKS (7.88%), PAN (6.01%), PPP (5.32%), PKB (4.94), Gerindra (4.46), and Hanura (3.77%). The three biggest political parties, as well as Hanura, have a nationalist and secular orientation. Most respondents (43.00%) who participated in the national election in 2009 voted for secular political parties instead of religiously based political parties. Only 10.00% of respondents voted for religiously based political parties. The most fundamentalist oriented political party, PKS, was more popular among respondents in Ambon (8.30%) than in Yogyakarta (3.20%). The most nationalist oriented political party, PDIP, was also more popular among respondents in Ambon (12.70%) than in Yogyakarta (6.00%).

3.2.2.2 Ethnic identification

Referring to Phinney and Rotherham's concept of ethnic identity (1987), and being similar to religious identification, ethnic identification consists of five indicators: ethnic self-definition, language use, friends by ethnicity, participation in ethnic ceremonies, and membership and participation in ethnic organizations.

Ethnic self-definition

The question about ethnic self-definition refers to what ethnic group an individual considers himself or herself to belong to and was phrased: "T*o what ethnic group do you consider yourself to belong to*?" The possible choices include the twelve biggest ethnic groups in the research sites according to census data. These are *Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Minangkabau, Ambonese, Buginese, Makassarese, Butonese, Toraja, Minahasa, Chinese,* and *Bataknese*. After the pilot survey, the Ambonese category was adjusted to '*Ambonese (e.g. Seram, Kei, Ternate, etc.), please specify*' in order to reflect the various ethnic groups, such as Eastern Seram, Western Seram, Kei, Hitu, and Saparua, that fall under the term Ambonese.

Table 3.14 *Ethnic group*

14a. To which ethnic group do you consider yourself to belong to?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Javanese	21	2.80	436	58.10	457	30.50
Sundanese	0	.00	38	5.10	38	2.50
Madurese	0	.00	37	4.90	37	2.50
Minangkabau	1	.10	16	2.10	17	1.10
Ambonese (e.g. Seram, Kei, Ternate, etc.)	581	77.50	8	1.10	589	39.30
Buginese	6	.80	5	.70	11	.70
Makassarese	1	.10	2	.30	3	.20
Butonese	93	12.40	2	.30	95	6.30
Toraja	10	1.30	10	1.30	20	1.30
Minahasa	1	.10	4	.50	5	.30
Chinese	2	.30	47	6.30	49	3.30
Bataknese	0	.00	37	4.90	37	2.50
Others, specify	14	1.90	90	12.00[16]	104	6.90
Missing	20	2.70	18	2.40	38	2.50
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00

6 Consisting of 28 ethnic groups such as Papua, Alor, Bali, Betawi, Flores, Melayu, Sangir-Talaud, Poso, Sasak, Timor-Leste, the Philippines, Banjar, Mandailing, Pamona, Kaili, Gorontalo, Flores, Dayak, etc.

This research also asks information about the ethnic identification of respondents' parents. This information is necessary to find out whether respondents come from families that have one or more ethnic group affiliations. The history of ethnicity is part of the preliminary information on ethnic socialization in a family. The ethnic identification of respondents' parents is measured by the question, "*To which ethnic group do you consider your father to belong to*?" and "*To which ethnic group do you consider your mother to belong to*?"

In our sample, respondents identified themselves as Ambonese (39.30%), Javanese (30.50%), Butonese (6.30%), Chinese (3.30%), Sundanese (2.50%), Madurese (2.50%), Bataknese (2.50%), Minangkabau (1.10%), Toraja (1.30%), Buginese (0.70%) and Makassarese (0.20%). Most of the respondents in Yogyakarta consisted of Javanese (58.10%), Chinese (6.30%), Sundanese (5.10%), Madurese (4.90%), and Bataknese (4.90%). Respondents in Ambon mostly comprised Ambonese (77.50%) and Buton (12.40%). Fathers of the respondents were identified as Ambonese (38.70%), Javanese (31.00%), Butonese (6.70%), Chinese (3.70%), and Bataknese (2.50%). The ethnicity of respondents' mothers was generally the same as that as the fathers. However, the profiles of the ethnic affiliation of respondents' fathers differed across the two sites. In Ambon, respondent's fathers were mainly identified as Ambonese (76.10%) and Buton (12.90%), while the fathers of most respondents in Yogyakarta were identified as Javanese (59.20%), Chinese (7.10%), Madurese (5.10%), Bataknese (5.10%), Sundanese (4.50%), and Minangkabau (2.00%).

Language use

Language use refers to how individuals speak their local languages in different places, including at home, at family gatherings, at school, with friends, in their community residence, and in dealing with local government. In many places the use of local languages signals identification with

a certain ethnic group, and can be used to distinguish members of one group from members of other ethnic groups. Language use is comparable with participation in religious practices, representing the extent to which individuals identify themselves with a certain ethno-religious group. We presume that languages are used not only for communication, but also for the expression of identity – identity that depends on where, and with whom, people speak. In Indonesia, individuals usually speak more than one language. Local languages in many places are viewed as highly salient ethnic identifiers.

There are two main inventories of questionnaires utilized in this research. The first is an inventory from the European Social Survey (2008/2009) which covers what languages Europeans speak most often at home. The second is Tuti's questionnaire on language practices, from which we drew the question "*What is the language you usually speak at home (big family gathering, work place, and social gathering*)?" Since this research used students as respondents, "work place" was changed to "university," and "social gathering" was changed to "a community of residence." We also added two additional categories of "close friend" and "government office" to the question. The modified question is "*What language do you usually speak ….(at home, in big family gatherings, in the university, with close friends, in your community of residence, and in dealing with government offices*)?" After the pilot survey, this question was changed to *"What is the language that you mainly speak?*"

Table 3.15a *Language use*

22. What is the language that you mainly speak at home?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Indonesian	319	42.50	254	33.90	573	38.20
Your ethnic language	346	46.10	449	59.90	795	53.00
Other language	30	4.00	11	1.50	41	2.70
Missing	55	7.30	36	4.80	91	6.10
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
23. What is the language that you mainly speak in big family gatherings?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Indonesian	327	43.60	323	43.10	650	43.30
Your ethnic language	316	42.10	383	51.10	699	46.60
Other language	22	2.90	9	1.20	31	2.10
Missing	85	11.30	35	4.70	120	8.00
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
24. What is the language that you mainly speak in the university?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Indonesian	561	74.80	617	82.30	1178	78.50
Your ethnic language	95	12.70	62	8.30	157	10.50
Other language	15	2.00	15	2.00	30	2.00
Missing	79	10.50	56	7.50	135	9.00
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
25. What is the language that you mainly speak with close friends?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Indonesian	379	50.5	356	47.50	735	49.00
Your ethnic language	233	31.1	298	39.70	531	35.40
Other language	52	6.9	30	4.00	82	5.50
Missing	86	11.5	66	8.80	152	10.10
Total	750	100.0	750	100.00	1500	100.00
26. What is the language that you mainly speak in your community of residence?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Indonesian	378	50.40	399	53.20	777	51.80
Your ethnic language	253	33.70	292	38.90	545	36.30
Other language	49	6.50	11	1.50	60	4.00
Missing	70	9.30	48	6.40	118	7.90
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
27. What is the language that you mainly speak in dealing with government offices?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Indonesian	692	92.30	710	94.70	1402	93.50
Your ethnic language	1	.10	11	1.50	12	.80
Other language	3	.40	2	.30	5	.30
Missing	54	7.20	27	3.60	81	5.40
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00

More than half of the respondents speak their local language at home (53.00%) rather than the national language (38.20%). Respondents in Yogyakarta speak local languages at home (59.90%) more than those in Ambon (46.10%). In general, respondents use both local language (46.60%) and the national language (43.30%) when they speak at big family gatherings. Most respondents speak the national language at university (78.50%). Respondents speak in the national language (49.00%) when they meet their close friends rather than in local languages (35.40%). They also use the national language when they meet in their community of residence. When speaking with people at government offices, almost all respondents speak in the national language (93.50%).

Table 3.15b *Language use for Muslim and Christian respondents*

22. What is the language that you mainly speak at home?	**RESPONDENTS**					
	AMBON		**YOGYA**		**TOTAL**	
	Muslim (n=348) (%)	Christian (n=344) (%)	Muslim (n=454) (%)	Christian (n=245) (%)	Muslim (n=802) (%)	Christian (n=589) (%)
Indonesian	36.50	55.20	23.80	58.40	29.30	56.50
Your ethnic language	59.80	39.80	75.10	40.40	68.50	40.10
Other language	3.70	4.90	1.10	1.20	2.20	3.40
23. What is the language that you mainly speak in big family gatherings?	**RESPONDENTS**					
	AMBON		**YOGYA**		**TOTAL**	
	Muslim (333) (%)	Christian (n=329) (%)	Muslim (n=450) (%)	Christian (n=250) (%)	Muslim (n=783) (%)	Christian (579) (%)
Indonesian	41.10	57.40	36.20	62.40	38.30	59.60
Your ethnic language	54.10	40.700	63.10	36.80	59.30	39.00
Other language	4.80	1.8	.70	.80	2.40	1.40

Table 3.15b indicates that Muslim respondents have a higher level of ethnic identification than Christian respondents do, based on language use at home and at family gatherings. However, when speaking at the university, community residence, and government offices, most Muslim and Christian respondents tend to use the national language rather than ethnic languages.

Friends by ethnicity

The measurement of "friends by ethnicity" refers to the number of an individual's close friends from the ethnic in-group and out-groups. This variable represents the degree to which individuals identify themselves with a certain ethnic group and differentiate themselves from other ethnic groups. The more ethnic in-group friends an individual has, and the fewer ethnic out-group friends, the higher their degree of ethnic identification. The question about friends by ethnicity is phrased as "*How many of your close friends are… (Javanese, Sundanese, etc*.)?"

Due to the location of our research sites in Ambon and Yogyakarta, Ambonese and Javanese respondents dominated our sample. Therefore, respondents who identify how many of their close friends are Javanese range from *some* (35.30%), to *relatively many* (29.90%), *to almost all* (22.30%). A similar pattern is seen for respondents who have Ambonese as close friends, with 25.70% of respondents answering that some of their friends are Ambonese, 16.50% answering that relatively many of their friends are Ambonese, 19.40% answering that almost all of their friends are Ambonese, and 15.60% answering that all of their friends are Ambonese. Respondents who have close friends from other ethnic groups display a different pattern. Most respondents have some close friends from the following groups: Makassarese (53.50%), Buginese (40.10%), Sundanese (38.20%), Bataknese (37.70%), Toraja (37.00%), Madurese (31.20%), Chinese (29.30%), Butonese (28.50%), Minangkabau (27.30%), and Minahasa (21.60%).

Participation in ethnic ceremonies

We consider participation in ethnic group ceremonies to be a good indicator for the individual's degree of identification with certain ethnic groups. The assumption behind this category of inquiry is that people in our research sites have their own customs and traditions. These traditions also function

as an instrument of socialization to maintain social integration within the in-group. We asked whether individuals know of, attend, or participate in the ethnic group rituals held by their community. The question used to measure this indicator was based on Tuti's questionnaire about participation in religious ceremonies, "*Could you indicate whether you participate or not in the religious ceremony/rituals* in…. (*religious ceremonies*)?" It was adjusted to ask, "*Could you indicate whether you know these ceremonies and whether you and/or your family participate or not in these ethnic ceremonies or rituals*?"

Table 3.16 *Ethnic ceremonies*

Could you indicate whether you know these ceremonies and whether you and/or your family participate or not in these ethnic ceremonies or rituals	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=307)	Christian (n=281)	Muslim (n=468)	Christian (n=253)	Muslim (n=755)	Christian (n=546)
15. Birth rituals	M: 2.62 SD: 1.24	M: 2.11 SD: 1.32	M: 3.16 SD: .981	M: 2.48 SD: 1.23	M: 2.95 SD: 1.12	M: 2.29 SD: 1.29
16. Wedding rituals	M: 3.26 SD: .87	M: 3.21 SD:1.07	M: 3.52 SD: .80	M: 3.45 SD: .84	M: 3.42 SD: .84	M: 3.32 SD: .98
17. Moving house	M: 2.34 SD: 1.32	M: 2.15 SD: 1.37	M: 2.70 SD: 1.17	M: 2.34 SD: 1.26	M: 2.56 SD :1.24	M: 2.25 SD: 1.31
18. Illness	M: 2.34 SD: 1.39	M: 2.28 SD: 1.39	M: 2.50 SD: 1.26	M: 2.07 SD: 1.23	M: 2.44 SD: 1.31	M: 2.18 SD: 1.32
19. Wake/ Funeral	M: 3.26 SD: 1.02	M: 3.14 SD: 1.24	M: 3.42 SD: .94	M: 3.39 SD: .94	M: 3.36 SD: .98	M: 3.26 SD: 1.12
20. Others, specify:___	M: 2.24 SD: 1.43	M: 2.07 SD: 1.34	M: 3.05 SD: 1.20	M: 2.78 SD: 1.46	M: 2.63 SD: 1.38	M: 2.27 SD :1.40

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

The ethnic ceremonies listed are birth rituals, wedding rituals, moving house, illness rituals, funerals, and others. The survey results clearly demonstrate that respondents participate in a variety of ethnic ceremonies. Their participation in ethnic ceremonies is relatively lower than their participation in religious ceremonies. For example, the mean values for participation in ethnic ceremonies are between 2.44 (illness) and 3.42 (wedding rituals) for Muslim respondents, and between 2.18 (illness)

and 3.32 (wedding rituals) for Christian respondents. Both Muslim and Christian respondents display the same pattern in that they participate less in ceremonies for illness and participate more in weddings and funeral rites. Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta also have relatively high level of participation in birth rituals (M=3.16) and other rituals (M=3.05). The standard deviation of values for Muslim respondents is between .84 and 1.38, and those for Christians are between .98 and 1.40. Both Muslim and Christian respondents have equally heterogeneous answers to these questions.

Membership and participation in ethnic organizations

This measurement describes an individual's affiliation to and participation in ethnic organizations, representing the degree to which individuals identify themselves with a certain ethnic group, and distinguish themselves from other ethnic groups. Similar to how we view affiliation to religious organizations, we presume that membership in ethnic organizations plays a major role in preserving ethnic identity. The more frequently a respondent participates in the activities of their ethnic organizations, the higher his or her degree of ethnic identification. The first question used in this measurement is "*Are you a member or a supporter of any ethnic organization?*", while the second question asked is, "*On average, how often did you participate in the activities of your ethnic group organization in the past year*?"

In our sample, the majority of respondents (77.30%) are not members or followers of any ethnic organizations, both in Yogyakarta (82.00%) and in Ambon (72.50%). Only a small percentage of respondents are members (9.00%) or followers (7.30%) of any ethnic organizations. The percentage of respondents involved in ethnic organizations in Ambon (16.10%) is almost the same as in Yogyakarta (16.40%). More than half of these respondents participate in the activities of ethnic organizations only on special days (52.50%). More of the respondents in Ambon (57.00%) participated in

the activities of ethnic organizations on special days than in Yogyakarta (48.00%). The number of respondents who said that they participate in these activities once a week or more than once a week (21.70%) is higher than those who answered that they participate at least once a month (12.30%).

3.2.3 Individual determinants

Individual determinants are a set of social categories that are used as control variables in statistical analysis. All of these determinants are conceptually related to the avoidance of intergroup contact in various ways, either induce or reduce it. Individual determinants include gender, age, the level of education achieved by the respondent's parents, occupational status, household income, urbanization, and the area of residence (Coenders et al., 2007; ESS 2008/2009).

Gender and age

The sex of respondents was recorded in our surveys, since we assume that women have less involvement in violent conflict than men. This study attempts to ascertain if avoidance of contact with out-group members varies according to sex. A study on refugees in Eastern Indonesia by Putranti and Subagya (2005) points out that men and women have different roles in reconciliation processes.

The age of respondents was recorded to examine whether older or younger student tend to avoid intergroup contact. While our original question to determine a respondent's age was, "*In what year were you born? In the year 19....*" we revised this question to, "*When is your birthday*?" after the pilot study.

In our sample, we have more male (52.78%) than female (47.22%) respondents, with 55.49% men and 44.50% women in Yogyakarta, and 50.07% men and 49.93% women in Ambon. These numbers correspond

with the composition of the population in the city of Ambon49.50% male and 49.84% female in 2010. The average age of our respondents is 22 years, with an average age of 22.50 years in Ambon and 21.70 years in Yogyakarta. A few respondents are considerably older, especially those who study in the faculties of nursing and public heath in Ambon. Respondents' status at university ranges from students in their second year (6.00%), third year (30.60%), fourth year (29.80%), fifth year (15.30%), and other (9.90%). A large percentage of respondents in Ambon are students in their third year (30.40%), and a large percentage of respondents in Yogyakarta are in their fourth year (39.30%). The number of respondents from each faculty and university can be seen in table 3.1.

Place of birth, living and growing up

Place of birth refers to the city or region in which an individual was born. This question is necessary to find out whether respondents are part of native or migrant communities. Respondents who answer that the research site is their place of birth are considered native. The question about birthplace is adapted from ESS (2008/2009), "*Where were you born (country)?*" However, we changed it into, "*Where were you born? Place of birth?"* Information on native-migrant status is necessary to classify whether natives have more of a tendency to avoid intergroup contact than migrants. To further clarify residence patterns, we asked, "*Where do you live now? Length of stay.*" Based on the pilot survey, this question was changed into, "*What is the name of the town or city where you live now,"* and *"length of stay*." The classification "place of growing up" is based on the area where a respondent grew up. This measurement aims to document information on the early life histories of respondents, to ascertain whether they come from rural or urban areas. The question regarding where they grew up is adapted from ESS (2008/2009): "*Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live? A big city, the suburbs, or the outskirts of a big city, a town or a small city, a country village, a farm or home in the countryside*?"

However, we revised it to say, "*Where did you grow up*?" After the pilot survey, this question was changed into "*What is the name of the town/city where you grew up*?"

In our sample, 41.30% of the respondents live in the Yogyakarta Special Region, and 46.40% respondents live in the Moluccas province. Respondents in Yogyakarta live in the regencies of Sleman (40.50%), Bantul (10.80%), and the city of Yogyakarta (27.60%), while most respondents in the Moluccas live in the city of Ambon (79.20%). Respondents in Yogyakarta grew up in Central Java (23.50%), Yogyakarta (20.50%), East Java (14.90%), West Java (7.90%), and other provinces. Respondents in Maluku grew up in Maluku (86.00%), Southeast Sulawesi (1.50%), North Maluku (1.30%), and other provinces. Respondents have lived in their current place of residence for more than three years, (47.70%), for two to three years (15.60%), or for one to two years (25.40%), and for less than one year (9.30%). In Yogyakarta 54.30% of respodents have lived in their current place of residence for more than three years, and the pattern is similar in Ambon (41.10%). The percentage of respondents in the Yogyakarta Special Region who are apparently part of the migrant population (79.50%) is higher than the percentage of migrants in the Moluccas province (14.00%).

Parents' background

The variables measured in relation to the background of a respondent's parents consist of household income, parents' education, occupational and occupation status. Parents' education level is measured by the status of education for both fathers and mothers, ranging from primary school to Ph.D. Respondents whose parents graduated from university are assumed to be of the middle to upper classes. Parents' occupational status includes the categories of self-employed, employee helped by paid workers, employee helped by unpaid workers, workers, free workers in agriculture, free workers in the non-agricultural sector, and unpaid workers. Parents'

occupation is based on their field of occupation, such as professionals, technicians, and clerks. These questions build on the measurements from ESS (2008/2009).

Household income is an estimation of the monthly gross income of a respondent's household, including the incomes of their parents and siblings. This measurement aims to identify the objective class of the respondent. We categorize respondents whose household income is under IDR 1,000,000 as lower class, while those whose household income is between IDR 1,000,000 and IDR 5,000,000 are categorized as middle class. We categorize respondents as upper class if their monthly gross household income is more than IDR 5,000,000. The question about household income asks, "*Please kindly estimate the monthly gross income of all those earning in your household including your parents and siblings*." We calculated the answer categories based on the average of provincial minimum wages (UMP) for Yogyakarta and Maluku in 2010.[6] In 2010, the UMP was IDR 750,490 in Yogyakarta and IDR 1,400,990 in the Moluccas (BPS, 2010:26). The average UMP in the two provinces was IDR 1,075,000. This study uses this number (IDR 1,000,000) as the interval. Nevertheless, we adjusted the minimum household income to IDR 500,000 to adapt to the poverty line in Indonesia (IDR 232,989 per capita per month, or around IDR 464,000 per household per month). In addition, the percentage of the population under the poverty line in 2010 was 16.80% in Yogyakarta, and 27.70% in Maluku.

6 The minimum wage, according to the Regulation of Ministry of Empowerment PER-01/MEN/1999, is the lowest wage consisting of basic salary and fixed allowances. The UMP is the lowest wage that is put into effect at provincial level (Depnakertrans, 2011).

Table 3.17a *Household income of respondents*

279. The monthly grass income of all those earning in your household including...	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Lower than IDR 500,000	221	29.50	47	6.30	268	17.90
IDR 500,000 - IDR 999,999	129	17.20	79	10.50	208	13.90
IDR 1,000,000 - IDR 1,999,999	119	15.90	113	15.10	232	15.50
IDR 2,000,000 - IDR 2,999,999	86	11.50	115	15.30	201	13.40
IDR 3,000,000 - IDR 3,999,999	60	8.00	98	13.10	158	10.50
IDR 4,000,000 - IDR 4,999,999	22	2.90	56	7.50	78	5.20
IDR 5,000,000 - IDR 5,999,999	18	2.40	65	8.70	83	5.50
IDR 6,000,000 and over	40	5.30	154	20.50	194	12.90
Missing	55	7.30	23	3.10	78	5.20
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00

In general, based on household income, most respondents fall within the middle class category (42.60%). However, while most respondents in Yogyakarta are middle class (51.00%), in Ambon the the lower class category has the largest number of respondents in it (46.70%). The percentage of respondents who fall in the upper class category is higher in Yogyakarta (29.20%) than in Ambon (7.70%). Compared with the statistical data on poverty levels, the amount of people who fall in the lower class category in Ambon is higher than the percentage of the population who live under the poverty line in Maluku (23.00%). However, the percentage of respondents identified as lower class in Yogyakarta is in line with the percentage of the population living in poverty in Yogyakarta in 2011 (16.08%). Overall, respondents both in Yogyakarta (M=3.52) and in Ambon (M=3.41) feel satisfied with their parents' income (M=3.47).

Table 3.17b *Household income for Muslim and Christian respondents*

279. The monthly grass income of all those earning in your household including...	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=356) %	Christian (n=338) %	Muslim (n=467) %	Christian (n=245) %	Muslim (n=583) %	Christian (n=583) %
Lower than IDR 500,000	43.50	19.50	8.10	3.30	23.50	12.70
IDR 500,000 - IDR 999,999	19.10	17.80	10.30	11.80	14.10	15.30
IDR 1,000,000 - IDR 1,999,999	14.60	19.80	16.70	13.50	15.80	17.20
IDR 2,000,000 - IDR 2,999,999	7.90	17.20	17.80	11.40	13.50	14.80
IDR 3,000,000 - IDR 3,999,999	6.70	10.70	13.70	12.20	10.70	11.30
IDR 4,000,000 - IDR 4,999,999	3.40	3.00	5.80	11.80	4.70	6.70
IDR 5,000,000 - IDR 5,999,999	1.10	4.10	7.30	12.70	4.60	7.70
IDR 6,000.000 and over	3.70	8.00	20.30	23.30	13.10	14.40

More Muslim respondents (37.60%) come from lower class households than Christian respondents (28.00%). However, in middle class households, the percentage of Christian respondents (50.00%) is higher than the percentage of Muslim respondents (44.70%). In general, Christian respondents' households are more economically prosperous than Muslim respondents' households are.

The question about parents' education is "*What is the highest level of formal education received by your father (mother)*? We adjusted the available answers to reflect the Indonesian context, listing the categories of, "*primary school, senior high school, diploma, bachelor (S1), master (S2), and Ph.D (S3*)." After the pilot survey, we added two more categories: "*No formal education*" and "*Pre-school*." The question on occupational status is "*What is the occupational status of your father (mother)*?" The answer categories refer to Indonesian statistical categories, including: "*self-employed, employee helped by paid workers, employee helped by unpaid workers, workers, free workers in agriculture, free workers in the non-agricultural sector, and unpaid workers*." The question regarding occupation status is, "*What is the field of your father's (mother's) occupation?"* After the pilot survey, we revised this question to say, "*What is the occupation of your father (mother)*?"

Table 3.18a *Level of father's education*

281. What is the highest level of formal education received by your father?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=356) %	Christian (n=346) %	Muslim (n=473) %	Christian (n=251) %	Muslim (n=829) %	Christian (n=597) %
No formal education	2.50	.30	1.70	1.20	2.10	.70
Kindergarten	-	-	.40	-	.20	-
Primary school	31.50	12.70	14.00	8.00	21.50	10.70
Secondary school	21.60	10.70	10.80	8.00	15.40	9.50
Senior high school	30.60	42.20	30.90	34.30	30.80	38.90
Diploma (D1-D4)	3.90	12.10	9.50	7.60	7.10	10.20
Bachelor (S1)	7.30	19.40	23.90	29.50	16.80	23.60
Master (S2)	2.50	2.30	7.40	8.00	5.30	4.70
Ph.D (S3)	2.50	.30	1.50	3.60	.80	1.70

In our sample, Christian respondents' fathers (40.20%) are more educated (diploma to Ph.D.) than Muslim respondents' fathers (30.00%). In Ambon, the percentage of Christian respondents' fathers who graduated in high school education (diploma to Ph.D.) (34.10%) is almost twice as high as Muslim respondents' fathers (16.20%). In Yogyakarta, the percentage of Christian respondents' fathers who graduated with a high school education (48.70%) is higher than that of Muslim respondents' fathers (42.30%).

Table 3.18b *Level of mother's education*

281. What is the highest level of formal education received by your mother?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=351) %	Christian (n=340) %	Muslim (n=468) %	Christian (n=250) %	Muslim (n=819) %	Christian (n=590) %
No formal education	3.70	.90	1.70	2.00	2.60	1.40
Kindergarten			.40		.20	
Primary school	47.90	15.60	16.70	8.40	30.00	12.50
Secondary school	21.10	12.10	13.90	8.80	17.00	10.70
Senior high school	22.80	43.80	30.80	34.00	27.40	39.70
Diploma (D1-D4)	2.30	11.80	10.50	15.20	7.00	13.20
Bachelor (S1)	2.00	15.00	22.90	27.20	13.90	20.20
Master (S2)	.30	.90	2.10	4.40	1.30	2.40
Ph.D (S3)			1.10		.60	

Respondents' mothers had similar patterns of level of education as their fathers. The percentage of Christian respondents' mothers who achieved degrees (diploma to Ph.D) (35.80%) is higher than that of Muslim respondents' mothers (22.80%). In Yogyakarta, more Christian respondents' mothers graduated with a diploma up to a Ph.D. (46.80%) than Muslim respondents' mothers (36.60%). In Ambon, the number of Christian respondents' mothers who achieved diplomas (27.70) is higher compared with Muslim respondents' mothers (4.60%).

In our sample, a larger number of respondents' fathers are self-employed (33.00%) or workers (including officer and labour) (33.50%). In Yogyakarta, the percentage of respondents' fathers who are employed as workers (41.50%) is higher than the percentage that is self-employed (27.70%). Otherwise, in Ambon, more respondents' fathers are self-employed (38.30%) than employed as workers (25.60%). Only a small percentage of respondents' fathers are employed as free workers in the agricultural sector, both in Ambon (7.90%) and in Yogyakarta (4.70%). In general, the pattern of occupational status for respondents' mothers is similar, with 38% answering they are self-employed and 22.80% answering that they are employed as workers. More respondents' mothers answered that they are self-employed in Ambon (45.50%) than in Yogyakarta (30.70%).

Table 3.19a *Fathers' occupation*

283a. What is the occupation of your father?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=356) (%)	Christian (n=335) %	Muslim (n=464) %	Christian (n=246) %	Muslim (n=820) %	Christian (n=581) %
Officials of government and special-interest organizations, corporate executives, managers, managing proprietors and supervisors	.30	2.40	4.50	3.70	2.70	2.90
Professionals	1.40	1.20	5.20	8.50	3.50	4.30
Technicians and Associate Professionals	1.10	1.20	1.70	2.00	1.50	1.50
Clerks	14.00	36.70	28.00	36.20	22.00	36.50
Service Workers and Shop and Market Sales Workers	1.70	4.20	5.80	8.50	4.00	6.00
Farmers, Forestry Workers, and Fishermen	55.10	26.00	20.90	3.70	35.70	16.50
Trades and Related Workers	9.00	4.20	14.20	16.30	12.00	9.30
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers	2.00	2.10	2.60	.40	2.30	1.40
Labourers and Unskilled Workers	2.50	3.30	5.40	2.80	4.10	3.10
Special Occupations (specify)	3.40	10.70	6.70	8.90	5.20	10.00
Dead/absent	9.60	8.10	5.00	8.90	7.00	8.40

Table 3.19a shows the percentage of Christian respondents' fathers who work as clerks (36.50%) is higher than the percentage of Muslim respondents' fathers who work in that profession (22.00%). The percentage of Muslim respondents' fathers who work as farmers, forestry workers, and fishermen (35.70%) is higher than the percentage of Christian respondents' fathers in those occupations (16.50%). In Ambon, a large number of Muslim respondents' fathers work as farmers (55.10%), while a larger number of Christian respondents' fathers work as clerks (36.75). The occupations of respondents' fathers in Yogyakarta follow a similar pattern, although some Muslims (14.20%) and Christians (16.30%) also work in trades and related workers.

Table 3.19b *Mothers' occupation*

283a. What is the occupation of your father?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=342) (%)	Christian (n=314) (%)	Muslim (n=447) (%)	Christian (n=245) (%)	Muslim (n=789) (%)	Christian (n=559) (%)
Officials of government and special-interest organizations, corporate executives, managers, managing proprietors and supervisors	.30	1.00	.90	1.20	.60	1.10
Professionals	.30	1.00	4.00	4.50	2.40	2.50
Technicians and Associate Professionals	5.00	32.80	.70	30.20	.40	31.70
Clerks	.60	1.60	23.90	9.80	15.70	5.20
Service Workers and Shop and Market Sales Workers	47.70	24.50	5.40	3.70	3.30	15.40
Farmers, Forestry Workers, and Fishermen	20.80	11.80	17.20	22.90	30.40	16.60
Trades and Related Workers	.60	.30	21.90	1.20	21.40	.20
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers	16.40	1.00	.20	21.20	.10	1.10
Labourers and Unskilled Workers	8.50	15.00	4.00	5.30	2.50	17.70
Special Occupations (specify)	.30	11.10	16.60	1.20	16.50	8.60
Dead/absent	.30	1.00	5.10	4.50	6.60	1.10

Table 3.19b demonstrates that far more Christian respondents' mothers work as associate professionals (31.70%) than Muslim respondents' mothers (.40%). More Muslim respondents' mothers work as farmers, forestry

workers, and fishermen (30.40%) than Christian respondents' mothers (16.60%). In Ambon, less than half of Muslim respondents' mothers are employed as shop workers (47.70%), while some Christian respondents' mothers work as associate professionals (32.80%). In Yogyakarta, some Muslim respondents' mothers work as clerks (23.90%) and trade workers (21.90%), while some Christian respondents' mothers work as associate professionals (30.20%) and farmers (22.90%).

3.2.4 Intermediary variables

Intermediary variables are expected to mediate ethno-religious identification and avoidance of intergroup contact in different ways. The following section describes indicators of each intermediate variable.

3.2.4.1 Salience of identity

In this research, salience identity is divided into two indicators, namely saliency of religious identity and saliency of ethnic identity.

Salience of religious identity

Salience of religious identity measures the degree to which an individual perceives religious affiliation to be important, as well as religion's influence on everyday life and social relations. The statements used to assess this indicator are based on the measurements used in Duckitt's questionnaire on the salience of cultural identity (2006), and the questionnaire by Eisinga et al. on the salience of identity (1991). The first question is derived from Duckitt's questionnaire [*my cultural identity is very important to me*"*]*, modified to the statement, "*My religious identity is very important to me*." The second statement is about the degree to which "*I see myself as a 'real' member of my religious group*." The third statement is modified from Eisinga's questionnaire [*my religion has much influence on my daily life*]

and says, "*My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence in my daily life*." The fourth statement is, "*my religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions*." In addition, we have added a statement about the degree to which "*My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I relate to others*."

Table 3.20 *Salience of religious identity*

Religious identity	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=365)	Christian (n=368)	Muslim (n=476)	Christian (n=254)	Muslim (n=841)	Christian (n=622)
40. My religious identity is very important to me.	M: 4.78 SD: .46	M: 4.65 SD: .59	M: 4.38 SD: .79	M: 4.06 SD: 1.00	M: 4.55 SD: .70	M: 4.41 SD : .84
41. I see myself as a committed member of my religious group.	M: 4.24 SD: .83	M: 4.11 SD: .89	M: 4.03 SD: .85	M: 3.80 SD: .88	M: 4.12 SD: .85	M: 3.98 SD : .89
42. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence in my daily life.	M: 4.47 SD: .89	M: 4.54 SD: .77	M: 4.33 SD: .74	M: 4.26 SD: .79	M: 4.39 SD: .80	M: 4.42 SD: .79
43. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions.	M: 4.29 SD: .95	M: 4.41 SD: .84	M: 4.23 SD: .81	M: 4.21 SD: .82	M: 4.26 SD: .87	M: 4.33 SD: .84
44. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I relate to others.	M: 4.25 SD:1.05	M: 4.13 SD:1.21	M: 4.05 SD: .95	M: 3.92 SD: .99	M: 4.14 SD: .99	M: 4.05 SD: 1.13

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

We find among respondents that their religious identities are more salient than ethnic identities. The mean values of Muslim respondents are between 4.12 (committed member) and 4.55 (importance), while those of Christian respondents are between 3.98 (committed member) and 4.41 (importance). In general, Muslim respondents seemingly have a higher level of salience of religious identity than Christian respondents. Muslim respondents in Ambon (M=4.24 to 4.78) have a higher degree of salience of religious identity than those in Yogyakarta (M=4.03 to 4.38). Christian respondents in Ambon also have a higher level of salience religious identity than those in Yogyakarta. The values of the standard deviation for Muslim

respondents are between .70 and .99, while those for Christian respondents are between .79 and 1.13. The heterogeneity of answers from Christian respondents is higher than answers from Muslim respondents.

Salience of ethnic identity

Salience of ethnic identity measures the degree to which individuals perceive ethnic group affiliation to be important, as well as the influence of a respondent's ethnic group on everyday life, and the ethnic group's influence on social relations. Questions about salience of ethnic identity refer to questions about the salience of religious identity by changing term ' religious identity' in 'ethnic identity'.

Table 3.21 *Salience of ethnic identity*

Ethnic identity	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=368)	Christian (n=346)	Muslim (n=475)	Christian (n=253)	Muslim (n=978)	Christian (n=599)
257. My ethnic identity is very important to me.	M: 4.30 SD: .72	M: 4.18 SD: .67	M: 3.69 SD: .87	M: 3.73 SD: .89	M: 3.96 SD: .86	M: 3.99 SD: .80
258. I see myself as a committed member of my ethnic group.	M: 3.61 SD: 1.05	M: 3.60 SD: .95	M: 3.59 SD: .81	M: 3.52 SD: .83	M: 3.60 SD: .93	M: 3.56 SD: .90
259. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence in my daily life.	M: 3.79 SD: .93	M: 3.76 SD: .96	M: 3.66 SD: .79	M: 3.62 SD: .83	M: 3.71 SD: .86	M: 3.70 SD: .91
260. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions.	M: 3.41 SD: 1.02	M: 3.40 SD: 1.05	M: 3.24 SD: .94	M: 3.20 SD : .87	M: 3.32 SD: .98	M: 3.32 SD: .98
261. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence on how I relate to others.	M: 3.49 SD: 1.03	M: 3.51 SD: 1.08	M: 3.45 SD: .93	M: 3.39 SD: .91	M: 3.47 SD: .97	M: 3.46 SD: 1.01

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

Similar to the patterns we see with regards to salience of religious identity, respondents also have a high level of salience of ethnic identity. The mean values from Christian respondents vary between 3.32 (important

decisions) and 3.99 (importance), while the mean values from Muslim respondents are between 3.32 (important decisions) and 3.96 (importance). The level of salience of ethnic identity apparently is lower than salience of religious identity. Muslim respondents in Ambon (M=3.41 to 4.30) have a higher level of salience of ethnic identity than those in Yogyakarta (M=3.24 to 4.18). Also, Christian respondents in Ambon (M=3.40 to 4.18) have a higher level of salience of ethnic identity than those in Yogyakarta (M=3.20 to 3.73). The standard deviation from the answers of Muslim respondents is between .86 and .98, and those from Christian respondents are between .80 and 1.01. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is almost the same as those from Christian respondents.

3.2.4.2 Perceived group threat

Perceived group threat refers to religious groups rather than ethnic groups, because the primary concern of this study is religious intergroup relations. Perceived threat refers to the feeling of being threatened by religious out-groups in reference to cultural practices, way of life, job prospects, housing, positions in government, security, business opportunities, and preferential treatment (Scheepers et al. 2002; Coenders and Lubbers, 2007; Semyonov et al., 2007; Schneider 2008: Savelkoul et al., 2010). These questions build on the measurements used by Scheepers et al. (2002) on majority-minority relations. In addition, some of Savelkoul (2010) and Tuti's (2008) questions are added to this study because they refer to threats in relation to housing, culture, and politics.

Based on the first question from Scheepers et al. (2002), the term minority group is adjusted to include other religious groups. The statement we use is "*The religious practices of people from other religious groups threaten our own way of life*." The second statement was broken down into two statements to become "*I am worried that the security in my neighbourhood will decline due to the presence of other religious groups*,"

and "*I am worried that security in my university will decline due to the presence of students of other religious groups*." The third statement was revised to say, "*People from other religious groups are given preferential treatment by the authorities*." The fourth statement was divided into two statements with two aspects, namely job prospects and business opportunities.[7]

7 The category about job prospects is more relevant to students in respect to unemployment. The category of business opportunities was added as a new aspect, referring to when the presence of other religious groups makes the local economy worse. Therefore, the new questions are, "*I am worried that job prospects for members of my group would decline due to the presence of other religious groups*," and "*Members of other religious groups are in control of business opportunities*."

Table 3.22 *Perceived group threat*

Group threat	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=367)	Christian (n=354)	Muslim (n=476)	Christian (n=252)	Muslim (n=843)	Christian (n=606)
152. I am afraid that the customs of my group will be lost due to the presence of other religious groups.	M: 3.09 SD: 1.18	M: 2.70 SD: 1.15	M: 2.59 SD: 1.00	M: 2.22 SD: 0.83	M: 2.80 SD: 1.11	M: 2.50 SD: 1.05
153. The migration of people of different religious groups to my community is a threat to my own religious group.	M: 2.88 SD: 1.18	M: 2.46 SD: 1.05	M: 2.38 SD: .92	M: 2.00 SD: .68	M:2.60 SD: 1.07	M: 2.27 SD: .94
154. I am worried that job prospects for members of my group will decline due to the presence of other religious groups.	M: 2.80 SD: 1.08	M: 2.56 SD: 1.02	M: 2.42 SD: .89	M: 2.14 SD: .76	M: 2.59 SD: .99	M: 2.39 SD: .94
155. I am worried that study grant opportunities will decline due to the presence of other religious groups.	M: 2.46 SD: 1.01	M: 2.30 SD: .91	M: 2.30 SD: .89	M: 2.11 SD: .78	M: 2.37 SD: .95	M: 2.22 SD: .86
156. I am worried that security in my university will decline due to the presence of students of other religious groups.	M: 2.69 SD: 1.16	M: 2.35 SD: .96	M: 2.26 SD: .84	M: 2.10 SD: .77	M: 2.44 SD: 1.01	M: 2.24 SD: .89
157. The day will come when members of other religious groups will occupy crucial positions in the government.	M: 3.00 SD: 1.12	M: 2.80 SD: 1.09	M: 2.97 SD: 0.99	M: 2.80 SD: 1.02	M: 2.98 SD: 1.05	M: 2.80 SD: 1.06
158. I am worried that the security in my neighbourhood will decline due to the presence of other religious groups.	M:2.93 SD: 1.12	M:2.59 SD: 1.08	M:2.33 SD: .88	M:2.19 SD: .85	M:2.59 SD: 1.03	M:2.42 SD: 1.01
159. The religious practices of people from other religious groups threaten our own way of life.	M: 2.94 SD: 1.19	M: 2.65 SD: 1.09	M: 2.40 SD: .92	M: 2.18 SD: .78	M: 2.63 SD: 1.08	M: 2.45 SD: 1.00
160. People from other religious groups are given preferential treatment by the authorities.	M: 2.56 SD: 1.09	M: 2.68 SD: 1.12	M: 2.41 SD: .90	M: 2.79 SD: 1.10	M: 2.47 SD: .99	M: 2.72 SD: 1.12
161. Members of other religious groups are in control of business opportunities.	M: 2.69 SD: 1.03	M: 2.64 SD: 1.04	M: 2.66 SD: .96	M: 2.54 SD: .91	M: 2.67 SD: .99	M: 2.60 SD: .99
162. I am afraid of increasing violence in my neighbourhood due to the presence of other religious groups.	M: 2.97 SD: 1.14	M: 2.68 SD: 1.09	M: 2.47 SD: .92	M: 2.39 SD: .89	M: 2.69 SD: 1.05	M: 2.56 SD: 1.02
163. The chances of getting space in a boarding house will decline due to the presence of other religious groups.	M: 2.43 SD: 1.02	M: 2.29 SD: .91	M: 2.26 SD: .91	M: 2.12 SD: .79	M: 2.33 SD: .96	M: 2.22 SD: .87

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

The first question from Savelkoul et al. (2010) is modified to use the term boarding house instead of housing market, stating, "*The chances of getting space in a boarding house will decline due to the presence of other groups*." The second question was also divided into two statements, separately referencing cultural groups and religious groups, becoming, "*I am afraid that the customs of my group will be lost due to the presence of other religious groups*," and "*The migration of people of different religious groups to my community is a threat to my own religious group*." This study also comes up with three questions in relation to grant opportunities (for studying), political threats, and violence.[8]

In our sample, both Muslim and Christian respondents have moderate levels of perceived group threat. The mean values for Muslim respondents are between 2.33 (boarding house) and 2.98 (position of government), and those for Christian respondents are between 2.22 (boarding house, grant opportunities) and 2.80 (position in government). Muslim respondents in Ambon perceive more threat than those in Yogyakarta. The mean values for Muslim respondents in Ambon are between 2.43 (boarding house) and 3.09 (customs), while those for Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta are between 2.26 (boarding house) and 2.97 (positions in government). In addition, Christian respondents in Ambon perceive more threat than those in Yogyakarta. The mean values for Christian respondents in Ambon are from 2.29 (boarding house) to 2.97 (positions in government), while those of Christian respondents in Yogyakarta are from 2.12 (boarding house) to 2.80 (positions in government). The values of standard deviation for Muslim respondents are between .95 and 1.11, while those for Christian respondents are between .86 and 1.12. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is almost the same as that of Christian respondents.

8 The first question from Tuti's questionnaire (2008) was modified to address the provision of student grants. The new statement is, *"I am worried that study grant opportunities will decline due to the presence of other religious groups."* The second statement was developed to represent two different dimensions, namely politics and violence. The new statements are, *"The day will come when members of other religious groups will occupy crucial positions in the government,"* and *"I am afraid of violence increasing in my neighbourhood due to the presence of other religious groups*."

3.2.4.3 Intergroup contact

This measurement assesses an individual's contact with religious out-groups as relatives, close friends, classmates, board mates, and neighbours over the previous year. We classify actual intergroup contact by the quantity of contact and the quality of contact.

Quantity of contact

This variable measures the frequency of an individual's contact with religious out-group members such as relatives, close friends, classmates, board mates, and neighbours (Nick, 1993; Wagner et al., 2006; Tabory, 2007; Schneider, 2008). These questions build on the measurements from Tabory (2007), Schneider (2008), and Wagner et al., (2008). The first question is adapted from Schneider and Wagner's questions, changing the dimensions of the terms used. We changed the term "*immigrant friends"* into "*people of other religious groups,*" and expanded the terms *"neighbourhood and work place"* into *"neighbours, close friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives*". The first question is, *"In the past year, have you had contact with people of other religions as neighbours, close friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives?"* The second question was adapted from Tabory and Wagner's questions by changing the terms "religious and non-religious group" into "Muslim and Christian," so our question is, "*In the past year, how often did you have contact with Christians (or Muslims) as neighbours, close friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives?"*

Table 3.23a *Quantity of contact (version 1)*

In the past year, how often did you have contact with Christians (Muslims) as....	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=356)	Christian (n=338)	Muslim (n=467)	Christian (n=251)	Muslim (n=823)	Christian (n=589)
neighbours?	M: 1.95 SD: 1.77	M: 2.75 SD: 2.13	M: 2.82 SD: 1.95	M: 4.96 SD: 1.60	M: 2.44 SD: 1.92	M: 3.71 SD: 2.21
classmates?	M: 2.68 SD: 2.14	M: 4.28 SD: 1.97	M: 3.47 SD: 2.25	M: 4.22 SD: 2.13	M: 3.12 SD: 2.23	M: 4.25 SD: 2.03
board/dorm/housemates?	M: 1.42 SD: 1.27	M: 2.00 SD: 1.82	M: 2.32 SD: 2.02	M: 3.51 SD: 2.35	M: 1.92 SD: 1.79	M: 2.69 SD: 2.20
close friends?	M: 2.46 SD: 2.02	M: 3.75 SD: 2.11	M: 3.07 SD: 2.17	M: 4.28 SD: 2.02	M: 2.81 SD: 2.12	M: 3.98 SD: 2.09
relatives?	M: 2.03 SD: 1.72	M: 3.40 SD: 2.07	M: 2.39 SD: 1.91	M: 3.97 SD: 2.02	M: 2.23 SD: 1.83	M: 3.64 SD: 2.06

Likert scale 1-6 (never to several times a day), the option 'not applicable' (for respondents who have no religious out-group members as their neighbours, classmates, boardmates, close friends, and relatives) is recoded as 1 (never). Muslim respondents answered the questions in relation to Christians (question 106-110), and Christian respondents answered the questions in relation to Muslims (question 111-115).

Table 3.23b *Quantity of contact (version 2)*

In the past year, how often did you have contact with Christian (Muslim) as....	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=297)	Christian (n=307)	Muslim (n=424)	Christian (n=242)	Muslim (n=717)	Christian (n=550)
neighbours?	M: 2.15 SD: 1.89	M: 2.94 SD: 2.16	M: 3.00 SD: 1.95	M: 5.08 SD: 1.48	M 2.66 SD:1.97	M:3.90 SD: 2.16
classmates?	M: 3.01 SD: 2.19	M: 4.42 SD: 1.88	M: 3.79 SD: 2.19	M: 4.56 SD: 1.95	M:3.46 SD: 2.29	M: 4.48 SD: 1.90
board/dorm/housemates?	M: 1.57 SD: 1.44	M: 2.31 SD: 1.98	M: 2.77 SD:2.17	M: 4.16 SD: 2.21	M: 2.25 SD: 1.98	M: 3.17 SD: 2.28
close friends?	M: 2.74 SD: 2.09	M: 3.96 SD: 2.04	M: 3.43 SD: 2.15	M: 4.55 SD: 1.87	M: 3.14 SD: 2.15	M: 4.21 SD: 1.99
relatives?	M: 2.28 SD: 1.83	SD: 3.65 SD: 2.02	M: 2.72 SD: 1.99	M: 4.24 SD: 1.88	M:2.53 SD: 1.93	M: 3.9 SD: 1.98

The Likert scale 1-6 (never to several times a day), the option ' not applicable,' is considered as a 'missing value' in statistical analysis. Muslim respondents answered the questions in relation to Christians (question 106-110), and Christian respondents answered the questions in relation to Muslims (question 111-115).

Overall, Christian respondents report more frequent contact with Muslims than Muslims report having with Christians. The mean values for Muslim respondents vary from 1.93 (housemate) to 3.12 (classmates). Meanwhile, the mean values for Christian respondents are between 2.69 (housemates) to 4.25 (classmates). Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta have more contact with Christians than those in Ambon. The mean values for Muslim respondents in Ambon range from 1.42 (housemates) to 2.46 (classmates), while those for Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta range from 2.38 (relatives) to 3.47 (classmates). Christian respondents in Yogyakarta also have more intergroup contact than those in Ambon. The range of mean values for Christian respondents in Ambon is between 2.00 (housemates) and 4.28 (classmates), while those of Christian respondents in Yogyakarta are between 3.51 (housemates) to 4.96 (neighbours). Table 3.23a shows the values of standard deviation for Muslim respondents are between 1.79 and 2.23, while those for Christian respondents are between 2.03 and 2.21. The heterogeneity of Muslim respondent's answers is higher than that of Christian respondents.

Quality of contact

This variable indicates how individuals rate their social interaction in terms closeness, equality, and cooperativeness with religious out-group members (Nix, 1993; Brown, 2007). Based on Nix's (1993) and Brown's (2007) measurements of the quality of contact, this indicator has four questions. We adapted Nix's first question to ask, "*How would you rate your contact with them [people from different religious groups] as neighbours, close friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives*?" The remaining questions were adapted from Brown by changing positive statements into questions and by introducing the dimension of social distance from neighbours and relatives. Those questions are "*How close are you with your neighbours, close friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives from other religious groups?"* "*How equal would you say you are with your neighbours, close*

friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives from other religious groups?" and "*How much do you cooperate with your neighbours, close friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives from other religious groups*?"

Table 3.24 *Quality of contact*

How would you rate your contact with them as...	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=229)	Christian (n=302)	Muslim (n=363)	Christian (n=242)	Muslim (n=564)	Christian (n=520)
116. neighbours?	M: 3.55 SD: .89	M: 3.98 SD: .85	M: 3.87 SD: .68	M: 4.04 SD: .62	M: 3.76 SD: .78	M: 4.01 SD: .74
117. classmates?	M: 3.67 SD: .93	M: 4.20 SD: .70	M: 4.04 SD: .67	M: 4.07 SD: .63	M: 3.89 SD: .81	M: 4.15 SD: .68
118. board/dorm/housemates?	M: 3.36 SD: 1.06	M: 3.88 SD: .89	M: 3.87 SD: .74	M: 4.08 SD: .59	M: 3.68 SD: .90	M: 3.99 SD: .75
119. close friends?	M: 3.66 SD: 1.03	M: 4.21 SD: .75	M: 4.01 SD: .72	M: 4.18 SD: .55	M: 3.87 SD: .87	M: 4.19 SD: .67
120. relatives?	M: 3.62 SD: .99	M: 4.18 SD: .75	M :3.89 SD: .77	M: 4.14 SD: .58	M: 3.78 SD: .88	M: 4.16 SD: .68

Likert scale 1-6 (very negative to very positive), the option 'not applicable' is recoded into missing in statistical analysis.

In general, Christian respondents give a more positive rating to the quality of their contact with Muslims than Muslim respondents do about their contact with Christians. The mean values for Christian respondents are between 3.99(housemate) and 4.19 (close friends), while those for Muslim respondents are between 3.68 (housemate) and 3.89 (classmates). Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta give a more positive rating to their interactions with Christians than Muslim respondents in Ambon. Christian respondents in both Ambon and Yogyakarta reported the same positive evaluation for their interactions with Muslims. The values of standard deviation for Muslim respondents are between .78 and .90, while for Christian respondents they are between .67 and .74. The heterogeneity of the answers of Muslim respondents is higher than that of Christian respondents.

Table 3.25 *Degree of closeness*

How close are you with your ... from other religious groups?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=239)	Christian (n=307)	Muslim (n=356)	Christian (n=244)	Muslim (n=579)	Christian (n=528)
121. neighbours	M: 2.75 SD: 1.33	M: 3.61 SD: 1.13	M: 3.19 SD: .97	M: 3.67 SD: .84	M: 3.02 SD: 1.14	M: 3.64 SD: .99
122. classmates	M: 3.38 SD: 1.31	M: 4.10 SD: .88	M: 3.74 SD: .90	M: 4.03 SD: .69	M: 3.59 SD: 1.10	M: 4.07 SD: .81
123. board/dorm/housemates	M: 2.69 SD: 1.41	M: 3.59 SD: 1.19	M: 3.48 SD: .99	M: 3.87 SD: .79	M: 3.17 SD: 1.24	M: 3.74 SD: 1.01
124. close friends	M: 3.40 SD: 1.46	M: 4.18 SD: .98	M: 3.90 SD: .89	M: 4.24 SD: .72	M: 3.69 SD: 1.19	M: 4.21 SD: .87
125. relatives	M: 3.19 SD: 1.40	M: 4.04 SD: .94	M: 3.70 SD: .96	M: 4.11 SD: .75	M: 3.48 SD: 1.20	M: 4.07 SD: .86

Likert scale 1-5 (not close at all to very close), option 'not applicable' (for respondents who have no contact with people from different religious groups, is considered as missing value.

Table 3.26 *Degree of equality*

How equal would you say you are with your ... from other religious groups?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=222)	Christian (n=296)	Muslim (n=352)	Christian (n=238)	Muslim (n=553)	Christian (n=518)
126. neighbours	M: 2.95 SD: 1.18	M: 3.84 SD: .78	M: 3.68 SD: .73	M: 4.02 SD: .61	M: 3.43 SD: .97	M: 3.94 SD: .69
127. classmates	M: 3.39 SD: 1.16	M: 4.06 SD: .61	M: 3.80 SD: .76	M: 4.08 SD: .53	M: 3.63 SD: .96	M: 4.07 SD: .58
128. board/dorm/housemates	M: 2.91 SD: 1.28	M: 3.88 SD: .84	M: 3.69 SD: .82	M: 4.08 SD: .57	M: 3.39 SD: 1.09	M: 3.99 SD: .71
129. close friends	M: 3.32 SD: 1.21	M: 4.09 SD: .66	M: 3.83 SD: .77	M: 4.16 SD: .54	M: 3.63 SD: 1.01	M: 4.12 SD: .61
130. relatives	M: 3.19 SD: 1.18	M: 4.03 SD: .75	M: 3.76 SD: .80	M: 4.14 SD: .56	M: 3.52 SD: 1.02	M: 4.08 SD: .67

Likert scale 1-5 (not equal at all to very equal), option ' not applicable' is considered as missing value.

Table 3.27 *Degree of cooperativeness*

How much do you cooperate with your .... from other religious groups?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=229)	Christian (n=304)	Muslim (n=353)	Christian (n=243)	Muslim (n=531)	Christian (n=590)
131. neighbours	M: 2.99 SD: 1.24	M: 3.81 SD: .92	M: 3.49 SD: .96	M: 3.94 SD: .69	M: 3.32 SD: 1.09	M: 3.89 SD: .81
132. classmates	M: 3.51 SD: 1.22	M: 4.13 SD: .71	M: 3.90 SD: .94	M: 4.21 SD: .55	M: 3.74 SD: 1.08	M: 4.17 SD: .65
133. board/dorm/housemates	M: 2.78 SD: 1.37	M: 3.83 SD: .97	M: 3.65 SD: 1.04	M: 4.13 SD: .53	M: 3.32 SD: 1.25	M: 3.99 SD: .77
134. close friends	M: 3.45 SD: 1.33	M: 4.17 SD: .77	M: 3.95 SD: .96	M: 4.27 SD: .54	M: 3.75 SD: 1.15	M: 4.21 SD: .67
135. relatives	M: 3.22 SD: 1.31	M: 4.03 SD: .77	M: 3.77 SD: 1.03	M: 4.15 SD: .59	M: 3.53 SD: 1.19	M: 4.08 SD: .69

Likert scale 1-5 (not cooperative at all to very cooperative), option 'not applicable' is considered as missing value.

In our sample, as well as giving a more positive rating to quality of contact, Christian respondents also report a higher degree of closeness, equality, and cooperativeness than Muslim respondents. The mean values of closeness for Christian respondents are between 3.64 (neighbours) and 4.21 (close friends); while those for Muslim respondents are between 3.02 (neighbours) and 3.69 (close friends). The mean values of equality for Christian respondents are between 3.94 (neighbours) and 4.12 (close friends), while those for Muslim respondents are between 3.39 (housemates) and 3.63 (classmates and close friends). The mean values for cooperativeness of Christian respondents are from 3.89 (neighbours) to 4.21 (close friends), while Muslim respondents are from 3.32 (neighbours and housemates) and 3.75 (close friends). In all questions, the standard deviations for Muslim respondents are between .96 and 1.25, while those for Christian respondents are between .65 and 1.01. The answers from Muslims display more heterogeneity than the answers from Christians.

3.2.4.4 Religiosity

Religiosity refers to religiocentric attitudes, different attitudes toward religious plurality, and interpretation of sacred writing.

Religiocentrism

Religiocentrism is analogous to ethnocentrism – it refers to a combination of positive attitudes towards the religious in-group and negative attitudes towards religious out-groups (Sterkens 2001, 158-165). These statements on religiocentrism build on measurements from the questionnaire of Sterkens and Anthony (2008; cf. Anthony, Hermans & Sterkens, 2015:143-167)). The question inquires to what extent the respondents agree with statements displaying positive attitudes towards the in-group and negative attitudes towards out-groups.

Table 3.28a *Positive attitudes toward religious in-group*

Positive attitudes towards in-group	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=361)	Christian (n=359)	Muslim (n=471)	Christian (n=251)	Muslim (n=831)	Christian (n=610)
1. Muslims/Christians respond to God the most faithfully.	M: 4.42 SD: .89	M: 4.39 SD: .89	M: 4.19 SD: .88	M: 3.36 SD: 1.12	M: 4.29 SD: .89	M: 3.97 SD: 1.11
2. Thanks to their religion, most Muslims/Christians are good people.	M: 3.16 SD: 1.34	M: 3.20 SD: 1.23	M: 3.21 SD: 1.14	M: 2.74 SD: .94	M: 3.19 SD: 1.23	M: 3.01 SD: 1.15
3. Muslims/Christians are best able to talk meaningfully about God.	M: 4.30 SD: .84	M: 3.69 SD: 1.16	M: 3.79 SD: 1.10	M: 2.75 SD: 1.06	M: 4.01 SD: 1.03	M: 3.30 SD: 1.21

In the Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree), Muslim respondents only answered questions about Christians (question 45-47) and Christian respondents only answered questions about Muslims (question 51-53).

In our research, Muslim respondents show higher levels of positive attitude towards the in-group than Christian respondents do. The range of mean values for Muslim respondents is between 3.19 (good people) and 4.29 (respond to God), while those for Christian respondents is between 3.01 (good people) and 3.97 (respond to God). Respondents in Ambon have higher positive attitudes towards the in-group than those in Yogyakarta. The standard deviation values for Muslim respondents are between 0.89 and 1.23, and those for Christian respondents are between 1.11 and 1.21. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is lower than of the heterogeneity of answers from Christian respondents.

Table 3.28b *Negative attitudes towards religious out-group*

Negative attitudes towards out-group	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=361)	Christian (n=359)	Muslim (n=471)	Christian (n=251)	Muslim (n=831)	Christian (n=610)
1. Christians/Muslims only talk about doing good deeds without practising them.	M: 2.99 SD: .99	M: 2.62 SD: 1.00	M: 2.60 SD: .95	M: 2.41 SD: .79	M: 2.77 SD: .99	M: 2.53 SD: .93
2. When it comes to religion, Christians/Muslims are less tolerant.	M: 3.12 SD: 1.03	M: 2.78 SD: 1.05	M: 2.64 SD: 0.91	M: 2.79 SD: .97	M: 2.84 SD: .99	M: 2.79 SD: 1.02
3. Christians/Muslims are often the cause of religious conflict.	M: 3.02 SD: 1.15	M: 2.81 SD: 1.24	M: 2.49 SD: .99	M: 2.73 SD: 1.09	M: 2.72 SD: 1.09	M: 2.78 SD: 1.18

In the Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree), Muslim respondents only answered questions about Christians (question 48-50) and Christian respondents only answered questions about Muslims (question 54-56).

Muslim respondents have a higher level of negative attitudes towards out-groups than Christian respondents do. The mean values for Muslim respondents are between 2.72 (religious conflict) and 2.84 (less tolerant), while those for Christian respondents are between 2.53 (good deeds) and 2.79 (less tolerant). Respondents in Ambon have more negative attitudes towards out-groups than those in Yogyakarta. The standard deviation values of Muslim respondents are between 0.99 and 1.09, and those of Christian respondents are between .93 and 1.18. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is lower than from Christian respondents.

Attitudes toward religious plurality

This measurement represents different individual's interpretations of religious plurality in relation to the normative truth claims of the own tradition. The three different models we distinguish are (exclusive and inclusive) monism, religious pluralism and religious relativism (cf. Anthony, Hermans & Sterkens, 2005; 2015:117-142).[9]

9 Exclusive monism refers to the affirmation that one's own religion is the only true religion in the world. Meanwhile, inclusive monism is an affirmation that there is a partial truth in other religions, although absolute truth is the provenance of one's own religion. Commonality pluralism emphasizes underlying common elements expressed by different religions in varied ways. Differential pluralism is the idea that differences amongst religions are real and that their particularities are sources for reciprocal enrichment and growth. Relativistic pluralism holds that there is no absolute truth among religions, due to the fact that religious words and experiences are true only within the given context of particular religions. The questions from Anthony et al. (2005) are selected as the basis of our measurement, with some revision to parts of the sentences.

Table 3.29a *Religious monism*

Monism	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=366)	Christian (n=362)	Muslim (n=473)	Christian (n=255)	Muslim (n=837)	Christian (n=617)
78. Compared with other religions, my religion offers the surest way to liberation.	M: 3.94 SD: 1.09	M: 3.73 SD: 1.19	M: 3.76 SD: 1.02	M: 3.15 SD: 1.14	M: 3.84 SD: 1.06	M: 3.49 SD: 1.21
81. Other religions do not provide as deep a God-experience as my religion.	M: 3.63 SD: 1.18	M:2.64 SD:1.17	M:3.26 SD:1.08	M:2.27 SD: 0.82	M: 3.42 SD: 1.14	M: 2.49 SD: 1.05
84. The truth about God is found only in my religion.	M: 4.09 SD: 1.14	M: 3.11 SD: 1.39	M: 3.85 SD: 1.09	M: 2.60 SD: 1.17	M: 3.96 SD: 1.12	M: 2.89 SD: 1.33
87. Compared with my religion, other religions contain only partial truths.	M: 3.54 SD: .98	M: 2.64 SD: .97	M: 3.24 SD: .95	M: 2.55 SD: .86	M: 3.37 SD: .94	M: 2.60 SD: .93

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

In our sample, Muslim respondents display a higher level of monism than Christian respondents. The mean values of Muslim respondents are between 3.37 (God partial truth) and 3.84 (way to liberation), while the mean of values of Christian respondents is from 2.49 (God experience) to 3.49 (way to liberation). Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta have a lower level of monism compared to their fellows in Ambon. In addition, Christian respondents in Yogyakarta are less monistic than Christian respondents in Ambon. The values of standard deviation for Muslim respondents are between .94 and 1.14, while those for Christian respondents are between .93 and 1.33. The responses from Muslim respondents display less heterogeneity than the answers from Christian respondents.

Table 3.29b *Religious pluralism*

Pluralism	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=359)	Christian (n=360)	Muslim (n=474)	Christian (n=255)	Muslim (n=833)	Christian (n=615)
79. In religious traditions, different aspects of God are revealed.	M: 3.56 SD: 1.01	M: 3.35 SD: 1.05	M: 3.46 SD: .89	M: 3.45 SD: .83	M: 3.50 SD: .95	M: 3.39 SD: .96
82. Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment.	M: 3.47 SD: 1.07	M: 3.90 SD: 1.03	M: 3.62 SD: .96	M: 4.11 SD: .81	M: 3.56 SD: 1.01	M: 3.99 SD: .95
85. Differences between religions provide more knowledge of God.	M: 3.65 SD: 1.03	M: 3.86 SD: .94	M: 3.50 SD: 1.03	M: 3.90 SD: .90	M: 3.57 SD: 1.03	M: 3.87 SD: .93
88. Differences between religions are a source of spiritual development.	M: 3.53 SD: .97	M: 3.80 SD: .92	M: 3.41 SD: .96	M: 3.84 SD: .78	M: 3.46 SD: .96	M: 3.82 SD: .87

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

The numbers indicate that Christian respondents display more pluralism than Muslim respondents. The mean values of Christian respondents are between 3.39 (different aspect of God) and 3.99 (mutual enrichment), and the mean values of Muslim respondents range from 3.46 (spiritual development) to 3.57 (knowledge of God). Christian respondents in Yogyakarta manifest slightly higher levels of pluralism compared to their fellows in Ambon. Meanwhile, Muslim respondents in Ambon are slightly more pluralistic than their fellows in Yogyakarta. The values of standard deviation for Muslim respondents are between .95 and 1.03, while those for Christian respondents are between .87 and .96. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is higher than that of answers from Christian respondents.

Table 3.29c *Religious relativism*

Relativism	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=363)	Christian (n=362)	Muslim (n=476)	Christian (n=255)	Muslim (n=839)	Christian (n=617)
80. All religions are equally valid ways to ultimate truth.	M: 3.02 SD: 1.32	M: 4.14 SD: .93	M: 3.20 SD: 1.19	M: 3.93 SD: .93	M: 3.12 SD: 1.26	M: 4.05 SD: .94
83. All religions are equally valid paths to liberation.	M: 3.03 SD: 1.21	M: 4.04 SD: .89	M: 3.28 SD: 1.11	M: 3.94 SD: .88	M: 3.17 SD: 1.16	M: 4.00 SD: .89
86. Everything that is said about God in other religions has the same value.	M: 2.76 SD :1.09	M: 3.77 SD: .99	M: 3.06 SD: 1.11	M: 3.66 SD: .88	M: 2.93 SD: 1.11	M: 3.72 SD: .95
89. At the deepest level, all religions are the same.	M: 2.76 SD 1.31	M: 4.13 SD: 1.02	M: 3.21 SD: 1.26	M: 3.91 SD:.99	M: 3.01 SD: 1.29	M: 4.04 SD: 1.02

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

As with the previous indicators, here we find that Christian respondents have higher level of religious relativism than Muslim respondents. The mean values for Christian respondents are between 3.72 (the same value) and 4.05 (ways to ultimate truth), meanwhile those of Muslim respondents are between 2.93 (the same value) and 3.17 (paths to liberation). Christian respondents in Ambon have higher level of religious relativism than their fellows in Yogyakarta. Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta have a higher degree of religious relativism than their fellows in Ambon. The values of standard deviation for Muslim respondents are between 1.11 and 1.29, while those of Christian respondents are between .94 and 1.02. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is higher than that of answers from Christian respondents.

Interpretation of sacred writing

The interpretation of sacred writing consists of two measurements, intratextual fundamentalism and hermeneutic interpretation. Questions regarding intratextual fundamentalism build on the measurements from Williamsons et al. (2010). After the pilot survey, Duriez's and Hutsebaut's questions (2005) were included as well, since their questions measure two

important aspects of interpretation; namely orthodoxy (literal affirmation or fundamentalist interpretation) and naiveté (symbolic affirmation or hermeneutic interpretation).

Table 3.30a *Religious intratextual fundamentalism*

Intratextual fundamentalism	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=369)	Christian (n=364)	Muslim (n=470)	Christian (n=254)	Muslim (n=840)	Christian (n=618)
62. Everything in the Sacred Writing is absolutely true without question.	M: 4.62 SD: .70	M: 4.34 SD: .94	M: 4.19 SD: 1.01	M: 3.48 SD: 1.27	M: 4.38 SD: .92	M: 3.99 SD: 1.16
63. The Sacred Writing should never be doubted, even when scientific or historical evidence outright disagrees with it.	M: 4.26 SD: 1.00	M: 4.17 SD: .97	M: 3.99 SD: 1.06	M: 3.41 SD: 1.19	M: 4.11 SD: 1.04	M: 3.86 SD: 1.13
64. The Sacred Writing is NOT really the words of God, but the words of man.	M: 1.40 SD: .66	M: 1.94 SD: .99	M: 1.58 SD: .86	M: 2.30 SD: .98	M: 1.50 SD: .78	M: 2.09 SD: 1.00
65. The truths of the Sacred Writing will never be outdated, but will always apply equally well to all generations.	M: 4.56 SD: .66	M: 4.58 SD: .69	M: 4.38 SD: .77	M: 4.04 SD: .93	M: 4.46 SD: .73	M: 4.36 SD: .84
66. The Sacred Writing is the only one that is true above all Holy Books.	M: 4.57 SD: .74	M: 3.61 SD: 1.33	M: 4.18 SD: .98	M: 2.72 SD: 1.14	M: 4.35 SD: .90	M: 3.25 SD: 1.33
67. I think that the Sacred Writing should be taken literally, as it is written.	M: 4.10 SD: .90	M: 3.96 SD: 1.07	M: 3.14 SD: 1.23	M: 2.75 SD: 1.24	M: 3.56 SD: 1.20	M: 3.45 SD: 1.29

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree). Question 64 should be reverse coded.

Muslim respondents have a more intratextual fundamentalist orientation than Christian respondents do. The mean values for Muslim respondents range from 1.50 (the words of man, which should be reverse coded in scale construction) to 4.46 (truth of sacred writing), while those for Christian respondents are between 2.09 (the words of man) to 4.36 (truth of sacred writing). Respondents in Ambon are more fundamentalist compared with those in Yogyakarta. The standard deviation values for Muslim respondents are between .73 and 1.20, and for Christian respondents are between .84 and 1.33. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is lower than that of answers from Christian respondents.

Table 3.30b *Religious Hermeneutic interpretation*

Hermeneutic interpretation	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=369)	Christian (n=364)	Muslim (n=470)	Christian (n=254)	Muslim (n=840)	Christian (n=618)
68. The meanings of the Sacred Writing are open to change and interpretation.	M: 3.34 SD: 1.26	M: 3.72 SD: 1.16	M: 3.56 SD: 1.12	M: 3.84 SD: .99	M: 3.46 SD: 1.19	M: 3.77 SD: 1.09
69. The Sacred Writing holds a deeper truth which can only be revealed by personal reflection.	M: 3.74 SD: 1.06	M: 4.21 SD: .92	M: 3.63 SD: 1.06	M: 3.84 SD: .85	M: 3.68 SD: 1.06	M: 4.06 SD: .91

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

Nevertheless, Christian respondents have a higher level of symbolic fundamentalism than Muslim respondents do. The mean values for Muslim respondents vary between 3.46 (open interpretation) and 3.68 (personal reflection), while those for Christian respondents are between 3.77 (open to interpretation) and 4.06 (personal reflection). The standard deviation values for Muslim respondents are between 1.06 and 1.19, and those for Christian respondents are between .91 and 1.09. The answers from Muslim respondents demonstrate more heterogeneity than the answers from Christian respondents.

3.2.4.5 Perceived discrimination

Perceived discrimination consists of both general and specific discrimination. General discrimination is the feeling of being discriminated against based on one or more indicators including colour or race, nationality, religion, language, ethnic group, age, gender, sexuality, and disability (Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2006: 545; ESS, 2008/2009). Our questions are "*Do you consider yourself to be a member of a group that is discriminated against in this city*?" and "*If yes, on what grounds are your group discriminated against?"* Specific discrimination is the feeling of being discriminated against by religious out-groups in the domain of politics, economics, culture, and religion (Fox, 2000). Questions related

to this variable build on the measurements from Fox (2000) on racial discrimination, using the question, "*Whether you would agree or disagree that your own ethno-religious group experiences the following limitations in…(economy, politics, culture, and religion).*"

After the pilot survey, the queries in this question regarding political discrimination were rephrased as *freedom of expression, freedom to choose a place of residence, recruitment as a civil servant,* and *attaining higher positions in government offices.*[10] The queries regarding economic discrimination are *access to credit, access to government subsidy, participation in the local market, access to the housing market,* and *access to the job market.*" After the pilot survey, a limitation on the query about *access to credit* was deleted due to the low correlation with the other questions. The queries about cultural discrimination were changed to *celebration of a group's ceremony, dress, behaviour, and marriage*.[11] The queries about religious discrimination are *public observance of religious services, public observance of religious holy days, public observance of religious festivals, building places of worship, forced observance of religious laws of other group, running of religious schools, and the observance of religious laws on marriage and divorce.* After the pilot survey, limitations on *religious services* and *religious holidays* were deleted from the questionnaire.

In our sample, most respondents (77.8%) do not consider themselves to be members of a discriminated against group. Only a few respondents (17%) consider themselves members of groups that are being discriminated against. The perceived discrimination against their group is grounded in religion (66%) and ethnicity or ethnic group affiliation (14.9%). Respondents in Ambon tend to feel more discriminated against on the grounds of religion

10 Before the pilot survey, the options for this question were *freedom of expression, free movement and place of residence, rights in judicial proceedings, political organization, voting, recruitment to the police and military, access to the civil service,* and *attainment of high office.*

11 The queries regarding cultural discrimination are *celebration of a group's holiday, ceremonies, and cultural events, limitations on wearing cultural dress, appearance, and behavior,* and *limitations on inter-ethnic marriage.*"

(73%) than ethnicity (12%). The same pattern is apparent for respondents in Yogyakarta(47.9% and 22.5% respectively).

Table 3.31 *Perceived discrimination*

Economic	**RESPONDENTS**					
	AMBON		**YOGYAKARTA**		**TOTAL**	
	Muslim (n=362)	Christian (n=347)	Muslim (n=474)	Christian (n=254)	Muslim (n=836)	Christian (n=601)
190. Limitations on access to government subsidy	M:2.21 SD:.97	M:2.31 SD:1.04	M:2.04 SD:.78	M:2.39 SD:.99	M:2.12 SD:.87	M:2.35 SD:1.02
193. Limitations on participation in the local market	M:2.26 SD:.95	M:2.29 SD:1.03	M:2.08 SD:.76	M:2.26 SD:.87	M:2.16 SD:.85	M:2.28 SD:.97
196. Limitations on access to the housing market	M:2.32 SD:.93	M:2.24 SD:1.00	M:2.09 SD:.81	M:2.26 SD:.90	M:2.19 SD:.87	M:2.25 SD:.96
199. Limitations on access to the job market	M:2.19 SD:.94	M:2.28 SD:1.01	M:2.97 SD:.75	M:2.34 SD:.99	M:2.12 SD:.84	M:2.30 SD:1.00
Politics	**RESPONDENTS**					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=362)	Christian (n=348)	Muslim (n=476)	Christian (n=254)	Muslim (n=837)	Christian (n=602)
188. Limitations on freedom of expression	M:2.22 SD:1.00	M:2.27 SD:1.03	M:1.99 SD:.81	M:2.36 SD:1.02	M:2.09 SD:.91	M:2.31 SD:1.03
191. Limitations on freedom to choose a place of residence	M:2.21 SD:1.04	M:2.19 SD:1.00	M:2.02 SD:.81	M:2.26 SD:.95	M:2.10 SD:.92	M:2.22 SD:.98
201. Limitations on recruitment as a civil servant	M:2.18 SD:1.04	M:2.22 SD:1.09	M:2.05 SD:.78	M:2.43 SD:1.12	M:2.11 SD:.90	M:2.31 SD:1.11
203. Limitations on attaining higher positions in government offices	M:2.23 SD:1.04	M:2.26 SD:1.07	M:2.16 SD:.87	M:2.57 SD:1.19	M:2.19 SD:.94	M:2.39 SD:1.13
Culture	**RESPONDENTS**					
	AMBON		**YOGYAKARTA**		**TOTAL**	
	Muslim (n=361)	Christian (n=347)	Muslim (n=478)	Christian (n=255)	Muslim (n=839)	Christian (n=602)
189. Limitations on celebration of group's ceremonies	M: 2.20 SD: .92	M: 2.11 SD: .89	M: 2.07 SD: .82	M: 2.27 SD: .98	M: 2.12 SD: 0.87	M: 2.18 SD: .93
192. Limitations on dress	M: 2.87 SD: 1.28	M: 2.59 SD: 1.17	M: 2.65 SD: 1.15	M: 2.49 SD: 1.00	M: 2.75 SD: 1.21	M: 2.55 SD: 1.10
197. Limitations on marriage	M: 2.50 SD: 1.18	M: 2.31 SD: 1.07	M: 2.48 SD: 1.08	M: 2.56 SD: 1.09	M: 2.48 SD: 1.12	M: 2.42 SD: 1.09
194. Limitation on behaviour	M: 2.69 SD: 1.21	M: 2.56 SD: 1.18	M: 2.63 SD: 1.12	M: 2.61 SD: 1.09	M: 2.65 SD: 1.16	M: 2.58 SD: 1.14
Religion	**RESPONDENTS**					
	AMBON		**YOGYAKARTA**		**TOTAL**	
	Muslim (n=362)	Christian (n=345)	Muslim (n=474)	Christian (n=253)	Muslim (n=834)	Christian (n=598)
195. Limitations on public observance of religious festivals	M: 2.22 SD: 1.07	M: 2.13 SD: .97	M: 2.13 SD: .84	M: 2.35 SD: 1.03	M: 2.17 SD: .95	M: 2.22 SD: 1.00
198. Limitations on building places of worship	M: 2.35 SD: 1.18	M: 2.12 SD: 1.05	M: 2.18 SD: .89	M: 2.56 SD: 1.23	M: 2.26 SD: 1.03	M: 2.31 SD: 1.15
200. Forced observance of religious laws of other group	M: 1.84 SD: .92	M: 2.01 SD: .97	M: 1.97 SD: .88	M: 2.28 SD: 1.11	M: 1.91 SD: .90	M: 2.13 SD: 1.04
202. Limitations on running of religious schools	M: 2.21 SD: 1.04	M: 2.11 SD: .95	M: 2.06 SD: .81	M: 2.41 SD: 1.12	M: 2.12 SD: .92	M: 2.24 SD: 1.04
204. Limitations on the observance of religious laws on marriage and divorce	M: 2.38 SD: 1.09	M: 2.36 SD: 1.09	M: 2.33 SD: .99	M: 2.50 SD: 1.09	M: 2.35 SD: 1.04	M: 2.42 SD: 1.09

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

The levels of perceived discrimination are relatively moderate for both Muslim and Christian respondents. For the category of economic discrimination, the mean values for Muslim respondents are between 2.12 (government subsidy) and 2.19 (housing); while those for Christian respondents are between 2.25 (housing) and 2.35 (government subsidy). In the category of political discrimination, the mean values for Muslim respondents are between 2.09 (freedom of expression) and 2.19 (position in the government offices), while those for Christian respondents are between 2.22 (place for residence) and 2.39 (position in government offices). The mean values of cultural discrimination and religious discrimination also display the same pattern. In short, Christian respondents feel slightly more discriminated against than Muslim respondents, based on the grounds of economy, politics, culture, and religion. In all questions, the standard deviations for Muslim respondents are between .84 and 1.16, and those for Christian respondents are between .93 and 1.14. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is almost the same as that of the answers from Christian respondents.

3.2.4.6 Individual memory of violence

This variable measures an individual's memories and experience of direct or indirect communal violence in the past. These memories might result in trauma and have the potential to influence attitude, behaviour, and ways of thinking about other ethno-religious groups (Doherty and Poole, 1997; Novak and Rodseth, 2006). We inquire about memories of violence by asking how frequently respondents witnessed, remember, and discuss violence within the family, and how frequently they were victims of communal violence in their provinces in the past (Sahdra and Ross, 2007). Questions about memories are derived from the measurements in Sahdra and Ross's (2007) inquiry into remembering communal violence, and from Hayes and McAllister's survey (2001) on (2001) Irish social mobility.

Table 3.32 *Individual memory of violence*

59a. In your family, did you talk about ethno-religious violence ….?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	157	20.90	448	59.70	605	40.30
Yes	572	76.30	299	39.90	871	58.10
Missing	21	2.80	3	.40	24	1.60
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
59b. If yes, how often do you talk about it?						
	AMBON		**YOGYAKARTA**		**TOTAL**	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Never					-	-
Rarely	181	31.60	125	41.80	306	35.10
Sometimes	318	55.60	155	51.80	473	54.30
Often	72	12.60	16	5.40	88	10.10
Missing	1	.20	3	1.00	4	.50
Total	572	100.00	299	100.00	871	100.00
60a. Did you witness violence, for example fighting or rioting …?						
	AMBON		**YOGYAKARTA**		**TOTAL**	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	262	34.90	528	70.40	790	52.70
Yes	462	61.60	217	28.90	679	45.30
Missing	26	3.50	5	.70	31	2.10
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
61a. Have you suffered any kind of physical injury due to the violence…?						
	AMBON		**YOGYAKARTA**		**TOTAL**	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	674	89.90	716	95.50	1390	92.70
Yes	45	6.00	29	3.90	74	4.90
Missing	31	4.10	5	.70	36	2.40
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00

In our sample, almost half of the respondents (49.50%) mentioned that their province had experienced ethno-religious violence in the past 10 years. Some of them answered that they could remember two (24.10%) to three incidents (19.20%). Most respondents (58.10%) talk about ethno-religious violence with their family in both Ambon (76.30%) and Yogyakarta (39.90%). More than half of respondents answered that they sometimes (54.30%) talk about the ethno-religious violence that occurred. The percentage of respondents who talk about religious violence in their family in Ambon (55.60%) is slightly higher than in Yogyakarta (51.80%). Less than half of the respondents (45.30%) witnessed ethno-religious violence, and those who did were mainly in Ambon (61.60%) rather than Yogyakarta (28.90%). Almost half of the respondents (45.90%) who witnessed violence suffered some kind of physical injury on at least one occasion.

Table 3.33 *Family members and relatives*

70a. Were any of your immediate family members injured due to the violence ...?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	472	62.90	705	94.00	1177	78.50
Yes	262	34.90	43	5.70	305	20.30
Missing	16	2.10	2	0.30	18	1.20
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
71a. Did any of your immediate family members lose their lives due to the violence ...?						
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	544	72.50	723	96.40	1267	84.50
Yes	188	25.10	25	3.30	213	14.20
Missing	18	2.40	2	.30	20	1.30
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
72a. Were any of your relatives injured due to the violence ...?						
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	466	62.10	686	91.50	1152	76.80
Yes	264	35.20	62	8.30	326	21.70
Missing	20	2.70	2	.30	22	1.50
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
73a. Did any of your relatives lose their lives due to the violence ...?						
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	556	74.10	716	95.50	1272	84.80
Yes	172	22.90	31	4.10	203	13.50
Missing	22	2.90	3	.40	25	1.70
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00

Most respondents said that their family members were not injured (78.50%) and did not lose their lives (84.50%). The percentage of respondents whose family members were injured in Ambon (34.90%) is higher than that in Yogyakarta (5.70%). The percentage of respondents whose family members lost their lives is also higher in Ambon (25.10%) than in Yogyakarta (3.30%). Also, most respondents mentioned their relatives were not injured (76.80%) and did not lose their lives (84.80%). There were relatively few respondents who reported that their relatives lost their lives (13.50%), both in Yogyakarta (22.90%) and Ambon (4.10%).

Table 3.34 *Close friends and neighbours*

74a. Were any of your close friends injured due to the violence ...?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	559	74.50	682	90.00	1241	82.70
Yes	170	22.70	62	8.30	232	15.50
Missing	21	2.80	6	.80	27	1.80
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
75a. Did any of your close friends lose their lives due to the violence ...?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	657	87.60	712	94.90	1369	91.30
Yes	72	9.60	31	4.10	103	6.90
Missing	21	2.80	7	.90	28	1.90
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
76a. Were any of your neighbours injured due to the violence ...?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	489	65.20	689	91.90	1178	78.50
Yes	241	32.10	55	7.30	296	19.70
Missing	20	2.70	6	.80	26	1.70
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00
77a. Did any of your neighbours lose their lives due to the violence ...?	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
No	555	74.00	716	95.50	1271	84.70
Yes	175	23.30	28	3.70	203	13.50
Missing	20	2.70	6	.80	26	1.70
Total	750	100.00	750	100.00	1500	100.00

Almost all of the respondents said their close friends were not injured (82.70%) and did not lose their lives (91.30%). A minority of respondents (15.50%) said that their close friends were injured. The percentage of respondents who reported that their close friends were injured was higher in Ambon (22.70%) than in Yogyakarta (8.30%). Few respondents (6.90%) said that their close friends lost their lives. Again, the percentage of respondents who had friends that lost their lives was higher in Ambon (9.60%) than in Yogyakarta (4.10%). Most respondents also mentioned that their neighbours were not injured (78.50%) and did not lose their lives (84.70%). The percentage of respondents whose neighbours were injured and lost their lives was higher in Ambon (32.10% and 23.30%) than in Yogyakarta (7.30% and 3.70% respectively). Overall, respondents in Ambon reported higher percentages of experiencing the results of violence

(including injury and death of their families, relatives, and neighbours) than respondents in Yogyakarta.

3.2.4.7 Nationalistic attitudes

Nationalistic attitudes consist of romantic nationalism (patriotism), ethnocentric nationalism (chauvinism), and regiocentrism (ethno-nationalism). Romantic nationalism or patriotism is an attachment to one's own country, while ethnocentric nationalism or chauvinism is an individual's feeling that his/her own country is superior to other countries. Regiocentrism refers to ethno-nationalism constructed by minority ethnic groups in opposition to nationalism. Questions about nationalism build on the measurements from Coenders (2001) and Todosijevic (1998) that include patriotism and chauvinism as dimensions. Based on their measurements, this study presents five questions on romantic nationalism and five questions on chauvinism. This study also adds four questions on regiocentrism by changing the dimension of nation to region.[12] After the pilot survey, the term "region" was changed to "district," and "ethno-religious group interest" became "national interest."

12 The questions on region-centrism are (i) "*I should support my region even if my region is wrong," (ii) "I should always put regional interest above ethno-religious group interest," (iii) I would rather be a resident of (my region) than of other regions in Indonesia,"* and *(iv) "I should respect my province and its traditions*."

Table 3.35 *Romantic nationalism*

Romantic nationalism	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=370)	Christian (n=363)	Muslim (n=478)	Christian (n=253)	Muslim (n=848)	Christian (n=616)
136. How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievements in history?	M: 4.53 SD: .73	M: 4.30 SD: .80	M: 4.16 SD: .81	M: 3.86 SD: .92	M: 4.32 SD: .80	M: 4.12 SD: .88
137. How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievements in equal treatment of all groups in society?	M: 3.78 SD: 1.19	M: 3.47 SD: 1.22	M: 3.51 SD: 1.04	M: 3.04 SD: 1.17	M: 3.62 SD: 1.11	M: 3.29 SD: 1.21
138. I should respect my nation and its tradition.	M: 4.55 SD: .59	M: 4.44 SD: .58	M: 4.26 SD: .76	M: 4.27 SD: .59	M: 4.39 SD: .71	M: 4.37 SD: 0.59
139. I should always put national interest above ethno-religious group interest.	M: 3.79 SD: 1.04	M: 3.85 SD: 1.04	M: 3.82 SD: .92	M: 3.74 SD: .84	M: 3.81 SD: .97	M: 3.80 SD: .96
140. Renewing national ideas is our national task.	M: 4.20 SD: .71	M: 4.21 SD: .65	M: 4.09 SD: .69	M: 4.00 SD: .66	M: 4.14 SD: .70	M: 4.12 SD: .66

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

In our sample, Muslim respondents have a higher level of romantic nationalism than Christian respondents. The mean values for Muslim respondents range between 3.62 (achievement in equal treatments) and 4.39 (respect my nation), while those for Christian respondents are 4.12 (national achievement in history) to 3.29 (achievement in equal treatment). In Ambon, Muslim respondents (M=4.55) are more nationalistic than Christian respondents are (4.44) in relation to the statement "one should (show) respect to the nation." However, in Ambon, Muslim respondents (M=3.79) are less nationalistic than Christian respondents (M=3.85) in their response to the statement that, "I should always put national interest above ethno-religious group interest." The standard deviation values for Muslim respondents are between .70 and 1.11, and those for Christian respondents are between .59 and 1.21. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is lower than that of answers from Christian respondents.

Table 3.36 *Chauvinism*

Chauvinism	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=369)	Christian (n=360)	Muslim (n=479)	Christian (n=254)	Muslim (n=846)	Christian (n=613)
141. I would rather be a citizen of Indonesia than of any other country in the world.	M: 4.42 SD: .82	M: 3.91 SD: 1.05	M: 3.89 SD: .89	M: 3.55 SD: 1.04	M: 4.12 SD: .90	M: 3.76 SD: 1.06
143. My country is better than most other countries.	M: 3.42 SD: 1.17	M: 2.96 SD: 1.23	M: 3.20 SD: 1.07	M: 2.79 SD: 1.07	M: 3.29 SD: 1.12	M: 2.89 SD: 1.17
145. I should support my country even if my country is wrong.	M: 2.50 SD: 1.24	M: 2.39 SD: 1.18	M: 2.45 SD: 1.07	M: 2.39 SD: 1.10	M: 2.47 SD: 1.15	M: 2.39 SD: 1.15
147. My most important characteristics come from my nationality.	M: 3.82 SD: .92	M: 3.73 SD: .97	M: 3.56 SD: .90	M: 3.35 SD: .93	M: 3.68 SD: .92	M: 3.58 SD: .97
149. There is something about Indonesia today that makes me feel shame.	M: 3.48 SD: 1.26	M: 3.59 SD: 1.29	M: 3.88 SD: 1.00	M: 3.87 SD: .98	M: 3.70 SD: 1.14	M: 3.71 SD: 1.18

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

In this question, Muslim respondents have higher chauvinistic views compared with Christian respondents. The mean values for Muslim respondents are between 2.47 (support my country) and 4.12 (citizenship), while those for Christian respondents are between 2.39 (support my country) and 3.76 (citizenship). Muslim respondents in Ambon (M=2.50 to 4.42) apparently have a higher degree of chauvinistic views than those in Yogyakarta (M=2.45 to 3.89.) The standard deviation values for Muslim respondents are between .90 and 1.15, and those of Christian respondents are between .97 and 1.18. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is lower than that of answers from Christian respondents.

Table 3.37 *Regiocentrism*

Regiocentrism	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=369)	Christian (n=360)	Muslim (n=479)	Christian (n=254)	Muslim (n=847)	Christian (n=614)
141. I should support my district even if my district is wrong.	M: 2.47 SD: 1.19	M: 2.61 SD: 1.20	M: 2.41 SD: 1.07	M: 2.64 SD: 1.09	M: 2.44 SD: 1.12	M: 2.63 SD: 1.15
144. I should always put district interests above national interests.	M: 2.49 SD: .96	M: 2.51 SD: 1.00	M: 2.50 SD: .97	M: 2.50 SD: .93	M: 2.49 SD: .97	M: 2.51 SD : .97
146. I would rather be a resident of my district than of other districts in Indonesia.	M: 3.23 SD: 1.18	M: 3.07 SD: 1.26	M: 3.10 SD: 1.10	M: 2.84 SD: 1.08	M: 3.16 SD: 1.13	M: 2.97 SD: 1.19
148. I should respect my district and its tradition.	M: 4.20 SD: .74	M: 4.19 SD: .81	M: 4.08 SD: .71	M: 3.96 SD: .61	M: 4.13 SD: .72	M: 4.10 SD: .75

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

Muslim respondents have similar levels of regio-centric attitudes as Christian respondents In two dimensions of this issue. In answering the statement "*I would rather be a resident of my district"* and *"I should respect my district*," Muslim respondents have mean values of 3.16 and 4.13, while Christian respondents have mean values of 2.97 and 4.10. However, in responding to the statement "*I support my district even if my district is wrong*" and "*I should put district interest above national interest*," Muslim respondents (M=2.44 and 2.49) display less region-centric tendencies than Christian respondents (M=2.63 and 2.51). In regards to the last two questions, respondents in Ambon have higher region-centric attitudes than those in Yogyakarta. The standard deviation values for Muslim respondents are between .72 and 1.13, and those for Christian respondents are between .75 and 1.19. The heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents is lower that of answers from Christian respondents.

3.2.4.8 Distrust

Questions about distrust build on the survey questionnaire "Living in Germany" conducted in 2003 that examined the social situation of households

(Sozialforschung, 2004). We made several changes to the questions to adapt them to the Indonesian social context and to the objectives of this study. The original questions are, "*On the whole, one can trust people," "Nowadays one can't rely on anyone," and "If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can trust them*." Those statements are assessed with the Likert scale, with possible answers ranging from from "totally disagree" to "totally agree." All the questions were modified by changing the terms "*one," "stranger,*" and "*people"* into "Muslim" or "Christian" as appropriate. Consequently, three of the questions were broken down into six questions to cover distrust against Muslims and distrust against Christians. The two other original questions are "*Do you believe that most people would exploit you if they had opportunity*?" and "*Do you believe that most people would attempt to be fair toward you*?" We revised those two questions into statements in the Likert scale, changing the *people"* and "*you"* into "*Muslim"* and "*Christian*" as appropriate.

Table 3.38 *Distrust*

Regiocentrism	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=371)	Christian (n=349)	Muslim (n=473)	Christian (n=252)	Muslim (n=844)	Christian (n=601)
208. On the whole one can trust Muslims	M=3.86 SD=.94	M=2.95 SD=.92	M=3.87 SD=.80	M=3.42 SD=.79	M=3.87 SD=.86	M=3.15 SD=.89
209. On the whole one can trust Christians	M=2.86 SD=.94	M=3.48 SD=.94	M=3.44 SD=.83	M=3.58 SD=.78	M=3.19 SD=.93	M=3.53 SD=.87
210. On the whole one can rely on Muslims	M=3.32 SD=1.00	M=2.67 SD=.90	M=3.57 SD=.85	M=3.07 SD=.88	M=3.46 SD=.93	M=2.84 SD=.91
211. On the whole one can rely on Christians	M=2.67 SD=.92	M=3.14 SD=1.00	M=3.10 SD=.84	M=3.26 SD=.89	M=2.91 SD=.90	M=3.19 SD=.96
212. It is better to be careful if one is dealing with Muslims	M=2.12 SD=1.00	M=2.66 SD=.95	M=2.29 SD=.96	M=2.70 SD=.98	M=2.22 SD=.98	M=2.68 SD=.96
213. It is better to be careful if one is dealing with Christians	M=3.01 SD=1.24	M=2.26 SD=.82	M=2.64 SD=1.06	M=2.40 SD=.86	M=2.80 SD=1.15	M=2.32 SD=.84
214. Most Muslims would exploit me if they had the opportunity	M=2.28 SD=.97	M=2.6 SD=1.00	M=2.14 SD=.94	M=2.60 SD=.96	M=2.20 SD=.95	M=2.60 SD=.98
215. Most Christians would exploit me if they had the opportunity	M=2.80 SD=1.10	M=2.16 SD=.83	M=2.47 SD=.99	M=2.25 SD=.81	M=2.61 SD=1.05	M=2.20 SD=.82
216. Most of the time, Muslims attempt to act in their own interest	M=2.16 SD=1.00	M=2.80 SD=1.05	M=2.17 SD=.87	M=2.77 SD=.97	M=2.17 SD=.93	M=2.79 SD=1.02
217. Most of the time, Christians attempt to act in their own interest	M=2.81 SD=1.19	M=2.26 SD=.87	M=2.54 SD=.97	M=2.37 SD=.79	M=2.66 SD=1.08	M=2.31 SD=.83

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

Questions 208 to 211 are on trust, while questions 212 to 217 are on distrust. Table 3.38 shows that Muslim respondents trust Christians (M=3.19 for q209) and Christian respondents trust Muslims (M=3.15 for q208). Muslim respondents' trust for Christians is similar to Christian respondents' trust for Muslims. Questions on Christians' distrust of Muslims have a range of mean values from 2.60 (q214) to 2.79 (q216), while questions on Muslims' distrust of Christians have mean values between 2.61 (q215) and 2.80 (q213). In Ambon, Muslims' distrust of Christians is higher than Christians' distrust of Muslims. The standard deviation values indicate that the heterogeneity of answers from Muslim respondents and Christian respondents is similar.

3.2.4.9 Social dominance orientation

Questions about social dominance orientation build on the measurements from Sidanius and Pratto (1999:100-102). This study used the measurements they developed with almost no changes because all of their questions are relevant to the relationship between Muslims and Christians in the Indonesian context. However, we revised one question about equality, changing "increased social equality" into "all groups should be (be) free to move to a place where they choose to live." The Sidanius scale consists of 16 items, which can be identified with dominant orientation and the dimension of equality.

Table 3.39 *Social dominance orientation*

Regiocentrism	RESPONDENTS					
	AMBON		YOGYAKARTA		TOTAL	
	Muslim (n=365)	Christian (n=360)	Muslim (n=477)	Christian (n=255)	Muslim (n=839)	Christian (n=614)
90. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups	M=2.29 SD=.96	M=2.36 SD=1.03	M=2.22 SD=.96	M=2.11 SD=.84	M=2.25 SD=.96	M=2.26 SD=.96
91. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups	M=2.48 SD=1.11	M=2.28 SD=1.03	M=2.61 SD=1.06	M=2.38 SD=1.03	M=2.55 SD=1.09	M=2.32 SD=1.03
92. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others	M=2.89 SD=1.14	M=2.63 SD=1.09	M=3.03 SD=1.07	M=2.82 SD=1.15	M=2.97 SD=1.11	M=2.71 SD=1.11
93. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups	M=2.48 SD=1.17	M=2.42 SD=1.11	M=2.49 SD=1.06	M=2.45 SD=1.06	M=2.49 SD=1.11	M=2.43 SD=1.09
94. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems	M=2.69 SD=1.01	M=2.58 SD=1.01	M=2.62 SD=.90	M=2.46 SD=.86	M=2.65 SD=.95	M=2.53 SD=.95
95. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom	M=2.25 SD=.96	M=2.09 SD=.87	M=2.46 SD=1.00	M=2.20 SD=.93	M=2.37 SD=.99	M=2.14 SD=.90
96. Inferior groups should stay in their place	M=2.16 SD=.93	M=2.10 SD=.85	M=2.32 SD=.95	M=2.07 SD=.80	M=2.25 SD=.95	M=2.09 SD=.83
97. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place	M=2.89 SD=1.09	M=2.65 SD=1.13	M=2.90 SD=1.05	M=2.71 SD=1.09	M=2.90 SD=1.07	M=2.67 SD=1.11
98. It would be good if groups could be equal	M=4.28 SD=.86	M=4.35 SD=1.83	M=3.97 SD=.95	M=4.10 SD=1.01	M=4.10 SD=.92	M=4.24 SD=1.54
99. Group equality should be our ideal	M=4.14 SD=.92	M=4.15 SD=.88	M=3.80 SD=.96	M=3.96 SD=.94	M=3.95 SD=.96	M=4.07 SD=.91
100. All groups should be given an equal chance in life	M=4.41 SD=.70	M=4.44 SD=.65	M=4.18 SD=.71	M=4.38 SD=.62	M=4.28 SD=.72	M=4.42 SD=.64
101. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups	M=4.24 SD=.75	M=4.35 SD=.63	M=4.11 SD=.66	M=4.18 SD=.68	M=4.17 SD=.70	M=4.27 SD=.66
102. All groups should be free to move to a place where they choose to live	M=4.17 SD=.77	M=4.15 SD=.86	M=3.98 SD=.80	M=4.13 SD=.69	M=4.06 SD=.79	M=4.14 SD=.79
103. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally	M=3.42 SD=1.21	M=3.55 SD=1.25	M=3.49 SD=1.07	M=3.66 SD=1.05	M=3.46 SD=1.13	M=3.60 SD=1.17
104. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible	M=3.82 SD=.87	M=3.92 SD=.99	M=3.64 SD=.93	M=3.75 SD=.87	M=3.72 SD=.91	M=3.85 SD=.94
105. No one group should dominate in society	M=3.73 SD=1.13	M=4.00 SD=1.07	M=3.70 SD=.96	M=3.98 SD=.89	M=3.71 SD=1.03	M=3.99 SD=.99

Likert scale 1-5 (from totally disagree to totally agree)

We classify these questions into dominance (q90-q97) and equality (q98-q105). In our sample, Muslim respondents have a slightly higher dominance orientation than Christian respondents. The mean values on q90-97 of Muslim respondents are between 2.25 and 2.97, while those of Christian respondents are between 2.09 and 2.71. Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta have higher mean values (between 2.22 and 3.03) than those in Ambon (between 2.16 and 2.89). Christian respondents in Yogyakarta

(between 2.07 and 2.82) also have higher mean values than those in Ambon (between 2.09 and 2.65). In respect to equality (q98-q105), Christian respondents have wider mean values than Muslim respondents. The mean values for Christian respondents are between 2.67 and 4.42, while those for Muslim respondents are between 2.90 and 4.28. In all questions, the standard deviation values for Muslim respondents are between .70 and 1.13, while those for Christian respondents are between .66 and 1.17, which means that answers from Christian respondents are more heterogeneous.

3.3 Development of topic list

We designed a topic list to use in interviews with our respondents. The following section sheds light on the development of the topic list and on the selection of interviewees.

3.3.1 Topic guide development

Interviews consisted of unstructured and structured approaches. Unstructured interviews are useful for understanding more detailed phenomena, while structured interviews are employed if the researcher already has a basic understanding of the phenomena. Unstructured interviews are informal conversations without predetermined questions and answer categories. Structured interviews involve operationalization of theory, collecting the subject ideas of interviewees, and analyzing the subject ideas in order to build up the researcher's knowledge (Merton, 1957 cf. Pawson, 1996:295-314). Both unstructured and structured interviews help us understand the cases in more detail. In carrying out structured interviews, the study needs a topic list that is a set of topics derived from operationalization of theory, from which the questions are developed.

We used the topic list to better illustrate the general processes and influential factors that we analyse through the survey, and to look for

additional explanations. The topic list also guides the interviewing process in a flexible way based on variables or on previously researched subjects. There might be some elements that we did not cover in the survey.

The structure of the topic list consists of main topics and sub-topics. The main topics refer to researched variables and contextual determinants that serve as umbrella categories for writing the sub-topic list. The main topics are ethno-religious identification, intergroup contact avoidance, intergroup contact, perceived group threat, perceived discrimination, memory and experience of violence, and nationalist versus regionalist orientation. Based on assumed relevant contextual factors, we developed a variety of additional topics (e.g. history of conflict, government policies, international influence, migration, education, mass media, and student organizations).

Sub-topics are elements of the main topic that provide more comprehensive and detailed questions. For example, the sub-topic for student organizations profiles provides questions on members, recruitment, funding, and alumni. Another example is the sub-topic of local values, which includes questions on which cultural values are used to resolve religious conflicts. A final example is the sub- topic on decentralization, which includes questions on which government policies have influenced contact avoidance and intergroup contestation.

Table 3.40 *Topic list*

Main-topics	Sub-topics
	survey respondents
Ethno-religious identification: ethnic and religious identity	6 (socialization, characteristics, ethnic organization, ceremonies, stereotypes, importance)
Intergroup contact	5 (family, clan, friends, classmates, neighbours)
Perceived discrimination	5 (social, economic, political, cultural, and religious)
Perceived threat	3 (presence of out group, in and out migration, nature and impact of threat)
Intergroup distrust	3 (experience and circumstance, reasons and effects, strengthening trust)
Memory and experience of violence	4 (experience, bio-physical effects, effects on attitudes, religious effects)
Contact avoidance	4 (practices, reasons and motivations, effects, contact barriers)
Nationalist orientation	3 (affinity, national interest, multiple identity)
	non-surveyed respondents
History of conflict	4 (groups, tensions, incident, resolution)
Student organizations	3 (profile, goal and activities, affiliations)
Social and cultural organizations	3 (customary laws, conflict resolution, local values)
National and local policies	3 (education and religion, decentralization, conflict resolution)
Media	4 (portrayal, reporting, policies and practices, media groups)
Migration	3 (presence of out group, nature and impact, adaptation and integration)
Education	3 (religious education, opinion on curriculum, influences)
International influences	3 (influences of colonial power, post influences, NGOs)
Total	59

We conducted pilot interviews to gather preliminary information on the research setting and to improve interview technique. We learned a number of lessons from these pilot interviews. First, the topics of contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification needed to be prioritized in all interviews. Furthermore, the interviewer needed to stick to the order of topics and give the respondents enough time to think about the questions. Another lesson learned was that the interviewer should give informants the topic list before the interviews. In addition, it was suggested that the interviewer press respondents to elaborate on superficial, socially desired, and politically correct answers to questions.

3.3.2 Selection of interviewees

The interviewees consisted of both surveyed respondents and non-surveyed respondents. The surveyed respondents were former respondents

who answered that they totally agree, neither agree nor disagree, or totally disagree with avoiding contact with out-groups in the survey-questionnaire. Meanwhile, non-surveyed respondents were people chosen because they have good knowledge about inter-group relationships in the universities. To find the surveyed-respondents, we searched the responses of respondents to the questionnaire and selected interviewees from that group. To find the non-surveyed respondents, we used the snowball method.

Several of the non-surveyed respondents are prominent members of campus or student organizations or larger student organizations, such as student executive boards, Christian student unions, and Islamic student associations. To a certain degree, they may also be affiliated with politicians, bureaucrats, and ethno-religious organizations. Other respondents are lecturers and administrative staff who have knowledge about interreligious group relations within the university. The leaders of religious and ethnic organizations that are often consulted by students on issues of ethnicity or religion were a separate category of interviewees. Another category of people we interviewed were alumni of student organizations who are now members of parliament, government, and equivalent organizations. In addition, we included NGO and tribal leaders in order to represent elements of civil society.

We conducted semi-structured interviews in Ambon in April and May of 2011 and September through December of 2011. Interviews were conducted in Yogyakarta between June and July of 2011. All interviews were conducted in the Indonesian language. Every interview started with some questions about ethno-religious affiliation and practices and then the flow of the interview followed the order of the topic list. However, in the case of non-surveyed informants, we followed the main issues that they developed in the interviews. The duration of the interviews varied between one hour and two hours depending on the respondents' availability. Interviews were conducted on campuses, in the offices of religious groups, cafes, informants' houses, and in government offices. We recorded all of

the interviews and created some interview-transcripts in the Indonesian language. Sixteen transcripts were translated into English because they contained significant amounts of information on contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification.

There were some constraints on some of the interviews. During inter-religious violence in the city of Ambon between September and December of 2011, it was rather difficult to find informants whose religion differed from ours, as they could not guarantee our security during the interview process. In this short period of tensions, we conducted observation at a few locations like refugee areas and the market, and wrote daily field notes. Another difficulty was following the order of the topic list in conversations, because informants drawn from the pool of non-surveyed respondents were only interested in talking about certain topics. Finally, in Yogyakarta, the time availability of was sometimes limited.

Table 3.41 *Surveyed respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta*

Characteristics		Composition	
		Ambon	Yogyakarta[1]
Contact avoidance	High	4	
	Moderate	10	
	Low	6	
Religion	Islam	12	14
	Christians	8	6
Gender	Male	7	15
	Female	13	8
Ethnic groups	Ambonese	6	13
	Migrants	14	7
Total		20	20

14 Conducted by Tri Subagya during fieldwork in Yogyakarta.

Table 3.42 *Non-surveyed respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta*

Categories of informant	Ambon	Yogyakarta
Journalist	3	
Priest	7	1
Islamic leader	3	3
Artist (poet)	2	
Tribal leader	1	1
Lecture	10	
University senate	3	
University staff	1	2
NGO	2	1
Provincial parliament	1	
Campus based student unions	5	5
Religion based student unions	7	6
Ethnic based student unions	2	2
Total	47	21

3.4 Summary

All of the data collection procedures were conducted by the researchers, and all of the questions in the final survey were tested in the pilot survey. Some questions were adapted to fit with the state of respondents' knowledge. Respondents selected by random sampling serve as a representation of the student population in the six universities surveyed. In the interviews, we were able to further inquire about almost all of the topics with a number of respondents.

Our sample shows that Muslim respondents tend to avoid contact more than Christian respondents. Respondents in Ambon tend to avoid contact with out-groups more than respondents in Yogyakarta. Spouses from outside the in-group are the most avoided subjects, while classmates from outside the in-group are the least avoided. Both Muslim and Christian respondents have strong ethno-religious identification, as measured by ethno-religious practices, participation in religious ceremonies, and friendship by religion. Muslim respondents seem to have stronger ethno-religious identification than Christian respondents. Most respondents are middle class and their parents are employed as workers. Christian respondents' parents have a better position in terms of economic status

and education than Muslim respondents' parents. Numbers of male and female respondents are almost the same, with an average age of 22 years. Religious identification is apparently stronger than ethnic identification for both groups of respondents. Most respondents have low levels of perceived threat and perceived discrimination, although Christian respondents feel slightly more discriminated against than Muslim respondents. However, Christian respondents have more contact with out-groups than Muslim respondents. Otherwise, Muslim respondents are more religiocentric, monistic, fundamentalistic, nationalistic, distrustful, and social-dominance orientated than Christian respondents. Finally, most respondents have few memories of violence, despite the fact that several incidents of ethno-religious violence broke out in their hometowns in the past 10 years.

The standard deviations of all the variables show that respondents' answers are rather homogenous. In the next chapter, results of the data survey will be further analysed with bivariate analyses between contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, and intermediate variables. In addition, this study also uses multiple-regression analyses between contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification, while controlling for individual determinants and intermediate variables. The findings based on interviews and observations will be analysed descriptively. We use qualitative data and analysis to enrich and strengthen the interpretation of quantitative data. ●

CHAPTER 4

THE SOCIAL LOCATION OF INTERGROUP CONTACT AVOIDANCE: RESULTS FROM BI-VARIATE ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter describes the construction of measurements used in the course of our research, intergroup differences between Muslims and Christians, and the analysis of variance (ANOVA) in regard to intergroup contact avoidance. A Mokken scale analysis (MSA) is used in the construction of contact avoidance, while factor analysis is employed for the construction of other (metric) variables. In this chapter we review the validity and reliability of the measurements, with the goal of comparing the main denominations and describing the relevant differences between Muslims and Christians according to data gathered on intergroup contact avoidance and the other respective variables. We test for the linearity of the relationships between intergroup contact avoidance and these variables, using analysis of variance (ANOVA) to investigate possible relationships between them. Finally, we present a selection of representative quotes taken from qualitative interviews that illustrate conclusions drawn from the quantitative analysis. Selections from the interviews present statements from Muslim and Christian respondents in both research sites (Ambon and Yogyakarta).

General procedures

Factor analysis is a method for investigating whether a number of questions are related to a smaller number of factors that represent some theoretical

variables (Kim and Mueller, 1978:9).[1] The procedure analysis the factors in three steps: at the national level, which includes both religious groups (Islam and Christianity); at the group level; and then at the national level again to identify identical factors and questions. In the first step, we assume that all of the items (survey questions) have the same structure for both groups, while the second step shows whether the overall structure in the first step holds for each group and across intergroup differences. In the third step, we determine the commensurable factors after we test structural differences between the models in each group (Hermans & Sterkens 2014:145-149; cf. Anthony et al. 2015:42ff). In each procedure, the KMO Bartlett's test should be significant ($p < .05$), eigenvalues should be more than 1, commonalities should be > .20, and factor loadings should be > .30. We also remove questions that load highly (>. 30) on more than one factor. If the correlation between two factors is high ($r \geq .60$), then both factors can be combined. Finally, we look for conceptually meaningful dimensions that can be given a substantive label.

At this point in the process, we use Cronbach's alpha (α) to test the reliability of the scale. The value of alpha depends on the number of questions in a scale; the more questions there are, the higher the value of α (Cortina, 1993:101). A scale is considered excellent if the α value is ≥ .91, and very good if α is between .81 and .90. A scale with an α value between .71 and .80 is considered good, and one with an α value between .61 and .70 is acceptable. The scale is considered poor if α is between .51 and .60 (Maholtra and Birks, 2007: 358). Scales are constructed by computing means of all questions included in a factor. We subsequently employ analysis of variance (ANOVA) to identify whether there are differences between means, (Field, 2009:349). If sample means are $\bar{Y}_1$, $\bar{Y}_2$, $\bar{Y}_3 \ldots \bar{Y}_k$, then we use ANOVA to ascertain whether the sample means are significantly

1 We use the confirmatory factor analysis rather than the exploratory factor analysis because our study addresses specific hypotheses, rather than exploring a set of underlying dimensions in the first place. This analysis assumes that some factors underlying several items are responsible for a covariation among the observed questions (Field, 2009:628).

different. If the F-ratio is significant ($p<.05$), then the hypothesis is not rejected, which means that the differences between means are significant. This analysis also generates linearity and correlation coefficients. Pearson-r is for linear relationships, while eta is for non-linear relationships. All tables of factor analysis and ANOVA are included in Appendices 1 and 2.

4.1 Intergroup contact avoidance

Intergroup contact avoidance has three dimensions, namely contact avoidance, avoidance of future spouse from a different religion, and support for residential segregation.

4.1.1 Contact avoidance

The first dimension of intergroup contact avoidance is contact avoidance. Our measurement of this dimension consists of nine questions presented to both Muslim and Christian respondents. A Mokken scale analysis (MSA), commonly employed in the analysis of ordinal scale data, is used to measure levels of contact avoidance through the following questions: "*To what extent would you accept or avoid a Christian / Muslim as your city/ town mayor, civil servant, police officer, neighbour, classmate, board mate, houseboy, close friend, future spouse*?"

The analysis adapts a basic principle of the Guttman scale, which proposes that questions can be divided questions that engender more positive responses (easier), and more difficult questions that provide fewer positive responses (Van Schuur, 2011:6). Essentially, the idea is that more people agree with contact with easy contact roles than difficult ones. The most important concepts in the application of the Mokken scale are the mean score and Loevinger's coefficient. Mean scores indicate the average percentage of respondents who answer positive to a certain question, and they also indicate the order that classifies questions as easier or harder. Loevinger's coefficient (Loevinger's H) measures the quality of a pair of

questions, which constitute a scale. We consider the scale to be poor if the Loevingers H is < .30, weak if the Loevingers H is between .30 and .40, and moderate if the Loevingers H is between .41 and .50. A good scale is indicated by having a Loevingers H ≥ .51 (Mokken, 1971).

Table 4.1 *Mokken scale analysis*

	Items (questions)									
Respondents	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**Score**
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9
2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
3	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
4	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
5	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5
6	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Source: Mokken, 1971:33

The process of using the Mokken Scale Analysis for the initial questions related to contact avoidance begins with recoding the answer categories to classify respondents as belonging to the binary categories of *accept* or *avoid* (Mokken, 1971:33). The answer categories *totally accept*, *accept* and *neither accept nor avoid* are recoded as *accept (0)*, while *avoid* and *totally avoid* are recoded as *avoid* (1). Referring to Table 4.1, if a respondent answers *avoid* (1) to question 1, then he or she is likely answer *avoid* (option 1) to questions 2 up to 9. The same pattern also works for a respondent who answers *avoid* (option 1) to question 5, indicating that he or she would answer *avoid* (option 1) to questions 6 up to 9. We presume that question 1 is more difficult and question 9 is easier. The MSA results in two measurements, one displaying levels of contact avoidance by Muslim respondents, and the other displaying levels of contact avoidance by Christian respondents.

Table 4.2 *Contact avoidance by Muslims against Christians*

Contact avoidance target	Obs.	Mean score	Observed Guttman errors	Expected Guttman errors	Loevingers H	Z-stat.
Classmate	823	.0863	111	352.07	.68	32.91
Civil servant	823	.1094	167	429.36	.61	32.59
Policeman	823	.1166	168	447.95	.62	33.93
Neighbour	823	.1191	153	452.17	.66	35.97
Boardmate	823	.1713	161	502.17	.68	36.11
Close friend	823	.1981	180	507.49	.64	33.14
Mayor	823	.3269	196	443.60	.59	22.22
Scale	823		568	1567.40	.64	59.36

The question regarding future spouses is excluded because it has a Loevinger's coefficient under .30. Furthermore, since the question regarding housemaids has a different position between Muslim and Christian respondents, it is eliminated from the analysis. In general, the Loevinger's coefficient for Muslim respondents is .64, meaning that the whole set of questions on contact avoidance for Muslim respondents has good scalability. The lowest mean score is for the answer category "classmate" at .0863, which means that 8.63% of Muslim respondents are unlikely to have contact with Christians in their classes. The question that refers to how likely they are to accept a mayor with a different religious background has the highest mean value of .3269, which means 32.69% of Muslim respondents indicated they would avoid having a Christian as their city mayor. The question about classmates is therefore identified as the easiest question on contact avoidance for Muslim respondents, while the question about city mayors is considered to be the most difficult.

Figure 4.1 *Contact avoidance by Muslim respondents*



most accepted *most avoided*

In Figure 4.1, we display results of the questions on contact avoidance as answered by Muslim respondents, rank ordering the mean ratings of targets who were most accepted to targets who were most avoided. Since in this scale the category of mayor is not adjacent to the categories of civil servant and the policeman (indicating they are not closely conceptually related), we cannot distinguish here between intimate (private domain) and official subjects. Although Muslim respondents avoid having a Christian city mayor, they accept Christians as policeman and civil servants (see Figure 4.1). Muslim respondents have a pattern of contact avoidance that differs completely from the Bogardus scale of social distance that is usually found in western societies (Hagendoorn and Hraba, 1987:323-324). For example, the Dutch avoid people of other ethnic groups in private domains (categories including *physician, children's marriage,* and *neighbours*) more than in public domains (categories including *work superiors, children's school*, and *colleagues*). Therefore, findings from this study are not consistent with

the Bogardus scale where the subjects who are avoided are more likely to be found in the intimate realm than in the official one.

Table 4.3 *Contact avoidance by Christian respondents*

Contact avoidance target	Obs.	Mean score	Observed Guttman errors	Expected Guttman errors	Loevingers H	Z-stat.
Classmate	591	.0135	12	46.05	.74	25.15
Neighbour	591	.0271	37	84.32	.56	25.61
Boardmate	591	.0288	42	88.12	.52	24.32
Close friend	591	.0321	59	98.72	.37	17.48
Civil servant	591	.0338	42	95.53	.56	26.39
Policeman	591	.0440	42	100.46	.58	25.99
Mayor	591	.0778	32	97.75	.67	24.21
Scale	591		133	302.97	.56	44.38

The question about future spouses for Christian respondents is excluded here since the Loevinger's coefficient for this question is under .30. The question on housemaids also falls into different positions due to the different answers from Muslim and Christian respondents; consequently the question is eliminated from the analysis. Overall, the Loevinger's coefficient for Christian respondents is .56, which means that all the questions on contact avoidance for Christian respondents have good scalability. On all questions, Christian respondents show lower levels of contact avoidance than Muslims do. The lowest mean score is found in the question about classmates (.0135), which means that 1.35% of Christian respondents avoid Muslims in their classes. The category of mayor shows the highest mean value (.0778), which means that 7.78% of Christian respondents are reluctant to have Muslims as their city mayor.

Figure 4.2 *Contact avoidance by Christian respondents*



most accepted *most avoided*

In Figure 4.2, we again rank the order from least avoided to most avoided contact roles. Differing from Muslim respondents, Christian respondents' answers display clear groupings that divide intimate contact roles from official ones in the ranking of whom they tend to avoid. Christian respondents rank mayors, civil servants, and policemen as the least accepted persons. This finding is consistent with the social distance scale for Western societies provided by Hagendoorn and Poppe (2004). Their studies on contact avoidance among Russians in the former Soviet republics distinguish between the private and the public domain. Other studies by Hagendorn and Hraba (1987:323-324) show that the Dutch tend to avoid contact with out-group members in the private (intimate) domain, such as *physician, children's marriage*, and *neighbours,* more than in the public domain categories of *work superiors, children's school*, and *colleagues*. Although Christian respondents in this study (and probably in Western societies generally) tend to categorize their social relations into private and public domains, they are more likely to accept intimate contact roles than official contact roles. However, people in Western countries are

more likely to accept official contact roles and are more likely to avoid intimate contact roles (Hagendoorn and Hraba, 1987).

Besides strong scalability, both scales for Muslim and Christian respondents have strong reliability. The Cronbach's alpha is .85 for Muslim respondents, and .80 for Christian respondents. The difference in overall mean of all the items shows that Muslim respondents score significantly higher on the measurement of contact avoidance (.16) than Christian respondents do (.04) ($p<.01$), as indicated by ANOVA testing.

In this section, we present several examples of how informants avoid members of religious-out groups in formal and informal settings. Following Bogardus (1925b:1-2) we examined several indicators of contact avoidance, such as the rejection of members of religious out-groups serving as city mayors, policemen and civil servants, or as neighbours, housemates, and close friends. In the interviews, we found many examples of contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians, but relatively few examples of avoidance between members of different ethnic groups. Contact avoidance between members of distinct ethnic groups is less prevalent than contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians.

The survey showed that Muslim respondents are more likely to avoid the appointment of city mayors and police commanders from religious out-groups than Christian respondents are. In Ambon, this attitude is related to the fixation on equal religious representation in government. Muslim respondents disapprove when Christians fill both the position of mayor and the position of governor. Quite a few of them emphasize that the Muslim population is bigger than the Christian population at provincial level (50.61% Muslims in the Moluccas province according to Sensus Penduduk 2010). More than once, Muslim respondents complained about the numeric imbalance between Christian and Muslim police officers, worrying that officers are likely to side with members of their own religious group when a conflict occurs. A female Muslim informant in Ambon, Fatima, explained:

> "In my view, for positions of mayor, governor, and governmental offices, those officials prefer their own people [Christians] over us [Muslims]. There is no justice there. They do the same on the police force. In a moment of conflict, it is possible that some Christian policemen would shoot [Muslims] secretly. A Christian policeman, on 11th September 2011, shot a friend of my brother."

She added:

> "I do not mind actually [if a Christian becomes mayor], however, I wish that the power distribution between Muslims and Christians would be equal. It is fine that the governor is a Christian, but I want the mayor to be a Muslim. The fact is, now all high officials are Christians."

Another Muslim informant, Ayesa, stated:

> "If the [government] official is a Christian, he will only develop facilities for Christians. Churches will be built everywhere and nothing will be done for the allocation of mosques. However, if the official is a Muslim, he will only work to develop Islam. I dislike having more Christians than Muslim policemen because if there is a conflict, the Christian policemen will only protect Christians. Also, Muslim policemen will protect Muslims."

Discussing relationships between students at the university, several informants described how they avoid members of religious out-groups on campus after classes. The students in Universitas Pattimura usually gather in religious and ethnic groups after class sessions ends. Lucas, a Christian student from Universitas Pattimura, said:

> "If people sit together, they are grouped according to ethnic belonging or they cluster according to the village communities they are coming from. This group consists of students from Eastern Seram [Muslims]. That group is made up of students from the Southeast Moluccas [Muslim], and their members come together, sit, and socialize only with people of their own ethnic group. The other groups are students from Christian ethnicities; their members sit together under the trees."

Contact avoidance between Muslim and Christian students also can be found in Yogyakarta. Amir, a Muslim student in Yogyakarta, explained:

> "In this faculty [Law-UGM], we mingle around in a cold manner. Muslim and Christian students separate after course sessions. There are usually bad Muslims, good Muslims, and Christian students. They do not interact. Members of HMI [Islamic University Student Association] communicate amongst themselves. There are also student communities based on the locations they gather in; for example, the parking lot, the mosque and coffee shops. They are named according to the places where they hang around."

Another indicator of contact avoidance is segregation in boarding houses. Most respondents mentioned that they live in boarding houses that are restricted to members of a particular religious group. Some respondents explained that they feel religiously homogenous houses are necessary to preserve religious customs. Amir, a Muslim informant and member of KAMMI (Unity of Action of Indonesian Muslim Students) in Yogyakarta, said:

> "We live in a boarding house or we rent a house. We give a specific name to the house that we rent, e.g. *Al Ikhwan, Hamas,* etc. I think the house is needed to maintain relationships, and people who think in the same way have to inhabit it. I am ready to socialize [with non-Muslims], but living in a mixed house is an impossible choice for me."

Unlike in Yogyakarta, many Muslim respondents in Ambon are afraid of having board mates from different religions for security reasons. A Muslim informant in Ambon mentioned: "I cannot be sure that they [Christian board mates] would have no intention of killing me. I am afraid that a religious conflict could possibly erupt in the night, while I am sleeping in my dorm." During our interviews, we did not find any Christian informants who said that they are reluctant to have Muslims as their housemates.

Differences between religious affiliations are likely the biggest barrier to contact between Muslims and Christians. Over the course of interviews in both locations, Informants explained in detail why that is the case. When asked why religion becomes a barrier to contact, Najib, a Muslim informant from Yogyakarta, said, "Muslims, as written in the Quran, will not follow non-Muslims' way of life. Besides that, tensions between religious groups always exist because there are still efforts to convert Muslims into non-Muslims or the other way around." Religious values become a barrier to inter-religious interaction when both groups lack understanding about the values of religious out-groups. For instance, Muslim women and men are not allowed to hold hands in public before they marry. Such a rule would become a barrier to contact in cases where non-Muslims do not understand or are not aware of these religious rules. A Catholic informant from Yogyakarta, Maria, said:

> "Most of the time it is because of the religious principles people hold. In my view, going out with a friend of the opposite sex is common, but one day, when attending an event, I came with my boyfriend. We were holding hands. This turned out to be a problem [for Muslims]."

4.1.2 Avoidance of future spouse from a different religion

The second dimension of intergroup contact avoidance is the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion. This topic was not included in the questions on contact avoidance based on the Mokken scale analysis. However, we included this question in the dimension of contact avoidance because it is seemed important in the Indonesian context. Individuals in Indonesia do not always choose their spouses. Parents, family, religious norms, and cultural traditions often determine who you have to marry. Marriages are deemed appropriate if they are arranged and conducted according to the religious regulations (UGM, 2010). Indeed, many interpretations of religious law in Indonesia forbid inter-religious marriage. Therefore, the question of how religion is involved in choosing a future

spouse differs from the other questions on contact avoidance, which assumed that individuals consciously and subjectively avoid or accept people from different religious groups.

Previous studies in Europe and Northern America include some questions on inter-ethnic or inter-religious marriages as part of the measurement of contact avoidance. For example, Tolsma et al. (2008) posed a question on inter-religious marital attitudes toward migrants in Netherlands. Bogardus (1925b; Hagendoorn, 1995) also included the subject as part of the social distance scale. This implies that the avoidance of a future spouse from an out-group is still common in Western countries and is included as an important avoided contact role in the social distance scale besides neighbours, close friends, colleagues, and fellow citizens. In this study, 'avoidance of future spouse' is a separate dimension of intergroup contact avoidance. Here too, we recoded the five answer categories into two categories: *accept* (0) and *avoid* (1). The difference in mean score demonstrates that Muslim respondents (.75) avoid future spouses who believe in another religious tradition more often than Christian respondents (.49) do.

It is evident from the survey data that both Muslim and Christian respondents avoid religious out-group members as future spouses. In the interviews, many Muslim respondents said that they are worried about being converted to Christianity. Fatima mentions that "I do not want to marry a [Christian]. I am afraid of being indoctrinated, as my faith is not firm yet." Faisal, a Muslim informant in Yogyakarta said, "A Muslim must marry a Muslim. If a Muslim man marries a non-Muslim woman, that woman must convert to Islam. Besides, having a Muslim wife makes life easier because the couple shares the same vision and mission for their future life." He added:

> "In Islam, we have rules and restrictions for both men and women in relationships. Men are not allowed to be too close to women and women are not permitted to go out at night. I see that non-Muslims have no such

> restrictions. For me, that is a problem in building a relationship with them."

Similarly, Peter, a Christian informant in Yogyakarta, said:

> "By having the same faith, there will be peace and togetherness. For example, when we go to church or celebrate events together, we could feel this togetherness. I learn it from my brothers [who married Muslims]. They respect each other's religion, but they still have many conflicts. I want a harmonious life."

4.1.3 Support for residential segregation

The third dimension of intergroup contact avoidance is support for residential segregation, as represented by q182 (*I prefer to live in a neighbourhood inhabited by persons of the same religion*) to q185 (*There should be separate neighbourhoods where Muslims and Christians can live separately*). We do not test the scale by Mokken scale analysis and factor analysis because the questions only have one dimension, support for residential segregation. As with other dimensions of intergroup contact avoidance, we recoded the answer category into *avoid (0)* and *accept (1)*. However, before recoding, the scores of q183 (*I prefer to live in a neighbourhood inhabited by people of a different religion*) were inverted because they contained a negative formulation. For both groups (Muslim and Christian respondents), the scale shows moderate reliability (α=.67) and also for Muslim respondents (68). For Christian respondents, however, the scale contained a low reliability (α =.56). Since there are only few questions, the respective values are sufficient to indicate that these questions are reliable. The difference in overall mean scores indicates that Muslim respondents prefer to live in residential segregation (.40) more than Christian respondents do (.22), as tested by ANOVA.

This view is supported by the interview data. A Muslim informant in Yogyakarta, Najib, mentioned: "I prefer a religiously homogenous neighbourhood. In religious practices, it is also more conducive. In social

relationships, I respect differences when not related to religious practices." Muhammad, a Muslim informant in Ambon, said:

> "For me, nothing is greater than *akidah* [faith]. That is why I live in a neighbourhood with one religion. Besides, if there is religious violence, there will be many friends to defend us against aggressors before the troops arrive. Since the violence in 1999, housing is divided by religion, for example, the area from Kebun Cengkeh to STAIN is a Muslim area and the area from Karpan to STAIN is a Christian area. It is better to have prejudices and keep people at a distance than [to have] them living side by side. When the religious violence breaks out again, the violence will be greater if we [Muslims and Christians] stay side by side."

Some Christian respondents also seem to prefer to live in religiously segregated neighbourhoods. A Catholic informant in Yogyakarta, Maria, explained: "Considering my recent experiences, I think that living in a homogenous environment will be more pleasant. Living in a heterogonous environment is all right, but it is difficult to guarantee that there will be no [religious] fanaticism."

4.1.4 Triangulation

Findings from the interviews confirm the survey results that demonstrate how the avoidance of intergroup contact is enacted in daily life. Both Christians and Muslims do not want to have people from the other religion serving as their city mayors, local policemen or regional civil servants. In addition to contact avoidance, most respondents also tend to avoid future spouses from religious out-groups, and avoid living in neighbourhoods inhabited by people of different religions. The interviews also confirm that Muslim respondents show higher intergroup contact avoidance than Christian respondents. The main reason for intergroup contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians is that both groups consider religious beliefs and practices to be barriers to contact. Consequently, to prevent religious tensions and conflicts, they prefer to avoid interaction with

religious out-group members. Our interviews also provide insight into how respondents rationalize the avoidance of contact with religious out-group members in specific instances. Few respondents avoid religious out-group members at all times. However, most of them avoid contact with people of other religions at specific times, such as during an outbreak of religious violence.

The interviews did not provide any additional information on the avoidance of religious out-group members as civil servants and close friends as described in the survey data.

4.2 Intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification

Referring to Phinney and Rotheram (1987), we define ethno-religious identification as ethno-religious definition and identification. The former refers to group categorization, while the latter indicates a group's attitude, behaviour, and practices.

4.2.1 The construction of measurement

The construction of the measurement explains the procedure of factor analysis, answer categories, and descriptive statistics.

4.2.1.1 Self-definition

We asked respondents whether they consider themselves to be Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Hindus, or Buddhists. However, Hindus and Buddhists are excluded from the analysis because the focus of this study is on the relationship between Muslims and Christians. Ethno-religious self-definition has a significant relation with contact avoidance, the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion, and the support for residential segregation ($p < .05$). Ethnic identification includes thirteen categories of ethnic groups: Javanese, Sundanese, Ambonese, Buginese, Makasarese,

Madurese, Minangkabau, Butonese, Toraja, Minahasa, Chinese, Bataknese, and other minority ethnic groups. The cross tabulation between religions and ethnicities can be seen in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4 *Cross tabulation between ethnic and religious self-definition*

Ethnic groups	Religions				Total
	Muslim		Christian		
	N	%	N	%	
Javanese	348	41.83	104	16.99	452
Sundanese	36	4.33	2	.33	38
Madurese	36	4.33			36
Minangkabau	17	2.04			17
Ambonese	241	28.97	346	56.54	587
Buginese	10	1.20			10
Makassarese	2	.24	1	.16	3
Butonese	95	11.42			95
Toraja			20	3.27	20
Minahasa			5	.82	5
Chinese	1	1.20	43	7.03	44
Bataknese	2	.24	35	5.72	37
Others	44	5.29	56	9.15	100
Total	832	100.00	612	100.00	1444

This data show that most Javanese, Butonese, Sundanese, Madurese, and Minangkabau respondents are Muslims. In contrast, most Ambonese, Chinese, Bataknese, and Torajanese respondents are Christians.

Self-definition in practice

In the following section, we describe how ethnic identity is expressed, given that respondents' ethnic identities are more varied than their religious identities. Based on the interviews, we are able to illustrate how respondents identify with their religious or ethnic groups. All of our informants mentioned their religious identities during the interview, which is common in Indonesia since everyone is required to adhere to one of the six official religions. However, several respondents also mentioned their ethnicity; some respondents referred to their parents' identities, while other respondents talked about places where they grew up.

Many respondents categorize their ethnicity directly. Joseph, a Catholic informant in Ambon, said, ‘’I belong to the Kei ethnic group.” Faisal, a Muslim informant in Yogyakarta, said, ‘’I am proud to be a Javanese.” Most answers indicate that respondents inherited their ethnic identities from their parents, even in cases where respondents migrated from their ethnic regions and do not speak their ethnic language properly. Ahmed, a Muslim informant, was born in Sumatra, but his parents migrated from Java to Sumatra more than twenty years ago. With respect to his identity, he explained that ‘’Well, I see myself as Javanese. I was born and brought up in an environment in which Javanese people are the majority. Although I live in an area with Malay people, my community is still Javanese.’’

In other cases, ethnicity is fluid. Several respondents report that they use their ethnic identities functionally, depending on the occasion. A Muslim, Ayesa, gave an example. She was born in Masohi, in Central Moluccas, from a Butonese father and an Ambonese mother. She speaks both Butonese and Ambonese. When asked about her identity, she said:

> “I declare myself Butonese only when I meet people from Buton. However, I say I am Ambonese in front of common people. On campus, I consider myself Butonese, but I also often say I come from Ambon or Seram. If I meet people at the market, I say I am both Ambonese and Butonese. But it is more comfortable to be Butonese, because Ambonese are associated with horrible, stubborn, and rough behaviour.”

Many informants in Ambon did not directly state their ethnicity, but only mentioned their hometowns or family names. Unlike other provinces in Indonesia, the Moluccas has consisted of villages divided according to religious and ethno-linguistically related groups since the 17th century. Moreover, each family name belongs to a specific Christian or Muslim village. For example, *Souwakil* is a family name in Ambalau, Southern Buru Island, and people with this family name are mostly Muslim. *Soselisa* is a family name in Saparua and people with this surname are mostly Christian. *Ufi* is a family name in the Kei islands, and those who carry

the name are mostly Catholic. Consequently, among the Ambonese or Moluccans, religious and ethnic identities are easily recognized through geographic associations and family names. Therefore, when our informants stated only their family names or hometowns in interviews, there was an assumption that we would recognize their ethnicity and religion. For example, an informant introduced herself by saying, "My name is Fatima Salwa Tuanany from Kailolo." This indicated that she is from the Hatuhaha ethnic group and that she is a Muslim. Another informant said, "My name is Johannes Weruatwarin from Wetlaar, Kei Islands," indicating that he is a Catholic from the Kei Islands.

4.2.1.2 Religious identification

Religious identification has several dimensions, including religious ceremonies, religious practices, religious friendships, and membership and participation in religious organizations. However, we use factor analysis for determining 'factors on religious ceremonies and religious practices' since these questions have the same scale, in terms of Likert scales.

1. Religious ceremonies and practices

We asked Muslims and Christians how often they attend religious ceremonies and participate in the religious practices of their own religious traditions. The questions about religious ceremonies are posed through the Likert scale. For example, we ask, '*could you indicate whether you participate or not in ...* (*religious ceremony*)?' The questions on religious practices ask about quantity, such as '*How often do you go to religious services in mosques, churches, or other places of worship?*' We conducted a factor analysis separately for Muslims and Christians because the questions on religious ceremonies are different. We exclude the observation of *Isra Miraj* and *Maulud,* since Muslims do not widely celebrate these collective rites.

Table 4.5 *Factor analysis for religious ceremonies and practices*

Scale label for full population	Muslims				Christians			
	Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix			Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		
		Collecti ve rites	Rites of passage	practices		Collecti ve rites	Rites of passage	practices
28. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Idul Fitri/Christmas	.97	.98			.97	.98		
29. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Idul Adha/Easther	.93	.94			.96	.96		
27. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Fasting	.80	.87						
25. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Marriage	.72		.86		.65		-.83	
24. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Circumcision	.47		.67					
26. Participation in religious ceremonies/rituals: Funeral	.49		.61		.66		-.75	
38. How often do you pray?	.17			.72	.26			.50
39. How often do you go to religious services in mosques, churches, temple or other places of worship?	.20			.41	.27			.51
57. How often do you read or recite the Holy Scripture (Koran, Bible)?	.51			.41	.62			.80
Initial eigenvalues		3.63	1.57	1.23		2.90	.74	1.74
% of variance (extracted)		38.02	11.89	8.43		39.16	6.47	17.08
Reliability (α)		.96	.78	.48		.98	.79	.60

The first and third step of factor analysis were not conducted due to different questions of religious ceremonies for Muslim and Christian respondents. The second step step for (Muslim respondents) produces three factors: collective rites (*fasting*, *Idul Fitri* and *Idul Adha),* rites of passage (*marriage, circumcision*, and *funeral*), and religious practices (*praying, religious services, and reciting the Holy Scriptures*). The second step (Christian respondents) results in two factors: *religious ceremonies* and *religious practices.* The question on fasting is excluded for Christians because of low communality (<.20). We split the factor analysis for Muslim respondents into two factors in order to adapt to the result of the second step (Christian respondents). However, the result is not statistically viable because it only consists of collective rites and rites of passage. Then, we divided the factor analysis for Christian respondents into three factors in order to adapt to the result of factor analysis for Muslim respondents at the

beginning. The three factors are: collective rites (*Christmas and Easter*), rites of passage (*marriage and funeral*), and religious practices (*praying, religious services, and reciting the Holy Scriptures*). The question on baptism is excluded because it loads highly in two factors (>.30). The correlation between the three factors are significant ($p < .05$) and moderate ($r < .60$).

The reliability of collective rites is very high both for Muslim (.96) and Christian respondents (.98). Rites of passage is also high for both groups (.78 and .79), while religious practices are moderate for Christian respondents (.60) and are low for Muslim respondents (.48). Rites of passage consists of four answer categories, including: *I do not participate in it and neither does my family* (1), *I do not participate in it but my family does* (2), *I do participate but for non-religious reasons* (3), and *I do participate for religious reasons* (4). Collective rites is composed of three categories: *I do not participate in it and neither does my family* (1), *I do not participate in it but my family does* (2), and *I do participate either for non-religious reasons or religious reasons* (3). Religious practices has six categories: *never and only on feast days* (1), *at least once a month* (2), *once a week* (3), *more than once a week* (4), *once a day* (5), and *several times a day* (6).

2. Friendship by religion

The questions on religious friendship ask respondents how many of their friends have the same faith as them. The reliability of the three questions for both groups (Muslim and Christian respondents) is .52. The reliability of these questions for Christian respondents is .46 and for Muslim respondents is .08.. This measurement is divided into two dimensions: religious in-group friends and religious out-group friends. This is in line with our conceptual framework: that among individuals, the more friends they have from the religious in-group, the more likely it is that they avoid contact with people from different religions. In contrast, the more friends they have from religious out-groups, the less likely it is that they avoid contact with

people from different religions. We compute both dimensions based on the maximum values because the questions emphasize the quantity of friends. The answer categories for both dimensions are recoded by combining 1 (none) and 2 (some) into 1 to get a normal distribution curve. The results are *none and some* (1), *relatively many and many* (2), *almost all* (3), and *all* (4).

3. Membership and participation in religious organization

Another dimension related to religious identity is membership and participation in religious organizations. The question about membership asks whether respondents are members, followers, and not members. We recoded the answer category to *not members* (0) and *members or followers* (1). The question about religious participation asks how frequently respondents participate in any religious organization, from *never* to *more than once a week*. To normalize the distribution, we recoded the answering category by combining category 4 (*once a week*) and 5 (*more than once a week*) into 4, therefore the results are *never* (1), *only on special days* (2), *at least once a month*(3), and at least *once a week* (4).

4.2.1.3 Ethnic identification

The measurement of ethnic identification consists of several dimensions, such as ethnic self-definition, ethnic ceremonies, ethnic languages, friendship by ethnicity, and membership and participation in ethnic organizations.

1. Ethnic ceremonies

The questions on ethnic ceremonies concern births, weddings, moving home, illnesses, and funerals. We ask respondents, '*Could you indicate whether you know these ceremonies and whether you and/or your family participate or not in these ceremonies*.' The answer category consists of *no knowledge* (1), *I do not participate in it and neither does my family* (2), *I*

do not participate in it but my family does (3), and *I do participate* (4). The reliability of four questions is relatively high for both of the groups (.79), with Muslim respondents at (.76), and Christian respondents at (.81).

2. Ethnic languages

The questions about ethnic languages refer to languages ordinarily used at home, with families, at universities, with close friends, in communities, and with government officials. In Indonesia, everyday language use could be in a language or dialect different from the national language. The highest reliability—as presented by the Cronbach alpha—is for Christian respondents (.81), while the value of Cronbach alpha for Muslim respondents and for both groups are (.70) and (.75), respectively. We computed the number of occasions when respondents speak their ethnic languages. Lastly, we recoded the use of ethnic languages to obtain a normal distribution, therefore the ethnic languages have four intervals: *never* (0), *one or two occasions* (1), *three or four occasions* (2), and *five or six occasions* (3).

3. Friendship by ethnicity

Friendship by ethnicity is referred to as *social embeddedness*. These questions ask how many friends from the same ethnic group that a respondent has, ranging from *none* to *all*. The reliability of the questions is relatively high, as revealed by the Cronbach alpha for both groups (.88), Christian respondents (.81), and Muslim respondents (.77). We computed the relative number of friends who belong to a respondent's ethnic group ('homogeneous friends'). We expect that intergroup contact avoidance is stronger for those who have many friends from their own ethnic group. Here, we recoded social embeddedness into fewer categories to obtain a normal distribution by combining the available answers between *none* and s*ome*. Social embeddedness contains four answer categories: *none and some* (1), *relatively many* (2), *almost all* (3), and *all* (4).

4. Memberships and participation in ethnic organizations

These questions focus on membership and participation in ethnic organizations. We ask whether respondents are not members, followers, or members of ethnic organizations. We recoded the answer category to *not members* (0) and *followers or members (*1). Meanwhile, the question on participation asks how often respondents participate in any ethnic organization, from never to more than once a week. We recoded the answer categories to find a normal distribution, i.e., *never* (1), *only on special days* (2), *at least once a month and a week* (3), and *more than once a week* (4).

4.2.2 Intergroup differences between Muslims and Christians

The following description is about intergroup differences between Muslim and Christian respondents in ethno-religious identification variables. Table 4.6 lists the differences of mean scores between Muslims and Christians.

Table 4.6 *intergroup differences in ethno-religious identification*

	Muslim			Christian					
	N	M	SD	N	M	SD	M diff.	t-test	df
Rites of passage	823	3.19	.85	583	3.40	.77	-.21	-4.78**	1323.99
Collective rites	825	2.89	.42	587	2.80	.46	.09	3.72**	1187.54
Religious practices	831	4.04	1.20	622	3.96	1.01	.08	1.36	1451
Religious In-group friends	842	3.22	.75	595	2.88	.85	.34	7.77**	1171.02
Religious out-group friends	760	2.05	.77	583	2.56	.72	-.51	-12.46**	1291.67
Membership in religious organization	828	.43	.49	580	.40	.49	.03	.97	1406
Participation in religious organization	346	2.58	.95	230	2.73	.97	-.15	-1.83	574
Ethnic ceremonies	761	2.62	.90	519	2.36	.98	.26	4.79**	1045.85
Ethnic languages	721	1.29	.88	541	.94	1.02	.35	6.40**	1066.78
Social embededness	776	2.67	.82	519	2.88	.874	-.21	-4.35**	1067.37
Membership in ethnic organization	822	.18	.38	564	.15	.36	.03	1.46	1384
Participation in ethnic organization	153	2.26	.80	90	2.43	.83	-.17	-1.59	241

Muslim and Christian respondents have significantly different mean scores in nine ethno-religious identification variables, the exceptions being religious practices, membership and participation in religious organization,

and membership and participation in ethnic organizations. Muslim respondents participate less in rites of passage (M=.319) than Christian respondents (M=3.40), but they are more in favor of attending collective rites (M=2.89) than Christian respondents (M=2.80). Muslim respondents are inclined to have more friends from the same religion (M=3.22) than Christian respondents do (M=2.88). In contrast, Christian respondents are more inclined to have more friends from different religions (M=2.56) compared to Muslim respondents (M=2.05). Table 4.6 indicates that Muslim respondents attend ethnic ceremonies more frequently (M=.262) than Christian respondents (M=2.36). Muslim respondents also speak an ethnic language more often (M=1.29) than Christian respondents (M=.94). In terms of social embeddedness, Christian respondents have more friends from the same ethnic group (M=2.88) than Muslim respondents (M=2.67).

Ethno-religious identifications by Muslims and Christians in practice

Survey findings showed that most Muslims celebrate *Idul Fitri, Idul Adha,* and most Christians celebrate Christmas. From the interviews, we find that almost all respondents celebrate these feast-days together with their families in their hometowns. Muslim communities in Ambon and Yogyakarta collectively celebrate *Idul Fitri and Idul Adha*. Christian communities hold Christmas parties in Ambon and Yogyakarta. In Maluku, the *Idul Adha* celebration features traditional rituals in which animals that will be slaughteredare paraded around the neighbourhood, and can include the reactivation of cultural bonds between villages. Fatima, a Muslim from Kailolo of Haruku Island said:

> "At the *Idul Adha* celebration on Haruku Island, we have *hadrat* [parades]. There [in Kailolo of Haruku Island], we also have a ceremony to reactivate *pela* [the cultural bond] after the *Idul Adha*. We have it every year. In Ambon, we celebrate *Idul Fitri* in lapangan merdeka [the city square] and celebrate the *Idul Adha* at a mosque in a housing complex."

In rural Maluku, it seems Islamic ceremonies are still intertwined with adat rituals, differing from local Christian ceremonies. This is due to the historical practice of placing Muslim preachers under the adat structure (Bartels, 2001:139-140).

Respondents provided varied responses in regard to the frequency of their mosque and church visits. Some respondents report that they go to the mosque every day, and at the other end of the spectrum, some said they only go during special events. A Muslim informant, Ayesa, said:

> "I go to the mosque only on Islamic celebration days like *Isra Miraj* [ascendence of the prophet] and *Maulid Nabi* [the birthday of the prophet] and I am only a participant. Also I went to the mosque for *shalat tarawih* [collective praying in the night during fasting month]."

Another Muslim informant, Muhammad, goes to the mosque almost every day. He says: "I perform *shalat* [religious services] in the campus mosque, but *subuh* [dawn praying] in *Musholla Al-Kalam*." This mosque belongs to a community that is politically affiliated to PKS, the Prosperous and Justice Party, one of the Islamic parties in Indonesia.

Most Christians go to church every Sunday. A Christian informant, Elisabeth, mentioned: "I only go to the church on Sunday to participate in mass and to teach children in a Sunday school." We did not find Christian informants who went to church only on Christian holy days.

Praying is an important activity in the lives of both Muslims and Christians. Survey findings demonstrated that most respondents pray to God several times a day. In the interviews, some respondents confirm this. For example, Muhammad mentioned "*doa* [praying] was conducted several times a day, after every *shalat* [religious services]. That kind of praying is general, which is to pray for safety of parents, pray for safety in the world and in the hereafter. There are also special moments for praying, like when dealing with exams." A Christian, Elisabeth, explained: "I pray

routinely before and after eating, sleeping, and going to campus. I also pray in special moments with God every day, between 12.00 and 02.30 pm or between 5.30 and 06.00 pm."

Another aspect of religious identification is reading the Holy Scriptures. Survey findings revealed that most Muslim and Christian respondents recite their Holy Scriptures at least once a day. In the interviews, many Muslim respondents mentioned that they recite the Quran after sunset, while most Christian respondents read the Bible during Sunday mass and during their morning prayers. A Muslim from Yogyakarta, Zahra, gave an example. When asked about when she recites the Quran, she replied, "after *magrib* [sunset praying], and when there is enough time after *subuh* [sunrise praying]." Henry, a Christian from Yogyakarta says that he reads the Bible during morning prayer.

Many respondents say that they have more friends belonging to their own religious groups than from other religions. However, several also mention that they have some friends from other religions, despite residential religious segregation. For example, a Muslim respondent from Ambon, Fatima, was asked whether she has Christian friends. She said, "I have some. They are in Passo and in Karpan, and some of them live behind Soya. We began to know each other when participating in an English debate in Yogyakarta. At that time, I was in the third year of SMK [specialist senior high school]." A Catholic respondent, Johannes, has many Muslim friends. "I socialized with Muslims in SD [primary school], SMP [junior high school] and SMA [senior high school]. I had even lived with a Muslim family in Tual, the family of my classmate. In [student] associations, university, and GMNI [the Indonesian National Students Movement], we also have Muslim friends." A Protestant respondent, Peter, says, "I have more Christian friends, but I have Muslim friends, too."

Another aspect of religious identification is participation in either religious organizations on campus or in mass-based religious organizations

outside campus. As mentioned earlier, several campus-based religious organizations were founded before the political reformation in 1998, such as the Campus Islamic Preaching Institute *(Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK)*; the Association of Christian University Students *(Persekutuan Mahasiswa Kristen, PMK*); and the Association of Catholic University Students *(Keluarga Mahasiswa Katolik, KMK*). In Ambon, several mass-based religious organizations were established during the colonial period, such as the Youth Forces of Moluccan Protestant Churches *(Angkatan Muda GPM, AM-GPM*) and the Association of Muhammadiyah Teenagers (*Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah,* IRM).

Although the survey findings showed that only a small percentage of respondents join religious organizations, it is worthwhile to give some examples. A Muslim in Ambon, Ayesa, stated, "I just participated in LDK. Our activities are studying religion [Islam] with various weekly topics. For examples about *fiqih*, Islamic laws, and how to dress in Islam. In my village [Masohi], I participated in IRM at *Al-Muhajirin* mosque." A Christian, Lucas, explains, "I was a former teenage-chairman of AM-GPM at Bethel church, Mardika. I was then involved in the leadership of youth generation. Next, I was elected as a head of department at or the Indonesian Christian Students Movement [*Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, GMKI*] of Economic-Unpatti."

Like religious identification, ethnic identification includes participation in ethnic ceremonies and organizations, use of ethnic languages, and friendship by ethnicity. As mentioned earlier, the survey findings indicated that most respondents participated in ethnic ceremonies, mainly wedding and funerals. The interviews also find that many respondents participate in ethnic ceremonies. A Muslim Butonese respondent, Ayesa, says, "I have also been a receptionist for a wedding committee. I was someone who delivered the property of the brides; there were scissors, blades [for women]; a long cloth for the groom. Then, as customs require, there was a pot for betel leaf." Although ethnic ceremonies are not popular

in Christian villages in Ambon, they are still conducted in Catholic villages in the Southeast Moluccas. A Catholic, Johannes, explains:

> "For *adat* ritual activities, we were involved even in our childhood. For example, marriage and funeral rituals. There are rituals where children are involved, such as *anak adat* [native sons]. Without considering whether they are the first, second or third born child, from a Catholic, Muslim or Protestant family, if they are *anak adat*, they are given the chance to speak out at funerals. They speak in the release of the dead."

Our survey findings revealed that Muslim respondents speak their ethnic language on more occasions than Christian respondents do. A Muslim, Fatima, says, "Our language is the Ambonese language because we have been living here a very long time. In Tulehu, I actually spoke the Kailolo language, but after moving here I completely forgot it because we speak the Ambonese language now." Yusuf, another Muslim respondent, adds:

> "Yes I speak in Sepa language. I learned it from my family. It was a traditional language. I began to learn it during childhood. In Sepa, we learned two languages, Ambonese-Malay and the mother tongue of our region. This language is used for talking about secret matters."

Johannes says he can speak his ethnic language from the Southeast Moluccas. "I know those [Kei] customs very well," he says. "I speak the language too. I am familiar with all the customs of the Kei ethnic group." Although Christian respondents from Java mostly speak Javanese, Christian respondents from Ambon generally do not speak their ethnic languages, which were replaced by the Malay languagewhen Dutch missionaries introduced Protestantism systematically in the 19th century (Chauvel, 1990:4-14).

Friendship with people of the same ethnicity, a type of social embeddedness, is an important aspect of ethnic identification. It is common for respondents to have many ethnic in-group friends. Ayesa, a Muslim, has

a Butonese father and an Ambonese mother. She was born and grew up in the Central Moluccas. Unlike other Butonese, she does not use her father's family name, but a common name, similar to the Javanese naming system. In Ambon, she studies at the State Islamic Institute and lives in a boarding house occupied by Butonese students. "In my rented house, almost all my friends are Butonese, they speak the Buton language. I am accepted because I know a little bit of it. But sometimes they mock me, saying that I am a fake Butonese," she says. None of our Christian informants mentioned similar issues.

Another element of ethnic identification is participation in either mass- or campus-based ethnic organizations. Here, we give examples of two campus based-ethnic organizations in Ambon, the *Evav* Students' Communication Forum *(Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Evav, Fokusmapa)* and the *Sepa* Students' Association *(Ikatan Pelajar Mahasiswa Sepa, IPMAS*). Johannes says:

> "In Ambon, we have *Fokusmapa*. The main goal of this organization is to unify all student communities from the Southeast Moluccas and Tual City. All people that have blood relationships [with people in the Southeast-Moluccas] are united. They are advised to become a member of this organization. All students from the Kei Islands of Southeast Moluccas, without considering their religions, are welcome to join in the organization."

This ethnic student organization had around 8000 members studying in higher educational institutes in Ambon. Their activities, according to Johannes, include "some seminars on local wisdom in the Southeast Moluccas and collective religious celebrations, such as Christmas, *Idul Fitri*, and Easter, during which Kei students gather."

On another ethnic organisation, IPMAS, Yusuf says:

> "We already have 12 branches throughout Indonesia. It is a national organization, with all its members from Sepa. University students or

> those from any educational institution are included. This organization is open for students belong to *negeri* [an *adat* village] and *petuanan* [an administrative village]. Students from outside Sepa, who have a Sepa bloodline, have the right to join us."

This organization has around 100 members in Ambon and focuses on studying the history of Sepa and Islam.

The interview findings reveal that growing religious identification is in line with the decrease of ethnic identification. Hasan, a Muslim and head of LDK-Unpatti, says:

> "In the Moluccas, culture is generally solid and strong. Among the many cultures is the culture of my village in Southern Buru, where *adat* [customary law] is unchangeable, and rather defies Islamic values [belief in God almighty]. Here is an example. Most people still believe in magic. We have laws in the Quran and Hadith but they believe in other parties beside Allah."

According to Hasan, people in his village still believe in supernatural powers. For example, during a long period of drought, they visited sacred places to pray for help. He and the other people from his village who study in Unpatti have tried to change this tradition to better reflect Islamic values. "Since my SMP [junior high school] years, I was still tied to our culture," he says. "However, after studying in Ambon [Sciences-Unpatti], being introduced to *tarbiyah* [Islamic preaching] and understanding it [pure Islamic belief], my village-mates and I attempted to change the tradition." When asked which bond is stronger, he says, "I have to say that my bond is to my religion."

Triangulation

The findings from the interviews confirm the results of the survey findings that indicate ethno-religious identification is relatively stronger among

respondents in Ambon than in Yogyakarta. Unlike the survey findings, the interviews are able to illustrate the growing religious identification among Muslim respondents in urban Moluccas, which is related to a decrease in traditional cultural systems. Relevant studies, for instance Lowry and Littlejohn (2006) and Bartels (2001), also point out that some cultural bonds have eroded due to the spread of conservative Islamic beliefs. In the interviews, Muslim respondents generally show stronger religious and ethnic identification than Christian respondents. In rural Moluccas, particularly in Muslim villages, this is due to the fact that religious practices and institutions are mostly subordinated under *adat* institutions. At the same time, we find that there are no significant differences between Muslim and Christian respondents in religious practices and membership in religious or ethnic organizations. Ten of the sixteen respondents say that they frequently attend religious services and that they pray several times a day. Additionally, more than half of them are affiliated with an ethnic or religious organization, although they are not members.

4.2.3 Intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification

In the following section, we present ANOVA results on the relationship between intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification. Only significant correlations will be described.

Table 4.7 *intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification*

	Contact avoidance				Avoidance of future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta
Rites of passage	.16	.13**	.04	.11**	.75	.16*						
Collective rites					.75	.09*						
Religious practices			.04	.08*			.49	.14**				
Religious in-group friends	.16	.25**	.03	.14**					.40	.40**	.22	.25**
Religious out-group friends	.15	-.29**			.75	-.17*			.39	-.38**	.21	-.21**
Membership in religious organizations	.16	.11**							.40	.10**	.22	.11**
Participation in religious organizations					.76	.17*						
Ethnic self-definition	.16	.23**	.03	.17**	.75	.11**			.40	.37**	.22	-.31**
Ethnic ceremonies					.74	-.10*	.51	.18**			.21	.12*
Ethnic languages	.16	-.09*					.52	.11*	.39	-.08*	.22	.16**
Social embededness	.16	.16**	.03	.16**					.40	.24**	.23	.25**
Membership in ethnic organizations	.16	.07*										
Participation in ethnic organizations					.76	-.19*						

*= p value < .05 ** p value < .01, M = mean score

Muslim respondents

The following section describes the social location of intergroup contact avoidance among Muslim respondents. Participation in rites of passage has a significant effect on contact avoidance and the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion ($p < .01$). Among Muslim respondents, we discover that the more they participate in rites of passage, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.13), and the more they tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (eta=.16). There is a significant relationship between participation in collective rites and the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion ($p < .05$). The more frequently Muslims participate in collective rites, for example, the more they tend to avoid Christians as their future spouses (eta= .09). The amount of religious in-group friends an individual has significantly affects both contact avoidance and the support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). Among Muslim respondents, we discover that the more Muslims friends they have,

the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=.20 eta=.25) and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.33 eta=.40).

Having religious out-group friends is significantly related to contact avoidance, avoidance of future spouses from a different religion, and support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). For Muslim respondents, the more friends from different religions they have, the less they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r = -.29), the less they avoid Christians as their future spouses (r=-.17), and the less they support residential segregation (r= -.38). Membership in a religious organization has an effect on contact avoidance and on support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). Muslim respondents who become members or followers of any religious organization tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.10) and membership makes them more likely to support residential segregation (eta=.11). Participation in religious organizations is only significantly related to the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion. For Muslim respondents, the more participations in any kind of religious organization they engage in, the more they avoid Christians as their future spouses (eta=.17).

Differences in ethnic groups have significant effects on contact avoidance ($p < .01$), on avoidance of future spouses from a different religion ($p < .01$), and on support for residential segregation ($p <. 01$). Among Muslim respondents, the more they are affiliated with ethnic groups, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.23), the more they tend to avoid Christians as their future spouses (eta=.11), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.37). Participation in ethnic ceremonies is significantly related to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion (Muslims $p <. 05$). We identify that the more frequently Muslim respondents participate in ethnic ceremonies, the less they tend to avoid Christians as their future spouses (r=-.10). Differences in using ethnic languages have a significant effect on contact avoidance (Muslim $p < .03$) and on support for residential segregation (Muslims $p < .05$). The more that Muslim respondents speak their ethnic languages, the

less they avoid contact with Christians (r=-.09), and the less they support residential segregation (r=-.08). Having friends from the same ethnicity is also significantly related to contact avoidance and support for residential segregation (p <.01). The ANOVA table shows that the more friends a Muslim respondent has with the same ethnic out-groups, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.16), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.24). Also, differences between members and non-members in any ethnic organization are significantly related to contact avoidance. Here, we find that the more that Muslim respondents become members or followers of any ethnic organization, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.07). In addition, participation in ethnic organizations has a significant effect on the avoidance of a future spouses from a different religion (p <. 05). The more Muslim respondents participate in ethnic organizations, the less they avoid Christians as future spouses (r=-.19).

Christian respondents

The following section describes the social location of intergroup contact avoidance among Christian respondents. Similar to Muslim respondents, attendance at rites of passage is significantly related to contact avoidance (p < .01). The more that Christian respondents participate in rites of passage, the more likely they are to avoid contact with Muslims (eta=.11). Moreover, religious practices relate significantly to contact avoidance (p < .05) and to the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion (p = .01). The more that Christian respondents engage in religious practices, the more they avoid contact with Muslims (r=.08) and the more they avoid Muslims as their future spouses (r=.14). Having friends from the same religion is related to contact avoidance (p < .01) and support for residential segregation (p <. 01). Among Christian respondents, we find that the more Christian friends they have, the more they tend to avoid contact with Muslims (r=.14), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.25).

Having friends from different religions is also significantly associated with support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). The more friends from different religions Christian respondents have, the less they tend to support residential segregation (r=.-21). Membership in any religious organization has a significant relationship with support for residential segregation. The more that Christian respondents become members and followers of any religious organizations, the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.11).

Among Christian respondents, differences in ethnic self-definition are significantly related to all measures of intergroup contact avoidance. The more they affiliate with their ethnic groups, the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.31) and contact avoidance (eta=.11). Also, participation in ethnic ceremonies is significantly related to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion ($p < .05$), and support for residential segregation ($p <. 05$). The more frequently Christian respondents participate in ethnic ceremonies, the more they avoid Muslims as their future spouses (eta=.18), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.12). Use of ethnic languages is significantly related to the avoidance of a future spouse of a different religion ($p < .05$) and to support for residential segregation ($p<.01$). The more often Christian respondents speak their ethnic languages, the more they avoid Muslims as their future spouses (r=.11), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.16). Having friends from the same ethnicity is significantly related to contact avoidance and support for residential segregation. The more friends from the same ethnic groups Christian respondents have, the more they tend to avoid contact with Muslims (eta=.16), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.25).

4.3 Intergroup contact avoidance and individual determinants

This section describes the construction of the measurement for intergroup

differences, and the analysis of variance between individual determinants and intergroup contact avoidance.

4.3.1 The construction of measurement

We use several variables for identifying the social characteristics of our respondents: gender, parents' religions, household income, parents' education, occupational status, and occupation status.

1. Gender

Gender consists of the categories of *female* and *male*.

*2. Parents' religio*ns

We asked respondents which religious tradition their mothers and fathers belong to, and then constructed a cross tabulation of respondents' religions and their parents' religions. Homogamous parents refers to respondents who are the same religion as their fathers and mothers, while non-homogamous parents refers to respondents whose parents have a different religion. Table 4.10 indicates that almost all Muslim respondents (98.83%) and Christian respondents (96.18%) are from homogamous parents.

Table 4.8 *Homogamous and non-homogamous parents*

	Muslim		Christian	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Non-homogamous parents	10	1.17	24	3.82
Homogamous parents	843	98.83	605	96.18
Total	853	100	629	100

3. Household income

The question on household consists of eight possible answer categories, as follows: *lower than IDR 500,000 (1), IDR 500,000 - IDR 999,999 (2), IDR 1,000,000, - IDR 1,999,999 (3), IDR 2,000,000, - IDR 2,999,999 (4), IDR*

3,000,000, - IDR 3,999,999 (5), IDR 4,000,000, - IDR 4,999,999 (6), IDR 5,000,000, - IDR 5,999,999 (7), over than IDR 6,000,000, (8). We recoded the answer categories from 8 into 3 to be in line with the classification of household income in the Indonesian social-economy survey, using the classifications of lower, middle, and upper income (Oktavianti, 2008:133; Arianingsih, 2012:471). We classify respondents whose household income is lower than IDR 1,000,000 as part of the 'lower class' and those whose household income is between IDR 1,000,000 and IDR 4,999,999 as part of the 'middle class'. We classify respondents whose household income is IDR 5,000,000 or more as part of the 'upper class'.

4. Parents' education

The question on parents' education refers to inquiries about father's educational level and mother's educational level. Both questions reflect the nine levels of education in the Indonesian educational system, as follows: *no formal education* (1), *kindergarten* (2), *primary school* (3), *secondary school* (4), *senior high school* (5), *diploma* or D1-D4 (6), *bachelor* or S1 (7), *master* or S2 (8), and PhD or S3 (9). We recoded the answer categories into four categories to adjust it to the standard Indonesian classification of the educational system, which consists of *no formal education* (1), *basic education* (2), *middle education* (3), and *higher education* (4) (*Pusat Statistik Pendidikan*, 2012). Basic education refers to kindergartens and primary schools, while the middle education refers to secondary and senior high schools. Higher education includes diploma, bachelor, master, and PhD. In addition, we compute parents' education by combining the mean values of both parents' level of education.

5. Occupational status

This question requests information on both mothers' and fathers' occupational status. Each question has sevenanswer categories: *self-employed (1), employee helped by paid workers (2), employee helped*

by unpaid workers (3), workers (4), free workers in agriculture (5), free workers in non-agriculture sector (6), and unpaid workers (7). We recoded the categories of *self-employed (1), employee helped by paid workers (2),* and *employee helped by unpaid workers (3)* into *self-employed*. *Free workers in agriculture (5)* and *free workers in non-agriculture sector* (6) were recoded into *free workers*. New answer categories are *self-employed (1), workers (2), free workers (3), and unpaid workers(4)* . We recoded the answer category to adapt with the conceptual definition of occupational status.

6. Occupation status

We asked respondents about their parents' occupation status. Each question has 11 answer categories: *executives*, *professionals*, *technicians*, *clerks*, *sales workers*, *farmers*, *trades, machine operators, unskilled workers, special occupations,* and *dead or absent.*

4.3.2 Intergroup differences between Muslim and Christian

Table 4.9 Intergroup differences in social characteristics

	Muslim			Christian					
	N	M	SD	N	M	SD	M diff.	t-test	df
Gender (1=m; 2=f)	838	1.50	.50	621	1.44	.49	.06	2.26*	1341.39
Parents' religion	853	.99	.11	629	.96	.19	.03	3.11**	917.64
Household income	823	1.80	.72	583	1.94	.70	-.14	-3.63**	1265.23
Parents education	568	2.96	.77	415	3.24	.67	-.28	-6.10**	948.73
Occupational status	758	1.61	.83	550	1.61	.77	-.00	-.07	1306
Occupation status	630	6.18	1.76	439	5.96	2.00	.22	1.92	1067

Muslim and Christian respondents display significant differences in mean scores for gender, parents' religion, household income, parents' education, and occupation status. There were more female Muslim respondents (M=1.50) than female Christian respondents (M=.144). Muslim respondents also reported that more of their parents share their religion (M=.99) than Christian respondents (M=.96). In terms of household income,

more Christian respondents belonged to the upper class category (M=1.94) compared to Muslim respondents (M=1.80). Christian respondents parents' had higher levels of education (M=3.24) than Muslim respondents' parents (M=2.96).

4.3.3 Intergroup contact avoidance and individual determinants

Table 4.10 *Intergroup contact avoidance and individual determinants*

	Contact avoidance				Avoidance of future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta
Gender					.75	.18**	.49	.27**			.22	.08*
Parents religion												
Household income	.16	.15**					.49	.20**	.40	-.19**		
Parents education	.15	-.14**					.49	.14*	.40	-.25**		
Occupational status									.41	.17**		
Occupation status	.16	.19*							.42	.30**		

*= p value <.05, ** =p value <.01, M = mean score

Muslim respondents

Among Muslim respondents, several measures of individual determinants have a significant relationship with avoidance of intergroup contact. Gender differences are related to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion (p <. 01). Female respondents appear more inclined to avoid a future spouse of a different religion than male respondents. Moreover, disparities in household income have a significant relationship with contact avoidance, and support for residential segregation (p < .01). The ANOVA table shows that the higher Muslim respondents' household income is, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=.12 eta=.15), and the less they tend to support residential segregation (r=-.25). Differences in parents' educational levels are significantly related to contact avoidance (p < .01) and to support for residential segregation (p < .01). For Muslim respondents, the higher their parents' educational levels are, the less they

tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=-.14) and the less they tend to support residential segregation (r=-.25).

Differences in parents' occupational status are significantly related to support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). The scalar order of occupational status ranges from higher (self-employed) to lower (unpaid workers), and among Muslim respondents, the lower their parents' occupational status, the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.17). Differences in parents' occupation status are also significantly related to contact avoidance ($p <. 05$), and to support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). The scalar order of occupational status ranges from higher (top executive) to lower (deceased father), and among Muslim respondents, the lower their parents' occupation status is, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.19) and support residential segregation (eta=.30).

Christian respondents

Similar to the case with Muslim respondents, gender differences in Christian respondents are significantly related to the avoidance of a future spouse of a different religion ($p < .01$). More female Christian respondents indicated that they tend to avoid a future spouse of a different religion (eta=.27) than female Muslim respondents (eta=.18).However, different from Muslim respodents, differences in gender among Christian respondents is related to support for residential segregation ($p<.05$). Differences in household income are also related to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion ($p < .01$). The higher Christian respondents' household income is, the more they tend to avoid Muslims as their future spouses (r=.14). Lastly, differences in parents' education are significantly related to support for residential segregation. Among Christian respondents, the higher their parents' levels of education, the more they tend to avoid Muslims as future spouses (r=.14).

4.4 Intergroup contact avoidance and intermediary variables

The following section describes the construction of the measurement for intermediate variables, intergroup differences between Muslims and Christians, and the analysis of variance.

4.4.1 The construction of measurements

Intermediate variables consist of salience of identity, perceived group threat, intergroup contact, religiosity, individual memory of violence, perceived discrimination, nationalism, distrust, and social dominant orientation.

4.4.1.1 Salience of identity

The questions regarding salience of identity explore to what extent religious and ethnic identities are important and influential in daily life. Since the questions are for Muslim and Christian respondents, we used three steps of factor analysis in order to extrapolate the factors. As we said in the description of the general procedure, we constructed a cross-religious comparability in order to discover the intergroup differences between Muslim and Christian respondents. It is also useful to find out whether or not the overall structure in both groups holds well for each group. In the first step (both groups), q40 (*my religious identity is important*) and q41 (*committed member of religious group*) loads highly (>.30) on two factors. Both questions were excluded from the next steps. The first step shows two factors, namely religious and ethnic salience. The second step (Muslim and Christian respondents separately) and the third step (both groups) have two identical factors that contain the same questions on religion and ethnicity (see Table 1, Appendix 1). The reliability of ethnicity is .82 while the reliability of religion is .77; therefore, both factors have high reliability. We decided to have two different factors because the correlation value is quite low (.35). To normalize the distribution, we recoded the answer categories into *totally disagree and disagree* (1), *neither disagree nor agree* (2), *agree* (3), and *totally agree* (4).

4.4.1.2 Perceived group threat

Both Muslim and Christian respondents were asked whether they feel threatened by religious out-groups in the context of the economy (job prospects, study grants, control of business, boarding houses), social contexts (security on campus, security of their neighbourhoods, violence in their neighbourhoods), politics (migration, crucial positions, preferential treatment), and in the context of culture (customs). In the first step (both groups), q157 (*The day will come when members of other religious groups will occupy crucial positions in the government*) has low communality (.24) and disappears in a patterned matrix. The result of the first step is two factors, political economy threat and socio-cultural threat. In the second step (for Muslim respondents), q162 (*I am afraid of increasing violence in my neighbourhood due to the presence of other religious groups*) loads highly (>.30) on two factors, and both are excluded from the next steps. The second step (Muslim and Christian respondents separately) and the third step (both groups) have two identical factors with the same items, namely political economy and culture (see Table 2, Appendix 1). The correlation between both factors is .58, which suggests that we should merge both factors into one factor. The reliability for one factor is .92, while the reliability for two factors is .92 and .80. We recoded the answer category to normalize the distribution into *totally disagree* (1), *disagree* (2), *neither disagree nor agree* (3), *agree* (4), and *totally agree* (5). The total number of respondents is 1,441 with an average score of 2.16.

4.4.1.3 Intergroup contact

The measurement for actual intergroup contact consists of the quantity of contact and the quality of contact.

1. Quantity of contact

We asked respondents about the frequency of their contact with their neighbours, housemates, close friends, classmates, and relatives from

different religions over the past year, from *never* to *not applicable*. The answer option *not applicable* (7) was recoded into missing. We do not use a factor analysis since quantity of contact only has one dimension. The questions have a high Cronbach alpha both for Muslim (.89) and Christian respondents (.84), indicating that all questions are reliable. The quantity of contact is made up of six answer categories: *never* (1), *at least once a month* (2), *once a week* (3), *more than once a week* (4), *once a day* (5), and *several times a day* (6). The mean value is 3.11 and the number of respondents who answer all of the questions on the quantity of contact is also high (1,220).

2. Quality of contact

Both Muslim and Christian respondents were asked to what extent they are close to, equal with, and cooperative with their neighbours, close friends, classmates, board mates, and relatives from different religions. Here, the answer option *not applicable* (6) is recoded into missing. We conducted a factor analysis in three procedures since all of the questions are applicable to both Muslim and Christian respondents. The result of the factor analysis in the first step (both groups) is identical with the result of the second step (Muslim respondents). Both of them have three factors: closeness and cooperativeness, evaluation, and equality. However, the second step (Christian respondents) has four factors that are in line with the conceptual framework. Then, we formulated the factor analysis of Christian respondents into three factors in order to adapt with the first step (both groups) and the second step (Muslim respondents). The third step (both groups) produces three identical factors that are similar to the first and second step (See table 3 Appendix 1). The Cronbach alpha at national level is .97, while for Muslim respondents it is .97 and for Christian respondents it is .95. This means that the reliability of these questions is very high. We recoded the answering categories into *very negative* (1), *negative* (2), *neither negative nor positive* (3), and *positive* (4). The average score of the 1,030 respondents is 3.45.

4.4.1.4 Religiosity

The measurement for religiosity consists of religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, and interpretation of sacred writing.

1. Religiocentrism

The questions on religiocentrism combine items on positive in-group attitudes and negative out-group attitudes for both Muslims and Christians. In this variable, we conduct one test procedure as we separate the questions between Muslim and Christian respondents. The results of the factor analysis for Muslim and Christian respondents are identical if both questions and factors are in accordance with the conceptual framework, i.e. religiocentrism as the combination of positive in-group attitudes and the negative out-group attitudes (see Table 4, Appendix 1). After recoding to normalize the distribution, the positive in-group attitudes have four answer categories, namely *totally disagree and disagree* (1), *neither disagree nor agree* (2), *agree* (3), and *totally agree* (4). Meanwhile, the negative out-group attitudes has five answer categories from *disagree* to *totally agree*. The mean value of the positive in-group category (3.23) is higher than negative out-group category (2.49). Moreover, the number of respondents who answered questions on the positive in-group attitudes (1,443) is higher than the number who answered regarding the negative out-group attitudes (1,434).

2. Attitudes toward Religious plurality

We asked Muslim and Christian respondents about their interpretations of the truth claims of their own religions in relation to other religions. Theoretically, we distinguish three different models of interpreting religious plurality: monism, pluralism, and relativism. To check the cross-religious comparability, a three-step procedure of factor analysis was followed. In the first step (both groups), q78 (*Compared with other religions, my*

religion offers the surest way to liberation) has low communality (.18) and is excluded from the next steps. The second step Muslim and Christian respondents separately) and the third step (both groups), produce two identical factors that contain the same questions, namely monism and pluralism (see Table 5, Appendix 1). The reliability of monism (.81) is a little higher than the reliability of pluralism (.80). The correlation value between monism and pluralism is lower than .60, therefore maintaining two factors is appropriate. The monism and pluralism categories have five answer categories ranging from *totally disagree* to *totally agree*. The mean value of *monism* (3.00) is lower than the mean value of *pluralism* (3.15). The number of respondents who answered questions on pluralism (1,456) is a little higher than the number who answered questions on monism (1,450).

3. Interpretation of sacred writing

The questions on interpretation of sacred writing concern the way respondents interpret their Holy Scriptures, either intratextually or symbolically. We conducted three procedures of factor analysis, but the results are rather complicated in terms of identical questions. The first step (both groups) results in two factors, intratextual and symbolic, where the loading value of q64 (*The Sacred Writing is not really the word of God, but the word of man*) is negative, while in contrast, other values are positive. The second step (Christian respondents) has the same pattern as the first step. The second step (Muslim respondents) has a different result, with the second factor (symbolic) having only one question. In addition, q67 (*I think that the Sacred Writing should be taken literally, as it is written*) and q68 (*The meanings of the Sacred Writing are open to change and interpretation*) have low commonalities (<.20). We excluded these questions from the next steps, including q64. The second step (Muslim and Christian respondents separately) and third step (both groups) have two identical factors that contain similar items, intratextual fundamentalism

and hermeneutic interpretation. The correlation value between both factors are very low (.08), therefore we decided to keep these two factors (See Table 6, Appendix 1). After recoding, intratextual fundamentalism consists of four categories, which range from *totally disagree and disagree* (1) to *totally agree* (4). Hermeneutic interpretation consists of five categories ranging from *totally disagree* (1) to *totally agree* (5). The mean score of questions on *intratextual fundamentalism* (3.85) is higher than the mean score of questions on *hermeneutic interpretation* (3.55). Respondents were more likely to answer questions on *intratextual fundamentalism* (1,457) than questions of *hermeneutic interpretation* (1,446).

4.4.1.5 Perceived discrimination

We asked respondents to what extent they feel discriminated against by religious out-group members in politics, the economy, culture, and religion. We conducted three procedures of factor analysis. The first step (both groups) produced two factors, where the first factor consists of 14 questions (on politics, the economy, and religion) and the second factor contains three questions (on culture). In the second step (Muslim respondents), q195 (*Limitations on public observance of religious festivals*), q198 (*Limitations on building places of worship*), and q204 (*Limitations on the observance of religious laws on marriage and divorce*) load highly (>.30) in two factors and these questions are exlcuded from the next steps. In the second step (Christian respondents), q197 (*Limitations on marriage*) loads highly (>.30) in two factors and is deleted from the next steps. The second step (Muslim and Christian respondents separately) and third step (both groups) produce two identical factors that contain similar questions, *public discrimination* and *private discrimination* (See Table 7, Appendix 1). The reliability of *public discrimination* (.91) is higher than that of *private discrimination* (.78). The correlation between factors is .49 for Muslim respondents and .63 for Christian respondents, therefore we decided to use only the factor of *discrimination*. The reliability of discrimination is also very high (.91).

This scale has four answer categories from *totally disagree* (1) to *agree and totally agree* (4). The mean value of *discrimination* is low (1.94), and 1,440 respondents answered all of the questions.

4.4.1.6 Individual memory of violence

The questions regarding memories of violence inquire whether respondents and their families, relatives, friends, and neighbours suffered any kind of physical injuries or loss of life due to violence. We only consider respondents who have experienced or witnessed violence in their hometowns between 2001 and 2011. Based on our literature review (Pooley and Doherty, 1997; Anderson and Shuttleworth, 2003), we classify memories and experiences of violence into three dimensions: *memory, direct experience,* and *indirect experience*. The category *memory* includes some questions on places, socialization, and witnesses. Meanwhile, *direct experience* contains several questions about physical injury, families, and relatives. *Indirect experience* only includes two questions about close friends and neighbours (See Table 8, Appendix 1). The Cronbach alpha of memory for Muslims (.71) is higher than that for Christians (.65), and for that of both groups (.69). Direct experience of violence for Muslims also has the higher Cronbach alpha (.81) compared to that for Christians (.79) and both groups (.80). Meanwhile, the indirect experience of violence for both groups and Christians (.76) has a similar alpha with that of Muslims (.75). All questions have a higher alpha (.85) for both groups and each group. After recoding to normalize the distribution, the memory of violence has four answer categories, namely *no experience* (0), *one occasion* (1), *two occasions* (2), and *three occasions* (3). Both direct violence and indirect violence consist of four answer categories from *no experience* (0) to *three and more occasions* (3). Respondents are more likely to answer questions on indirect violence (1452) compared to questions on memory (1,431) and direct violence (1,434). The correlation values between dimensions are low (<.60), therefore we decide to keep the three dimensions.

4.4.1.7 Nationalism

The measurement for nationalism consists of nationalism itself, regiocentrism, and national pride.

1. Nationalism and regiocentrism

The questions on nationalism ask to what extent respondents love and respect their own country and regencies. We conducted three procedures of factor analysis. The first step (both groups) resulted in two factors, nationalism and regiocentrism. Moreover, q149 (*There is something about Indonesia today that makes me feel shame*) and q146 (*I would rather be a resident of my district than of other districts in Indonesia*) have low communality (<.20); while q143 (*My country is better than most other countries*) and q147 (*My most important characteristics come from my nationality*) load highly (>.30) in two factors. We excluded these four questions from the next steps. The second step (Muslim respondents) also produces two factors, but q145 (*I should support my country even if my country is wrong*) loads highly (>.30) in two factors and is excluded from the next steps. The second step (Christian respondents) and the third step (both groups) have two identical factors, which are the same with the second step (Muslim respondents), i.e., nationalism and regiocentrism (See Table 9, Appendix 1). The Cronbach alpha of nationalism (.66) is not much different from the alpha of regiocentrism (.62). The correlation between the two factors is very low (<.20), therefore it is reasonable to maintain two factors. After recoding, nationalism has four answer categories, from *totally disagree and disagree* (1) to *totally agree* (4), while regiocentrism consists of five categories from *totally disagree* (1) to *totally agree* (5).

2. National pride

We exlcuded the following questions on national pride: q136 (*How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievement in history?*) and q137

(*How proud are you of your country in terms of its achievement in equal treatment of all groups in society?*). We exlcuded these questions due to their interrogative form. National pride consists of five answer categories from *totally disagree* to *totally agree*. The questions on nationalism have a higher mean value (3.76) than the questions on regiocentrism (2.34) and national pride (3.68). The number of respondents who answered all of the questions of the three factors is 1,438. The questions on regiocentrism were answered by more respondents (1,464) than were the questions on nationalism (1,459) and national pride (1,448).

4.4.1.8 Distrust

Muslim respondents were asked to what extent they trust or distrust Christians, and Christian respondents were questioned to what extent they trust and distrust of Muslims (See Table 10, Appendix 1). The score of questions q208-q211 (*On the whole one can trust Muslims, On the whole one can trust Christians, On the whole one can rely on Muslim, On the whole one can rely on Christians*) are inverted because they contain a negative formulation. After recoding, *distrust* consists of four answer categories from *totally disagree* (1) to *agree and totally agree* (4). Additionally, the mean value of distrust from a significantly high number of respondents (1,442) is quite moderate (2.43).

4.4.1.9 Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)

We asked both Muslim and Christian respondents to what extent they feel dominance and equality in intergroup relations is important. The score of questions q98 (*It would be good if groups could be equal)* to q105 *(No one group should dominate in society*) are inverted because they contain a negative formulation. We used three procedures of factor analysis. The first step (both groups) consists of three factors. Question q104 (*We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible*) loads highly within

two factors (>.30) and is excluded from the next steps. In the second step (Muslim respondents), q103 (*We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally*) has a low communality value (<.02) and it is excluded from the next steps. The result of the second step (Muslim respondents) is three factors, while the second step (Christian respondents) is two factors. Then, we formulate the factor analysis (Muslim respondents) into two factors. Question q90 (*Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups*) and q105 that have low communality (<.20) are excluded from this analysis. The second step (Christian respondents) and third step (both groups) have the same results as the second step (Muslim respondents). The two identical factors contain the same questions, namely dominance and equality (See Table 11, Appendix 1). After recoding, dominance has four answer categories from *totally disagree* (1) to *totally agree and agree* (4), while inequality has three answer categories that consist of *totally disagree* (1), *disagree* (2), and *neither, agree, and totally agree* (3). The questions on dominance have a higher mean value (2.15) than the questions on equality (1.62). More respondents answered questions on dominance (1,452) than on inequality (1,439).

4.4.2 Intergroup differences between Muslim and Christians

Here we present the findings regarding the differences in mean scores between Muslim and Christian respondents

Table 4.11 *Intergroup differences in intermediate variables*

	Muslim			Christian					
	N	M	SD	N	M	SD	M diff.	t-test	df
Religious salience	835	3.09	.83	617	3.08	.84	.01	.17	1450
Ethnic salience	842	1.45	.58	598	1.43	.62	.02	.63	1438
Perceived threat	838	2.21	.77	603	2.09	.73	.12	2.92**	1340.86
Quantity of contact	688	2.65	1.71	532	3.72	1.67	-1.07	-10.91**	1154.14
Quality of contact	528	2.29	.74	502	2.71	.62	-.43	-10.11**	1011.63
Positive in-group	835	2.54	.85	608	1.87	.76	.67	15.70**	1386.28
Negative out-group	827	2.53	.91	607	2.44	.89	.09	1.98*	1320.39
Monism	832	3.33	.86	618	2.56	.92	.78	16.33**	1273.87
Pluralism	839	2.88	.87	617	3.51	.72	-.63	-15.18**	1433.58
Intratextual fundamentalism	841	3.07	.77	616	2.58	.92	.49	10.73**	1179.93
Hermeneutic interpretation	831	3.39	.92	615	3.76	.84	-.37	-8.02**	1380.14
Perceived discrimination	838	1.88	.64	602	2.02	.74	-.15	-4.03**	1169.13
Memory of violence	836	1.38	1.18	595	1.78	1.12	-.40	-6.43**	1318.77
Direct violence	830	.57	1.04	604	.76	1.12	-.18	-3.15**	1240.39
Indirect violence	834	.42	.85	618	.65	1.01	-.23	-4.65**	1186.99
Nationalism	845	2.80	.68	614	2.71	.69	.09	2.40*	1311.77
Regiocentrism	848	2.29	.89	616	2.40	.94	-.11	-2.34*	1285.26
National pride	835	3.79	.87	613	3.53	.94	.26	5.46**	1265.30
Distrust	842	2.42	.75	600	2.44	.68	-.03	-.68	1440
Dominance	839	2.22	.70	613	2.04	.69	.17	4.64**	1327.68
Equality	836	1.66	.58	612	1.56	.58	.10	3.15**	1320.36

Muslim and Christian respondents display several significant differences in the mean scores of all intermediate variables, except for religious salience, ethnic salience, and inequality. Muslim respondents tend to indicate a stronger sense of perceived threat (M=2.21) than Christian respondents (M=2.09). Christian respondents have more frequent contact (M=3.72) with Muslim respondents (M=2.65), and have a more positive evaluation of such contact (M=2.71) compared to Muslim respondents (M=2.29). In the religiocentrism category, Muslim respondents have a more positive image of their in-group (M=2.54) and a more negative picture of out-groups (M=2.53) than Christian respondents (M=1.87 and M=2.44 respectively). Muslim respondents also tend to have a stronger religious monistic view (M=3.33) than Christian respondents (M=2.56). Not surprisingly, then, Christian respondents show more support for

religious pluralism (M=3.51) than Muslim respondents (M=2.88). In terms of religious fundamentalism, Muslim respondents are more in favour of textual interpretations based on their Holy Scriptures (M=3.07) than Christian respondents (M=2.58). In contrast, Christian respondents are more in favour of hermeneutic interpretations of their Holy Scriptures (M=3.76) compared to Muslim respondents (M=3.39).

Christian respondents feel more discriminated against (M=2.02) than Muslim respondents (M=1.88). In terms of memory of violence, Christian respondents remember more occasions of violence (M=1.78) than Muslim respondents(M=1.38). Christian respondents reported experiencing more occasions either of direct violence (M=.76) or indirect violence (M=.65) compared to Muslim respondents (M=.57 M=.42).Muslim respondents tend to have stronger nationalistic views (M=2.80) than Christian respondents (M=2.29). Additionally, Muslim respondents also have stronger feeling of regiocentrism (M=2.29) than Christian respondents (M=2.40). Muslim respondents also take more pride in their country (M=3.79) than Christian respondents (M=3.53). Muslim respondents are inclined to have a stronger orientation of dominance (M=2.22) and a stronger orientation of inequality (M=1.66) compared to Christian respondents (M=2.04; M=1.56).

4.4.3 Intergroup contact avoidance and intermediate variables

In this section, we will describe the summary of ANOVA between our dependent variables and all intermediate variables.

Table 4.12 *Intergroup contact avoidance and intermediate variables*

	Contact avoidance				Avoidance of future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta	M	r/eta
Religious salience	.17	.15**			.75	.11**			.40	.19**	.22	.18**
Ethnic salience	.16	.07*							.40	.26**	.22	.26**
Perceived threat	.16	.42**	.04	.28**	.75	.11*			.41	.43**	.22	.24**
Quantity of contact	.14	-.24**							.38	-.35**	.22	-.23**
Quality of contact	.13	.38**	.03	-.16**	.74	-.12**	.49	.18**	.35	-.42**		
Positive in-group	.16	.17**	.03	.14**					.40	.24**	.22	.29**
Negative out-group	.16	.34**	.03	.37**					.40	.41**	.22	.24**
Monism	.16	.29**	.04	.13**	.75	.15**	.49	.13**	.41	.30**	.22	.26**
Pluralism	.16	-.22**			.74	-.14**			.40	-.23**		
Intratextual fundamentalism	.16	.11**	.03	.16**	.75	.19**	.49	.14**	.40	.22**	.22	.27**
Hermeneutic interpretation	.16	.15**			.75	.14**	.49	.13*	.40	.12*	.22	.20**
Perceived discrimination	.16	.15**					.49	-.09*	.40	.15**	.22	.11*
Memory of violence	.16	.14**			.75	.11**			.40	.19**	.22	.17**
Direct violence	.16	.13**							.40	.19**	.22	.15**
Indirect violence									.40	.10**	.22	.23**
Nationalism	.16	.12**			.75	.10*			.40	.10*		
Regiocentrism	.16	.14**							.40	.16**	.22	.18**
National pride			.04	.18**	.75	.16**			.40	.15**	.22	.15**
Distrust	.16	.27**	.03	.09*	.75	.09*			.41	..31**	.22	.36**
Dominance							.49	.12*	.41	.10**	.22	.13**
Equality												

*= p value <.01, ** =p value <.05, M = mean score

Muslim respondents

The following description provides an explanation of social location of intergroup contact avoidance among Muslim respondents. Religious salience relates significantly to contact avoidance, avoidance of future spouses from a different religion, and support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). Among Muslim respondents, we can see that the more religious salience they have, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.15), the more they tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (r=.11), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.19). Likewise, ethnic salience has a significant effect on contact avoidance (Muslims $p < .05$) and on

support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). For Muslim respondents, the more ethnic saliency they have, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=.07) and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.26). As in previous cases, perceived group threat relates significantly to contact avoidance, to the avoidance of future spouses, and to support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). The ANOVA table indicates that the more that Muslim respondents feel threatened by Christians, the more likely they are likely to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.42), the more likely they are to avoid Christians as future spouses (r=.11), and the more likely they are to support residential segregation (eta=.43).

Quantity of contact is significantly related to contact avoidance and support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). We find that among Muslim respondents, the more frequently they have contact with Christians, the less they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=-.24), and the less they tend to support residential segregation (r=-.35). Quality of contact has a significant association with contact avoidance, avoidance of future spouses from a different religion, and support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). For Muslim respondents, the more positively they rate the quality of their contact with Christians, the less they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.38), the less they tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (r=-.12), and the lower they tend to score on residential segregation (r=-.42). Positive religious in-group attitudes significantly relates to contact avoidance and support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). The ANOVA table indicates that among Muslim respondents, the more positive images they have of their in-group, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=.17), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.24). Negative out-group attitudes also has a significant relationship with contact avoidance and support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). The ANOVA table shows that among Muslim respondents, the more negative images of Christians they have, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.34), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.41).

Monism relates significantly to all dependent variables. For Muslim respondents, we can see that the more they have a religiously monistic view, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.29), the more they tend to avoid Christians as their future spouses (r=.15), and the higher they tend to score on support for residential segregation (r=.30). On the other hand, the more that Muslims support religiously pluralistic views, the less they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=-.22), the less they tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (r=-.14), and the less they tend to support residential segregation (r=-.23). We also find here that intratextual fundamentalism has a significant relationship to all dependent variables (p <. 01). Among Muslim respondents, we discover that the more they favor intratextual fundamentalism in relation to their Holy Scriptures, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (r=.11), the more they tend to avoid Christians as their future spouses (eta=.19), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.22). Hermeneutic interpretation is also significantly related to all dependent variables ($p < .05$), but contact avoidance is not related to Christian respondents. Moreover, the ANOVA table indicates that the more that Muslim respondents favor symbolic fundamentalism, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.15), the more they tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (eta=.14), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.12).

Perceived discrimination is significantly related to all dependent variables ($p < .05$), but contact avoidance is not related to Christian respondents. The avoidance of future spouses from a different religion is not related to Muslim respondents. Among Muslim respondents, we discover that the more they feel discriminated against, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.15), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.15). Similarly, memory of violence is significantly related to all dependent variables ($p < .01$). For example, the ANOVA table shows that the more occasions of violence that Muslim respondents remember, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians

(eta=.11), the more they tend to avoid Christians as their future spouses (r=.11), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.19). Direct violence is significantly related to contact avoidance and support for residential segregation ($p < .01$), but contact avoidance is not related to Christian respondents. Among Muslim respondents, we find that the more occasions of direct violence they experience, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.13), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.19).Indirect violence is significantly related to support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). For Muslim respondents, the more occasions of indirect violence that they experience, the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.10).

Nationalism has a significant relationship to all dependent variables ($p <.05$). The ANOVA table indicates that the more nationalistic Muslim respondents are, the more they avoid contact with Christians (r=.12), the more they avoid Christians as future spouses (r=.10), and the more they support residential segregation (r=.10). Regiocentrism is also significantly related to contact avoidance and to support for residential segregation ($p < .01$), but contact avoidance is not related to Christian respondents. Among Muslim respondents, the more regiocentrism they have, the more they avoid contact with Christians (r=.14), and the higher they tend to score on residential segregation (eta=.16). Indeed, the ANOVA table indicates that the more national pride Muslim respondents have, the more they avoid Christians as future spouses (eta=.16), and the more they support residential segregation (eta=.15). Distrust of out-groups is significantly related to all dependent variables ($p <. 01$). Among Muslim respondents, we find that the more they distrust Christians, the more they tend to avoid contact with Christians (eta=.27), the more they tend to avoid Christians as future spouses (r=.09), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.31). The orientation of dominance has a significant relationship with the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion and with support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). However, the avoidance of a future

spouse from a different religion is not related to Muslim respondents. Table 4.12 points out that among Muslims respondents, the more they have an orientation of dominance, the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.10).

Christian respondents

The following section describes the social location of intergroup contact avoidance among Christian respondents. Religious salience and ethnic salience are significantly related to support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). Among Christian respondents, we discover that the more religious salience they have, the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.18). Likewise, the more ethnic salience they have, the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.26). Moreover, perceived threat is significantly related to contact avoidance ($p < .01$), and support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). Among Christian respondents, the more they feel threatened by Muslims, the more they are likely to avoid contact with Muslims (eta=.28) and the more they are likely to support residential segregation (r=.24). Quantity of contact is only significantly related to support for residential segregation ($p<.01$), while quality of contact is significantly associated with all dependent variables ($p<.01$). The more frequently Christian respondents have contact with Muslims, the less they tend to support residential segregation (r=-.23). The more positively they rate the quality of their contact with Muslims, the less they tend to avoid contact with Muslims (r=-.16), but the more they tend to avoid Muslims as future spouses (eta=.18).

Positive religious in-group attitudes and negative religious out-group attitudes are significantly related to contact avoidance and to support for residential segregation. The more positively that Christians view their own group, the more they tend to avoid contact with Muslims (r=.14), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.29). Furthermore,

the more negatively that they view Muslims, the more they tend to avoid contact with them (eta=.37), and the more they support residential segregation (r=.24). Religious monism is significantly related to all dependent variables ($p < .01$). Among Christian respondents, we find that the more they show higher levels of support for religious monism, the more they tend to avoid contact with Muslims (r=.13), the more they tend to avoid Muslims as future spouses (r=.13), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.26). Intratextual fundamentalism is significantly associated with all dependent variables ($p <. 01$). The more that Christian respondents favour intratextual fundamentalism in regards to their Holy Scriptures, the more they tend to avoid contact with Muslims (eta=.16), the higher they avoid Muslims as their future spouses (eta=.14), and the higher they tend to score on residential segregation (eta=.27). However, hermeneutic interpretation (symbolic fundamentalism) is significantly related to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion ($p < .01$) and to support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). The more that Christian respondents favour symbolic fundamentalism, the more they tend to avoid Muslims as future spouses (eta=.13), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.20).

Perceived discrimination is significantly related to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion ($p < .01$) and to support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). Among Christian respondents, we find that the more they feel discriminated against, the less they tend to avoid Muslims as their future spouses (r=-.09), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.11). Memory of violence, direct violence, and indirect violence, have significant associations with support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). The more occasions of violence that Christian respondents remember, the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.17). The more occasions of direct violence that they experience, the more they tend to score on residential segregation (r=.15). Futhermore, the more occasions of indirect violence they experience, the greater their support

for residential segregation (eta=.23). Also, regiocentrism is significantly related to support for residential segregation. Among Christian respondents, we can see that the more regiocentric attitudes they have, the morethey tend to support residential segregation (eta=.18). As with Muslim respondents, Christians' national pride is significantly related to contact avoidance ($p < .01$) and to support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). Among Christian respondents, the more national pride they have, the more contact avoidance they tend to show (eta=.18), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (r=.15).

In addition, distrust is significantly related to contact avoidance ($p<.01$) and to support for residential segregation ($p < .01$) among Christian respondents. We can observe that the more they distrust Muslims, the more they tend to avoid contact with them (eta=.09), and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.36). Finally, orientation of dominance has a significant relationship with the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion ($p < .05$) and with support for residential segregation ($p < .01$). Among Christian respondents, the more they display an orientation of dominance, the more they tend to avoid Muslims as future spouses (eta=.12) and the more they tend to support residential segregation (eta=.13).

4.5 Summary

We tested the reliability and validity of all of the questions and grouped them into dimensions and factors. All of the factors and dimensions were computed, and their bivariate relations were tested by ANOVA. Muslim and Christian respondents have some significant differences in the mean scores of contact avoidance, ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, and intermediary variables. In general, the differences indicate that Muslim respondents tend to avoid contact, and incline to have stronger ethno-religious identification, moreso than Christian respondents.

We acknowledge that several variables of ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, and intermediate variables are not

comparable between Muslim and Christian respondents. The ANOVA table shows that the number of variables that have significant associations for Muslims and Christians are limited (see Appendix 1). Nevertheless, several ethno-religious identification and intermediate variables are significant for both Muslim and Christian respondents. Contact avoidance, rites of passage, religious in-group, ethnic self-definition, and social embeddedness have significant relationships for both groups. Most intermediate variables also have significant relationship for both groups, such as the quantity of contact, quality of contact, positive in-group, negative out-group, monism, intratextual fundamentalism, and distrust. Other variables only have significant relationships for one group.

In the avoidance of future spouses from different religions, few variables have a significant relation for both Muslim and Christian respondents. Only ethnic self-definition and gender are significantly related to the avoidance of future spouses for both groups. For intermediate variables, quality of contact, monism, intratextual fundamentalism, hermeneutic interpretation, and perceived discrimination are significant. Nevertheless, support for residential segregation has more variables that display significant associations for both groups. Religious in-group friends, religious out-group friends, membership in religious organizations, ethnic self-definition, ethnic languages, and social embeddedness are all significantly related to support for residential segregation in both groups. All intermediate variables are significantly related to support for residential segregation. Only quality of contact, pluralism, nationalism, and equality are not significantly related to support for residential segregation.

In the next chapter, we employ multivariate analysis between intergroup contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification, social characteristics, and intermediate variables. However, we did not separate the analysis between Muslim and Christian respondents because the focus of this study is to investigate to what extent ethno-religious identification influences intergroup contact avoidance.

CHAPTER 5

INTERGROUP CONTACT AVOIDANCE ON THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: RESULTS FROM MULTIVARIATE MODEL TESTING

This chapter describes the procedures and the results of multivariate analyses. We use regression analyses to test whether ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, and several intermediate variables affect intergroup contact avoidance. This chapter is structured in six sections, as follows. The first section illustrates briefly how we derive hypotheses from ethnic group conflict theory (Gijsberts, Hagendoorn, Scheepers, 2004), from social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), and from other theories. The second section describes the procedures of our regression analyses. The third section explains the construction of regression models and the subsequent building of four empirical models. The fourth section summarizes our findings, including the effect of ethno-religious identification after controlling for individual determinants and several intermediate variables. The fifth section elaborates on the results of multivariate analyses by considering the findings from in-depth interviews. The final section discusses our empirical findings within broader theoretical frameworks incorporating other relevant studies.

5.1 Theoretical models and hypotheses

We use social identity theory, ethnic group conflict theory, and other relevant theories to derive hypotheses with regard to the effects of ethno-

religious identification, individual determinants, and intermediate variables on contact avoidance. Social identity theory postulates that group identity and group identification play a significant role in hostility and prejudice between conflicting groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Gijsberts et al., 2004). Group membership is sufficient in itself to generate in-group favouritism and discrimination against out-groups. According to social identity theory, having stronger positive attitudes toward in-groups and stronger negative attitudes towards out-groups leads to exclusionary reactions (Turner, 1981). Moreover, self-categorization *per se* and intergroup comparison also tend to increase exclusionary attitudes (Turner, 1999). Hence, our first hypothesis is that *ethno-religious self-definition is likely to be related to the avoidance of intergroup contact (hypothesis 1)*.

Ethnicity and religion are the bases for group categorization, identification, and comparison. Phinney and Rotheram (1987) defined ethnic identity as one's sense of belonging to an ethnic group and one's perceptions, feelings, attitudes, and behaviours deriving from ethnic group membership. Following Phinney and Rotheram (1987), we categorize ethnic identity as involving ethnic self-definition and ethnic behaviours, i.e. the use of ethnic languages, participation in ethnic ceremonies, social embededness, and the membership of and participation in ethnic organizations. Likewise, we consider religious identity to involve religious self-definition and religious behaviours, i.e. religious practices, participation in collective rites and rites of passage, having friends from the same/different religion, and membership of and participation in religious organizations. Based on social identity theory, we expect that ethnic and religious identification will have positive effects on contact avoidance.

Therefore, our second hypothesis is that *the stronger people's ethnic and religious identification is, the higher will be the level of intergroup contact avoidance (hypothesis 2)*. More specifically, people *who participate more in religious practices (2a), in collective rites (2b), and in rites of passage (2c); who have more friends from their religious*

in-group and fewer friends from their religious out-groups (2d and 2e); who are members of religious organizations (2f); who often participate in their religious organizations (2g) and in ethnic ceremonies (2h); who often use their ethnic languages (2i); who have more friends from their ethnic in-group than from their ethnic out-groups (2j); who are members of ethnic organizations (2k); and who often participate in their ethnic organizations (2l), will tend to avoid contact with out-groups.

The theoretical rationale for the next proposition is derived from ethnic group conflict theory, which posits that the stronger the actual competition between ethnic groups is, the stronger the perceived ethnic threat will be. This, in turn, due to stronger social identification, will then tend to induce exclusionary reactions. However, the level of actual competition and perceived group threat, which may vary between groups, apparently influences exclusionary reactions (Gijsberts et al., 2004:18). Many studies on exclusionary reactions in Western countries provide evidence that these reactions affect certain groups more than others. For example, avoidance of inter-ethnic marriages is more prevalent among lower social classes (Tolsma, Lubbers, and Coenders, 2008), and people with lower education levels tend to support in-group favouritism, compared to those with higher education levels (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). Moreover, discriminatory attitudes are more likely to be expressed by males than females (Sidanius and Veniegas, 2000). In addition, one study showed that people with higher occupational statuses are more inclined to live in racially segregated residential areas (Iceland and Wilkes, 2006). We also add parents' religion as one of the individual determinants, as certain religious orientations tend to induce prejudice (Allport, 1954; Hunsberger, 1995).

These individual determinants from Western studies, i.e. gender, parents' religion, education of parents, social class or household income, parents' occupational status, can possibly have an effect on contact avoidance. However, we propose that the effects of ethno-religious identification overwhelm the effects of such determinants. In other words,

after taking into account individual characteristics in Western countries, ethno-religious identification determinants will still have significant effects on contact avoidance. Hence, our third hypothesis: *the stronger people's ethno-religious identification is, the higher will be the level of avoidance of intergroup contacts, even after controlling for gender, household income, religion of parents, education of parents and occupational status of parents (hypothesis 3)*.

The fourth hypothesis is also derived directly from ethnic group conflict theory, which adopts perceived ethnic threat from a neo-realistic conflict theory (Bobo, 1988; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Central to ethnic group conflict theory is the proposition that perceived group threat is an intermediate determinant to discriminatory behaviour, prejudice, and negative feelings towards out-group members (Gijsberts et al., 2004). We expect that the relationship between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance can be explained by perceived group threat. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is *the stronger the perceived group threat is, the stronger contact avoidance will be (hypothesis 4a)*.

Another theory mentions that group identification does not directly induce hostility toward out-groups (Allport, 1954 [1958]; Brewer and Campbell, 1976; Brewer and Miller, 1996). The meaning and importance of ethnic identity is more salient in certain situations (Phinney and Ong, 2007, Phinney and Rotheram, 1987). Duckit (2006:154) called it *salience of ethno-cultural group attachment*. This study identifies salience of identity, which consists of the salience of religious identity and ethnic identity. We expect that salience of ethnic and religious identity will mediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance. Thus, *the salience of ethnic* and *religious identity will likely induce contact avoidance (hypothesis 4b and 4c)*.

Another theory that explains exclusionary attitudes is the contact hypothesis, which postulates that intergroup contact can reduce negative

intergroup attitudes (Allport, 1954 [1958]). However, contact alone will be not be effective in reducing prejudice, not without specific conditions, i.e. equal status between groups and shared common goals (Pettigrew, 1998; Brown, Vivian, and Hewstone, 1999). Other studies mention that intergroup contact will reduce prejudice against the out-group if the contact has stronger and more beneficial effects on favourable intergroup attitudes (Maras and Brown, 1996, Eller and Abrams, 2004; Brown et al., 2007). In this study, we also expect that both quantity of contact and quality of contact will reduce contact avoidance. This study expects that *more actual intergroup contact* and *more positive intergroup contact will likely reduce contact avoidance* (*hypothesis 4d and 4e*).

Studies on religiosity emphasize that religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality, and fundamentalism are likely related to exclusionary reactions (Anthony and Sterkens, 2005; Sterkens and Anthony, 2008; Williamson, et al., 2010). Religiocentric attitudes are defined as one's positive attitudes toward religious in-groups and negative attitudes toward religious out-groups. We classify attitudes towards religious plurality i.e. an individual's interpretation of different religions as sources of truth and values, into monism and pluralism. Fundamentalism is defined as "*intratextual disposition toward the text that a tradition holds as sacred*" (Williamson et al., 2010:722). We use the intratextual fundamentalism scale (Williamson et al., 2010), which is opposed to the hermeneutic interpretation scale (Duriez et al., 2005). This study expects that *stronger positive attitudes towards in-groups, coupled with stronger negative attitudes toward out-groups, will likely induce contact avoidance (hypothesis 4f and 4g). Stronger monism and weaker pluralism will induce greater contact avoidance (hypothesis 4h and 4i). More fundamentalism and less hermeneutic interpretation are likely to reinforce contact avoidance (hypothesis 4j and 4k).*

Studies on communal violence in Northern Ireland describe how memories and experiences of violence are related to residential segregation, contact avoidance, and confrontation between Catholics and

Protestants (Doherty and Pooley, 1997; Anderson and Shuttleworth, 2003). We distinguish people's memory and experience of violence into three categories: memory of violence, direct experience of violence, and indirect experience of violence. It is expected that both memory and experience of violence will have positive effects on contact avoidance. *Having more memories of violence, and more experience of direct violence or indirect violence, will likely induce more contact avoidance (hypothesis 4l, 4m, and 4n).*

The literature on discrimination suggests that the activation of social boundaries will increase discriminatory attitudes (Tilly, 2005). Unfair daily treatment and discriminatory experiences are more likely to create perceived discrimination. Another piece of research by Iceland and Wilkes (2000) explained that perceived discrimination plays an important role in supporting residential segregation, which is one indicator of contact avoidance. We expect that perceived discrimination will intermediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance. Hence, *the stronger the perceived discrimination is, the stronger the contact avoidance will be (hypothesis 4o).*

Studies on nationalistic attitudes found that both romantic nationalism and chauvinism tend to induce ethnic exclusionism and intolerance toward national minorities (Latcheva, 2010; Coenders, 2001). Similarly, stronger ethno-religious identification is more likely to increase nationalistic attitudes (Gellner, 2006; Loizides, 2000) than weak ethno-religious identification. In Indonesia, the strong attachment one has to one's region (regiocentrism) became prominent after the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998. Therefore, in this study, we distinguish between nationalistic attitudes, national pride, and regiocentrism. Here, too, we expect that these variables will intermediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance. Our hypothesis is that *nationalism, national pride, and regiocentrism will likely reinforce contact avoidance (hypothesis 4p, 4q, and 4r).*

The literature on social trust posits that trust is a basic element of a society because that society would disintegrate without it (Simmel, 1990; Möllering, 2001). Less trust in out-groups and less acceptance of out-groups will reinforce in-group identification. In-group identifications are likely to induce mutual distrust between groups, which then will increase avoidance of intergroup interaction (Tropp et al., 2006). It is expected that distrust will mediate the relationship between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance. Hence, our hypothesis is that *the stronger the distrust of out-groups is, the stronger will be contact avoidance (hypothesis 4s)*.

Social dominance theory explains that the existence of group hierarchies depends on social dominance orientation and social equality orientation (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). According to the theory, superior groups tend to legitimize their domination over subordinate groups. In contrast, inferior groups will support equality between groups. Therefore, our hypothesis is that *strong social dominance orientation will likely induce contact avoidance*, while *strong social equality orientation will likely reduce contact avoidance (hypothesis 4t and 4u)*.

5.2 Procedures of analysis

We use regression analyses to observe the influence of ethno-religious identification variables on contact avoidance, and to control for individual determinants and intermediate variables. According to Field (2009:198), regression is a way of predicting an outcome variable (Y) (i.e., a dependent variable) from one or several determinants (X_1, X_2,.., X_n). We use the parameters, R^2, adjusted R^2, and the significance of parameters to interpret the results of regression analyses. The parameter of a determinant (*beta* or *b*-coefficient) is the change of an outcome value if the value of the determinant changes by one unit. R^2 points out how much the variance of an outcome is accounted for by the regression model from our sample. Adjusted R^2 indicates how much the variance of an outcome will be accounted for if the number of determinants in the model is taken into

account (Field, 2009:221). We use a significance level of .05 (two tailed), except for dummy variables because the direction is presumed to be one-way (te Grotenhuis, 2009:115). The *t*-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the difference in the estimated parameter is zero, which means there is no relationship between an outcome and a determinant. If the significance of the estimated parameter is less than .05, we have sufficient evidence to accept the alternative hypothesis that difference in the estimated parameter is not zero, which indicates that the determinant has a significant influence on the outcome.

To draw conclusions regarding a population based on regression analysis, we should test the assumptions of linearity and multicollinearity (Field, 2009:220). Regression analysis can accurately estimate the relationship between dependent and independent variables if the relationships are linear and there are no perfect linear relationships between the independent variables. We conduct twelve (12) linearity tests between contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification based on analysis of variance (See table 42 Appendix 2). 'Religious practices' has a linear relationship supporting residential segregation. 'Ethnic languages, collective rites, religious in-group friends, and religious out-group friends' have linear relationships to the avoidance of a marriage with somebody from another religious tradition (which we label in short as 'avoidance of future spouse'). Both 'religious in-group friends' and 'religious out-group friends' have significant linear and non-linear relationships to contact avoidance and the support for residential segregation. Referring to Weisberg (1985:148), we tested both 'religious in-group friends' and 'religious out-group friends' by using a regression, which transformed independent variables into log linear. If the R^2 increases by more than 25%, the variable has not a linear relationship to the dependent variable. Based on the test, we keep 'religious in-group friends' as having a linear relationship to contact avoidance. Also, we keep both 'religious in-group friends' and 'religious out-group friends'

in linear relationships in support for residential segregation.[1]

One way of identifying multicollinearity is to run correlations between all pairs of determinants and observe if the variables are highly correlated (above .80) or not. We ran correlations among all pairs of determinants and found high correlations between membership of a religious organization and participation in religious organization, and between membership of an ethnic organization and participation in ethnic organization. We excluded one of them by comparing R^2 between two models: between the first model 2a (contact avoidance and all religious identification, excluding membership) and the second model 2a (excluding participation). We keep participation in religious organization because the R^2 of the first model (.20) is higher than the second model (.17). Also, we compare R^2 between the first model 2b (contact avoidance and all ethnic identification, excluding membership) and the second model 2b (excluding participation). Participation in ethnic organization is incorporated due to the R^2 of the first model 2b (.28) being higher than the second model 2b (.14).

Another test of multicollinearity is the Variance of Inflation Factor (VIF) to indicate whether a determinant has a strong linear relationship with the other determinants (Field, 2009:223-224). If VIF is above 10, Myers (1990) suggests that it indicates a strong linear relationship (Field, ibid.). For ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, and intermediate variables, no VIFs exceed 2.07, which indicates that there is no multicollinearity among our determinants (See table 42 appendix 4). Therefore, there will be no biases in our regression results and in the standard errors of our regression models.

1 The R^2 of contact avoidance by 'religious out-group friends' increases by more than 25% and the R^2 of contact avoidance by 'religious in-group friends' decreases by 10%. The R^2 of support for residential segregation by 'religious in-group friends' decreases by 10%, while the R^2 of support for residential segregation by 'religious out-group friends' increases less than 25%. This means that 'religious in-group friends' has a linear relation to both contact avoidance and support for residential segregation. 'Religious out-group friends' has a linear relation to support for residential segregation.

The following steps are general procedures in using regression analysis. Ethnic and religious identification variables, which have no linear relationship to our dependent variables, are dummy coded to enter into regression models (Dunn and Clark, 1987:345). Also, all individual determinants are transformed into dummy variables because we regard them as nominal and ordinal variables, while the measurement level of the intermediate variables are considered interval. To represent the two categories of a variable, we create a dummy and we assign the value 0 if respondents belong to category 1, and the value 1 if respondents belong to category 2. The number of dummies in a regression model is determined by the number of categories, i.e., the number of dummy variables minus one. For example, 'household-income' has three response categories and is coded as three dummies, *low-income, middle income,* and *high-income*. Two dummies are entered into the regression model and the other dummy variable becomes a reference category. In this study, the reference categories are the lowest response categories because we expect the higher categories to indicate stronger contact avoidance.

As mentioned earlier, we distinguish between ethno-religious self-definition and ethno-religious identification, and we propose four sets of hypotheses. Based on hypothesis 1, we come up with model 1, which only contains ethno-religious self-definition as an independent variable. Hypothesis 2 is branched into three sub-models. Model 2a includes the effect of ethno-religious self-definition and elements of religious identification on contact avoidance. Model 2b incorporates the effects of ethno-religious self-definition and elements of ethnic identification. Model 2c is a fuller model that consists of ethno-religious self-definition, the religious-, and the ethnic identification. Hypothesis 3 will be tested in model 3, which includes ethno-religious identification and all individual determinants. Next, a set of hypotheses 4 will be tested in model 4, which incorporates ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, and intermediate variables. All models can be seen in several formulations, as follows.

$Y_i = (b_0 + b_1 \text{ERD}) + \varepsilon$ ..... Model 1 (*hypothesis 1*)
$Y_i = (b_0 + b_1 \text{ERD} + b_2\text{RI}) + \varepsilon$ ..... Model 2a (*hypothesis 2*)
$Y_i = (b_0 + b_1\text{ERD} + b_2\text{EI}) + \varepsilon$ ..... Model 2b (*hypothesis 2*)
$Y_i = (b_0 + b_1 \text{ERD} + b_2\text{RI} + b_3\text{EI}) + \varepsilon$ ..... Model 2c (*hypothesis 2*)
$Y_i = (b_0 + b_1\text{ERD} + b_2\text{RI} + b_3\text{EI}) + (b_4\text{SOC}) + \varepsilon$ ..... Model 3 (*hypothesis 3*)
$Y_i = (b_0 + b_1\text{ERD} + b_2\text{RI} + b_3\text{EI} + b_4\text{SOC}) + (b_5\text{INTER}) + \varepsilon$ ..... Model 4 (*hypothesis 4*)

Y_i = Intergroup contact avoidance ERD = Ethno-religious self-definition ε = error
RI = Religious identification EI = Ethnic identification
SOC = individual determinants INTER = Intermediate variables

We use the backward elimination method in selecting determinants – so-called model trimming – in order to have a simple and more parsimonious model. At the beginning, all determinants are incorporated in regression models according to the hypotheses. Then, we delete determinants that have the lowest *t* value based on the *t*-test or *F*-test (Dunn and Clark, 1987:341; Agresti and Finlay, 2008:632). We start trimming from model 2c to find the significant ethno-religious identification variables, by deleting one by one a metric variable or a set of dummy variables. A metric variable will be deleted if it has the lowest *t* value or the biggest *p* value from the *t*-test. A set of dummy variables will be eliminated if the set of dummies has a non-significant *F*-test (Agresti and Finlay, 2008:632). In model 3, again we trim firstly from the individual determinants, and then from the remaining religious and ethnic variables that become non-significant. Moreover, in model 4, we only trim on intermediate variables based on the *t*-test. At the end, a final regression model only has the remaining significant determinants.

In the previous chapter, we combined religious and ethnic self-definition to form ethno-religious self-definition because there is a considerable overlap between both of them. We have twelve (12) major ethnic groups (e.g. Javanese, Ambonese, and Sundanese), and twenty-eight (28) smaller ethnic minorities (e.g. Timorese and Papua). An ethno-religious group must have at least 30 respondents to be included in regression models. Muslim ethnic groups with fewer than 30 respondents (e.g. Minangkabau, Buginese, Makassar, Batak, and Chinese) are combined into *Muslims-rest*.

In the same way, Christian ethnic groups with fewer than 30 respondents (e.g. Sundanese, Makassar, Toraja, and Minahasa) are combined into *Christians-rest*. We identify 28 ethno-religious groups, which in total have 104 respondents, as '*other Muslims*' or '*other Christians*'. We distinguish 'rest' from 'other' ethnic groups, because the rest-ethnic groups are significant minorities in Yogyakarta and Ambon. Another reason is that the rest-ethnic groups are identified with certain religious groups. For example, Torajanese and Minahasa are Christians, while Minangkabau and Buginese are Muslims. Furthermore, the other-ethnic groups represent smaller groups on the periphery of the Indonesian archipelago (van Klinken, 2003).

Table 5.1 *Ethno-religious self-definition*

Muslim Ethnic groups	n	Mean			Christian Ethnic groups	n	Mean		
	(% of 1444)	Contact avoidance	Avoidance of future spouse	Support for residential segregation		(% of 1444)	Contact avoidance	Avoidance of future spouse	Support for residential segregation
Javanese Muslims	348 (24.10)	.10	.74	.29	Javanese Christians	104 (7.2)	.02	.56	.12
Sundanese Muslims	36 (2.49)	.10	.60	.30	Ambonese Christians	346 (23.96)	.04	.47	.29
Madurese Muslims	36 (2.49)	.23	.50	.46	Chinese Christians	43 (2.98)	.03	.56	.15
Ambonese Muslims	241 (16.69)	.20	.77	.53	Batak Christians	35 (2.42)	.01	.46	.12
Butonese Muslims	95 (6.58)	.25	.84	.54	Other Christians	56 (3.88)	.02	.43	.14
Other Muslims	44 (3.05)	.18	.75	.37	Christians-rest	28 (1.94)	.02	.49	.14
Muslims-rest	32 (2.22)	.18	.75	.37	General means		.11	.64	.33
					Range		1	1	1
					Min and Max		0 and 1	0 and 1	0 and 1
					F-test		7.12**	3.92**	14.63**

*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01

We distinguish between *Javanese Muslims*, *Sundanese Muslims*, *Madurese Muslims*, *Ambonese Muslims*, *Butonese Muslims*, *Other Muslims*, *Muslims-rest*, *Javanese Christians*, *Ambonese Christians*, *Chinese Christians*, *Batak Christians*, *Other Christians* and *Christians-rest*. The reference category of ethno-religious self-definition is the ethno-religious group with the largest number of respondents (24.10%), i.e. *Javanese*

Muslims. Differences between ethno-religious groups on avoidance of intergroup contact are very significant, based on the F-test. Here, we could ascertain that Muslim ethnic groups tend to score higher than Christian ethnic groups on contact avoidance, on avoidance of future spouses, and on support for residential segregation.

5.3 Empirical models

We present three regression models: contact avoidance; avoidance of future spouse; and support for residential segregation. The complete results of regression analyses are reported in Appendix 3.

5.3.1 Contact avoidance

In model 1, we expect that all ethno-religious groups are significantly different from *Javanese Muslims* in contact avoidance scores. The adj. R^2 is .12, which indicates that ethno-religious self-definition explains 12% of the variance of contact avoidance (see table 1 Appendix 3). All ethno-religious groups have significant differences on contact avoidance, except for *Sundanese Muslims*. We establish that *Madurese Muslims* (*b*=.13), *Ambonese Muslims* (*b*=.10), *Butonese Muslims* (*b*=.15), and *Muslims-rest* (*b*=.07) score significantly higher on contact avoidance compared to *Javanese Muslims*. On the other hand, *Javanese Christians* (*b*=-.09), *Ambonese Christians* (*b*=-.09), *Chinese Christians* (*b*=-.07), *Batak Christians* (*b*=-.09), and *Christians-rest* (*b*=-.08) score lower on contact avoidance compared to *Javanese Muslims*. In short, Muslims ethnic groups tend to avoid contact with out-group more than Christians ethnic groups.

When all religious identification variables are included in model 2a, *Butonese Muslims* and *Ambonese Christians* still have significant differences on contact avoidance, but differences between other ethnic groups become non-significant. Among all religious identification variables, only 'religious

out-group friends' significantly explains contact avoidance. Respondents who have *some*, *relatively many*, *almost all*, and *all* friends from different religions tend to avoid contact with religious out-group members less compared to those who have *none*. Other determinants of religious identification have no significant effects on contact avoidance. In model 2a, adj. R^2 is .15 (see table 1 Appendix 3). After all ethnic identification variables are incorporated into model 2b, *Madurese Muslims* and *Butonese Muslims* still have significant differences on contact avoidance. Among all religious identification variables, only 'ethnic languages' significantly explains contact avoidance. Respondents who speak ethnic languages on *three or four occasions* avoid contact less than those who *never* speak in ethnic languages. The explained variance (adj. R^2=.16) is slightly higher compared to the previous model (adj. R^2=.15) (see table 1 Appendix 3).

When all religious and ethnic identification variables are included in model 2c, only *Muslims-rest* has a significant difference on contact avoidance. Similar to model 2a, 'religious out-group friends' remains significant. Adj. R^2 decreases drastically to .04 (See table 1 Appendix 3). We then trim and exclude some independent variables based on the *F*-tests, as follows: ethnic ceremonies (p=.79), ethnic languages (p=.75), rites of passage (p=.64), participation in religious organizations (p=.78), participation in ethnic organizations (p=.99), religious practices (p=.63), social embeddedness (p=.26), and collective rites (p=.61). After trimming, all ethno-religious groups significantly explain contact avoidance, except for *Sundanese Muslims, Madurese Muslims,* and *Chinese Christians*. *Ambon Muslims*, *Butonese Muslims*, and *Muslims-rest* tend to avoid more contact with Christians compared to *Javanese Muslims*. In contrast, *Javanese Christians*, *Ambonese Christians*, *Batak Christians*, and *Christians-rest* tend to avoid contact with out-groups less than *Javanese Muslims*. Here, too, respondents who have *some*, *relatively many*, *almost all*, and *all* friends from different religions still have significant differences on contact avoidance, while 'religious in-group friends' has a significant positive effect

on contact avoidance. The explained variance (adj. R^2) increases drastically from .04 to .16 (see table 1 Appendix 3).

When all the significant variables in model 2c together with all individual determinants are included in model 3, *Butonese Muslims*, *Ambonese Christians*, and *Christians-rest* still have significant differences on contact avoidance. The difference of *Sundanese Muslims* on contact avoidance also becomes significant. 'Religious out-group friends' remains significant, while 'religious in-group friends' is reduced to non-significant. In occupation status, respondents from *traders*' families show less contact avoidance compared to those from *farmers*' families. The adj. R^2 (.20) is higher than in model 2c (adj. R^2 =.16) (See table 2 Appendix 3). The following individual determinants are deleted in model trimming: parents' religion (p=.92), occupational status (p= .73), parents' education (p=.76), household income (p=.74), and gender (p=.20). After trimming, the differences of *Ambonese Muslims* and *Muslims-rest* on contact avoidance increases to significant. The difference of *Sundanese Muslims* on contact avoidance reduces to non-significant. The differences of *Butonese Muslims*, *Ambonese Christians*, and *Christians-rest* on contact avoidance remain significant. 'Religious in-group friends' and 'religious out-group friends' remain significant. Moreover, 'occupation status' remains significant. The adj. R^2 decreases slightly from .20 to .17 (see table 2 Appendix 3).

When all the significant variables in model 3 together with all intermediate variables are included in model 4, only the differences of *Butonese Muslims* and *Muslims-rest* on contact avoidance remain significant. Here, too, 'religious in-group friends' has a significant positive influence on contact avoidance. Also, 'religious out-group friends' remain significant. However, 'occupation status' is reduced to non-significant. Whereas 'quality of contact', 'pluralism', and 'regiocentrism' have significant negative effects on contact avoidance, 'perceived group threat', 'negative out-group', and 'indirect violence' have positive effects on contact avoidance. The adj. R^2 (.25) is higher compared to model 3 after trimming

(.17) (see table 2 in Appendix 3). In model trimming, these intermediate variables are excluded: ethnic saliency (*t*=.05; *p*=.96), religious saliency (*t*=-.10; *p*=.92), orientation of equality (*t*=.27; *p*=.79), quantity of contact (*t*=.63; *p*=.53), positive in-group (*t*=.27; *p*=.78), national pride (*t*=-.41; *p*=.68), nationalism (*t*=.70; *p*=.48), distrust (*t*=.69; *p*=.49), discrimination (*t*=.89; *p*=.37), memory (*t*=-.83; *p*=.41), monism (*t*=.89; *p*=.37), orientation of dominance (*t*=-1.01; *p*=.31), indirect violence (*t*=1.51; *p*=.13), direct violence (*t*=-.87; *p*=.38), hermeneutic interpretation (*t*=1.41; *p*=.16), intratextual fundamentalism (*t*=1.60; *p*=.11), and regiocentrism (t=-1.84; p=.07). After trimming, the differences of *Butonese Muslims* and *Muslims-rest* on contact avoidance remain significant. However, the differences of *Javanese Christians* and *Ambonese Christians* turn into significant. Both 'religious out-group friends' and 'religious in-group friends' remain significant. 'Indirect violence,' and 'regiocentrism,' are reduced to non-significant. While 'perceived group threat' and 'negative out-group' significantly induce contact avoidance, 'quality of contact' and 'religious pluralism' significantly reduce contact avoidance. The adj. R^2 remains the same before and after trimming (.25) (see table 2 Appendix 3).

5.3.2 Avoidance of future spouse

All ethno-religious group are expected to have significant differences from *Javanese Muslims* in the avoidance of future spouse scores. The adj. R^2 is quite low (.08), which means that this model only explains 8% variance of the avoidance of future spouse (see table 3 in Appendix 3). With the exception of *Ambonese Muslims* and *Muslims-rest*, all ethno-religious groups have significant differences on the avoidance of future spouse. *Sundanese Muslims* (*b*=-.14), *Madurese Muslims* (*b*=-.24), *Javanese Christians* (*b*=-.18), *Ambonese Christians* (*b*=-.28), *Chinese Christians* (*b*=-.19), *Batak Christians* (*b*=-.29), and *Christians-rest* (*b*=-.26) tend to score lower on avoidance of future spouse compared to *Javanese Muslims*. Only *Butonese Muslims* score significantly higher than *Javanese Muslims*

on the avoidance of future spouse. In general, both Muslim and Christian ethnic groups tend to avoid out-group members as their future spouses.

When all religious identification variables are included in model 2a, only the differences of *Madurese Muslims*, *Ambonese Christians*, and *Batak Christians* on the avoidance of future spouse remain significant. Among all religious identification, only 'collective rites' has a significant positive effect on the avoidance of future spouse. The adj. R^2 is also quite low (.08) (see table 3 in Appendix 3). Once all ethnic identification variables are included in model 2b, only the difference of *Ambonese Christians* on the avoidance of future spouse remains significant. The adj. R^2 (.07) is slightly lower than model 2a (.08) (see table 3 Appendix 3).

After all ethnic and religious identification variables are incorporated into model 2c, none of ethnic and religious identification variables can significantly explain the avoidance of future spouse, which differs from our expectations, although the adj. R^2 increases drastically from .07 to .32 (see table 3 in Appendix 3). We trim model 2c and delete these variables based on *F*-tests: rites of passages (p=.95), social embeddedness (p=.97), ethnic ceremonies (p=.44), participation in ethnic organization (p=.76), and participation in religious organization (p=.94). The following variables are eliminated based on *t*-tests: religious in-group friends (t=.83 p=.41), ethnic languages (t=1.053 p=.29), and collective rites (t=1.55 p=.12). After trimming, the differences of *Sundanese Muslims*, *Madurese Muslims*, *Javanese Christians*, *Ambonese Christians*, *Batak Christians*, *Chinese Christians*, and *Christians-rest* on the avoidance of future spouse become significant. 'Collective rites' no longer has a significant effect on the avoidance of future spouse; however, 'religious out-group friends' has a significant negative effect on the avoidance of future spouse. Respondents who attend religious practices *once a week, more than once a week, once a day*, and *several times a day* tend to avoid out-group members as future spouses more than those who *never attend* or *attend only on feast days*. The adj. R^2 decreases drastically from .32 to .10 (see table 3 Appendix 3).

When all significant variables in the previous model together with all individual determinants are incorporated into model 3, only the differences of *Madurese Muslims*, *Javanese Christians*, *Ambonese Christians*, and *Batak Christians* on the avoidance of future spouse remain significant. However, the differences of *Sundanese Muslims, Chinese Christians,* and *Christians-rest* on the avoidance of future spouse become non-significant. Here, 'religious practices' is reduced to non-significant, while 'religious out-group friends' remains significant. *Female* respondents score higher on avoidance of future spouses than *male* respondents. Respondents from *uneducated* families avoid out-group members as future spouses less than those from *low-education* families. Respondents whose parents are *machine operators* tend to avoid religious out-group members as future spouses more than those whose parents are *farmers*. The adj. R^2 becomes higher, from .10 to .15 (see table 4 Appendix 3). We delete the following individual determinants based on *F*-tests in model trimming: parents' religion (p=.75), occupational status (p=.78), parents' education (p=.19).[2] After trimming, the differences of *Madurese Muslims*, *Javanese Christians*, *Ambonese Christians*, and *Batak Christians* on the avoidance of future spouse remain significant. The differences of *Sundanese Muslims* and *Christians-rest* on the avoidance of future spouse become significant. Here, *religious practices* becomes significant and 'religious out-group friends' remains significant. 'Parents' education' is reduced to non-significant, while 'household income' becomes significant. Respondents from *middle classes* show less avoidance of future spouse compared to those from *high classes*. *Gender* and *occupation status* remain significant. The adj. R^2 slightly decreases from .15 to .13 (see table 4 Appendix 3).

After the significant variables in model 3 and all intermediate variables are incorporated into model 4, the differences of *Sundanese Muslims*, *Madurese Muslims*, and *Ambonese Christians* on the avoidance

2 Household income still has significant effects on the avoidance of future spouses (p=.04), hence we keep it by changing its reference category from 'low-income' to 'high-income'.

of future spouse remain significant. The differences of *Javanese Christians* and *Christians-rest* on the avoidance of future spouse are reduced to non-significant. However, the difference of *Javanese Christians* on the avoidance of future spouse becomes non-significant. 'Religious practices' remains significant, while 'religious out-group friends' is reduced to non-significant. As in model 2c, *female* respondents show higher avoidance than *male* respondents of a future spouse who has a different religion. Respondents who come from *middle class* and *lower class* score significantly lower on the avoidance of future spouses than *high class*. Respondents whose parents are *machine operators* score higher on the avoidance of future spouses than those whose parents are *farmers*. Among all intermediate variables, 'monism' and 'distrust' significantly increase the avoidance of future spouse, while 'regiocentrism' considerably decreases the avoidance of future spouse. The adj. R^2 increases from .13 to .17 (See model 4 Appendix 3).

The trimming procedure excludes these variables: quantity of contact (t=-.09 p=.93), positive in-group (t=.02 p=.99), intratextual fundamentalism (t=.06 p=.95), orientation of equality (t=.08 p=.94), national pride (t=.23 p=.82), negative out-group (t=.19 p=.85), quality of contact (t=-.43 p=.66), perceived group threat (t=.50 p=.61), ethnic salience (t=.54 p=.59), hermeneutic interpretation (t=-.68 p=.50), nationalism (t=-.65 p=.52), religious salience (t=.65 p=.51), perceived discrimination (t=-1.13 p=.26), direct violence (t=-1.33 p=.18), indirect violence (t=.80 p=.42), religious pluralism (t=-1.27 p=.20), orientation of dominance (t=-1.45 p=.15), and memory of violence (t=1.71 p=.09). After trimming, the differences of *Sundanese Muslims*, *Madurese Muslims*, and *Ambonese Christians* on the avoidance of future spouse remain significant. Moreover, the differences of *Javanese Christians* and *Christians-rest* on the avoidance of future spouse become significant. Again, 'religious practices,' 'religious out-group friends,' 'gender', 'household income', and 'occupation status' remain significant. Also, 'monism' and 'distrust of out-group' significantly induce

the avoidance of future spouse, and 'regiocentrism' considerably reduces the avoidance of future spouse. The adj. R^2 decreases slightly from .17 to .16 (see model 4 Appendix 3).

5.3.3 Support for residential segregation

Here, too, we expect that all ethno-religious group will have significant differences from *Javanese Muslims* in residential segregation scores. All ethno-religious groups have significant differences on the support for residential segregation, with the exception of *Sundanese Muslims* and *Ambonese Christians*. *Madurese Muslims* (*b*=.17), *Ambonese Muslims* (*b*=.24), *Butonese Muslims* (*b*=.25), *Muslims-rest* (*b*=.08) tend to support residential segregation significantly more than *Javanese Muslims*. In contrast, *Javanese Christians* (*b*=-.16), *Chinese Christians* (*b*=-.14), *Batak Christians* (*b*=-.17), and *Christians-rest* (*b*=-.15) support residential segregation significantly less than *Javanese Muslims*. In short, the Muslim ethnic groups support for residential segregation is greater than that of Christian ethnic groups. The explained variance of this model is higher (adj. R^2 =.18) than avoidance of future spouse (adj. R^2 =.08) and than contact avoidance (adj. R^2 =.12) (see table 5 Appendix 3).

When all religious identification variables are included in model 2a, the differences of *Ambonese Muslims*, *Butonese Muslims*, and *Muslims-rest* on support for residential segregation remain significant. Respondents who *do not participate in rites of passage but their families do*, *participate for religious reasons,* and *participate but for non-religious reasons*, are less likely to support residential segregation than those who *do not participate in it and nor do their families participate*. Respondents who *participate in collective rites for religious and non-religious reasons* are more likely to support residential segregation than those who *do not participate in it and nor do their families*. Religious out-group friends has a significant negative effect on support for residential segregation, while religious in-

group friends has a significant positive effect on support for residential segregation. Adj. R^2 increases from .18 to .24 (see table 5 in Appendix 3). Once all ethnic identification variables are incorporated into model 2b, only the differences of *Ambonese Muslims* and *Butonese Muslims* remain significant. Respondents who have *relatively many* ethnic in-group friends score less on support for residential segregation than those who have *none* and *some*. Also, respondents who participate in ethnic organizations *only on special days* score less on support for residential segregation compared to those who *never participate in it*. Adj. R^2 is lower (.17) than model 2a (.24) (see table 5 Appendix 3).

When all ethnic and religious identification variables are incorporated into model 2c, the differences between *Ambonese Muslims* and *Muslims-rest* with Javanese Muslims on support for residential segregation remain significant. The difference of *Ambonese Christians* on support for residential segregation becomes significant. 'Rites of passage' and 'religious out-group friends' remain significant, but 'collective rites' and 'religious in-group friends' are reduced to non-significant. 'Social embededdness' and 'participation in ethnic organizations' remain significant. Respondents who *do not participate in ethnic ceremonies and nor do their families too,* and those who *do not participate in it but their families do*, show higher support for residential segregation than those who have *no knowledge on it*. Also, respondents who speak ethnic languages on *three or four occasions*, and *five or six occasions*, show higher support for residential segregation than those who *never* speak ethnic languages. The adj. R^2 becomes higher (.38) than in model 2a (.24) and model 2b (.17) (see table 5 Appendix 3). We exclude the following variables in model trimming: participation in religious organizations (p=.08), ethnic languages (p=.72), participation in ethnic organizations (p=.17), ethnic ceremonies (p=.50), collective rites (p=.39). After trimming, the difference of *Ambonese Muslims* on support for residential segregation remains significant, while the differences of *Muslims-rest* and *Ambonese Christians* on support for residential

segregation become non-significant. However, the differences of *Butonese Muslims*, *Javanese Christians*, *Batak Christians*, and *Chinese Christians* on support for residential segregation become significant. Again, 'rites of passage,' 'religious out-group friends,' and 'social embeddedness' remain significant. Differing from the situation before trimming, 'religious in-group friends' becomes significant. The adj. R^2 decreases from .38 to .27 (see table 5 Appendix 3).

When all the significant variables in model 2c together with all individual determinants are incorporated into model 3, the differences of *Ambonese Muslims, Butonese Muslims,* and *Javanese Christians* on support for residential segregation remain significant. The differences of *Chinese Christians* and *Batak Christians* on support for residential segregation are reduced to non-significant. 'Rites of passage' and 'religious in-group friends' are reduced to non-significant, while 'religious out-group friends' and 'social embededdness' remain significant. Respondents who come from *worker* families score lower on support for residential segregation than those who come from *self-employed* families. Respondents whose parents are *traders* score lower compared to those whose parents are *farmers*. The adj. R^2 increases slightly from .27 to .30 (see table 5 in Appendix 3). The following individual determinants are deleted in model trimming: parents' religion (p=.91), parents' education (p=.76), household income (p=.83), and gender (p=.28). After trimming, the differences of *Ambonese Muslims*, *Butonese Muslims*, and *Javanese Christians* on support for residential segregation remain significant. 'Rites of passage,' and 'religious in-group friends,' become significant. 'Religious out-group friends,' 'social embeddedness,' 'occupational status,' and 'occupation status' remain significant. The adj. R^2 decreases slightly from .30 to .28 (see table 5 Appendix 3).

When all the significant variables in model 3 together with all intermediate variables are included in model 4, the differences of *Ambonese Muslims and Butonese Muslims* on support for residential segregation remain significant, while the difference of *Javanese Christians* on support

for residential segregation changes becomes non-significant. 'Rites of passage,' 'religious out-group friends,' and 'religious in-group friends' remain significant. However, 'social embeddedness' is reduced to non-significant. 'Occupational status' remains significant, but 'occupation status' is reduced to non-significant. Whereas 'salience ethnic identity', 'perceived group threat', 'negative out-group', 'hermeneutic interpretation', and 'distrust' have significant positive effects on support for residential segregation, 'religious pluralism' has a significant negative effect. The adj. R^2 increases drastically from .28 to .37 (see table 6 Appendix 3).

We exclude these intermediate variables based on *t*-tests: religious monism (*t*=-.06 *p*=.95), perceived discrimination (*t*=.06 *p*=.95), indirect violence (*t*=-.02 *p*=.98), quality of contact (*t*=.11 *p*=.91), positive in-group (*t*=-.01 *p*=.99), hermeneutic interpretation (*t*=.01 *p*=.99), direct violence (*t*=-.64 *p*=.52), regiocentrism (*t*=.76 *p*=.45), national pride (*t*=.81 *p*=.42), memory of violence (*t*=-1.23 *p*=.22), orientation of equality (*t*=-1.30 *p*=.19), negative out-group (*t*=1.51 *p*=.13), religious salience (*t*=-1.60 *p*=.11), nationalism (*t*=1.52 *p*=.13), and orientation of dominance (*t*=-1.81 *p*=.07). After trimming, the differences of *Ambonese Muslims* and *Butonese Muslims* on support for residential segregation remain significant, while the difference of *Muslims-rest* on support for residential segregation becomes significant. Again, 'rites of passage', 'religious in-group friends,' 'religious out-group friends' and 'occupational status' remain significant. 'Negative out-groups' are reduced to non-significant, while 'quantity of contact' becomes significant. 'Salience of ethnic identity', 'perceived group threat', 'intratextual fundamentalism', and 'distrust' significantly increase support for residential segregation. In contrast, 'pluralism' and 'quantity of contact' considerably reduce support for residential segregation. The adj. R^2 increases from .37 to .41 (see table 6 Appendix 3).

5.4 Summary of findings

In the following section, we summarize the regression models. The focus of description is on how the b- and the beta-coefficients change from model 1 to model 4.

5.4.1 Contact avoidance

We sum up our findings with respect to the effects of ethno-religious identification, individual determinants, and intermediate variables on contact avoidance.

Table 5.2 *Contact avoidance and other determinants*

Model	Determinants	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	(Constant)	.10**	.13**	.13**	.09*
1.	Ethno-religious definition (ref: *Javanese Muslims*)				
	Sundanese Muslims	-.00	.02	.03	.04
	Madurese Muslims	.13**	.02	-.00	.00
	Ambonese Muslims	.10**	.05**	.05*	-.00
	Butonese Muslims	.15**	.09**	.11**	.09**
	Muslims-rest	.07**	.07**	.07*	.07
	Javanese Christians	-.09**	-.04*	-.04	-.04*
	Ambonese Christians	-.06**	-.05**	-.04*	-.04*
	Chinese Christians	-.07*	-.04	-.02	-.04
	Batak Christians	-.09*	-.06*	-.05	-.04
	Christians-rest	-.08**	-.06*	-.05*	-.04
2c.	Religious in-group friends		.09**	.07*	.07*
	Religious out-group friends (ref: *none and some*)				
	Relatively many		-.09**	-.08**	-.07**
	Almost all		-.14**	-.12**	-.07**
	All		-.12**	-.10**	-.03
3.	Occupational status (ref: *farmer*)				
	Executive			.07	.04
	Professionals			-.04	-.02
	Technicians			.02	.03
	Clerks			-.00	.01
	Sales			-.01	-.02
	Traders			-.03*	-.02
	Machine			.00	-.02
	Unskilled			-.03	-.03
	Special			-.02	.02
	Absent			-.01	-.01
4.	Perceived threat				.18**
	Quality of contact				-.11**
	Negative out-group				.15**
	Pluralism				-.11**
R^2		.34	.17	.41	.28
R^2 *Adj.*		.12	.16	.17	.25

*= 0 < *p* value < .05 and ** = 0 < *p* value < .01

In relation to contact avoidance, the influence of ethno-religious self-identification is clear: most Muslim ethnicities tend to avoid contact with out-groups more than *Javanese Muslims*, which is not the case for Christian ethnicities, and this seems to be driven by several intermediate variables. When 'religious in-group friends' and 'religious out-group friends' are included in model 2, the parameters of ethno-religious groups become smaller. Actually, it seems to be the case that the more respondents have religious in-group friends, the more they tend to avoid contact with out-groups. Respondents who have *relatively many, almost all, and all* religious out-group friends show less contact avoidance compared to those who have *none* and *some*. After 'occupational status' is incorporated into model 3, most parameters of ethno-religious groups, 'religious in-group friends', and categories belonging to 'religious out-group friends' decrease. In contrast, the parameter of *Ambonese Muslims* do not change, even after controlling for individual determinants. Respondents from traders' families tend to avoid contact less than those from farmers' families.

When some intermediate variables are included in model 4, again, the parameters of ethno-religious groups and categories belonging to 'religious out-group friends' become smaller. In the end, only three ethno-religious groups have significant differences on contact avoidance from the reference category. The parameter of 'religious in-group friends' does not change, while parameters of categories belonging to 'occupation status' decrease, but they no longer have significant differences on contact avoidance. 'Perceived group threat' and 'negative religious out-group' significantly increase contact avoidance, while 'religious pluralism' and 'quality of contact' considerably decrease contact avoidance.

Butonese Muslims seemingly display more contact avoidance with Christians because they have more Muslim friends, more perceived group threats by Christians, and more negative images of Christians. On the other hand, *Javanese Christians* and *Ambonese Christians* tend to avoid contact with Muslims less because they have more Muslim friends, have positive contact with Muslims, and hold religious pluralism views.

5.4.2 Avoidance of future spouse

Now, let us have a look at the findings regarding the avoidance of a future spouse who is from a religious out-group.

Table 5.3 *Avoidance of future spouse and other determinants*

Model	Determinants	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	(Constant)	.74**	.72**	.63**	.28*
1.	Ethno-religious definition (ref: *Javanese Muslims*)				
	Sundanese Muslims	-.14*	-.14*	-.22*	-.21*
	Madurese Muslims	-.24**	-.40**	-.36**	-.31**
	Ambonese Muslims	.03	-.01	.01	-.04
	Butonese Muslims	.10*	.04	-.00	-.04
	Muslims-rest	.01	.02	-.05	-.03
	Javanese Christians	-.18**	-.16**	-.18**	-.11*
	Ambonese Christians	-.28**	-.28**	-.24**	-.21**
	Chinese Christians	-.19*	-.17*	-.13	-.11
	Batak Christians	-.29**	-.25**	-.20*	-.13
	Christians-rest	-.26**	-.20**	-.18**	-.13*
2c.	Religious practices (ref: *never or on feast days*)				
	At least once a month		.07	.14	.14
	Once a week		.16*	.17*	.15
	More than once a week		.23**	.25*	.21*
	Once a day		.24**	.28**	.25*
	Several times a day		.17*	.22*	.17
	Religious out-group friends		-.12**	-.12**	-.07*
3.	Gender (ref: *male*)				
	Female			.20**	.21**
	Household income (*ref: high income*)				
	Middle income			-.11*	-.10*
	Low income			-.08	-.04
	Occupation status (ref: *farmer*)				
	Executive			-.02	-.04
	Professionals			.15	.13
	Technicians			.14	.13
	Clerks			.07	.07
	Sales			.01	.02
	Traders			.03	.05
	Machine			.16*	.15*
	Unskilled			.05	.04
	Special			.06	.05
	Absent			.05	.08
4.	Monism				.16**
	Regiocentrism				-.10**
	Distrust				.10**
R^2		.08	.11	.16	.19
R^2 *Adj.*		.08	.10	.13	.16

*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01

Again, we find that many ethno-religious groups tend to be less likely than *Javanese Muslims* to avoid contact with a future spouse from out-groups. This holds for all other Muslim ethnicities, except for *Butonese Muslims*, and for all Christian ethnicities. When 'religious practices' and 'religious out-group friends' are incorporated into model 2, parameters of ethno-religious groups decrease except for *Sundanese Muslims*, *Madurese Muslims*, and *Ambonese Christians*. Respondents who participate in religious practices *more than once a week* and *once a day* tend to avoid future spouses more than those who *never participate* and *only participate on feast days*. With regard to 'religious out-group friends', the more respondents have friends from different religious groups, the less they will avoid people from a different religion as their future spouses.

After several individual determinants are incorporated into model 3, again, parameters of ethno-religious groups become smaller except for *Sundanese Muslims* and *Javanese Christians*. In contrast, the parameters of *Sundanese Muslims*, *Javanese Christians*, and categories belonging to 'religious practices' increase, even after controlling for individual determinants. Moreover, the parameter of 'religious out-group friends' does not change. *Females, middle-income families*, and *machine operators* appear to differ from their reference categories. *Female* respondents show higher avoidance of future spouse compared to *males*, even after controlling for several intermediate variables. Respondents from *middle-income* families tend to avoid future spouses from out-groups less than respondents from *high-income* families. Respondents from *machine operators*' families tend to avoid people from different religions as future spouses more than those from *farmers*' families do.

When several intermediate variables are included in model 4, parameters of ethno-religious groups, 'religious out-group friends,' and categories belonging to 'religious practices,' become smaller. Parameters of categories belonging to 'gender,' 'household income,' and 'occupation status' also decrease. We also identify that intermediate variables significantly

explain avoidance of future spouse in different directions. On the one hand, 'regiocentrism' significantly reduces the avoidance of future spouse, which is different from what we propose in our research hypotheses. On the other hand, 'monism' and 'distrust' significantly increase the avoidance of future spouse. *Sundanese Muslims, Madurese Muslims, Javanese Christians*, *Ambonese Christians*, and *Christians-rest* score lower on the avoidance of future spouse than *Javanese Muslims*, as they are likely to have more regiocentric attitudes. Actually, *Javanese Muslims* show higher avoidance of future spouses than other ethno-religious groups, as they are likely to have more monistic attitudes and more distrust toward Christians.

5.4.3 Support for residential segregation

Here, we present the result of multivariate analyses between support for residential segregation and all significant determinants.

Table 5.4 *Support for residential segregation and other determinants*

Model	Determinants	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	(Constant)	.29**	.54**	.57**	.09
1.	Ethno-religious definition (ref: *Javanese Muslims*)				
	Sundanese Muslims	.01	.04	.04	.05
	Madurese Muslims	.17**	.03	-.00	.04
	Ambonese Muslims	.24**	.18**	.15**	.10**
	Butonese Muslims	.25**	.17**	.19**	.12**
	Muslims-rest	.08	.08	.10	.14*
	Javanese Christians	-.16**	-.06*	-.07*	.00
	Ambonese Christians	.00	-.00	-.03	-.01
	Chinese Christians	-.14**	-.08*	-.07	-.05
	Batak Christians	-.17**	-.08*	-.07	-.01
	Christians-rest	-.15**	-.06	-.11	-.06
2c.	Rites of passage (ref: *I do not participate in it and neither does my family*)				
	I do not participate in it but my family does		-.06	-.10	-.10
	I do participate but for non-religious reasons		-.10*	-.14*	-.13*
	I do participate for religious reasons		-.08*	-.11*	-.11*
	Religious in-group friends		.10**	.11**	.10**
	Religious out-group friends		-.26**	-.23**	-.12**
	Social embededness (ref: *all*)				
	Relatively many		-.10**	-.09**	-.07*
	Almost all		-.07**	-.05*	-.04
	None and some		-.06	-.00	-.01
3.	Occupational status (ref: *self employed*)				
	Worker			-.06*	-.05*
	Free worker			.00	-.02
	Unpaid worker			.06	.00
	Occupation status (ref: *farmers*)				
	Executive			-.01	-.01
	Professionals			-.06	-.08
	Technicians			.02	.01
	Clerks			.02	.01
	Sales			.01	-.02
	Traders			-.07**	-.04
	Machine			.01	.01
	Unskilled			-.02	-.04
	Special			-.04	-.01
	Absent			.05	.09
4.	Salience of ethnic identity				.13**
	Perceived threat				.16**
	Quantity of contact				-.10*
	Pluralism				-.10**
	Intratextual fundamentalism				.14**
	Distrust				.16**
R^2		.19	.29	.31	.44
R^2 *Adj.*		.18	.27	.28	.41

*= 0 < p value < .05 and ** = 0 < p value < .01

Again, we find a similar pattern: Muslim ethnicities tend to support residential segregation more than Javanese Muslims and nearly all Christian ethnicities. Several intermediate variables strengthen or weaken the relationship between ethno-religious identification and the support for residential segregation. When several religious and ethnic identification variables are included in model 2, the parameters of ethno-religious groups become smaller. 'Religious out-group friends' has a significant negative effect on support for residential segregation, while 'religious in-group friends' has a considerable positive effect. Respondents who *participate in rites of passage both for religious and non-religious reasons* support residential segregation less than those who *never participate in it*. We also find that respondents who have *relatively many* and *almost all* ethnic in-groups friends support residential segregation less than those who have *all*.

Once some individual determinants are incorporated into model 3, only the parameter of *Ambonese Muslims* decreases, which differs from our expectations. The parameters of *Butonese Muslims* and *Javanese Christians* increase after controlling for individual determinants. Parameters of 'religious out-group friends' and categories belonging to 'social embeddedness' become smaller, while parameters of 'religious in-group friends' and categories belonging to 'rites of passage' increase after controlling for individual determinants. 'Occupational status' and 'occupation status' significantly explain support for residential segregation. Respondents from *worker*s' families score lower on support for residential segregation than respondents from *self-employed* families. Respondents whose parents are *traders* show less support for residential segregation than those whose parents are *farmers*.

When several intermediate variables are included in model 4, the parameters of *Ambonese Muslims* and *Butonese Muslims* become smaller, while the parameter of *Muslims-rest* becomes bigger. Parameters of 'religious in-group friends,' 'religious out-group friends,' categories belonging

to 'rites of passage' and categories belonging to 'social embeddedness' decrease. Also, parameters of categories belonging to 'occupational status' and 'occupation status' become smaller. We can also identify that 'salience of ethnic identity', 'perceived group threat', 'intratextual fundamentalism', and 'distrust' have significant positive influences on support for residential segregation. To the contrary, 'quantity of contact' and 'pluralism' have significant negative effects on support for residential segregation.

5.5 The relevant determinants of intergroup contact avoidance

Based on findings from our interviews, we will now illustrate several determinants that have a significant effect on contact avoidance, on avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion, and on support for residential segregation.

Perceived group threat

As was previously mentioned, we define perceived group threat as the perception of being threatened by religious out-groups in political, economic, socio-cultural, and religious realms. The threats are related to an increase in the size of out-groups resulting from migration, which increases intergroup competition. This competition strengthens social identifications, which can lead to exclusionary reactions (Gijsberts et al., 2004:18). Most of our respondents feel threatened by religious out-groups with regard to their religious convictions, security, and education. In Yogyakarta, Christian migrants, mainly students from outside of Java, are perceived to be a threat to Muslims' way of life. When asked about Christian migrants in Yogyakarta, a Muslim respondent in our study, Faisal, says:

> "I just predict whenever there is a majority in a society, policymaking will be dominated by the majority. Of course, religious aspects will influence their way of life. Here is, in my opinion, a potential problem. Every religion has a mission to persuade people to become followers. In this situation, it can become a source of competition."

In the city of Ambon, the arrival of Muslim migrants became a perceived threat for the Christian Ambonese, leading to an escalation of violence between 1999 and 2004. Asked about Muslim migrants in the city, Marcus, a Christian respondent and the chairman of the student council of Unpatti university [*Universitas Pattimura*], describes his worries after the violence erupted in September of 2011:

> "If Ambon becomes violent, the perpetrators are usually [Muslim] migrants and this makes me afraid. What we know about them is about jihad. Jihad is teaching to kill, so there are many terror-bombs here. I feel that Ambon has become unsafe due to the many Muslim migrants and because the religious conflicts never end."

Often, Muslim migrants are seen as a threat to the Christian Ambonese when they start competing for jobs – jobs in the police force, for example. A deputy dean from the Faculty of Sciences at Unpatti says:

> "They [Christian Ambonese] see police become[ing] a threat because they've recruited more and more [Muslim] Javanese and Makassarese. Their opportunities are greater [compared to the Ambonese] because they have enough money to pay the police-test fee [bribe], which is increasing. Before economic crisis, it cost IDR 10 million, then it increased to IDR 20 million and now it is IDR 50 million. People who have enough money to pay it are mostly migrants. The Ambonese who can pay it are usually rich clove farmers."

However, not all respondents consider the presence of migrants from other religious groups to be a threat. Lucas, a Christian respondent in Ambon, has a positive perception of Muslim migrants, feeling that they can encourage Moluccans to improve the quality of their human resources. When asked to what extent the arrival of Muslim migrants is considered a threat to Christian Ambonese in competition for economic and political resources, he answers, "I do not feel threatened by their presence. What we have to compete on is our quality and the quality of our rivals, whether they are Muslim or non-Muslims." According to him, it is unreasonable to refer

to ethnicities and religions in competition. Another Christian respondent, Marcus, does not see Muslims who migrate to Ambon to trade as a threat. "What we are really afraid of is if they come here with bad intentions," he said.

Many examples reveal that our Muslim respondents from Unpatti feel threatened by the presence of Christians. At this university, Muslim students consider Christian lecturers and students as sources of religious threats. Since the establishment of the university in 1970, it is clear that Muslims have been reluctant to send their children to study there because of concerns over their children converting to Christianity. A Muslim respondent, Yusuf, explains:

> "In my village, my parents are concerned with this issue [religious conversion]. However, we have no problems with it because we are boys. We forbid [Muslim] girls from studying here and it becomes our tradition. It is what our parents have told us. Boys are considered firmer physically and mentally to face problems here. That is why we are allowed study here."

Many in the Muslim community are suspicious that Unpatti tries to convert female Muslim students to Christianity.

Some respondents also expressed a sense of being threatened politically, often in relation to religious belonging or to migration. More than once, respondents stated that Muslims had become a political threat to the Christian majority in Ambon. The deputy-dean of the Faculty of Sciences at Unpatti said:

> "If you know the provincial government, most civil servants are Christians. Historically, more Christians worked in the government than Muslims; later the number of Muslims increased. After ICMI become politically stronger [in the Moluccas], many Muslims from Hatuhaha of Haruku Island were appointed as government officials. Christians then perceived these people as a Muslim representation. While the Muslims [Hatuhaha] became high officials, Christian numbers were greater among middle and

> low-level officials. So, the Christians' hatred toward the Muslim Hatuhaha was directed at all Muslims in the Moluccas."

Moreover, the arrival of Butonese Muslim migrants increased political competition between migrants and natives in the Moluccas. A Muslim respondent in Ambon says, "Government officials who are Butonese will only care for their Butonese fellows. In the future, I am worried whether my brothers and sisters will have opportunities to work in government."

Salience of ethnic identity

According to Duckit (2006:154), ethnic saliency is the extent of an individual's awareness about their ethnic identification, including the importance of this identity in daily life and in decision-making. Our survey findings indicate that respondents display a moderate degree of ethnic saliency in everyday life. Here we give several examples of ethnic saliency based on the interviews.

Ethnic identity, which be analyzed as something separate from religion, can be considered salient when people from a certain ethnic group make use of it to interact with their people in daily life. Our interviews indicate that the Kei, an ethno-linguistic group from the Moluccas, tend to give preference to their ethnic identity over their religious identity. According to Johannes, a Catholic respondent from the Kei Islands, ethnic identity is very important in his life. He said:

> "[Ethnic] identity is very useful. I said earlier that Kei people have the strongest solidarity. If we have economic or academic problems, a lecturer from Kei will certainly help us, even if he is from a different religion. For example, the third deputy-rector at Unpatti is a Muslim Kei. If I have some problems, he would surely help me."

In Ambon, Muslim respondents tend to have higher levels of ethnic saliency than Christian respondents. A Muslim respondent, Fatima,

describes her experience while taking a mini-bus to the market driven by someone from her hometown:

> "After arriving at the market, the driver asked me, "Where are you from?" I answered, "From Kailolo." Then we talked about his family name and his house where he lived in Kailolo. When leaving the bus my friend paid her ride, but I did not. All people with the family name of *Tuanany* are like brothers and sisters."

Fatima did not pay for the ride because the driver knew she was from his hometown, so he considered her as a sister because of their shared ethnicity. When studying in the school SMK *Muhammadiyah* in Ambon, Fatima says that a teacher from her hometown also helped her:

> "We had Mr. Sangadji from Rohomoni of Haruku Island. He taught mathematics. In the mid-semester test, he helped me. He knew that I came from the same community he belongs to. He gave me the answers to the test. I passed the test."

Quite a few respondents mentioned that they based their votes for the student executive board chairman on ethnicity. "I elected Malik Tuasamu because he is from Kailolo. From the poster and campaign, I could identify his family name, which indicates clearly that he is from my hometown," Fatima says.

People from religious minorities identify with ethnic groups more than religious ones in order to affiliate with the religious majority. A Catholic respondent, Maria, regards her Javanese identity as very important, even stronger than her religious identity. Belonging to a religious minority in Yogyakarta often creates difficulties, such as discrimination and prejudice from neighbours. Consequently, by using her ethnic identity, Maria can reference shared boundaries with the religious majority. When asked which of her identities is stronger, Catholic, Javanese, or Catholic Javanese, she unequivocally states that her Javanese identity is the most important. "What I mean is," she says, "according to the concept of '*empan papan*' [adapting

to the environment], we have to put traditions into important aspects of our life, instead of religion." People from ethnic minorities also use ethnic saliency as a way of distinguishing between their in-group and out-groups, allowing them to profit from daily interactions with people from the same ethnicity. For instance, a Muslim respondent from Riau studying in Yogyakarta shared his experience regarding the salience of ethnic identity. Although he comes from Riau, his parents are Javanese. In his hometown, therefore, he perceives his Javanese identity to be important in his daily life. "When we meet with a Javanese [in Riau], he or she usually treats us in a good manner and likes helping us," he says.

We found several examples of why people from dominant groups consider their ethnic identities to be of importance. When ethnic identity plays a role in daily life, the significance of these identities is related to pride and practicality. A Javanese Muslim respondent, Faisal, mentions that his ethnic identity is important. "I am proud to be a Javanese, but I never think other ethnic groups are worse than mine. I am proud of being a Javanese, perhaps, because of its rich culture. For example, look at the complex nature of Javanese language and etiquette." Fauzi says he references his ethnicity in everyday life, "As long as it is beneficial for me. For example, if I want to go shopping in Malioboro, I will benefit if I speak Javanese well, since some traders will give us friendlier treatment." A female Javanese Muslim, Zahra, who regards ethnic identity to be of practical importance, gives another example. When asked about whether her ethnic identity influences her daily life, she says, "More or less yes. In friendships, for example, I tend to choose and feel more comfortable among the Javanese. Perhaps it is just about the similarities in values we hold. Different values make me feel uncomfortable."

It is clear from multivariate analyses that ethnic saliency significantly increases support for residential segregation. We propose that ethnic saliency, with its attached negative images of ethnic out-groups, probably has an influence on exclusionary reactions, including support for residential

segregation. Previous studies on prejudice and ethnocentrism say that, at least theoretically, ethnocentrism will lead to exclusionary reactions. Here, we would like to illustrate several examples of this attitude. Johannes, a Catholic respondent from the Kei Islands who lives in a religiously segregated neighbourhood in Ambon, shared negative stereotypes about the Ambonese:

> "What I dislike mostly from the Ambonese is that they do not have good manners. They are impolite in general. Their impoliteness shows in the way they speak, particularly among females. They do not respect others. The way they talk is different from us, the Southeast people. The people of the Southeast may sometimes be rude, but our accents are plain. They [Ambonese] speak uncontrolled, so it is not good. Their daily habits, which I have seen for a few years in Ambon, do not respect old people."

Zahra, A female Muslim respondent in Yogyakarta who lives in a segregated area, says, "For me, the Bataknese, for example, are typically tough, and bold. The people of Eastern Indonesia, such as the Ambonese, despite being tough and bold, tend to use violent ways.

Intergroup contact

As was previously discussed, intergroup contact is distinguished by quantity and quality. Quantity of contact, following previous studies (Nix 1993:33-35; Wagner et al., 2006:382), is the frequency of an individual's interaction with religious out-group members, such as relatives, close friends, classmates, board mates, and neighbours. Quality of contact, referring to Brown (2007:3-4), is how individuals rate their contacts with religious out-group members according to closeness, equality, and cooperativeness.

It seems that most respondents who are active in student organizations have many opportunities for contact with members of religious out-groups, some of whom include classmates and close friends. For example, a Christian interviewee, Lucas, who is the chairperson of the student union in

the Faculty of Economics at Unpatti, says, "I have a close friend from HMI [Islamic Students Association]. Now he is in Namlea on Buru Island. I also have close friends from IMM [Muhammadiyah Student Association] and PMII [Indonesian Muslim Students Movement]. They are close friends in university." He also lives in a military housing complex where Muslims and Christians stay together. "The majority of people in our housing complex are Muslims," he said. "My father was a sergeant there. My friends are mostly Muslims."

Compared to the period before 1999, the relationship between Muslims and Christians at Unpatti has improved. Umar, a Muslim director of the Social Development Institute at Unpatti said, "They [Christians] were very arrogant and felt more dominant. They thought Ambon was theirs, especially Unpatti. We really felt isolated. But after 1999, Christians started to promote peace more."

> "Relations between [Muslims and Christians] are incredibly good now that the HMJ [Department of Student Associations] has been created. If the association conducts *halal bi halal* [the celebration of *Idul fitri*], Christian students attend it. When the association held a Christmas celebration, Muslim students also attended it. So relations are good."

As a lecturer in the Faculty of Education at Unpatti, Umar always combines Muslim and Christian students to work on group assignments. According to him, Muslim and Christian students have become closer since the conflict ended in 2004. "Their arrogance has dramatically decreased. However, nowadays, it disappears. It is possibly the result of the horrifying conflict between 1999 and 2004".

A number of respondents stated that inter-religious contact in Ambon is not limited to meeting on college campuses and at school, but also occurs in the course of everyday life, in places like markets and hospitals. A Muslim interviewee, Fatima, says she buys things from both Muslim and Christian traders in the city. When she gets sick, she even goes to a public

hospital that is located in a Christian area, as the hospital in the Muslim area has insufficient facilities. In addition, Fatima talks about her strategy to stay in contact with former classmates from different religions. She created a motorbike gang with Muslims and Christian members. "There are friends from the motorbike gang in Karpan [Christian area]. Every Friday or Saturday night, I go to Karpan to have fun with them. I am usually picked up from Kebun Cengkeh [a Muslim area] and then we go to Karpan to hang out with them". In addition, she always invites her friends to visit her during Islamic celebrations, but she never goes to the houses of her Christian friends, as her parents do not allow it. She also uses Facebook to maintain her social network.

In rural areas of the Moluccas, it is difficult to have inter-religious contact in the course of one's educational career, because educational institutions are religiously segregated. However, people between villages that have cultural ties, referred to as relations of *pela* and *gandong,* tend to have good relationships. [3] In Ambon, students from these villages work to maintain such relationships. For example, the Sepa of Central Moluccas has a *pela* relationship with the Kamariyan of Western Seram. Therefore, students from Sepa have a special bond with students from Kamariyan, regardless of their different religions. Yusuf, a Muslim respondent, says, "We know them through communicating with friends, or acquaintances of friends. I do not know all of them. I surely know the family names Penturi and Leomase."

Most of our respondents in Ambon mentioned that after the violence ended in 2004, and up until 2011, Christian students went to Muslim friend's houses in the city and vice versa. The recent violence, however, has stopped them from visiting each other as frequently. Johannes says:

> "After the September 11, 2011 violence, I was a bit worried, but it only lasted one week. In Ambon, people are used to hearing bombs. I live within a community that is close to them [Muslims], and they accept me.

3 See Chapter 1 section 1.3.2

> When going home late at night, however, I am still terrified. At noon we are free, but I worry at night."

Another interviewee, a Muslim female student, also experienced difficulties in visiting some Christian areas after the riots. She explained:

> "A week and two days after the riots, I went to Karpan, AY Patti, Kudamati Street, and Halaussy Hospital by public city transport [shuttle bus]. In Kudamati, almost all people are Christians. I had to take my veil off. I was still worried although my veil was off. In the bus, I sat near the door. If something bad happened, I could jump out. I went there alone."

In regard to contact with neighbours from different religions, quite a few respondents say that they have no Christian neighbours. A Muslim interviewee in Yogyakarta, Hakim, says there are no Christians living in his neighbourhood in Tasikmalaya, West Java. In contrast, several other interviewees who have neighbours from different religions describe their peaceful relationships. A Muslim female respondent, Zahra, provides a good example of contact between Muslims and Christians from a neighbourhood in Yogyakarta. When asked about her problems living in a religiously heterogeneous neighbourhood, she says, "Well, I once had a problem with a dog because I am afraid of dogs." According to Zahra, Muslims in her village allow Christians keep their dogs in order to maintain peaceful relationships between them.

In Yogyakarta, it is still possible to find students who have relatives from different religions because inter-religious marriage was common in Java before the 1990s. A few respondents say they have some relatives from different religions. Peter, a Christian interviewee from Surakarta, says his father is a Muslim and his mother is a Christian. His father told Peter and his siblings that they could choose which religion they would practice. As a result, his brothers and sisters followed Christianity. However, when one of his brothers married a Muslim woman, he converted to Islam. After several years, he returned to Christianity. So, he has a Muslim sister-in-law and a

Muslim father. "Everyone in the family respects each other in practicing their religions," he says. "For example, my brother who has a Muslim wife allows his wife to practice Islam." Another respondent, a female Muslim, Zahra, also says she has relatives from different religions due to previous inter-religious marriages. Her grandmother's sister married a Christian man, so she converted to Christianity. In addition, a grandfather's brother married a Christian woman and he converted to Christianity. All of her relatives now live in Yogyakarta, and she still has good relations with her Christian relatives.

In the interviews, we found that Christian students have difficulty finding boarding houses in Yogyakarta, as Muslim owners tend to rent only to Muslim students. A Muslim respondent, Najib, says there are no Christian students in his boarding house, although he has many Christian classmates. Also, he admits that his interactions with Christian classmates are restricted to interacting on campus. Several Muslim respondents, however, want to live in a boarding house with students from different religions. For instance, a Muslim interviewee, Faisal, explains that he prefers to live in a more heterogeneous religious community, although more of his university classmates are Muslim than Christian. "I prefer heterogeneous housing," he says. "Having non-Muslim friends is not a problem for me. One of our research group members is also a non-Muslim, and he respects me. When it is time to pray, he allows me to go first."

Aside from the quantity of contact, quality of contact is also important for reducing avoidance of intergroup contact. Many respondents state that they rate their contact with religious out-group members in terms of closeness and cooperativeness. A Catholic interviewee in Ambon, Johannes, says, "I have close relationships with a Muslim community [Amaci, the city of Ambon], and they accept me." A Muslim respondent, Yusuf, mentions that his relationship with his Christian classmates became better after they had an in-depth discussion about the causes of the recent violence in 2011. "We became closer and closer after. After the conflict, we

are just closer friends". In terms of cooperativeness, Fatima says she often helps her Christian friends in her motorbike gang. "We are used to helping each other. If I have a problem, they will help. Once a car hit my [Christian] friend in front of the telecommunication office, he was brought to the RST [a military hospital]. And then all the members of the motorbike gang came to see him."

Now we will provide some illustrations of inter-religious relationships in Yogyakarta, where Muslims are the majority and Christians the minority. Although both groups seem to have peaceful relations in daily life, a few problems of religious intolerance still exist. Some respondents rate their contact with religious out-group members positively, while other respondents rate their contact with people from different religions negatively. When asked how he rates his contact with his Christian classmates, Faisal says, "I have positive views." Another Muslim respondent, Zahra, says the same thing about her contact with her Christian relatives, and always visits them during Christmas celebrations. "So far, the interaction is very good," she says. A female Catholic respondent, Maria, tells a different story. In the questionnaire, she states that she has many Muslim friends and neighbours. However, she also says that she has negative perceptions of her Muslim classmates and neighbours. "My negative image of Muslims is due to the attitudes of Muslim neighbours to me. I tried to respect them, but they treated me offensively and impolitely. This forced me to think negatively about Muslims." According to her, a group of people from a Muslim neighbourhood destroyed her car and house.

Religiosity

The results of the multivariate analyses indicate that negative views on religious out-groups, religious monism, and intratextual fundamentalism contribute considerably to avoidance of intergroup contact, while religious pluralism significantly reduces it. According to Sterkens and Anthony (2008:34), negative attitudes towards religious out-groups and positive

attitudes towards the religious in-group are representative of religiocentrism. Religious monism refers to the interpretation that truth and values only can be found in one respected religion, while religious pluralism refers to the interpretation that different religions are sources of both truth and values (Anthony et al., 2005:157-162). Intratextual fundamentalism, as considered in studies by Williamsons et al. (2010:723-724), is a form of religious fundamentalism based on a literal interpretation of a sacred text. Here we give some examples relating to negative attitudes toward religious out-groups, monism, pluralism, and hermeneutic interpretations.

Several respondents say they have a negative image of religious out-group members. Muhammad clearly states his negative view of Christians: "Now, the governor is Christian, so the majority of positions in government are occupied by them [Christians]. So, I believe that Christians are the cause of religious conflict." Another Muslim respondent, Fatima, provides another negative view about Christians, related to a bad experience she had with Christians in the past. She noticed that Christians seemed to denigrate Muslims when she attended a socialization program held by the Indonesian Red Cross. She says, "Once, they [Christians] laughed me at an event on drug counselling. A Christian student stated that the [intellectual] capacities of Muslim presenters are bad. His statement humiliated us [Muslims] and regarded the Muslims as lower than the Christians." The same views are heard on the other side. Apparently, Christian students generally see Muslim students as too emotional and supportive of violent conflicts. When asked about his image of Muslims, Lucas from Unpatti, says, "What I fear are the stupid groups among the youth of Moluccans. For example, Moluccan youngsters are emotionally aggressive. We do not like to be told to study. However, when we are told to fight, we get very excited. Like what happened at the last demonstration [when Muslims burned the university registration's building]."

Quite a few respondents in Yogyakarta shared negative images of religious out-group members. Some Muslim respondents may tend to

identify Christians only with pork and liquor. Ahmed, says, "Another thing is about eating pork. Christian and Kong Hu Cu people eat it. If they invite us to their homes and serve some food, we would not eat it, even if they cook fried chicken. We think the chicken is cooked in the same pan with the pork." Another Muslim respondent, Amir, mentions, "Before Muslim students held positions in student council in 2006, Christian students controlled it. Liquor, then, was usually found in the secretariat." On other hand, a Catholic interviewee has a negative perception of her Muslim neighbours because of previous incidents. "A long time ago, some people threw stones at my house," she says. "Previously, they also damaged my car." Based on these incidents, her negative perception is that that Muslims like conflict and support violence.

Data from our survey shows that Muslim respondents are more likely to believe that the truth can only be found in their religion, while Christian respondents are more likely to believe that the truth can be found in many religions. Therefore, we can state that Muslim respondents have stronger monistic religious views than Christian respondents, while Christian respondents have stronger religiously pluralistic views than Muslims. The interviews support these findings from the survey. It seems most Muslim respondents prefer monistic religious views. A Muslim respondent, Hakim, says:

> "The sources of Islam are the Quran and Hadith. The sources of Christianity are the Bible, but the Bible is not true. Men have modified it, so it is not the original Bible given by Jesus. Buddhism and Hinduism are even worse. They worship statues. What can a statue do for them? It is illogical. They have no common sense."

A Christian respondent, Elisabeth, expresses a religiously pluralistic view:

> "If Christianity is the only true religion, why did God create other religions? We can learn from others. For example, our Muslim brothers, they pray five times a day. I have observed what others consider not important. Muslims wake up at 05.00. They sell yellow rice at 07.00. Before they get on the bus, they say *bismillah* [in the name of God]."

Another Christian interviewee, Peter, says:

> "What I admit is Jesus, who is the one who guides the way to live and the one who saves me. I am open to the possibility that other religions also have the way to salvation. For me, however, Jesus is the way to salvation. I do not mind people who say that they also find salvation in their religion; it is a reflection of their faith."

His statements indicate that he has a pluralistic view. "I like saying that religions are the same in an abstract level. I believe that [all] religions teach all good things".

Another characteristic of religiosity is hermeneutic interpretation. Again, the findings of the survey indicate that Muslim respondents are more likely to use hermeneutic interpretation than Christian respondents are. The interviews seemingly confirm these survey findings, demonstrating that several Muslim respondents interpret the Holy Scriptures literally. For example, Muhammad says, "The Holy Scriptures should be interpreted literally." When asked about the interpretation of the Quran, a Muslim respondent named Hakim says, "The Quran is the way of life and guidance for us. There is an absolute truth, which we have to believe in it, so no need to interpret the verses." Another Muslim, Najib, states, "The Quran for a Muslim is '*qalamullah*' (God's writing). It is given directly by God. In Islam, it is considered God's word, so the truth is absolute and cannot be denied. Other people perhaps will use their logical thinking to question it, then, they believe it. For me, I need to believe it first, and then I shall find the truth."

Regiocentric attitudes

Regiocentrism derives from ethnocentric-nationalism, or chauvinism, defined as a sentiment of the superiority of one's country in comparison to other countries (Coenders, 2001:64; Todosijevic, 1998:14-15). Therefore, a 'regiocentric attitude' refers to ethnocentric-nationalism constructed in a

specific region as opposed to nationalism. As explained in the multivariate analyses, 'regiocentric attitudes' significantly reduce the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion. After the political reformation in 1998, regiocentrism seemingly flourished in line with the inception of political decentralization and the decline of nationalism.

Our survey data indicates that Muslim respondents show higher levels of regiocentric attitudes than Christian respondents. In interviews many Muslim and Christian respondents expressed love for their region and ethnicity. When we asked whether the respondent Lucas whether he identifies more strongly as Indonesian, Moluccan, or Ambonese, he answered, "I am a proud to be Ambonese because I was born and grew up in Ambon. It is like Unpatti's motto, *hitimesse*, meaning we [the Ambonese] develop from challenges." Most Muslim respondents in Ambon seem to mix regiocentric attitudes with ethnicity. For them, both are similar in terms of opposition to provincial and national identities, since increased use of ethnic identities is related to the rise of a regiocentric identity. A Muslim respondent in Ambon, Fatima, says, "I am closer to the Kailolo people than other Moluccans, because in Kailolo, our traditions tend to unite people of the same culture. Therefore, in Ambon, we are relatively separated from other Moluccans. Adat is stronger in our villages than here.[4]"

In Yogyakarta, the survey and interviews were conducted while debates took place in the national parliament on the position of the sultan as governor. This political situation probably influenced respondents from Yogyakarta towards emphasizing their regional and local identities rather than their national identities. In answering the question about which identity is stronger, Indonesian or being from Yogyakarta, a Catholic interviewee named Maria, responds, "I think, always Yogyakartan. I am proud to be from Yogyakarta. If we enlarge the scope, then, I am proud to be an Indonesian." Quite a lot of respondents expressed that their love for their region is related

4 See chapter 1 section 1.3.2; adat refers to all the traditional values and laws within a specific community (Sterkens and Hadiwitanto, 2009:69).

to the government's performance in fulfilling basic needs. When we asked which government they regard as more important, the local government or the national government, answers varied. Many respondents stated that they prefer the local government because they are satisfied with the state of development in their hometowns. A Muslim interviewee named Ahmed says, "For local development, I am quite satisfied, but I am not satisfied yet with the issue of equity, balance, and justice. Well, they prioritize their community only, the native people."

In respect to regiocentrism, several respondents state that they love their region because the region means a lot to the people and makes them proud. Najib, a Muslim respondent from the Kutai group of Kalimantan states "Both [nationalism and regiocentrism] are important. I prefer regiocentrism because it only focuses on the region, not on the central government." Another Muslim interviewee, Zahra, says:

> "Honestly, I am more proud to be from Yogyakarta. I am not sure, but I think because this situation is more conducive. The leaders are more concerned with their people than the leaders in the central government. Perhaps, also because I live in a neighbourhood where Javanese are in the majority."

When asked whether she is in favour of gubernatorial elections or the appointment of the sultan, she answers, "In my opinion, so far, it is no problem that that sultan is also in charge as the governor of Yogyakarta. Why should we question his position and qualification now? It is, in fact, a bit difficult to imagine two leaders in the same area. Besides, we all know that the people of Yogyakarta respect the sultan very highly."

It seems that several respondents implicitly emphasized that the rise of regiocentrism is in line with a growing dissatisfaction with the national government and an increasingly favourable attitudes toward ethnic groups. A Muslim interviewee in Yogyakarta, Ahmed, explains:

> "I am not satisfied. Our government is not clean anymore. Another thing that I am not satisfied with is that the current government has no grand design for development, unlike during the New Order period. At that time, we had designs for five-year and 25-year development. Now we have none."

This strong dissatisfaction indicates that Ahmed puts religious and ethnic interests above national interests. He adds, "Honestly, I want to put national interests as my priority, but I have to prioritize my religious and ethnic group because from there we can develop ourselves and our place." Several respondents spoke positively about their ethnic group, which implies their strong attachment to their region. A Muslim interviewee from the Sepa ethnic groupsays:

> "What I am proud of is the voluntary labour, cooperation, and work for common interests; the people of Sepa are willing to help each other for such activities. For example, they will still participate in these activities even if there are hostilities between them. They give themselves to this work, such as repairing mosques, drainage systems, and so on."

A Catholic interviewee, Johannes, gives a similar example. "The positive side of the Kei people generally is they have high solidarity. There is a custom in our society call *yelim*. In Indonesian, it is called *sumbangan* [contribution]. We practice it, for instance, when we have disasters, funerals, or marriages. If I have a problem both my close and distant relatives, and also neighbours, would give some contribution, wherever and whenever."

Distrust

Distrust refers to negative expectations in certain religious groups when they perceive that religious out-group members are prejudiced against them, and in interaction between groups (Tropp et al. 2006:771-772). In this research we consider distrust to consist of an individual's attitudes and behaviours that show distrust toward religious out-group members

in intergroup relationships. Our multivariate analyses demonstrate that distrust considerably increases support for residential segregation and for the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion. In addition, the survey data shows that Muslim respondents score higher on distrust toward religious out-group members than Christian respondents. Here, we provide several illustrations of distrust of religious out-group members that occur in the interviews.

Distrust of religious out-group members is seemingly greater in Ambon than in Yogyakarta, given that the city experienced a series of violence incidents between 1999 and 2004. Also, in 2011, some religious incidents also led to violence. Many respondents in Ambon mention their distrust of Christians directly. Fatima from Ambon says, "I still distrust those Christians. Before September 11, I went anywhere. But after the event, I am worried." However, she still maintains a good relationship with her Christian classmates from senior high school, although she adds, "I once went up to Bentas and Karpan. Then, I trusted them, but my friends whispered to me 'don't be so close to them, and never be plunged into their religions'." Fatima also doubts that peace will come after the recent violence. She remarks, "Now I disbelieve in such a thing [peace]. I thought that conflicts would not come again. However, today the facts say otherwise; conflicts keep on happening. I do not believe that the conflict will cease, it will happen again. I see Ambon is not peaceful anymore as the peace has broken." Soldiers stationed in the border areas between Muslims and Christians often stimulate distrust for members of the religious out-group. "There are RMS [Southern Moluccas Republic] supporters among Christians, according to the soldiers," Fatima says. "They said that we have to be careful when going there."

Another Muslim interviewee in Ambon, Ayesa, tells a story about how she distrusts Christians because of a traffic accident in which her classmate passed away. She says, "A Christian, who rode a motorcycle while drunk, hit him. It makes me angry. One of [the] perpetrator's family members said

that the perpetrator also died, but I distrust them. They wanted to cover up the accident; it made me annoyed and angry." In addition, she hears rumours that Christians raped a Muslim woman in their area. Such rumours in Ambon are quite sensitive and can increase prejudice, hatred, and distrust of other religious groups. Another Muslim respondent, Imran, explains that he lost trust in Christians when he studied in Unpatti between 2001 and 2006 because of unfair treatment of Muslim students by Christian members of the university staff. "When you are in Unpatti, you will see that certain people get priority access to services and others do not," he said.

Several Christian respondents, mainly in Yogyakarta, also stated they distrust Muslims. Maria, who gave a donation to the victims of the Mount Merapi eruption in 2010, talks about Muslims' distrust of Christians. "What hurt me most is when there were disasters, Muslims rejected the supplies we gave to help the victims of Merapi eruption and the earthquake. I witnessed how difficult it was to distribute supplies. I think they had a crisis of trust, so they were afraid that we would convert them into Christianity." It is likely Muslims thought that Christians did not want only to help, but also to spread their beliefs. She had this experience in several areas, not just in Muntilan after the Merapi eruption, but in Bantul after the earthquake:

> "I remember when I participated in helping victims of the disasters with *Kentungan* Seminary. We had a problem distributing goods because of religious issues. The donations and supplies sent to us piled up there. Finally, we divided the supplies into smaller amounts and removed the identity written on the containers."

In another case, Maria also lost trust for Muslims when she found out that someone had killed her dog. She suspected the perpetrator was one of her Muslim neighbours. "What I do not understand is, according to my neighbours, the people who killed my dog are from the neighbouring village. How could they know that there is a non-Muslim family living in the neighbouring kampong. Moreover, my dogs were not noisy. The dogs were always kept inside the house."

Several Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta state that they dislike Christians who make trouble. A Muslim, Hakim, tells a story about his distrust for Christians in Yogyakarta:

> "There used to be a Papuan in our boarding house. He was a non-Muslim. The owner disliked him because of his attitude. He liked hanging around with his friends, disturbing other people. The owner, then, forced him to leave. When I arrived there, the owner said that he would never accept another person from Papua again. Aside from a person from Papua, a non-Muslim is not really welcomed either."

In this interview, we discovered that the owner not only dislikes people from Papua, but also distrusts their ability to live harmoniously in his dormitory. In present-day Yogyakarta, distrust against the Papuan and Timorese, who are mostly Christians, has become more intense. Making racial and ethnic assumptions and stereotypes is common in Yogyakarta.

The results of these interviews, and our analysis of the qualitative data, has strengthened and deepened interpretations of the results of the multivariate analyses related to the relevant intermediate variables. Based on the interviews, we find that perceived group threat, ethnic saliency, intergroup contact, religiosity, regiocentric attitudes, and distrust are strong among both Muslim and Christian respondents. Compared to Christian interviewees, Muslims interviewees show higher levels of perceived group threat, ethnic saliency, religious monism, negative religious out-group feelings, regiocentric attitudes, and distrust. Christian respondents show higher levels of religious pluralistic views than Muslim respondents. Some phenomena emerged in the interviews conducted in Ambon that were not present in the survey data. For example, Muslim migrants are considered to be political threats for Ambonese Muslims. Also, respondents reported that after the religious conflict ended in 2004, Muslims and Christians have experienced more peaceful relations, despite the fact that they live in religiously segregated residential areas. Finally, contact between Muslims and Christians takes place in many public places, and is not limited to schools, boarding houses, and neighbourhoods.

5.6 Discussion of results against wider theoretical background

We now discuss the findings from these multivariate analyses against the background of our theoretical framework, including social identity theory, ethnic group conflict theory and other relevant theories.

As mentioned earlier, social identity theory holds that categorization, identification and comparison are likely to induce exclusionary reactions (Turner, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Gijsberts et al., 2004). We distinguished between ethno-religious self-definition (merely categorization), religious identification and ethnic identification. Findings from the regression analyses give evidence that ethno-religious self-definitions are significantly related to our dependent variables. Our first hypothesis is confirmed when social categorization itself significantly relates to avoidance of intergroup contact. Muslim ethnic groups tend to score higher on contact avoidance than *Javanese Muslims*, except for *Sundanese Muslims*, while Christian ethnic groups score lower on contact avoidance than *Javanese Muslims*. With the exception of *Sundanese Muslims* and *Madurese Muslims*, all Muslim ethnic groups show more avoidance of future spouse than *Javanese Muslims*. Christian ethnic groups show less avoidance of future spouses compared to *Javanese Muslims*. Apart from *Ambonese Christians*, all Christian ethnic groups show less support for residential segregation than *Javanese Muslims*.

Also, our second set of hypotheses on the relationship between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance is supported, at least partially, because the behavioural elements of religious and ethnic identification have significant effects on intergroup contact avoidance. We identify that having relatively many friends from the religious in-group induces contact avoidance (*hypothesis 2d*), while having relatively many friends from religious out-group reduces contact avoidance (*hypothesis 2e*). People who frequently engage in religious practices are more likely to avoid religious out-group members as future spouses (*hypothesis 2a*), while those who

have more religious out-group friends are less likely to avoid religious out-group members as future spouses (*hypothesis 2e*). People who frequently attend rites of passage (*hypothesis 2c*) and have more religious and ethnic in-group friends (*hypotheses 2e* and *2j*) show more support for residential segregation, while those who have more religious out-group friends show less support for residential segregation. Participation in rites of passage, religious practices, and friendship by ethnicity and religion are found to be the most relevant experiences in relation to avoidance of intergroup contact. Experiences that are meaningful and relevant to individual identity will further reinforce the process of identification (Phinney and Ong (2007). This finding also supports the previous studies by Allport and Ross (1967), Scheepers et al. (2002), and Coenders et al. (2007) that church attendance is likely to induce prejudicial attitudes.

Additionally, and differing from our expectations, other ethno-religious identification variables, i.e. participation in collective rites, ethnic ceremonies, the use of ethnic languages, and participation in ethnic and religious organizations, do not significantly explain avoidance of intergroup contact. Suryadinata (2002) mentioned that most Indonesian Muslims are secular. For Muslim respondents, therefore, participation in collective rites is apparently related to cultural traditions. Ethnic languages become non-significant as the Indonesian language becomes a mediator of social interactions between geographically dispersed ethnic groups (Abas 1987; Dardjowidjojo, 1998; Lowenberg, 1990; Sneddon, 2003 cf. Goebel, 2008). Another linguistic study by Collin (1982) explains that the Christian villages of Central Moluccas lost their ethnic languages during colonial times. The recent study by Florey (2005:61) describes that 16 of 42 ethnic languages in Central Moluccas are known to have fallen into disuse. Ethnic ceremonies have less of a role in determining ethnic identification, because many traditional cultures are perceived as obstacles to socio-economic development (Dove, 1988 cf Hoey, 2003). These ceremonies become less popular because of the development of Islamic conservatism that proscribes

traditional rituals (Hefner, 1990). Membership of, and participation in, ethno-religious organizations are not significantly related to avoidance of intergroup contact among our respondents. Referring to Peek (2005), most ethnic and religious organizations seemingly offer psychological and social benefits instead of material benefits.

According to ethnic group conflict theory, certain groups of personal details (e.g. gender, social class, and occupational status) are more related to exclusionary attitudes than others, because the level of actual competition and perceived group threat might be different between groups (Gijsberts et al., 2004:18). In our study, several individual determinants, i.e. occupation status, occupational status, gender, and household income, are significantly related to our dependent variables. People from traders' families show less contact avoidance than those from farmers' families. Also, women score higher on the avoidance of future spouse, a finding which is in contrast to Sidanius' study (2000) which found that men express more prejudice than women. Differing from Tolsma et al. (2008), who found avoidance of interethnic marriage to be more prevalent among the lower class, in this study people from middle classes score lower on the avoidance of future spouse compared to those from higher classes. People from machine operators' families show higher avoidance of future spouse than those from farmers' families. People from workers' families show less support for residential segregation than those from self-employed families. Also, people from traders' families support residential segregation less than those from farmers' families. Other individual determinants, mainly parents' religion and parents' education, do not significantly explain intergroup contact avoidance.

In our study, people with higher social economic status show stronger contact avoidance than those with lower statuses, which is in contrast to Western societies. Status differences are likely related to power differences. Many current studies on Indonesian politics explain that Indonesia is a patrimonial state, which is characterized by the personification of power,

wide political stratifications, and a government which only serves the rulers (Webber, 2006). Despite having a democratic system, civil society in Indonesia is not strong as in Western countries (Fukuoka, 2012:16). Political and economic activity are still centered in an oligarchy of elites, while the lower classes have been excluded from politics since 1965 (Hadiz, 2003:605; Fukuoka, ibid.). The middle and upper classes are more powerful in politics and businesses. As a result, they often differentiate themselves from the lower classes, a behavior which manifests itself in exclusive lifestyles. Access to political and economic resources is controlled by the middle and upper classes, leading to the lower classes being systematically marginalized by the state.

Our third set of hypotheses is confirmed when the effects of 'religious in-group friends' and 'religious out-group friends', and the differences between ethno-religious groups and the reference category on avoidance of intergroup contact are still significant after controlling for these social categories (*hypothesis 3*); our findings indicate that this is the case, although initial differences between ethno-religious groups tend to decrease.

Looking at the fourth set of hypotheses regarding the explanatory power of intermediate variables on the relationship between ethno-religious identification and the avoidance of intergroup contact, we find 10 determinants that have significant effects on our dependent variables. Moreover, inclusion of these intermediate determinants further reduces initial differences between ethno-religious groups. As we expected, 'perceived group threat' and 'negative religious out-group attitudes' induce contact avoidance, whereas 'quality of contact' and 'pluralism' reduce contact avoidance. In addition, 'monism' and 'distrust' induce the avoidance of future spouse, while 'regiocentric attitudes' reduce avoidance of future spouse. Moreover, 'ethnic saliency', 'perceived group threat', 'hermeneutic interpretation', and 'distrust' have positive effects on support for residential segregation, while 'quantity of contact' and 'religious pluralism' have negative effects on support for residential segregation.

The multivariate analyses give strong support to the notion that 'perceived group threat' intermediates the relationship between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance, which also holds for the relationship between ethno-religious identification and support for residential segregation. Therefore, these findings are consistent with our hypothesis (*4a*) and support previous studies that demonstrated perceived group threat as a determinant of prejudice and hostility toward out-groups (Bobo, 1988; Quillian, 1995; Coenders et al., 2007; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010; Savelkoul et al., 2010; Coenders et al., 2013). However, perceived group threat does not significantly explain the avoidance of future spouses, which is likely not related to the intergroup competition. Avoidance of future spouse in Indonesia apparently stems from the marriage law. According to the law, a marriage is valid if it is conducted according to their respective religious laws of each religion. However, most religious laws do not allow such inter-religious marriages (Bowen, 2005; Mujiburrahman, 2006).

Another intermediate variable that has a significant effect on intergroup contact avoidance is 'salience of ethnic identity'. This finding confirms our hypothesis (*4b*), which states that salience of ethnic identity will likely induce support for residential segregation. We find that when ethnic identity becomes more salient, this induces stronger ethnic self-definition, which in turn leads to greater exclusionary attitudes toward religious out-group members. This finding is consistent therefore with the studies of Allport (1954 [1958]), Brewer and Campbell (1976), and Brewer and Miller (1996). In Indonesia, although religious identity became more salient after the political reforms of 1998, ethnic identity is still important, because political decentralization revived regional autonomy. Consequently, native communities, compared to migrant communities, profited more from the regional autonomy, as they had the cultural legitimacy to rule their own regions (van Klinken, 2003).

Other intermediate variables that are found to have significant effects on intergroup contact avoidance are 'quantity of contact' and 'quality of

contact'. Consistent with our hypotheses (*4d* and *4e*), the quantity of contact has a significant negative effect on support for residential segregation, while the quality of contact has a significant negative effect on contact avoidance. These findings support the contact hypothesis, which states that contact with out-group members will induce favourable intergroup attitudes and reduce hostilities towards out-groups (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006:766; Wagner et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2007; Schlueter and Wagner, 2008). Referring to Allport (1954 [1958]) and Pettigrew (1998), having contact with out-group members (neighbours, classmates, board mates, close friends, and relatives) is likely to provide more opportunities for friendship and to reduce negative stereotypes, prejudice and discriminatory attitudes.

The significant findings on religiosity confirm our hypotheses on 'negative religious out-group attitudes' (*4g*), 'monism' (*4h*), 'pluralism' (*4i*), and 'intratextual fundamentalism' (*4j*). 'Negative religious out-group' has a significant positive effect on contact avoidance. 'Pluralism' has a significant negative effect on contact avoidance and on support for residential segregation. 'Monism' has a significant positive influence on the avoidance of future spouse. 'Intratextual fundamentalism' has a significant positive effect on support for residential segregation. Here, we find that that negative attitudes toward religious out-groups, toward religious plurality and toward the interpretation of Holy Scriptures are likely to increase prejudice and discriminatory behaviour. Therefore, these findings support the previous studies of Anthony et al. (2005), Sterkens and Anthony (2008), and Williamson et al. (2010).

The surprising finding of this study is the effect of 'regiocentrism' on the avoidance of future spouse, which is not consistent with our hypothesis (*4r*). Regiocentric attitudes in Indonesia have different characteristics compared to regiocentric attitudes in Western countries. In the study of exclusionary reactions in European countries, both Coenders (2001) and Latcheva (2010) explained that the more nationalistic and chauvinistic attitudes are, the more prejudice and discriminatory the citizens will

be. In contrast, our study provides evidence that a regiocentric attitude, as a sense of belonging to a hometown, reduces hostility and prejudice against out-group members. This finding is consistent with previous studies on Muslim-Christian relations in the Moluccas that cultural bonds will strengthen peaceful relations and reduce hostility toward out-group members (Cooley, 1962; Bartels, 1977). It seems that our respondents still have strong attachments to their hometown or villages, and that their regiocentric attitudes also foster the development of peaceful and traditional relationships with their religious out-groups.

The other intermediate variable that is found to have a significant effect on avoidance of intergroup contact is the distrust of out-groups. Our hypothesis (*4s*) – the stronger that distrust of out-groups is, the stronger will be the avoidance of future spouse and the stronger will be support for residential segregation – is confirmed. This finding supports studies by Tropp et al. (2006). One of our research sites, Ambon, is a place of prolonged tensions between Muslims and Christians since colonial times. The mutual distrust between both groups led to the communal violence that took place between 1999 and 2004 (van Klinken, 2007; Adam, 2010a). It seems that the level of intergroup distrust is still high in present day Ambon, which likely induces avoidance of intergroup contact. Other intermediate variables, such as memory and experience of violence, perceived discrimination, and social dominance orientation (SDO) do not significantly explain avoidance of intergroup contact. Therefore, overall, these findings are inconsistent with the theoretical frameworks, as well as the previous research. ●

CHAPTER 6
OVERALL SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This chapter summarizes all of the research questions and their answers, based on the findings from the survey and interviews. After reviewing the empirical answers, we will describe what progress we made in this study compared to other relevant studies. Also, we propose new research issues for future studies on ethno-religious conflicts. This chapter therefore consists of four sections. The first section describes both the descriptive and explanatory research questions at the individual level. The second section sets out to provide empirical answers, and the third section discusses the contributions of this study to further development of ethnic group conflict theory, methodological approaches to studying conflict, and the general field of conflict studies. The final section presents several possibilities for future research.

The general objective of this study was to find out about the relationship between ethno-religious identification and the avoidance of intergroup contact between Muslims and Christians in two regions in Indonesia (Ambon and Yogyakarta), taking into account factors at the individual level. Following Tajfel's concept of social identity (1978b:63), we define ethno-religious identification as part of a self-concept that builds on the knowledge of membership of a social group, and the simultaneous attribution of value and emotional significance attached to that membership. Referring to Phinney and Rotheram (1987:14), we can further define this concept as an individual's sense of belonging to an ethno-religious group, including their perceptions, feelings, behaviours and attitudes related to their ethno-religious affiliation. Avoidance of intergroup contact is the degree to which

people evade interactions with out-group members, rooted in cognitive and emotional distance from these out-groups. We have endeavoured to observe avoidance of intergroup contact with the help of three indicators: contact avoidance of official and intimate out-group persons; avoidance of out-group members as future spouses; and support for residential segregation (cf. Bogardus, 1925a; Sterkens, 2009:6). In this study, we have investigated the relationship of ethno-religious identification with intergroup contact avoidance at the individual level, including individuals' perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours related to religious in-groups and out-groups.

This study also addresses a gap in the literature between studies that emphasize economic and political competition as main sources of conflict, and studies that focus on prejudice and discrimination as causes of conflict. As mentioned before, previous studies on conflict tend to focus predominantly on actual competition as a source of intergroup conflict, or on prejudice and discrimination (Green and Seher, 2003:510). According to Adam (2010a:43), empirical studies on how individuals support conflict and hostilities are unsatisfactory because they discuss very limited aspects of the problem. This study focuses on the individual level to provide an empirical perspective on latent conflicts which refer to the less explicit and unintended consequences of disputed relationships. In contrast with studies on contextual levels, this research explores how people's ethnic and religious identities play a role in their support of exclusionary reactions against religious out-groups. We focus on the role of ethno-religious identification in latent conflict at the individual level, controlling for other personal characteristics and several intermediate determinants derived from well-developed theories such as perceived threat, salience of ethnic identity, intergroup contact, religiocentrism, pluralism, monism, regiocentrism, and distrust.

In studying ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia, this study aims to examine ethnic group conflict theory, which is relevant to the analysis of ethno-religious conflicts in Western countries. This theory postulates that

the social context of actual interethnic competition may foster stronger perceived ethnic threat, inducing the mechanisms of social (contra-) identification, which in turn contribute to stronger nationalist attitudes and exclusionary reactions (Gijsberts et al., 2004:18). Many studies use this theory to explain the support for exclusionary reactions against minority ethnic groups in Europe, such as Scheepers et al., (2002), Coenders et al., (2007), Tolsma et al., (2008), and Savelkoul et al., (2010). Where those studies provide strong evidence on the significance of actual competition and group identities in exclusionary attitudes, this study uses the theory of ethnic group conflict to analyse intergroup contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians in the cities of Ambon and Yogyakarta in Indonesia. We also utilize several theoretical propositions from other theories as intermediate determinants between different measures of ethno-religious identification and exclusionary attitudes, which will be described in section 6.3. These intermediate determinants are: salience of identity, perceived threat, intergroup contact, religiocentrism, attitudes towards religious plurality, interpretation of sacred writing, perceived discrimination, memory of violence, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation.

6.1 Crucial questions

As mentioned above, the research questions for this study consist of descriptive and explanatory questions at the individual level.

Descriptive questions

This study originated four descriptive questions in order to find out how, and to what extent, ethno-religious identifications and avoidance of intergroup contact are present amongst Muslims and Christian respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta. Also, we describe how Muslims and Christian respondents in both cities express ethno-religious identification and avoidance of

intergroup contact in their daily lives. The complete descriptive research questions are as follows:

> *"To what extent is ethno-religious identification present among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta*?" (Question 1a)
> *"To what extent is avoidance of intergroup contact present among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta*?" (Question 1b)
> *"In which ways is ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians observable in their daily lives*?" (Question 1c)
> *"In which ways is avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims and Christians observable in their daily liv*es?" (Question 1d)

Explanatory questions

Based on social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986, Gijsberts et al., 2004), this study focuses on how ethno-religious identification is related to avoidance of intergroup contact. Thus, the first explanatory question is:

> *"To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta and avoidance of intergroup contact*?" (Question 2a)

In line with ethnic group conflict theory, we also developed a question that examines whether the influence of ethno-religious identification on avoidance of intergroup contact varies according to individual determinants, such as gender, parents' religion, household income, parents' education, occupation and occupational status. Therefore, the second explanatory question is:

> *"To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification and avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims and Christians in Ambon, considering individual determinants such as gender, parents' religion, household income, parents' education, occupation and occupational status*?" (Question 2b)

The last question we proposed is how ethno-religious identification influences the avoidance of intergroup contact, considering particular intermediate determinants such as salience of identity, perceived threat, intergroup contact, religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, interpretation of sacred writing, perceived discrimination, experience of violence, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation. Hence, the third explanatory question is formulated as follows:

> "*To what extent can we explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification and avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta with particular intermediate determinants such as salience of identity, perceived threat, intergroup contact, religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, interpretation of sacred writing, perceived discrimination, experience of violence, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation*?" (Question 2c)

6.2 Empirical answers

Here we describe the empirical answers to both the descriptive and explanatory questions based on our descriptive and multivariate analyses.

Question 1a: "To what extent is ethno-religious identification present among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta?"

From the results of the survey detailed in Chapter Three, we find high levels of religious identification among Muslim respondents, demonstrated by their participation in religious practices, which we define as frequency of praying, attending religious services, and reading the Holy Scriptures. Most Muslims surveyed pray several times a day, almost half of them go to the mosque more than once a week, and a little over half of those surveyed read the Quran more than once a week. Moreover, Muslim respondents show high levels of religious identification indicated by their levels of friendship by religion and participation in religious ceremonies. Almost all

of their friends are from the same religion, nevertheless, they have some religious out-group friends. The Muslims surveyed also frequently attend religious ceremonies, including rites of passage and collective rites. We find a similar pattern among Christian respondents: a high level of religious practices and having more religious in-group friends and fewer religious out-group friends. Most Christians surveyed pray several times a day, almost half of them go to church more than once a week, and a little over half of those surveyed read the Bible once a day. Also Christian respondents show high levels of religious identification indicated by the level of attendance at religious ceremonies. In general, religious identification is strong among both Muslim and Christian respondents.

Besides religious identification, our research also addresses ethnic self-definition and ethnic identification. Ethnic self-definition refers to respondents' statements that they consider themselves to be a member of a specific ethnicity (for example, Javanese or Ambonese). Muslim respondents state that they are Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Ambonese or Butonese, as well as members of some additional, smaller ethnic groups. A little less than half of the Muslim respondents surveyed are Javanese, and almost one-third of them are Ambonese. There were no Muslim respondents identifying as Toraja and Minahasa. Christian respondents identified themselves as Ambonese, Javanese, Chinese, Batak, Toraja, and some other smaller ethnicities. More than half of the Christian respondents identified themselves as Ambonese, with the remainder identifying as Javanese, Chinese, Batak, and some other ethnicities. There were no Christian respondents who identified as Madurese, Minangkabau, Buginese, or Butonese. We combined ethnicity and religion in ethno-religious self-definition because of the considerable overlap. The overwhelming majority (if not all) members of a specific ethnicity in our samples of students are also members of a specific religious group.

With respect to ethnic identification among Muslim respondents, our survey results reveal that they rarely use their ethnic languages, and

only within their families. Muslim respondents participate frequently in only a few kind of ethnic ceremonies, particularly wedding and funeral ceremonies. In addition, differences between mean scores (as described in Chapter Four) indicate that Muslim respondents have many friends from the same ethnicity. Similarly, Christian respondents reported low levels of ethnic language use, infrequent participation in ethnic ceremonies, and many ethnic in-group friends. In general, this indicates lower levels of ethnic identification compared to religious identification among our both Muslim and Christian respondents.

Significant differences between Muslim and Christian respondents in regards to religious and ethnic identification can be observed from the mean values in Chapter Four. Muslim respondents tend to participate in collective rites more often, and have more friends from the same religion, than Christian respondents. In contrast, Christian respondents are more likely to participate in rites of passage, and have more friends from different religions than Muslim respondents. Moreover, Muslim respondents tend to attend ethnic ceremonies and use ethnic languages more often than Christian respondents. Compared to Muslim respondents, Christian respondents have more friends from the same ethnicity, both in Ambon and in Yogyakarta. In addition, regional differences can be observed. Both Muslim and Christian respondents in Ambon show higher levels of religious identification, and lower levels of ethnic identification, than respondents in Yogyakarta.

Question 1b: "To what extent is avoidance of intergroup contact present among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta?"

As was previously mentioned, avoidance of intergroup contact consists of contact avoidance, avoidance of future spouses from another religion, and the support for residential segregation.

In assessing contact avoidance, a distinction can be made between relationships with 'official people' (mayor, police officers, and civil servants), and 'intimate people' (classmates, neighbours, board mates,

and close friends). We have tested a set of indicators of contact avoidance, which resulted in valid and reliable measurements. The measurement we used to assess contact avoidance employs a ranking order from the most avoided subjects to the most accepted subjects. Based on the survey findings described in Chapter Four, we observed that most Muslims are likely to avoid having a Christian mayor. Next, many Muslim respondents are reluctant to have Christians as their board mates and close friends. Only a few Muslim respondents do not accept Christians as their neighbours, policemen, civil servants, and classmates.Most Christian respondents indicated they would prefer not to have a Muslim mayor. Christian respondents also indicated that they are reluctant to have Muslims serving as policemen and civil servants. Only a few Christian respondents do not accept Muslims as their close friends, board mates, neighbours, and classmates.

The survey results also show that in both Yogyakarta and Ambon most Muslim respondents do not accept people from different religions as possible future spouses, and they do not want to live in a neighbourhood inhabited by people from other religions. Christian respondents in both cities demonstrated a similar pattern: a high level of avoidance of future spouses from a different religion, and support for residential segregation.

Overall, the level of contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians is fairly low in our samples of students in Ambon and Yogyakarta. The level of avoidance of future spouse however is relatively high. Total mean scores of contact avoidance and avoidance of future spouse are .11 and .64 respectively (Likert scale between zero and one). The level of support for residential segregation is moderate, with a total mean score of .33. Still there are significant differences between the two religions, with Muslim respondents showing higher level of contact avoidance. Also, in both cities, Muslim respondents generally show higher levels of contact avoidance of future spouses from a different religion, and support for residential segregation, than Christians. These phenomena show that there are several barriers to contact between Muslims and Christians. Our

respondents mentioned that differences in religion, values, and attitudes are barriers to interreligious contact.

As was the case with ethno-religious identification, we discovered significant regional differences in patterns of contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians. Survey data indicates that Muslim respondents in Ambon are more likely to avoid contact with Christians compared with those in Yogyakarta. Similarly, Muslim respondents in Ambon have a higher preference for living in religiously homogenous neighbourhoods than Muslims in Yogyakarta. Compared to Muslim respondents in Ambon, Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta are more likely to avoid Christians, and are more likely to avoid future spouses from other religions. A similar pattern is apparent for Christian respondents in Ambon who avoid contact with Muslims and avoid Muslims as their possible future spouses. In addition, Christians in Ambon show more support for residential segregation than those in Yogyakarta. The prolonged rivalry between Muslims and Christians, and the recent violence in Ambon in 2011, apparently affected the answers of respondents in that region. Overall, Muslim and Christian respondents in Ambon have higher levels of intergroup contact avoidance than respondents in Yogyakarta.

Question 1c: "In which ways is ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians observable in their daily lives?"

As described in Chapter Four, findings from the interviews we conducted help to confirm the the data from survey results, adding to observations on religious identification among Muslim and Christian respondents in their daily lives by documenting their religious practice, participation in religious ceremonies, and the religious identities of their friends. In the interviews we found that Muslim respondents attend Friday prayers at mosques that are located inside or around campus, celebrate several religious ceremonies (including *fasting, Idul Fitri,* and *Idul Adha*), perform collective religious services at campus preaching institutes

(for example *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK*), recite the Quran in the evenings, and pray before starting an activity. Most Christian respondents attend weekly mass on Sunday at churches that are located inside or around campus, celebrate some religious ceremonies (including Christmas, Easter, and baptisms), pray collectively on campus, recite the Bible in the morning, and pray before doing something. Students' patterns of interaction on campus could serve as an indicator of their religious identification. In reality, however, many institutes of higher education in Indonesia are affiliated with a religious tradition or even a particular religious denomination, which means that there is little or no opportunity to interact with people outside of a student's religious group.

Findings from interviews were also used to support survey data on how Muslims and Christians use local languages, maintain friendships with people of the same ethnicity, and view attendance at ethnic ceremonies (like funerals and weddings) as expressions of their ethnic identification in daily life. The responses we gathered in interviews provided additional information about the processes of ethnic identification in both regions. Despite the fact that several kinds of ethnic ceremony are still practiced in Ambon and Yogyakarta, these ceremonies are often mixed with religious ceremonies. Interviewees indicated that religious groups in both regions, especially those in more urban areas, have abandoned such ethnic ceremonies and now only attend religious ceremonies, with the exception of weddings and funerals. In addition, quite a few respondents reported that they make use of their ethnic identities in pursuit of profitable interactions with people who share the same ethnic identification. Moreover, many respondents no longer affiliate with their ethnic traditions and rituals or ethnic ceremonies due to the influence of stricter or more conservative religious values.

No additional dimensions of ethnic and religious identification emerged in our interviews that were not covered by the survey findings. However, interviews did provide some contrast to sections of the survey findings. For instance, the survey data indicate that few respondents are

members of religious and ethnic organizations, while in interviews many respondents reported that many students become members or followers of these kinds of organizations in both Ambon and Yogyakarta. The campus-based religious organizations that are easily observed in both cities are the Campus Preaching Institutes (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK*), the Christian Students Associations (*Perkumpulan Mahasiswa Kristen, PMK*), and the Catholic Students Associations (*Keluarga Mahasiswa Katolik, KMK*). In Ambon, many campus-based ethnic organizations represent the various ethno-linguistic groups in Maluku, such as *Sepa*, *Kei*, and *East Seram*. Local politicians and government officials in Maluku often make use of campus-based ethnic organizations in Ambon to promote their interests and their bids for leadership in gubernatorial and mayoral elections. In Yogyakarta, there are 30 campus-based ethnic organizations representing ethnic groups from outside of Java, complete with provisions for student housing from regional governments.

*Question 1d: "In which ways is avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims and Christians observable in their daily liv*es?"

As detailed in Chapter Four, findings from the interviews generally confirm survey results demonstrating that intergroup contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians can be observed in daily life through the use of measurements on contact avoidance, avoidance of future spouses from another religion, and support for residential segregation. Additional information on contact avoidance emerged in interviews conducted in the two sites. For example, contact avoidance between Muslim and Christian respondents can be seen in daily life in both cities, mainly with respect to the respondents' tendency to avoid voting for a mayor, or expressing support for hiring police forces from the religious out-group. Consequently, in the elections for governor and city mayor, both groups indicated that they prefer to have a governor and a mayor that share their own religion. Many Muslim respondents in Yogyakarta mention that their reason for electing officials who share their religion is in accordance with the religious conviction that

Muslims should select a leader from the ranks of their religious fellows. Muslim respondents in Ambon said that Christian leaders tend to care only their fellow co-religionists. In the city of Ambon, both groups rejected the idea of hiring police from religious out-groups, as they suspect police officers of only protecting their religious fellows during periods of religious conflict.

Strategies to evade or avoid contact with classmates and board mates from different religious groups were apparent in interviews with respondents in Ambon and Yogyakarta. We also observed contact avoidance at universities in both cities after class sessions, where students were grouped or gathered according to their religion and ethnicity. To a certain degree, students in both cities seem to avoid interaction with classmates who come from different religious groups or who have different religious beliefs. Choosing not to live in a boarding house occupied by people of different religions is common in both cities, with our respondents reporting that they consider the boarding houses to be places to preserve their religious beliefs and practices. It is difficult to find any boarding houses inhabited by people of different religions in Ambon, as the city has been religiously segregated since the religious conflicts starting in 1999. Unlike the survey findings, however, interview findings did not provide much more information on the avoidance of civil servants, close friends, and neighbours from religious out-groups.

Based on the interviews we conducted, we found evidence that respondents in both Ambon and Yogyakarta tend to avoid the possibility of a future spouse from another religion, while support for residential segregation is more prevalent among respondents in Ambon. Muslim and Christian respondents in both cities express that they avoid having a spouse from different religion because of religious laws that prohibit inter-religious marriage. Both groups also avoid living in a neighbourhood inhabited by

people from different religions. In daily life, therefore, both Muslim and Christian respondents live in residential segregation based on religion, instead of living in religiously heterogeneous neighbourhoods.

Question 2a: "*To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta and avoidance of intergroup contact?"*

Based on the *bi-variate* analyses in Chapter Four, several measures of religious and ethnic identification have significantly moderate correlations with avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslim respondents. We find that among Muslims, having religious and ethnic in-group friends is positively related to contact avoidance, while having religious out-group friends is negatively related to contact avoidance. Also, participation in rites of passage and in religious organizations is positively related to avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion, while having religious out-group friends and participation in ethnic organizations is negatively related to the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion. Moreover, having religious and ethnic in-group friends is positively related to support for residential segregation, but having religious out-group friends is negatively related to support for residential segregation. Among Christian respondents, we observed that having ethnic in-group friends is positively related to contact avoidance. In addition, participation in ethnic ceremonies is positively related to the avoidance of future spouses from a different religion. Finally, having religious and ethnic in-group friends, and using ethnic languages, is positively related to the support for residential segregation, but having religious out-group friends is negatively related to support for residential segregation.

Our multivariate analyses in Chapter Five demonstrate that ethno-religious self-definition, along with particular measures of ethno-religious identification, significantly account for avoidance of intergroup contact. Apart from *Sundanese Muslims,* all other Muslim ethnic groups are likely

to score higher on contact avoidance than the reference category of ethnic groups, *Javanese Muslims*. In contrast, Christian ethnic groups are likely to score lower on contact avoidance than *Javanese Muslims*. Muslim ethnic groups also tend to show more avoidance of future spouses from a different religion than *Javanese Muslims*, with the exception of *Sundanese Muslims* and *Madurese Muslims*. In contrast, Christian ethnic groups tend to show less avoidance of future spouses from different religions compared with *Javanese Muslims*. Moreover, Muslim ethnic groups are more likely to support residential segregation than *Javanese Muslims*. With the exception of *Ambonese Christians*, Christian ethnic groups are less likely to support residential segregation than *Javanese Muslims*.

The *multivariate analyses* reveal that some measures of religious identification and one measure of ethnic identification have considerable effects on avoidance of intergroup contact. Consistent with our hypotheses, people who participate more frequently in religious practices and those who have fewer friends from different religions and ethnicities show more avoidance of intergroup contact. In contrast, people who participate more often in rites of passage, and those who have more friends from the same religion, show less avoidance of intergroup contact. In particular, people who have more friends from the same religion and fewer friends from other religions tend to avoid contact with religious out-group members. Furthermore, people who participate more frequently in religious practices and those who have fewer friends from different religions are more likely to avoid somebody from the religious out-group as their possible future spouse. Finally, people who participate more often in rites of passage, those who have a greater number of friends who share their religion and ethnicity, and those who have fewer friends from different religions tend to support residential segregation.

Other elements of religious identification, such as participation in collective rites, and participation in religious organizations, do not have significant effects on contact avoidance, avoidance of a future spouse from

a different religion, and support for residential segregation. Also, several elements of ethnic identification, such as participation in ethnic ceremonies, ethnic organizations, and the use of ethnic languages, do not contribute to the explanation of the avoidance of intergroup contact either. Overall, these findings are consistent with social identity theory. Social identity theory says that social identification is more likely to induce negative attitudes toward out-groups and positive attitudes toward in-groups (Turner, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986).

Question 2b: To what extent is there a relationship between ethno-religious identification and avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims and Christians in Ambon, considering individual determinants such as gender, parents' religion, household income, parents' education, occupation and occupational status?

Our *bi-variate* analyses in Chapter Four display several moderate correlations between particular individual determinants and avoidance of intergroup contact. Among Muslim respondents, we find that household income and occupational status are positively related to contact avoidance, while parents' education is negatively associated with contact avoidance. Men show lower levels of avoidance of a spouse from a different religion than women. Occupational status and occupation are positively related to support for residential segregation, while household income and parents' education are negatively associated with support for residential segregation. Among Christian respondents, we find that differences in gender, household income, and parents' education are positively related to avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion.

Based on the *multivariate* analyses in Chapter Five, we find that only particular individual determinants significantly explain avoidance of intergroup contact. Respondents from families employed in trade are more likely to avoid contact with religious out-group members than those from farmer families. Women avoid future spouses from other religious

traditions more than men do, and respondents from middle-income households are less likely to avoid the religious out-group as a pool for future spouses compared to those from high-income households. People from families employed in trade tend to avoid members of religious out-groups as their future spouses than those from farmer families.. People from families with labourers' backgrounds are more inclined to support residential segregation than those from families who are self-employed. Those from families with a background in trade are more likely to support residential segregation than those from farmer families. Overall, there are significant relationships between particular individual determinants and avoidance of intergroup contact. In contrast to our expectations, however, some individual determinants, such as parents' religion and education, do not significantly explain contact avoidance, avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion, or support for residential segregation.

Consistent with our hypothesis, the stronger that people's ethno-religious identification is (the more they participate in religious practices and the more friends they have from the same religion), the higher the level of avoidance of intergroup contact. This is true even after controlling for gender, household income, occupation and occupational status. In summary, these findings support ethnic group conflict theory, which states that certain individual determinants are closely related to exclusionary attitudes, because the level of competition and perceived threat might be different between groups (Gijsberts et al., 2004). However, differing from Sidanius's study (2000) that states men express more prejudice than women, in this study females tend to avoid members of religious out-groups as their future spouses more than males. Also, this study is not consistent with Tolsma et al. (2008), who explained that avoidance of inter-ethnic marriage is more prevalent among the lower classes. In contrast, this study shows that avoidance of inter-religious marriage is more prevalent among the middle class.

Question 2c: To what extent can we explain the relationship between ethno-religious identification and avoidance of intergroup contact among Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta with particular intermediate determinants such as salience of identity, perceived threat, intergroup contact, religiocentrism, attitudes toward religious plurality, interpretation of sacred writing, perceived discrimination, experience of violence, nationalistic attitudes, distrust, and social dominance orientation?

The *bi-variate* analyses in Chapter Four shows several moderate correlations between particular intermediate determinants and avoidance of intergroup contact. Among Muslim respondents, we find that religious salience, perceived threat, quality of contact, positive in-group attitudes, negative out-group attitudes, monism, hermeneutic interpretation, perceived discrimination, and distrust have positive correlations to contact avoidance; but quantity of contact and pluralism have negative correlations to contact avoidance. In addition, monism, fundamentalism, and national pride have positive correlations to avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion. Furthermore, ethnic saliency, perceived threat, positive in-group attitudes, negative out-group attitudes, monism, fundamentalism, and distrust have positive correlations to support for residential segregation, while quantity of contact, quality of contact, and pluralism have negative correlations to support for residential segregation. Among Christian respondents, we discovered that perceived threat, negative out-group attitudes, and fundamentalism have positive correlations to contact avoidance, while quality of contact has a negative correlation to contact avoidance. Also, quality of contact has a positive correlation to avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion. Finally, ethnic saliency, perceived threat, positive in-group attitudes, negative out-group attitudes, monism, fundamentalism, hermeneutic interpretation, and distrust have positive correlations to support for residential segregation, while quantity of contact has a negative correlation to support for residential segregation.

The *multivariate* analyses in Chapter Five show that the relationships between ethno-religious identification and avoidance of intergroup contact can be explained by several particular intermediate determinants: ethnic saliency, perceived threat, quantity and quality of contact, religiocentrism (negative out-group attitudes), monism, pluralism, fundamentalism, regiocentric attitudes, and distrust of religious out-groups. Consistent with our expectations, salience of ethnic identity is linked to support for residential segregation. Also, the stronger that perceived threat is, the stronger contact avoidance and support of residential segregation are.

A few generalizations can be made based on the multivariate analyses. First, more intergroup contact and a more positive evaluation of this contact are likely to reduce support for residential segregation. Next, stronger negative attitudes toward religious out-groups induce contact avoidance. Views that support religious pluralism reduce contact avoidance, while religious monism is likely to increase the tendency to avoid a future spouse from a different religion. Religious fundamentalism is likely to reinforce support for residential segregation. Differing from our original hypothesis, stronger regiocentric attitudes reduce the tendency to avoid a future spouse from a different religion. Lastly, as we expected, stronger distrust of religious out-groups leads to more contact avoidance and a greater tendency to avoid a future spouse from a different religion. Contrary to our expectations, other intermediate variables such as religious saliency, positive (religious) in-group attitudes, hermeneutic interpretation, perceived discrimination, memories of violence, direct violence, indirect violence, nationalism, national pride, dominance, and equality orientations have no significant influence on contact avoidance, avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion, and support for residential segregation.

Overall, these findings provide evidence in support of ethnic group conflict theory and the other theories that we used in this study. Findings on perceived threat support the proposal made in ethnic group conflict theory that perceived threat is the most significant determinant of prejudicial

and discriminatory attitudes toward out-groups (Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010; Savelkoul et al., 2011). Also, our findings on ethnic saliency confirm the previous studies theorizing that there is a correlation between stronger ethnic identification and ethnic saliency, which in turn induce exclusionary attitudes (Brewer and Campbell, 1976; Brewer and Miller, 1996). Also, our findings on intergroup contact are consistent with the contact hypothesis, which explains that contact with out-group members will reduce hostilities toward out-groups (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006:766). Our findings on the topic of religiosity support previous research on religiocentrism and pluralism conducted by Anthony et al., (2005) and Sterkens and Anthony (2008). Their work demonstrated that negative attitudes toward religious out-groups induce hostility towards religious out-groups, while more pluralistic views combined with less religious monism reduces hostility. The findings from our research are also consistent with those of Williamson et al., (2010) who concluded that literal interpretations of the Holy Scriptures contribute to prejudice toward out-groups, while non-literal interpretations are related to less out-group derogation. Moreover, the findings on distrust confirm previous studies that emphasize how lower trust can solidify group identity, which in turn tends to reinforce exclusionary reactions (Tropp et al., 2006). However, our findings on regiocentric attitudes do not support previous studies that claim nationalistic attitudes are likely to increase exclusionary reactions (Coenders, 2001; Latcheva, 2010).

6.3 Innovations and progress

Based on the empirical findings, this study makes several contributions to both theoretical and methodological approaches in the field of conflict studies in Indonesia.

Contribution to empirical research questions

This study proposed some theory-driven explanations for contact avoidance between ethno-religious groups in Indonesia. We addressed several

socially relevant research questions on the relationship of ethno-religious identification with intergroup contact avoidance as a crucial dimension of ethnic exclusionism. These are questions that have not been previously explored in the field of Indonesian conflict studies. We tested several hypotheses concerning the partial influence of individual determinants and different measures of religious identification, as well as intermediary variables on exclusionary reactions. Previous conflict studies on Indonesia were predominantly descriptive, analysing how conflicts between ethno-religious groups arose and developed.

However, our research parallels earlier empirical studies on inter-ethnic group relations in Indonesia, such as Warnaen's study (1979) on ethnic stereotypes and Tuti's study (2008) on ethnic identity and prejudice. We adopted several questions on ethnic identification from Tuti's studies in the development of questions on ethnic and religious identifications. In contrast to these earlier studies, our research focuses on how ethno-religious identification affects contact avoidance, even after considering several individual social characteristics and intermediate determinants. In addition, this study emphasizes the relationship between Muslims and Christians, while Warnaen and Tuti's studies were primarily focused on inter-ethnic relations. Another recent study on religious identity in Indonesia by Hadiwitanto (2014) also tests several hypotheses, but his study focuses on the influence of religious identification on generalized trust.

Contribution to theory

This research examined a series of theories that guided empirical research on exclusionary reactions. As previously mentioned, this study utilizes theories that are usually used to analyse conflictual relationships between ethnic groups in European countries. According to ethnic group conflict theory, perceived threat is the most important intermediate determinant between ethnic identification and exclusionary attitudes toward out-groups (Scheepers et al., 2002:18). Other theoretical propositions identify

alternative intermediate determinants as the most significant ones. Studies on salience of identity (Brewer and Miller, 1996; Duckit, 2006) propose that ethnic and religious saliency is likely to induce exclusionary reactions. The contact hypothesis (Brown et al., 2007) provides evidence that intergroup contact will likely reduce negative attitudes towards out-groups. Literature on religion (Sterkens 2001; Sterkens and Anthony, 2008; Anthony et al. 2015; Williamson et al., 2010) suggests that religiocentrism, monism, and fundamentalism are more likely to reinforce hostile attitudes towards out-groups, while religious pluralism and hermeneutic interpretation of Holy Scriptures are more likely to reduce those attitudes. Studies on communal violence (Doherty and Pooley, 1997) emphasize that memories and experiences of violence contribute to exclusionary reactions. Studies on discrimination (Iceland and Wilkes, 2000) say that perceived discrimination induces social avoidance. Empirical studies have found that nationalism and regiocentrism increase exclusionary reactions (Coenders, 2001; Latcheva, 2010). Other studies on trust (Tropp et al., 2006) propose that distrust reinforces prejudice. Finally, according to studies by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), social dominance orientation (SDO) is a determinant of exclusionary reactions.

Based on the results of the multivariate analyses, a combination of the aforementioned determinants can explain how ethno-religious identification is related to avoidance of intergroup contact. Consequently, the majority of the theoretical propositions outlined above are relevant for analysing contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia. We have found that perceived threat and religiocentrism increase contact avoidance, while quality of contact and religious pluralism are more likely to reduce it. Religious monism and distrust of out-groups increase the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion, but regiocentric attitudes reduce the avoidance of contact. Ethnic saliency, perceived threat, fundamentalism, and distrust of out-groups tends to induce support for residential segregation, while quantity of contact and religious pluralism

are more likely to reduce it. Other determinants, such as experience of violence, perceived discrimination, and social dominance orientation (SDO), do not significantly explain avoidance of intergroup contact. These findings are summarized in Figure 6.1. Overall, the ethnic group conflict theory and other theoretical propositions that are supported by evidence in Western countries are very worthwhile for analysing ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia.

Figure 6.1 *Intergroup contact avoidance in Indonesia*



Contribution to research methods

This study contributes to the development of research methods by adopting both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This kind of mixed method approach has not previously been applied to studies of ethno-religious

conflict in Indonesia. Our complementary data collection methods consisted of a survey and interviews. Topics we did not cover in the survey were covered in the interviews, and findings from the survey were explored in more detail over the course of the interviews. The simultaneous application of both methods of data collection helped to improve our research. Firstly, at the analytical level, triangulation between quantitative and qualitative findings increased the validity and reliability of our findings. Secondly, distinct from conflict studies that only use a qualitative approach, this empirical study collected information from a wide group of student respondents through the application of large-scale sampling of individuals. In addition, the study was able to provide illustrations of contact avoidance and most intermediate determinants in the daily lives of our respondents, providing more context than a traditional quantitative analysis.

Overall, the triangulation of data was extremely worthwhile. Findings from the survey were illustrated and explored in more detail by findings from the interviews. In the interviews, we did not find other relevant dimensions of the measurements at the individual level that were not covered in the questionnaire. The findings from both the interviews and the surveys were complementary. Through the interviews, for example, we identified several extra reasons for avoiding contact with religious out-group members (i.e. due to balance of power in provincial government, in a moment of communal violence) and for expressing ways of utilizing ethnic identity in daily life, but this information did not undermine the validity and reliability of our quantitative measurements. In general, most of the findings from the interviews support and confirm findings from the survey. Despite the discovery that there are still some limitations on the level of analysis (described in the next section), the mixed methods approach provided more information from fieldwork both in terms of representation of the respondents and in terms of the description of social contexts.

Contribution to conflict studies in Indonesia

Following Gismar (2000) and Adam (2010a), this empirical study addresses a gap in the literature in the field of conflict studies, where the scholarly literature primarily focuses on economic and political competition. While most of the previous studies on conflict in Indonesia pay more attention to the contextual levels of ethno-religious conflict in particular areas, this study comes up with a set of measurements to investigate latent conflict at the individual level both in an area of conflict and also in an area that has not experienced conflict. This study also explains to what extent individuals support contact avoidance by making use of their ethno-religious identities, while most previous studies on conflict discuss tensions and communal violence between ethno-religious groups.

Studies on ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia generally emphasize that ethnic or religious identity are not the main causes of the conflict, but that ethnic and religious identities are mobilized and socially constructed at the moment of intergroup conflict (Van Klinken, 2007:53-71; Spiyer, 2002:26-27). These studies predominantly focus on economic and political competition as the basis of ethnic or religious conflicts. For example, despite his focus on ethno-religious identity, Van Klinken (2007) proposes that political competition between political elites, and the prolonged rivalries between Muslims and Christians in the Moluccas, could be the main cause of the religious conflict in 1999. Another example is Wilson's study on religious conflict in North Maluku (2008) that describes how political forces at the national level, and changes in political structure during the political reformation in 1998, stimulated religious conflict between Christians and Muslims. In opposition to those approaches, this study focuses on the individual level to investigate how ordinary people support hostile attitudes toward religious out-groups by primarily referring to their ethno-religious identity.

In contrast to previous studies about conflict in Indonesia, this empirical study is innovative in that it focuses on the individual level in order

to answer how, and to what extent, ethno-religious identification supports latent conflict. It is clear that ethno-religious identity itself can generate exclusionary reactions, in particular, the avoidance of intergroup contact. As we described earlier, the avoidance of intergroup contact may result from a prolonged conflict between ethno-religious groups. Findings from this study on ethno-religious identification support other studies that document how conservative religious beliefs flourished, and religious identities seemed to become stronger, in Indonesia after the political reformation in 1998 (Van Bruinessen, 2003; Hasan, 2006; Feillard & Madinier, 2011). Nevertheless, differing from those studies that predominantly focus on the radicalization of some Muslim groups in Indonesia, this empirical research emphasizes latent conflict, particularly intergroup contact avoidance, between Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Yogyakarta.

Contribution to the discourse of social distance in non-Western countries

Finally, this study sheds new light on the discourse about social distance in the context of non-Western countries. As stated earlier, in this study, social distance is identified with support for contact avoidance. In addition, the avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion, and support for residential segregation have been conceptually included on in the definition of social distance, but in a separate measurement. Here, we describe several differences between contact avoidance in Western countries and in Indonesia, based on our findings. In Western countries, individuals of other ethnic groups who are traditionally avoided the most are, in order of importance: (future) spouse, close friends, neighbours, colleagues, and fellow citizens (Bogardus, 1925b; Wark and Galliher, 2007). Apparently, in Indonesia, the people prefer to have officials (mayor, police officers, and civil servants), and intimates (close friends, housemates, neighbours, and colleague) from the same religions.

In Western countries, avoidance of spouses from different out-groups is part of the social distance scale, which indicates that choosing a spouse

is a part of an individual's attitudes. In this study, however, avoidance of a future spouse from a different religion is separated from the social distance scale. In our estimation, choosing a spouse in most cases is not only decided by individuals, but also by families and other social institutions to which individuals are affiliated. Lots of people have written to the contrary that in the context of Indonesia, as said before, it is difficult to register an inter-religious marriage according to Indonesian marriage law; a marriage is legal if it is conducted according to religious laws that definitely prohibit interreligious marriage. Religious practitioners respect these rules, so inter-religious marriage is not common in Indonesia. Moreover, in Western countries, people seemingly avoid living in neighbourhoods inhabited by out-groups, mostly due to the unequal socio-economic levels (Iceland and Wilkes, 2006). In Indonesia, according to this study, people prefer to live in a neighbourhood inhabited by their in-group predominantly because they want to preserve their ethno-religious identities, not due to the effects of differences in socio-economic status.

We can identify several determinants of intergroup contact avoidance besides ethno-religious identification. People who have a less positive image of intergroup contact, a more negative attitude towards out-groups, and less belief in the concept of religious pluralism will likely avoid contact with out-group members. Those who have more religiously monistic views, less regiocentric views, and more distrust of out-groups are more likely to avoid out-group members as their future spouses. Also, people who have more ethnic saliency, perceive more threat from out-groups, have less contact with out-group members, have less belief in the concept of religious pluralism and more fundamental views, and are more distrustful of out-groups are more likely to support residential segregation. In addition, avoidance of intergroup contact is more prevalent among middle and upper classes based on their household income, occupation, and occupational status. In summary, this study is able to explore, explain, and compare social distance between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia, as well as providing a set of

measurements of social distance for non-Western countries derived from indicators of social distance in Western countries.

6.4 New research issues

Further studies on contact avoidance between ethno-religious groups

Despite the fact that we have reported a number of interesting findings from this study, research on contact avoidance can be further developed by utilizing an approach that distinguishes between individual and contextual levels, as well as by adding more research sites in cities inhabited by various ethno-religious groups, and by using more heterogeneous and representative samples. Further study, which distinguishes influences at individual and contextual levels, will further contribute to theoretical insights. Our study is limited because it does not analyse contextual factors such as recent migration, group size, history, and actual (versus perceived) intergroup competition by means of quantitative measurements. Although we discussed these contextual factors in our summary of the research setting in Chapter One, and in the discussion of interviews in Chapters Four and Five, we did not include them in the regression analyses, because our research sites were too limited. In order to provide a better representation of Indonesian society, it is necessary to duplicate studies like this in areas affected by ethno-religious violence, such as Poso, Sambas, and Sampit between 1998 and 2001. We also suggest that such studies be conducted in religiously pluralistic areas that seem to enjoy peaceful relations between ethno-religious groups, such as Jakarta, Surabaya, and Medan. Finally, we suggest that future studies use representative samples drawn from groups in society other than university students. Conducting more studies on avoidance of intergroup contact with multilevel analyses, in more areas, and with samples that are more representative, will enable us to draw a map of latent conflicts in Indonesia.

Studies on the importance of ethno-religious identity among the middle classes in daily lives

It is necessary to develop studies on the importance of ethno-religious identification among middle class individuals in their daily lives. This idea stems from the findings of this study, and other relevant studies on the development of fundamentalism in Indonesia. According to our research results, members of middle class, mainly students, are more likely to attend religious practices and ceremonies than to attend ethnic ceremonies. Also, avoidance of intergroup contact is more prevalent among people from the middle class, upper-level occupations, and people who are employed. Other studies propose that most people in Indonesia display a strong sense of religious identity, and consider their religious beliefs to be important in their daily lives. For instance, Hefner (1987) and Van Bruinessen (2003) emphasize that the spread of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia has increased since the 1980s, when the authoritarian government marginalized pious Muslims in politics. Other studies on charismatic Christians by Koning (2011) point to the spread of Christian conservatism among middle class groups in certain denominations. Consequently, religion in Indonesia has become a point of reference for creating a social identity, which has a tendency to increase negative attitudes towards out-groups and positive attitudes towards in-groups. Although ethnicity is still important in the present day Indonesia, religion seems to have become more important in decision-making and daily interactions. We hope that future studies will further develop measurements of religiosity for non-Western countries.

Studies on perceived threat in competition between ethno-religious groups

This study proposes that future research is needed on the development of perceived threat in political, economic, and socio-cultural competition between ethno-religious groups. This idea derives from the findings provided by this study showing that perceived threat can contribute to contact avoidance and can increase support for residential segregation. Perceived

threat is the most important determinant of exclusionary reactions, which indicates that competition between ethno-religious groups has a significant effect on how these groups relate to each other in contemporary Indonesia. Future studies should identify determinants of perceived threat and work to distinguish between symbolic and realistic threat. Furthermore, these studies could examine how differences in power, status, and group size between ethno-religious groups lead certain groups to feel more threatened in political, economic, and socio-cultural fields. These kinds of studies are important at this pivotal moment in Indonesia, since certain ethno-religious groups still dominate political and economic competition in certain regions, which creates an unequal distribution of resources. As demonstrated in our research, perceived threat and competition can still be found in educational and government institutions, which are characterized by divisions between ethno-religious groups. Consequently, several latent conflicts between ethno-religious groups that are expressed through contact avoidance have emerged, and have the potential to transform into communal violence in the future.

Studies on the evolution of religious tolerance between Muslims and Christians

With the completion of this research, we propose a new study on the evolution of religious tolerance in Indonesia, which can be identified at the level of non-cooperation between religious groups and in attitudes towards religious plurality. According to this study, both Muslims and Christians should pay attention to intergroup contact and religious pluralism in order to support religious tolerance as well as to prevent the spread of religious conservatism. Consequently, future research should emphasize the evolution of religious values among Muslims and Christians, and whether their religious values become relatively more conservative or more moderate. Future studies could focus on the frequency of interactions between Muslims and Christians, and specifically on evidence of more or less contact avoidance between both groups of believers. In future research,

intergroup contact and religious pluralism could become determinants that reduce exclusionary attitudes. Also, it is necessary to seek other predictive values that impact on the evolution of religious tolerance and on the increase of religious conservatism. For example, according to this study, regiocentric attitudes may become a determinant to reduce exclusionary reactions between ethno-religious groups.

Studies on ethno-religious identity and social cohesion in Ambon and Yogyakarta

Given our conclusions about contact avoidance in these Indonesian cities, we also deem it necessary to study the formation of both formal and informal networks between ethno-religious groups to strengthen civic society and to prevent ethno-religious conflict in the future. This proposition is based on our analysis that contact avoidance between Muslims and Christians has become widespread in Ambon and has started growing in Yogyakarta. This situation has the potential to disturb social cohesion and inter-religious relationships. Furthermore, the absence of either formal or informal interactions between ethno-religious groups in most cases tends to evoke communal violence (Varshney, 2002:9). Referring to several studies, ethno-religious identity also can be used in the creation of peaceful relationships. For example, studies on alliances between villages in the Moluccas, such as those by Bartels (1977) and Lowry & Littlejohn (2006), mention that hostilities between villages from different religions are reduced when these villages are tied under some cultural bonds like the *pela* and *adat* systems. Another study on Muslim and Christian relationships in Yogyakarta (Jae, 2012:49-51) describes how moderate leaders from both groups developed many interfaith dialogues in 1998 when a series of incidents of religious violence erupted in several cities. For future research, therefore, we propose to develop an idea of how ethnic or religious identifications can generate peaceful relationships between ethno-religious groups. This hypothesis is acceptable as shared social boundaries between groups can be used to prevent hostilities and violent conflict. ●

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Factor Analyses

Table 1. *Salience of identity*

Scale label for full population	Muslim			Christian		
	Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Ethnic	religion		Ethnic	religion
260. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions	.59	.76		.56	.76	
259. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence in my daily life	.56	.76		.64	.80	
261. My ethnic identity has a great deal of influence on how I relate to others	.52	.70		.45	.64	
257. My ethnic identity is very important to me	.42	.64		.39	.62	
258. I see my self as a committed member of my ethnic group	.29	.55		.42	.65	
43. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions	.64		.89	.67		.82
42. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence in my daily life	.77		.81	.58		.78
44. My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I relate to others	.56		.73	.46		.64
Initial eigenvalues		3.18	2.03		3.38	1.70
% variance of squared loadings extraction		34.01	20.63		36.33	15.82
RELIABILITY		**.81**	**.84**		**.82**	**.77**

Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)

Factor	Religion
Ethnic	.22

Factor correlation matrix (Christian)

Factor	Religion
Ethnic	.35

Table 2. *Perceived group threat*

Scale label for full population	Muslim			Christian		
	Com.	Factor loading Pattern Matrix		Com.	Factor loading Pattern Matrix	
					Perceived threat	
		Political economy	Socio-cultural		Political economy	Socio-cultural
153. The migration of people of different religious groups to my community is a threat to my own religious groups	.71	.91		.75	.95	
152. I am afraid that customs of my group will be lost due to the presence of other religious groups	.59	.84		.53	.78	
154. I am worried that job prospects for members of my group will decline due to the presence of other religious groups	.64	.81		.71	.83	
158. I am worried that the security in my neighbourhood will decline due to the presence of other religious groups	.64	.75		.69	.59	
156. I am worried that security in my university will decline due to the presence of other religious groups	.64	.68		.62	.78	
159. The religious practices of people from other religious groups threaten our own way of life	.59	.64		.55	.54	
155. I am worried that study grant opportunities will decline due to the presence of other religious groups	.54	.56		.59	.73	
163. The chances of getting space in a boarding house will decline due to the presence of other groups	.41	.47		.54	.61	
160. People from other religious groups are given preferential treatment by the authorities	.67		.78	.64		.80
161. Members of other religious groups are in control of business opportunities	.59		.75	.74		.81
Initial eigenvalues		5.66	1.11		5.93	1.13
% variance of squared loadings extraction		52.68	7.40		55.69	8.06
RELIABILITY		**.91**			**.92**	

Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)

Factor	Socio-cultural
Political economy	.57

Factor correlation matrix (Christian)

Factor	Socio-cultural
Political economy	.58

Table 3. *Quality of contact*

Scale label for full population	Muslim				Christian			
	Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix			Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		
		Closeness and cooperative ness	evaluation	equality		Closeness and cooperative ness	evaluation	equality
133. How much do you cooperate with your board/dorm/housemates from other religious groups?	.76	.91			.55	.70		
131. How much do you cooperate with your neighbours from other religious groups?	.64	.88			.44	.48		
121. How close are you with your neighbours from other religious groups?	.63	.83			.56	.69		
135. How much do you cooperate with your relatives from other religious groups?	.75	.83			.60	.61		
123. How close are you with your board/dorm/housemates from other religious groups?	.67	.80			.63	.70		
134. How much do you cooperate with your close friends from other religious groups?	.78	.79			.70	.82		
125. How close are you with your relatives from other religious groups?	.74	.74			.62	.71		
132. How much do you cooperate with your classmates from other religious groups?	.73	.73			.57	.72		
122. How close are you with your classmates from other religious groups?	.73	.66			.64	76		
124. How close are you with your close friends from other religious groups?	.78	.66			.69	.78		
117. How would you rate your contact with them? As classmates	.88		.92		.64		-.77	
119. How would you rate your contact with them? As close friends	.84		.89		.81		-.83	
116. How would you rate your contact with them? As neighbours	.86		.89		.79		-.80	
120. How would you rate your contact with them? As relatives	.79		.89		.76		-.78	
118. How would you rate your contact with them? As board/dorm/housemates	.80		.86		.77		-.78	
129. How equal would you say you are with your close friends from other religious groups?	.89			-.96	.76			-.81
127. How equal would you say you are with your classmates from other religious groups?	.88			-.92	.75			-.81

128. How equal would you say you are with your board/dorm/housemates from other religious groups?	.85			-.88	.68			-.75
126. How equal would you say you are with your neighbours from other religious groups?	.76			-.85	.75			-.82
130. How equal would you say you are with your relatives from other religious groups?	.81			-.81	.74			-.78
Initial eigenvalues		13.31	1.73	1.12		10.53	2.07	1.79
% variance of squared loadings extraction		65.47	7.964.53	4.53		51.06	8.95	7.36
RELIABILITY		**.97**				**.95**		

Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)

Factor	**evaluation**	**equality**
Closeness and cooperativeness	.68	-.80
evaluation		-.64

Factor correlation matrix (Christian)

Factor	**evaluation**	**equality**
Closeness and cooperativeness	-.55	-.56
evaluation		.38

Table 4. *Religiocentrism*

Scale label for full population	Muslim			Christian		
	Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Negative out-group	Positive in-group		Negative out-group	Positive in-group
48. When it comes to religion. Christians are less tolerant/54. Muslim	.70	.84		.72	.90	
50. Christians are often the cause of religious conflict/56. Muslim	.62	.79		.48	.64	
46. Christians only talk about doing good deeds without practicing them/52. Muslim	.44	.64		.47	.65	
45. Muslims respond to God the most faithfully/51. Christian	.51		.77	.41		.68
49. Muslims are best able to talk meaningfully about God/55. Christian	.64		.72	.85		.89
47. Thanks to their religion. Most Muslims are good people/53. Christian	.16		.32	.35		.47
Initial eigenvalues		2.80	1.16		2.95	1.16
% variance of squared loadings extraction		39.55	11.71		42.20	12.56
RELIABILITY		**.80**	**.62**		**.78**	**.74**

Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)

Factor	Positive in-group
Negative out-group	.48

Factor correlation matrix (Christian)

Factor	Positive in-group
Negative out-group	.50

Table 5. *Attitudes toward religious plurality*

Scale label for full population	Muslim			Christian		
	Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Pluralism	Monism		Pluralism	Monism
83. All religions are equally valid paths to liberation	.59	.68		.57	.72	
85. Differences between religions provide more knowledge of God	.40	.64		.37	.61	
88. Differences between religions are a source of spiritual development	.39	.64		.40	.63	
89. At the deepest level, all religions are the same	.54	.63		.39	.59	
86. Everything that is said about God in other religions has the same values	.47	.61		.33	.57	
80. All religions are equally valid ways to ultimate truth	.51	.59		.42	.63	
82. Differences between religions are a basis for mutual enrichment	.33	.58		.29	.53	
84. The truth about God is found only in my religion	.55		.71	.64		.79
81. Other religions do not provide as deep a God-experience as my religion	.51		.69	.52		.72
78. Compared with other religions, my religion offers the surest way to liberation	.31		.57	.43		.65
87. Compared with my religion, other religions contain only partial truths	.31		.56	.54		.73
Initial eigenvalues		3.94	2.09		3.42	2.55
% variance of squared loadings extraction		31.15	13.64		26.02	18.59
RELIABILITY		**.83**	**.74**		**.80**	**.81**

Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)

Factor	Monism
Pluralism	-.19

Factor correlation matrix (Christian)

Factor	Monism
Pluralism	-.09

Table 6. *Interpretation of sacred writing*

Scale label for full population	Muslim			Christian		
	Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Intra textual	Hermeneutic		Intra textual	Hermeneutic
62. Everything in the Sacred Writing is absolutely true without question	.75	.86		.81	.90	
63. The Sacred Writing should never be doubted. Even when scientific or historical evidence outright disagrees with it	.52	.72		.75	.87	
65. The truths of the Sacred Writing will never be outdated, but will always apply equally well to all generations	.34	.60		.32	.55	
66. The Sacred Writing is the only one that is true above all Holy Books	.29	.54		.25	.50	
68. The meanings of the Sacred Writing are open to change and interpretation	.21		.46	.30		.54
69. The Sacred Writing holds a deeper truth which can only be revealed by personal reflection	.21		.45	.42		.56
Initial eigenvalues		2.40	1.20		2.61	1.27
% variance of squared loadings extraction		32.17	7.02		36.97	10.61
RELIABILITY		**.77**	**.33**		**.78**	**.40**

Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)

Factor	Hermeneutic
Intratextual	.04

Factor correlation matrix (Christian)

Factor	Hermeneutic
Intratextual	.08

Table 7. *Perceived discrimination*

Scale label for full population	Muslim			Christian		
	Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Public	Private		Public	Private
190. Limitations on access to government subsidy	.62	.83		.66	.76	
199. Limitations on access to job market	.62	.80		.72	.77	
201. Limitations on recruitment as a civil servant	.52	.76		.77	.97	
188. Limitations on freedom of expression	.49	.74		.59	.69	
191. Limitations on freedom to choose a place of residence	.55	.71		.56	.62	
203. Limitations on attaining higher positions in government offices	.53	.69		.75	.94	
189. Limitations on celebration of group's ceremonies	.49	.66		.55	.68	
196. Limitations on access to the housing market	.55	.65		.67	.57	
202. Limitations on running of religious schools	.45	.62		.70	.87	
193. Limitations on participation in the local market	.59	.61		.66	.56	
200. Forced observance of religious laws of other group	.30	.57		.61	.82	
192. Limitations on dress	.69		.84	.74		.84
194. Limitations on behavior	.58		.72	.59		.73
Initial eigenvalues		6.54	1.30		8.16	1.09
% variance of squared loadings extraction		46.76	7.09		60.23	5.88
RELIABILITY		**.91**			**.95**	

Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)

Factor	Private
Public	.49

Factor correlation matrix (Christian)

Factor	Private
Public	

Table 8. *Individual memory of violence*

Scale label for full population	Dimension	Reliability		
		National	Muslim	Christian
58a. Did any acts of ethno-religious violence occur in the province where you came from in the past 10 years?	Memory of violence	.69	.71	.65
59a. In your family, did you talk about ethno-religious violence that happened in your province?				
60a. Did you witness violence, for example fighting or rioting (related to ethno-religious conflict), in the past 10 years?				
61a. Have you suffered any kind of physical injury due to the violence in the past 10 years?	Direct experience of violence	.80	.81	.79
70a. Were any of your immediate family members injured due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
71a. Did any of your immediate family members lose their lives due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
72a. Were any of your relatives injured due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
73a. Did any of your relatives lose their lives due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
74a. Were any of your close friends injured due to the violence in the past 10 years?	Indirect experience of violence	.76	.75	.76
75a. Did any of your close friends lose their lives due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
76a. Were any of your neighbours injured due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
77a. Did any of your neighbours lose their lives due to the violence in the past 10 years?				
All questions		.86	.85	.85

Table 9. *Nationalism*

Scale label for full population	Muslim			Christian		
	Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Nationalism	Regiocentrism		Nationalism	Regiocentrism
140. Renewing national ideas is our national task	.48	.69		.55	.74	
138. I should respect my nation and its tradition	.48	.69		.33	.57	
139. I should always put national interest above ethno-religious group interest	.30	.55		.41	.64	
141. I would rather be a citizen of Indonesia than of any other country in the world	.23	.47		.24	.46	
142. I should support my district even if my district is wrong	.47		.68	.55		.73
144. I should always put district interest above national interest	.34		.59	.41		.64
Initial eigenvalues		2.08	1.42		2.09	1.51
% variance of squared loadings extraction		24.66	13.82		25.15	16.45
RELIABILITY		**.67**	**.57**		**.66**	**.62**

Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)

Factor	Regiocentrism
Nationalism	-.00

Factor correlation matrix (Christian)

Factor	Regiocentrism
Nationalism	.03

Table 10. *Distrust*

Scale label for full population	Dimension	Reliability		
		National	Muslim	Christian
208. On the whole one can trust Muslims*	Distrust of out group	.70	.71	.69
209. On the whole one can trust Christians*				
210. On the whole one can rely on Muslim*				
211. On the whole one can rely on Christians*				
212. It is better to be careful if one is dealing with Muslims				
213. It is better to be careful if one is dealing with Christians				
214. Most Muslims would exploit me if they had the opportunity				
215. Most Christians would exploit me if they had the opportunity				
216. Most of the time, Muslims attempt to act in their own interest				
217. Most of the time, Christians attempt to act in their own interest				

*= q208-211 are inverted because they contain a negative formulation

Table 11. *Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)*

Scale label for full population	Muslim			Christian		
	Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix		Com.	Factor loadings Pattern matrix	
		Domi nance	Inequality		Domi nance	Inequality
91. In getting what you want. it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups	.29	.54		.29	.53	
92. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others	.21	.47		.31	.56	
93. To get ahead in life. it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups	.27	.52		.40	.63	
94. If certain groups stayed in their place. we would have fewer problems	.27	.53		.31	.56	
95. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are the top and other groups are at the bottom	.47	.63		.48	.66	
96. Inferior groups should stay in their place	.47	.64		.55	.70	
97. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place	.38	.62		.39	.62	
98. It would be good if groups could be equal	.28		.54	.29		-.55
99. Group equality should be our ideal	.48		.69	.37		-.61
100. All groups should be given an equal chance in life	.73		.85	.73		-.86
101. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups	.52		.72	.68		-.82
102. All groups should be free to move to a place where they choose to live	.38		.60	.41		-.63
Initial eigenvalues		2.38	3.52		2.65	3.61
% variance of squared loadings extraction		14.91	24.87		17.69	25.74
RELIABILITY		**.73**	**.73**		**.74**	**.75**

Factor correlation matrix (Muslim)

Factor	Inequality
Dominance	.18

Factor correlation matrix (Christian)

Factor	Inequality
Dominance	-.13

Appendix 2. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Contact avoidance and ethno-religious identification

Table 1. *Religious self-definition and contact avoidance*

Religious self-definition	Contact avoidance		Avoidance for future spouse		Support for residential segregation	
	National		National		National	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.16	841	.75	843	.40	837
2.00	.04	604	.49	604	.22	610
Total	.11	1445	.64	1447	.33	1447
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	121.24	.00	108.29	**.00**	137.12	.00
Linearity						
Deviance						
r						
eta	.28		.26		.29	

1=Islam, 2=Christian

Table 2. *Rites of passage and contact avoidance*

Passage	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.19	23	.04	12	.78	**23**	.36	11	.46	23	.31	12
2.00	.17	164	.03	66	.79	166	.40	65	.45	165	.25	65
3.00	.11	258	.04	175	.68	259	.48	175	.33	257	.21	176
4.00	.19	370	.03	314	.78	369	.52	316	.43	364	.22	316
Total	.16	815	.04	567	.75	817	.49	567	.40	809	.22	569
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	4.61	**.00**	3.42	**.02**	6.89	**.00**	.20	.99	1.39	.24	1.01	.39
Linearity	1.58	.21	.09	.76	.00	.974						
Deviance	6.12	.00	5.08	**.01**	10.34	**.00**						
r												
eta	.13		.11		.16							

1 = I do not participate in it and neither does my family, 2= I do not participate in it but my family does,
3= I do participate but for non- religious reasons, 4= I do participate for religious reasons.

Table 3. *Collective ritual and contact avoidance*

Collective ritual	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.16	29	.02	13	.59	29	.31	13	.35	30	.27	14
2.00	.19	34	.04	90	.62	34	.54	89	.41	33	.24	90
3.00	.16	754	.03	468	.76	756	.49	469	.40	748	.21	469
Total	.16	817	.03	571	.75	819	.49	571	.40	811	.22	573
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	.19	.83	.35	.70	3.89	**.02**	1.31	.27	.44	.64	.70	.49
Linearity					7.35	**.01**						
Deviance					.43	.51						
r					.09							
eta												

1 = I do not participate in it and neither does my family, 2= I do not participate in it but my family does,

Table 4. *Religious practices and contact avoidance*

Religious practices	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.18	21	.02	16	.73	22	.19	16	.44	22	.25	16
2.00	.14	56	.03	31	.66	56	.34	30	.33	57	.14	31
3.00	.16	162	.02	108	.75	163	.41	108	.41	163	.21	111
4.00	.14	307	.04	275	.78	308	.53	275	.39	302	.22	278
5.00	.19	169	.03	141	.76	167	.53	142	.42	167	.23	141
6.00	.18	196	.11	28	.72	106	.54	28	.43	104	.30	28
Total	.16	821	.04	599	.75	822	.49	599	.40	815	.22	605
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	.95	.45	2.53	**.03**	.85	.51	3.11	**.01**	1.10	.36	1.31	.26
Linearity			3.83	**.05**			11.39	**.00**				
Deviance			2.21	.07			1.04	.38				
r				.08			.14					
eta												

1 = Never and Only on feast days or special holy days, 2= At least once a month,
3= Once a week, 4=More than once a week, 5 = Once a day, 6 = Several times a day.

Table 5. *Religious in-group friends and contact avoidance*

Friends in-group	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.19	17	.02	26	.65	17	.35	26	.41	16	.11	26
2.00	.09	111	.02	173	.69	110	.50	173	.28	110	.14	175
3.00	.11	377	.03	229	.73	377	.55	229	.30	374	.23	230
4.00	.24	327	.07	154	.79	330	.45	153	.56	328	.30	157
Total	.16	832	.03	582	.75	834	.50	581	.40	828	.22	588
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	17.94	**.00**	4.97	.00	1.99	.11	2.08	.10	51.63	**.00**	13.09	**.00**
Linearity	35.34	**.00**	12.15	.00					105.56	.00	38.54	.00
Deviance	9.24	**.00**	1.39	.25					24.67	.00	.37	.69
r		.20		.14						.33		,25
eta		.25								.40		

1=None and Some, 2=Relatively many, 3=Almost all, 4=All.

Table 6. *Religious out-group friends and contact avoidance*

Friends out-group	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.27	182	.04	22	.83	182	.41	22	.59	180	.34	24
2.00	.13	386	.03	261	.77	388	.52	259	.36	383	.26	262
3.00	.06	160	.02	233	.65	159	.51	233	.22	159	.16	234
4.00	.08	27	.05	55	.50	28	.36	55	.28	28	.15	56
Total	.15	755	.03	571	.75	757	.50	569	.39	750	.21	576
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	26.98	**.00**	.62	.60	8.18	**.00**	1.90	.13	49.24	**.00**	1.01	**.00**
Linearity	69.05	.00			23.13	.00			129.91	.00	27.24	.00
Deviance	5.94	.00			.71	.49			10.55	.00	1.40	.25
r	-.29				-.17				-.38		-.21	
eta	.31								.41			

1=None, 2= Some, 3=Relatively many, 4=Almost all and All.

Table 7. *Membership of religious organization and contact avoidance*

Religious membership	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
0.00	.13	466	.03	340	.73	467	.50	341	.38	468	.19	345
1.00	.19	352	.04	227	.77	352	.48	227	.44	346	.25	229
Total	.16	819	.04	567	.75	818	.49	568	.40	814	.22	574
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	10.64	**.00**	.22	.64	1.28	.26	.15	.69	7.81	**.00**	6.96	**.01**
Linearity												
Deviance												
r												
eta	.11								.10			.11

0=Not member, 1=Members and followers.

Table 9. *Participation in religious organization and contact avoidance*

Religious participant	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.15	35	.04	24	.63	35	.54	24	.41	35	.28	24
2.00	.21	152	.06	73	.81	152	.39	73	.47	152	.25	75
3.00	.19	80	.01	67	.82	80	.50	66	.46	77	.23	66
4.00	.18	77	.04	60	.67	77	.60	60	.37	74	.29	61
Total	.19	344	.04	224	.76	344	.49	223	.44	338	.26	226
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	.46	.71	1.54	.20	**3.50**	**.02**	1.89	.13	1.87	.13	.50	.68
Linearity					.31	.57						
Deviance					5.09	**.01**						
r												
eta					**.17**							

1 =Never, 2=Only on special days, 3=At least once a month and Once a week, 4=More than once a week.

Table 9. *Ethnic self-definition and contact avoidance*

Religious participant	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.10	343	.02	102	.74	344	.56	102	.29	344	.12	103
2.00	.10	35	.29	2	.60	35	.50	2	.30	35	.12	2
3.00	.23	35	.04	324	.50	36			.46	36		
4.00	.18	17			.88	17			.29	17		
5.00	.20	237	.00	1	.77	238	.47	324	.53	234	.29	330
6.00	.17	10			.60	10			.58	9		
7.00	.50	2	.00	20	.50	2	1.00	1	.50	2	.25	1
8.00	.25	95			.84	94			.54	94		
9.00							.55	20			.16	20
10.00			.00	5								
11.00	.00	1	.03	43	1.00	1	.56	43	.50	1	.15	43
12.00	.00	2	.01	35	.50	2	.46	35	.00	2	.12	35
13.00	.18	44	.02	56	.75	44	.43	56	.37	43	.14	56
Total	.16	821	.03	588	.75	823	.49	588	.40	817	.22	594
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	4.45	**.00**	**2.13**	**.03**	2.57	.00	.96	.46	12.53	**.00**	7.92	.00
Linearity	20.59	.00	.80	.37	2.06	.15			44.73	.00	4.48	.03
Deviance	2.66	.00	2.32	.02	2.63	.00			8.95	.00	8.41	.00
r	.15								.22		-.08	
eta	.23		.17		**.**11				.37		.31	

1=Javanese, 2=Sundanese, 3=Madurese, 4=Minangkabau, 5=Ambonese, 6=Bugis, 7=Makassar, 8=Buton, 9=Toraja, 10=Minahasa, 11=Chinese, 12=Batak, 13=Others.

Table 10. *Ethnic ceremony and contact avoidance*

Ethnic ceremony	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.19	82	.05	110	.82	83	.41	109	.44	85	.23	112
2.00	.18	247	.03	178	.79	249	.61	178	.39	246	.22	178
3.00	.13	294	.02	146	.71	293	.43	147	.37	292	.17	148
4.00	.15	130	.03	73	.69	130	.58	74	.38	127	.26	73
Total	.16	753	.03	507	.74	755	.51	508	.39	750	.21	511
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	2.29	.08	1.18	.31	2.86	**.04**	5.53	**.00**	1.16	.32	2.61	.05
Linearity					7.81	**.00**	.71	.40			.03	.85
Deviance					.38	.68	7.93	**.00**			3.89	.02
r						-.10						
eta								.18			.12	

1**=**No knowledge, 2=I do not participate in it and neither does my family, 3=I do not participate in it but my family does, 4=I do participate

Table 11. *Ethnic language and contact avoidance*

Ethnic language	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
0.00	.17	146	.04	235	.79	145	.47	235	.43	146	.25	239
1.00	.19	270	.01	125	.74	273	.53	125	.43	271	.15	124
2.00	.13	238	.04	117	.77	239	.54	117	.35	237	.21	116
3.00	.12	60	.06	45	.72	60	.69	45	.38	60	.28	46
Total	.16	714	.03	522	.75	717	.52	522	.39	714	.22	525
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	**2.92**	**.03**	2.0	.10	.63	.59	**2.64**	**.05**	**2.59**	**.05**	**4.89**	**.00**
Linearity	**5.28**	**.02**					**6.61**	**.01**	**4.85**	**.03**	.06	.80
Deviance	1.74	.18					.65	.52	1.46	.23	7.31	.00
r	-.09						.11		-.08			
eta											.16	

0=Never, 1=one and two, 2=three occasions and four occasions, 3=five and six occasions.
The occasions are: ethnic languages in home, family gathering, university, close friends, neighbors, and government officers.

Table 12. *Social embededness and contact avoidance*

Social embedded-ness	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.25	58	.08	34	.75	59	.42	34	.49	57	.22	33
2.00	.13	256	.01	128	.70	255	.47	128	.33	252	.15	129
3.00	.14	336	.03	214	.78	336	.55	214	.39	336	.21	218
4.00	.23	117	.05	134	.75	119	.47	132	.56	119	.33	135
Total	.16	767	.03	510	.75	769	.50	508	.40	764	.23	515
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	6.41	**.00**	4.56	**.00**	1.67	.17	1.44	.23	15.57	**.00**	11.29	**.00**
Linearity	.70	.40	1.11	.29					14.26	**.00**	22.62	**.00**
Deviance	9.27	**.00**	6.28	**.00**					16.23	**.00**	5.62	**.00**
r										.13		.20
eta		.16		.16						.24		.25

1=None and Some, 2=Relatively Many, 3=Almost All, 4=All.

Table 13. *Membership of ethnic organization and contact avoidance*

Ethnic membershi p	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.15	662	.03	468	.75	664	.50	468	.40	663	.21	475
2.00	.20	149	.05	84	.76	149	.48	84	.39	144	.22	85
Total	.16	811	.03	552	.75	813	.49	552	.40	807	.21	560
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	4.25	**.04**	2.26	.13	.02	.89	.11	.74	.04	.85	.11	.74
Linearity												
Deviance												
r												
eta		.07										

0=Not member, 1=Members and followers.

Table 14. *Participation ethnic organization and contact avoidance*

Ethnic participation	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.19	19	.14	7	.84	19	.57	7	.51	19	.36	7
2.00	.21	90	.06	46	.78	90	.54	46	.39	87	.22	47
3.00	.20	29	.01	23	.79	29	.30	23	.39	28	.18	23
4.00	.13	14	.09	12	.43	14	.58	12	.45	14	.37	12
Total	.20	152	.06	88	.76	152	.49	88	.41	147	.24	89
		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.
F	.31	.82	1.35	.26	3.24	**.02**	1.44	.24	.82	.48	2.24	.09
Linearity					5.67	**.02**						
Deviance					2.02	.14						
r					-.19							
eta												

1=Never, 2=Only on special days, 3=At least once a month and Once a week, 4=More than once a week.

Contact avoidance and Individual determinants

Table 15. *Gender and contact avoidance*

Gender	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.16	416	.04	338	.67	418	.37	336	.40	413	.22	342
2.00	.16	411	.03	259	.83	412	.64	261	.41	411	.22	260
Total	.16	827	.04	597	.75	830	.49	597	.41	824	.22	602
		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.
F	.00	.98	.77	.38	29.09	**.00**	47.73	**.00**	.58	.44	.16	.69
Linearity												
Deviance												
r												
eta					**.18**		**.27**					

1=Male, 2=Female.

Table 16. *Parents religion and contact avoidance*

Parents religion	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
.00	.24	9	.02	23	.78	9	.39	23	.30	10	.12	23
1.00	.16	832	.22	587	.75	834	.22	587	.41	827	.22	587
Total	.16	841	.04	604	.75	843	.49	604	.40	837	.22	610
		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.		Sig.
F	.83	.36	.46	.50	.04	.84	.96	.33	1.08	.30	3.88	**.05**
Linearity												
Deviance												
r												
eta											.08	

0=Non homogamous parents, 1=Homogamaous parents.

Table 17. *Household income and contact avoidance*

Household income	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.21	304	.04	160	.78	305	.37	160	.48	301	.26	161
2.00	.13	367	.03	284	.74	366	.49	283	.37	365	.21	287
3.00	.14	144	.04	129	.71	144	.65	129	.33	143	.20	129
Total	.16	815	.04	573	.75	815	.49	572	.40	809	.22	577
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	8.91	**.00**	.32	.73	1.46	.23	11.82	**.00**	16.13	**.00**	2.90	.06
Linearity	12.04	.00					23.35	**.00**	29.14	**.00**		
Deviance	5.79	.02					.29	.59	3.11	.08		
r	-.12						.20		-.19			
eta	.15											

1=Lower than IDR 500,000 - IDR 999,999; 2=IDR 1,000,000, - IDR 4,999,999; 3=IDR 5.000.000 and over.

Table 18. *Parents education and contact avoidance*

Parents education	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.17	10	.00	3	.70	10	.00	3	.40	10	.25	3
2.00	.22	149	.03	45	.71	149	.40	45	.52	147	.21	46
3.00	.14	259	.04	208	.75	258	.46	207	.41	261	.23	208
4.00	.12	145	.03	149	.75	147	.57	149	.28	145	.20	152
Total	.15	563	.04	405	.74	564	.49	404	.40	563	.22	409
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	4.35	**.00**	.39	.76	.32	.81	3.04	**.03**	14.91	**.00**	2.90	.06
Linearity	10.63	.00					8.00	.00	39.10	.00		
Deviance	1.21	.30					.56	.57	2.82	.06		
r	**-.14**						**.14**		**-.25**			
eta												

1=No formal education, 2=Kindergarten and Primary school, 3=Secondary school and Senior high school, 4=Diploma (D1 – D4), Bachelor (S1), Master (S2), PhD (S3).

Table 19. *Parents occupational status and contact avoidance*

Occupational status	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.16	444	.03	291	.73	445	.48	292	.45	443	.23	295
2.00	.13	166	.03	173	.75	166	.51	173	.31	165	.20	173
3.00	.19	121	.02	63	.80	121	.48	63	.80	121	.21	63
4.00	.19	16	.06	10	.94	17	.40	10	.51	17	.17	10
Total	.16	747	.03	537	.74	749	.49	538	.41	746	.21	541
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	1.25	.29	.69	.56	2.13	.09	.28	.84	7.37	**.00**	.57	.63
Linearity									3.39	.07		
Deviance									9.35	.00		
r												
eta									.17			

1=Self-employed, self employed but helped by temporary workers, and self employed but helped by permanent workers, 2=Workers/labour/officer, 3=Free workers in agriculture sector

Table 20. *Parents occupation status and contact avoidance*

Occupation status	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.21	11	00	2	.73	11	.50	2	.36	11	.00	2
2.00	.03	5	.00	6	.60	5	.67	6	.20	5	.08	6
3.00	.16	13	.01	15	.92	13	.53	15	.29	13	.17	15
4.00	.12	90	.03	123	.73	90	.52	122	.34	91	.20	123
5.00	.11	25	.08	26	.52	25	.62	26	.33	25	.28	27
6.00	.21	239	.04	83	.73	238	.37	84	.53	236	.25	86
7.00	.11	138	.03	104	.70	139	.52	104	.32	140	.17	105
8.00	.16	38	.02	14	.87	38	.71	14	.42	37	.23	14
9.00	.12	38	.02	18	.76	38	.50	18	.40	37	.15	18
10.00	.16	19	.04	31	.80	20	.52	31	.35	20	.27	30
11.00	.26	6	.00	5	1.00	6	.40	5	.63	6	.25	5
Total	.16	622	.03	427	.73	623	.50	427	.42	621	.21	431
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	2.21	**.02**	.68	.74	1.58	.11	1.10	.36	5.89	**.00**	1.46	.15
Linearity	.01	.90							1.34	.25		
Deviance	2.46	.01							6.39	.00		
r									.			
eta	.19								.30			

1=Officials of government and special-interest organisations, corporate executives, managers, managing proprietors and supervisors, 2=Professionals, 3=Technicians and associate professionals, 4=Clerks, 5=Service workers and shop and market Sales workers, 6=Farmers, forestry workers and fishermen, 7=Trades and related workers, 8=Plant and machine operators

Contact avoidance and intermediary variables

Table 21. *Religious salience and contact avoidance*

Religious salience	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.17	43	.03	33	.70	44	.31	32	.44	44	.21	33
2.00	.09	119	.02	90	.66	119	.44	91	.26	116	.13	93
3.00	.15	381	.04	268	.73	382	.50	268	.41	380	.21	270
4.00	.21	285	.04	206	.81	284	.52	205	.45	282	.27	207
Total	.17	828	.03	597	.75	829	.49	596	.40	822	.22	603
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	6.61	**.00**	.45	.71	4.33	**.00**	1.92	1.24	9.91	**.00**	6.97	**.00**
Linearity	12.03	**.00**			10.49	**.00**			12.86	**.00**	14.24	.00
Deviance	3.90	.02			1.26	.29			8.43	.00	3.33	.04
r	.12				.11				.12		.15	
eta	.15								.19		.18	

1=Totally disagree and Disagree, 2=Neither disagree nor agree, 3=Agree, 4= Totally agree.

Table 22. *Ethnic salience and contact avoidance*

Ethnic salience	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.14	492	.03	369	.75	494	.47	369	.34	487	.17	376
2.00	.19	305	.04	179	.76	304	.53	178	.50	305	.30	178
3.00	.15	36	.05	39	.59	37	.56	39	.52	37	.35	40
Total	.16	833	.03	587	.75	835	.50	586	.40	839	.22	594
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	4.15	**.02**	1.05	.35	2.37	.09	1.17	.31	30.53	**.00**	21.84	**.00**
Linearity	4.66	**.03**							55.33	**.00**	42.02	.00
Deviance	3.63	.06							5.69	.02	1.67	.20
r		.07							.25		.26	
eta									.26			

1=Totally disagree and Disagree, 2=Neither disagree nor agree, 3=Agree and Totally agree.

Table 23. *Perceived group threat and contact avoidance*

Perceived group threat	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.09	113	.01	98	.68	114	.49	97	.25	114	.17	100
2.00	.12	481	.02	370	.73	482	.51	371	.35	478	.19	371
3.00	.23	190	.07	101	.78	190	.43	100	.54	188	.30	104
4.00	.47	37	.19	18	.89	37	.50	18	.82	37	.46	18
5.00	.82	9	.14	5	1.00	9	.80	5	.89	9	.50	5
Total	.16	830	.04	592	.75	832	.49	591	.41	826	.22	598
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	44.34	**.00**	12.36	**.00**	2.87	**.02**	.94	.44	47.50	**.00**	10.55	**.00**
Linearity	140.71	.00	36.57	.00	10.71	.00			178.13	.00	36.03	.00
Deviance	12.22	.00	4.29	.01	.25	.86			3.96	.01	2.06	.10
r	**.37**		**.24**		**.11**				**.42**		**.24**	
eta	**.42**		**.28**						**.43**			

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree.

Table 24. *Quantity of contact and contact avoidance*

Quantity of contact	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.21	278	.06	72	.78	281	.55	71	.50	278	.34	72
2.00	.13	93	.06	65	.81	93	.51	65	.39	92	.30	65
3.00	.11	85	.04	97	.69	85	.58	97	.31	82	.20	97
4.00	.09	95	.02	104	.72	95	.42	104	.28	94	.21	104
5.00	.06	82	.02	80	.76	82	.51	80	.24	82	.18	80
6.00	.07	51	.03	108	.61	51	.46	108	.21	49	.15	108
Total	.14	684	.03	526	.75	687	.50	525	.38	677	.22	526
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	9.47	**.00**	1.57	.17	2.16	.06	1.23	.29	19.67	**.00**	6.92	**.00**
Linearity	41.75	.00							92.12	.00	30.69	.00
Deviance	1.39	.23							1.56	.18	.97	.42
r	**-.24**								**-.35**		**-.23**	
eta												

1=Never, 2=At least once a month, 3=Once a week, 4=More than once a week, 5=Once a day, 6= Several times a day

Table 25. *Quality of contact and contact avoidance*

Quality of contact	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.31	86	.14	12	.78	86	.45	11	.69	85	.40	12
2.00	.12	206	.05	151	.80	207	.49	151	.31	203	.21	150
3.00	.06	230	.02	301	.67	230	.53	301	.26	228	.21	304
4.00	.05	3	.01	32	.67	3	.16	32	.08	3	.22	32
Total	.13	525	.03	496	.74	526	.49	495	.35	519	.22	498
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	29.96	**.00**	6.14	**.00**	3.65	**.01**	5.39	**.00**	53.91	**.00**	2.06	**.10**
Linearity	78.63	.00	13.08	**.00**	7.33	**.01**	2.24	.14	121.95	.00		
Deviance	5.63	.00	2.67	.07	1.81	.16	1.70	**.00**	19.89	.00		
r	-.36		-.16		-.12				-.42			
eta	.38						.18		.49			

1=Very negative, 2=Negative, 3=Neither negative nor positive, 4= Positive.

Table 26. *Positive in-group and contact avoidance*

Positive in-group	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.07	94	.02	204	.63	93	.47	203	.24	93	.13	203
2.00	.14	292	.03	276	.74	295	.48	275	.37	292	.23	279
3.00	.18	338	.06	99	.77	337	.56	100	.45	335	.34	101
4.00	.25	103	.10	11	.78	103	.27	11	.52	102	.36	11
Total	.16	827	.03	590	.74	828	.49	589	.40	822	.22	594
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	8.66	**.00**	4.55	**.00**	2.52	.06	1.44	.23	17.27	**.00**	18.99	**.00**
Linearity	25.50	**.00**	12.31	**.00**					50.42	**.00**	56.02	**.00**
Deviance	.24	.79	.67	.51					6.94	.50	.48	.62
r	.17		.14						.24		.29	
eta												

1=Totally disagree, and Disagree, 2=Neither disagree nor agree, 3=Agree, 4=Totally agree.

Table 27. *Negative out-group and contact avoidance*

Negative out-group	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.08	83	.02	80	.64	83	.47	79	.19	84	.16	79
2.00	.09	351	.02	242	.75	352	.48	242	.31	348	.17	246
3.00	.20	271	.03	207	.76	271	.50	207	.49	266	.25	209
4.00	.30	95	.06	49	.73	96	.49	49	.61	96	.37	49
5.00	.47	20	.34	11	.85	20	.64	11	.65	20	.45	11
Total	.16	820	.03	589	.74	822	.49	588	.40	814	.22	594
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	26.96	**.00**	23.53	**.00**	1.66	.16	.31	.87	43.01	**.00**	11.16	**.00**
Linearity	98364	.00	31.94	.00					165.81	.00	38.19	.00
Deviance	3.06	.03	20.73	.00					2.08	.10	2.15	.09
r	**.32**		**.22**						**.41**		**.24**	
eta	**.34**		**.37**									

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree.

Table 28. *Monism and contact avoidance*

Monism	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.08	17	.03	62	.45	18	.35	62	.19	18	.13	61
2.00	.06	109	.02	242	.66	110	.46	242	.28	109	.18	247
3.00	.12	322	.04	212	.72	322	.52	212	.35	317	.23	213
4.00	.22	329	.06	70	.80	329	.61	70	.49	330	.39	70
5.00	.37	47	.05	16	.83	47	.56	16	.62	46	.37	16
Total	.16	824	.04	602	.75	826	.49	602	.41	820	.22	607
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	18.94	**.00**	4.05	**.00**	5.34	**.00**	2.80	**.02**	20.58	**.00**	13.12	**.00**
Linearity	67.76	.00	10.26	.00	19.12	.00	10.20	.00	79.49	.00	45.46	.00
Deviance	2.67	.05	1.99	.11	.74	.53	.34	.80	.94	.42	2.34	.07
r	.27		.13		.15		.13		.30		.26	
eta	.29											

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree.

Table 29. *Pluralism and contact avoidance*

Pluralism	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.35	52	.09	3	.91	53	1.00	3	.60	53	.25	3
2.00	.21	200	.02	32	.76	201	.50	32	.47	198	.26	32
3.00	.14	390	.05	264	.76	389	.52	266	.39	386	.20	263
4.00	.11	175	.02	262	.68	176	.45	260	.32	176	.23	267
5.00	.04	14	.01	40	.29	14	.55	40	.23	14	.23	41
Total	.16	831	.04	601	.74	833	.49	601	.40	827	.22	606
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	12.18	**.00**	1.83	.12	7.24	**.00**	1.65	.16	12.05	**.00**		
Linearity	42.49	.00			17.53	.00			46.6	.00	.57	.69
Deviance	2.07	.10			3.81	.01			.51	.68		
r	-.22				-.14				-.23			
eta					.18							

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree.

Table 30. *Intratextual fundamentalism and contact avoidance*

Intratextual fundamentalism	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.09	28	.03	82	.45	29	.51	82	.16	29	.13	82
2.00	.11	131	.01	192	.61	131	.45	193	.31	130	.16	193
3.00	.16	421	.05	223	.77	422	.46	222	.40	417	.26	226
4.00	.19	252	.06	100	.81	252	.64	100	.48	252	.32	101
Total	.16	832	.03	597	.75	834	.49	597	.40	828	.22	602
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	3.81	**.01**	5.22	**.01**	11.35	**.00**	3.88	**.01**	**14.69**	**.00**	16.54	**.00**
Linearity	11.41	.00	9.40	.00	27.66	.00	3.36	.07	43.10	**.00**	46.71	**.00**
Deviance	.15	.86	3.13	.04	3.22	.04	4.14	**.02**	.49	.61	1.46	.23
r	.11		.12		.18				.22		.27	
eta			.16		.19		.14					

1=Totally disagree and Disagree, 2=Neither disagree nor agree, 3=Agree, 4=Totally agree.

Table 31. *Hermeneutic interpretation and contact avoidance*

Hermeneu-tic inter-pretation	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.23	26	.06	5	.70	27	.20	5	.52	27	.29	6
2.00	.13	99	.06	33	.79	99	.53	34	.39	99	.22	34
3.00	.17	302	.03	164	.81	302	.49	164	.39	299	.19	165
4.00	.13	321	.04	287	.67	321	.45	286	.38	318	.20	289
5.00	.26	74	.03	109	.79	75	.60	109	.50	75	.33	109
Total	.16	822	.04	598	.75	824	.49	598	.40	818	.22	603
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	4.59	**.00**	.47	.76	4.33	**.00**	2.38	.05	2.93	**.02**	6.56	**.00**
Linearity	.69	.41			2.97	.08	1.89	.17	.21	.64	10.54	.00
Deviance	5.90	.00			4.78	.00	2.54	.06	3.84	.01	5.20	.00
r									.		.13	
eta	.15				.14		.13		.12		.20	

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree.

Table 32. *Perceived discrimination and contact avoidance*

Perceived discrimin a-tion	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.14	214	.02	129	.75	214	.56	128	.37	211	.19	134
2.00	.15	514	.03	337	.75	517	.48	337	.39	513	.21	339
3.00	.25	90	.06	102	.68	89	.50	102	.52	90	.26	101
4.00	.30	11	.05	24	.82	11	.25	24	.64	11	.32	24
Total	.16	829	.04	592	.75	831	.49	591	.40	825	.22	598
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	5.95	**.00**	1.69	.17	.74	**.53**	2.78	**.04**	6.54	**.00**	2.84	**.04**
Linearity	11.42	.00					4.89	.03	13.66	**.00**	7.92	.00
Deviance	3.22	.04					1.72	.18	2.98	.05	.29	.74
r	.12						-.09		.13		.11	
eta	.15								.15			

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree and Totally agree.

Table 33. *Memory of violence and contact avoidance*

Memory of violence	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
0.00	.14	271	.02	107	.67	273	.49	107	.37	274	.15	109
1.00	.12	166	.02	125	.75	166	.46	125	.31	164	.19	126
2.00	.21	181	.04	140	.82	182	.56	140	.45	180	.25	141
3.00	.18	207	.05	205	.78	206	.48	206	.48	203	.26	208
Total	.16	825	.04	577	.75	827	.49	578	.40	821	.22	584
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	**5.27**	**.00**	1.86	.13	**4.86**	**.00**	1.04	.37	**10.11**	**.00**	**6.42**	**.00**
Linearity	6.96	.01			**1.02**	**.00**			19.21	.00	**18.06**	**.00**
Deviance	4.42	.01			2.28	.10			5.56	.00	.60	.54
r	.09				.11				.15		.17	
eta	.14								.19			

0=Not experience, 1=One occasion, 2=Two occasions, 3=Three occasions. The occasions are memory, place, and witness.

Table 34. *Direct violence and contact avoidance*

Direct violence	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1000	.14	599	.03	373	.73	602	.52	373	.38	597	.19	379
1.00	.14	57	.03	64	.80	56	.48	64	.35	57	.23	63
2.00	.26	73	.04	65	.81	73	.51	65	.56	71	.29	66
3.00	.19	90	.07	83	.77	90	.40	84	.49	90	.29	83
Total	.16	819	.04	585	.75	821	.49	586	.40	815	.22	591
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	**4.85**	**.00**	2.04	.11	1.08	.36	1.18	.31	10.07	.00	4.95	.00
Linearity	8.19	.00							21.48	.00	14.02	.00
Deviance	3.19	.04							4.36	.01	.41	.66
r	.09								.16		.15	
eta	.13								.19			

0=Not experience, 1=One occasion, 2=Two occasions, 3=Three, for, and five occasions. The occasions are physical injury, family injury, family lose, relative injury, and relative lose.

Table 35. *Indirect violence and contact avoidance*

Indirect violence	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
0.00	.15	627	.02	389	.74	630	.50	389	.39	624	.18	392
1.00	.15	86	.04	79	.74	86	.44	79	.44	87	.33	80
2.00	.22	68	.04	74	.78	67	.46	74	.51	67	.29	76
3.00	.18	42	.05	53	.83	42	.48	54	.45	42	.27	54
Total	.16	823	.03	595	.74	825	.49	596	.40	820	.22	602
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	1.54	.20	1.06	.37	.77	.51	.38	.76	**3.62**	**.01**	**11.38**	**.00**
Linearity									8.14	.00	18.79	.00
Deviance									1.36	.26	7.67	.00
r									.10		.17	
eta											.23	

0=Not experience, 1=One occasion, 2=Two occasions, 3=Three, and four occasions. The occasions are close friend injury, close friends lose, neighbor injury, and neighbor lose.

Table 36. *Nationalism and contact avoidance*

Nationalism	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.25	21	.11	12	.50	22	.67	12	.47	22	.27	12
2.00	.17	227	.04	220	.75	228	.49	220	.38	228	.19	222
3.00	.14	486	.03	298	.76	486	.50	297	.40	480	.24	301
4.00	.22	103	.03	69	.74	103	.42	69	.48	103	.24	70
Total	.16	837	.04	599	.75	839	.49	598	.40	833	.22	605
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	3.95	**.00**	2.31	.08	2.57	**.05**	.97	.40	2.86	**.04**	1.73	.16
Linearity	.00	.99			1.46	.23			3.16	.08		
Deviance	5.93	.00			3.13	.04			2.71	.07		
r												
eta	.12				.10				.10			

1=Totally disagree and Disagree, 2=Neither disagree nor agree, 3=Agree, 4=Totally agree.

Table 37. *Regiocentrism and contact avoidance*

Regio-centrism	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.18	138	.04	92	.77	140	.49	91	.42	139	.22	93
2.00	.14	413	.04	257	.77	413	.53	256	.36	412	.19	262
3.00	.14	206	.03	180	.70	206	.47	180	.44	203	.21	179
4.00	.26	71	.05	58	.70	71	.37	59	.51	71	.34	59
5.00	.30	12	.03	14	.83	12	.43	14	.58	11	.34	14
Total	.16	840	.04	601	.75	842	.49	600	.40	836	.22	607
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	4.42	**.00**	.43	.79	1.32	.26	1.39	.23	5.32	**.00**	5.14	**.00**
Linearity	3.41	.06							9.24	.00	9.28	.00
Deviance	4.75	.00							4.01	.01	3.76	.01
r									.10		.12	
eta	.14								.16		.18	

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree.

Table 38. *National pride and contact avoidance*

National pride	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.25	14	.13	12	.50	14	.50	12	.46	14	.29	13
2.00	.14	37	.08	69	.50	38	.55	69	.36	38	.27	71
3.00	.17	223	.03	189	.75	222	.49	188	.38	225	.17	189
4.00	.14	385	.03	247	.79	385	.45	249	.38	378	.22	248
5.00	.20	168	.03	81	.74	168	.52	80	.50	168	.28	82
Total	.16	827	.04	598	.75	827	.49	598	.40	823	.22	603
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	2.27	.06	4.96	**.00**	5.14	.00	.68	.61	5.14	**.00**	3.65	**.01**
Linearity			9.45	.00	6.59	.01			67.92	.01	.62	.43
Deviance			3.46	.02	4.66	.00			3.47	.02	4.66	.00
r			-.12		.09				.10			
eta			.18		.16				.15		.15	

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Totally agree.

Table 39. *Distrust and contact avoidance*

Distrust	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.04	75	.01	31	.72	75	.50	30	.20	75	.19	31
2.00	.08	395	.02	300	.70	397	.45	300	.29	392	.15	305
3.00	.23	303	.04	227	.79	303	.53	228	.53	303	.27	228
4.00	.50	60	.23	33	.85	60	.67	32	.81	59	.52	32
Total	.16	833	.03	591	.75	835	.49	590	.41	829	.22	596
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	69.97	**.00**	34.29	**.00**	3.40	**.02**	2.32	.07	95.90	**.00**	28.68	**.00**
Linearity	183.17	.00	49.97	.00	8.18	.00			272.41	.00	65.82	.00
Deviance	13.37	.00	26.45	.00	1.00	.37			7.64	.00	10.12	.00
r	.42		.10		.09				.49		.31	
eta	.27		.09						.31		.36	

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree and Totally agree.

Table 40. *Dominance orientation and contact avoidance*

Dominance	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.15	113	.03	119	.81	114	.55	119	.37	113	.24	120
2.00	.15	444	.03	342	.75	445	.47	341	.39	441	.20	343
3.00	.18	253	.04	127	.73	253	.53	127	.43	252	.22	131
4.00	.21	20	.07	10	.65	20	.10	10	.58	20	.45	10
Total	.16	830	.03	598	.75	832	.49	597	.41	826	.22	604
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	.86	.46	.63	.60	1.24	.29	3.05	**.03**	3.57	**.01**	3.49	**.01**
Linearity							1.33	.25	8.34	**.00**	.39	.53
Deviance							3.91	**.02**	1.18	.31	5.04	**.01**
r									.10			
eta							.12				.13	

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, 4=Agree and Totally agree.

Table 41. *Inequality orientation and contact avoidance*

Inequality	Contact avoidance				Avoidance for future spouse				Support for residential segregation			
	Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian		Muslim		Christian	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
1.00	.16	330	.02	286	.77	329	.51	286	.42	324	.24	289
2.00	.15	453	.05	285	.74	455	.48	284	.39	455	.21	288
3.00	.20	45	.05	26	.61	46	.35	26	.39	45	.15	26
Total	.16	828	.04	597	.75	830	.49	596	.40	824	.22	603
		Sig.		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**		**Sig.**
F	.58	.56	2.56	.08	2.76	.06	1.48	.23	1.08	.34	1.73	**.18**
Linearity												
Deviance												
r												
eta												

1=Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither disagree nor agree, Agree, and Totally agree.

Table 42. *Linearity test between ethno-religious identification and contact avoidance*

Variables	Contact avoidance					Avoidance of future spouse					Support of residential segregation				
	F	Lin.	Dev.	r	eta	F	Lin.	Dev.	r	eta	F	Lin.	Dev.	r	eta
Rites of passage	3.57**	.03	5.34**		.09	2.06					7.79**	2.86	10.25**		.13
Collective rites	.88					3.85*	7.50**	.21	.07		1.30				
Religious practices	2.22*	3.41	1.93		.09	1.70					3.04**	6.77**	2.11	.17	
Religious in-group friends	30.48**	70.53**	10.46**	.22	.25	5.22**	13.15**	1.25	.10		70.85**	178.80**	16.87**	.33	.37
Religious out-group friends	53.06**	118.88**	20.15**	.29	.33	16.18**	46.98**	.78	-.19		85.47**	221.86**	17.28**	-.38	.41
Membership of religious organization	10.11**				.09	.55					15.78**				.11
Participation in religious organization	1.32					.55					1.45				
Ethnic ceremonies	.74					4.08**	.08	6.08**		.10	.53				
Ethnic languages	2.75*	.07	4.09*		.08	3.30*	8.27**	.82	.09		.68				
Social embededness	5.72**	.01	8.58**		.11	2.81*	.03	4.20*		.08	16.12**	17.94**	15.21**	.12	.19
Membership of ethnic organization	8.19**				.08	1.11				.01	2.40				.01
Participation in ethnic organization	.65				.08		1.78			.15	2.40				.17

Lin. =linearity, Dev. =deviation from linearity, *=p<.05, **=p<.01

Appendix 3. Regression Tables

Table 1. *Contact avoidance model 1 and 2*

Model	Determinants	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	
					Before	After
	(Constant)	.10**	.16	.18	.02	.13**
1.	**Ethno-religious definition** (ref: *Javanese Muslims*)					
	Sundanese Muslims	-.00	-.01	-.06	.05	.02
	Madurese Muslims	.13**	.02	.23*	.08	.02
	Ambonese Muslims	.10**	.04	.10	.16	.05**
	Buton Muslims	.15**	.10*	.19*	.20	.09**
	Muslims- rest	.07**	.06	.10	.29*	.07**
	Javanese Christians	-.09**	-.04	-.06	-.00	-.04*
	Ambonese Christians	-.06**	-.09**	-.09	.11	-.05**
	Chinese Christians	-.07*	-.09	-.25	-.07	-.04
	Batak Christians	-.09*	-.08	-.06	.06	-.06*
	Christians- rest	-.08**	-.05			-.06*
2a.	**Rites of passage** (ref: I *do not participate in it and neither does my family*)					
	I do not participate in it but my family does		-.09		-.05	
	I do participate but for non-religious reason		-.10		-.05	
	I do participate for religious reason		-.10		.04	
	Collective rites (ref: *I do not participate in it and neither does my family*)					
	I do not participate in it but my family does		.07		.03	
	I do participate for non-religious reason and I do participate for religious reason		.08		.08	
	Religious practices (ref: *Never and only on feast days*)					
	At least once a month		.08		.22	
	Once a week		.06		.03	
	More than once a week		.04			
	Once a day		.10		.03	
	Several times a day		.08		.09	
	Religious in-group friends		.03		.06	.09**
	Religious out-group friends (ref: *None*)					
	Some		-.11**		-.14	-.09**
	Relatively many		-.15**		-.24*	-.14**
	Almost all and all		-.16**		-.16	-.12**
	Participation in religious organization (ref: *Never*)					
	Only on special days		.02		.14	
	At least once a month		.01		.08	
	More than once a week		.01		.16	
2b & 2c.	**Ethnic ceremonies** (ref: *No knowledge*)					
	I do not participate in it and neither does my family			.02	.09	
	I do not participate in it but my family does			-.03	.01	
	I do participate			.11	.00	
	Ethnic languages (ref: *Never*)					
	One and two occasions			-.02	.06	
	Three and four occasions			-.131*	.00	
	Five and six occasions			-.12	-.03	
	Social embededness (ref: *none and some*)					
	Relatively many			-.04	-.06	
	Almost all			.05	-.03	
	All			.00	-.03	
	Participation in ethnic organization (ref: *Never*)					
	Only on special days			.02	-.11	
	At least once a month and once a week			-.06	-.16	
	More than once a week			-.01	-.15	
	R^2	*.34*	*.20*	*.28*	*.43*	*.17*
	R^2 Adj.	*.12*	*.15*	*.16*	*.04*	*.16*

Model 1, 2a, and 2b is without trimming
*= 0 < *p* value < .05 and ** = 0 < *p* value < .01

Table 2. *Contact avoidance model 3 and 4*

Model	Determinants	Model 3		Model 4	
		Before	After	Before	After
	(Constant)	.22**	.13**	.03	.09*
3.	**Ethno-religious definition** (ref: *Javanese Muslims*)				
	Sundanese Muslim s	.10*	.03	.04	.04
	Madurese Muslims	.00	-.00	.05	.00
	Ambonese Muslims	.03	.05*	-.01	-.00
	Buton Muslims	.11*	.11**	.10**	.092**
	Muslims- rest	.03	.07*	.09**	.07**
	Javanese Christians	-.05	-.04	-.02	-.04*
	Ambonese Christians	-.07**	-.04*	-.02	-.04*
	Chinese Christians	-.06	-.02	-.02	-.04
	Batak Christians	-.05	-.05	-.02	-.04
	Christians- rest	-.07*	-.05*	-.01	-.04
	Religious in-group friends	.03	.07*	.08*	.07*
	Religious out-group friends (ref: *None*)				
	Some	-.10**	-.08**	-.07**	-.07**
	Relatively many	-.11**	-.12**	-.07**	-.07**
	Almost all and all	-.11**	-.10**	-.04	-.03
	Gender (ref: *male)*				
	Female	-.03			
	Parents religion (ref: *heterogamy)*				
	Homogamy	.01			
	Household income (ref: *low income*)				
	Middle income	-.03			
	High income	-.04			
	Parents education (ref: *low education*)				
	No education	-.05			
	Middle education	.02			
	High education	.05			
	Occupational status (ref: *self employ*)				
	Worker	-.02			
	Free worker	-.02			
	Unpaid worker	-.01			
	Occupation status (ref *:farmers*)				
	professionals	.05	.07	.04	.04
	Technicians	-.08	-.04	-.03	-.02
	Clerks	-.01	.02	.02	.03
	Sales	-.04	-.00	.00	.01
	Farmers	-.06	-.01	-.04	-.02
	Traders	-.07**	-.03*	-.02	-.02
	Machine	-.07	.00	-.02	-.02
	Unskilled	-.05	-.03	-.02	-.03
	Special	-.01	-.02	-.00	.02
	Absent	-.05	-.01	.01	-.01
4.	**Intermediate variables**				
	Salience religious identity			-.01	
	Salience ethnic identity			.00	
	Perceived threat			.18**	.18**
	Quantity of contact			.03	
	Quality of contact			-.10*	-.11**
	Positive in-group			.034	
	Negative out-group			.11*	.15**
	Monism			.04	
	Pluralism			-.17**	-.11**
	Intratextual fundamentalism			.05	
	Hermeneutic interpretation			.07	
	Perceived discrimination			.04	
	Memory of violence			-.03	
	Direct violence			-.08	
	Indirect violence			.10*	
	Nationalism			.05	
	Regiocentrism			-.11*	
	National pride			-.03	
	Distrust			.04	
	Dominance orientation			-.05	
	Equality orientation			.01	
	R^2	*.45*	*.41*	*.31*	*.28*
	R^2 Adj.	*.20*	*.17*	*.25*	*.25*

*= 0 < *p* value < .05 and ** = 0 < *p* value < .01

Table 3. *The avoidance of future spouse model 1 and 2*

Model	Determinants	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	
					Before	After
	(Constant)	.74**	.28	.73**	.73	.72**
1.	**Ethno-religious definition** (ref: *Javanese Muslims*)					
	Sundanese Muslims	-.14*	-.14	-.32	.11	-.14*
	Madurese Muslims	-.24**	-.28*	-.01	-.14	-.40**
	Ambonese Muslims	.03	-.03	.08	.07	-.01
	Buton Muslims	.10*	.02	.16	-.06	.04
	Muslims- rest	.01	.11	-.02	-.16	.02
	Javanese Christians	-.18**	-.05	-.28	-.13	-.16**
	Ambonese Christians	-.28**	-.27**	-.22*	-.13	-.28**
	Chinese Christians	-.19*	.05	.15	.08	-.17*
	Batak Christians	-.29**	-.81*	-.19	-.70	-.25**
	Christians-rest	-.26**	-.09			-.20**
2a.	**Rites of passage** (ref: I *do not participate in it and neither does my family*)					
	I do not participate in it but my family does		.05		.11	
	I do participate but for non-religious reason		-.03		.01	
	I do participate for religious reason		-.02		.02	
	Collective rites		.10*		.20	
	Religious practices (ref: *Never and only on feast days*)					
	At least once a month		.10		-.25	.07
	Once a week		.18		-.11	.16*
	More than once a week		.24			.23**
	Once a day		.29		-.02	.24**
	Several times a day		.19		-.26	.17*
	Religious in-group friends		-.00		.03	
	Religious out-group friends		-.08		-.25	-.12**
	Participation in religious organization (ref: *Never*)					
	Only on special days		.04		.0	
	At least once a month		.06		-.04	
	More than once a week		.08		.06	
2b & 2c.	**Ethnic ceremonies** (ref: *No knowledge*)					
	I do not participate in it and neither does my family			.14	.05	
	I do not participate in it but my family does			-.10	-.09	
	I do participate			-.03	-.25	
	Ethnic languages			-.01	-.03	
	Social embededness (ref: *none and some*)					
	Relatively many			.12	.01	
	Almost all			.10		
	All			-.04	.06	
	Participation in ethnic organization (ref: *Never*)				-.06	
	Only on special days			.04	-.04	
	At least once a month and once a week			-.07	-.23	
	More than once a week			-.07	-.06	
	R^2	*.08*	*.13*	*.19*	*.56*	*.11*
	R^2 Adj.	*.08*	*.08*	*.07*	*.32*	*.10*

Model 1, 2a, and 2b is without trimming; *= 0 < *p* value < .05 and ** = 0 < *p* value < .01

Table 4. *The avoidance of future spouse model 3 and 4*

Model	Determinants	Model 3		Model 4	
		Before	After	Before	After
	(Constant)	.65**	.63**	.40	.28*
3.	**Ethno-religious definition** (ref: *Javanese Muslims*)				
	Sundanese Muslims	.03	-.22*	-.27*	-.21*
	Madurese Muslims	-.44**	-.36**	-.24*	-.31**
	Ambonese Muslims	.02	.01	-.11	-.04
	Buton Muslims	-.06	-.01	.01	-.04
	Muslims- rest	-.07	-.05	.01	-.03
	Javanese Christians	-.17*	-.18**	-.10	-.11*
	Ambonese Christians	-.21**	-.24**	-.23**	-.21**
	Chinese Christians	.05	-.13	-.11	-.11
	Batak Christians	-.18*	-.20*	-.09	-.13
	Christians-rest	-.05	-.18**	-.08	-.13*
	Religious practices (ref: *Never and only on feast days*)				
	At least once a month	-.01	.14	.13	.14
	Once a week	.05	.17*	.24*	.15
	More than once a week	.08	.25*	.30*	.21*
	Once a day	.13	.28**	.32*	.25*
	Several times a day	.10	.22*	.27*	.17
	Religious out-group friends	-.13**	-.07**	-.02	-.07*
	Gender (ref: *male)*				
	Female	.23**	.20**	.24**	.21**
	Parents religion (ref: *heterogamy)*				
	Homogamy	.04			
	Household income (ref: *low income*)		-.12	-.12*	-.04
	Middle income	-.03	-.11*	-.11*	-.10*
	High income	.11	*reference*	*reference*	*reference*
	Parents education (ref: *low education*)				
	No education	-.29*			
	Middle education	.01			
	High education	.10			
	Occupational status (ref: *self employ*)				
	Worker	-.02			
	Free worker	.03			
	Unpaid worker	.11			
	Occupation status (ref *:farmers*)				
	professionals	-.07	-.02	-.18	-.04
	Technicians	.01	.15	.12	.13
	Clerks	.06	.14	.11	.13
	Sales	-.04	.07	.02	.07
	Farmers	-.16	.01	-.01	.02
	Traders	-.09	.03	.01	.05
	Machine	.24*	.16*	.16*	.15*
	Unskilled	.10	.05	.07	.04
	Special	-.09	.06	.02	.05
	Absent	-.03	.05	-.05	.08
4.	**Intermediate variables**				
	Salience religious identity			.04	
	Salience ethnic identity			.07	
	Perceived threat			.06	
	Quantity of contact			-.00	
	Quality of contact			-.02	
	Positive in-group			.01	
	Negative out-group			.02	
	Monism			.13*	.16**
	Pluralism			-.08	
	Intratextual fundamentalism			.01	
	Hermeneutic interpretation			-.04	
	Perceived discrimination			-.07	
	Memory of violence			.10	
	Direct violence			-.11	
	Indirect violence			.06	
	Nationalism			-.05	
	Regiocentrism			-.11*	-.10**
	National pride			-.02	
	Distrust			.10*	.10**
	Dominance orientation			-.03	
	Equality orientation			.01	
	R^2	*.20*	*.16*	*.25*	*.19*
	R^2 Adj.	*.15*	*.13*	*.17*	*.16*

*= 0 < *p* value < .05 and ** = 0 < *p* value < .01,

Table 5. *The support of residential segregation model 1 and 2*

Model	Determinants	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c	
					Before	After
	(Constant)	.29**	.31*	.43**	.71*	.54**
1.	**Ethno-religious definition** (ref: *Javanese Muslims*)					
	Sundanese Muslims	.01	.06	-.09	-.22	.04
	Madurese Muslims	.17**	.05	.18	-.01	.03
	Ambonese Muslims	.24**	.20**	.23**	.41**	.18**
	Buton Muslims	.25**	.19**	.21*	.13	.17**
	Muslims-rest	.08*	.10*	.06	.26*	.08
	Javanese Christians	-.16**	.01	-.12	.17	-.06*
	Ambonese Christians	.00	.04	-.01	.29*	-.00
	Chinese Christians	-.14**	-.13	-.23	-.19	-.08*
	Batak Christians	-.17**	-.22	-.09	-.07	-.08*
	Christians- rest	-.15**	-.08			-.06
2a.	**Religious practices**		.07		.15	
	Rites of passage (ref: I *do not participate in it and neither does my family*)					
	I do not participate in it but my family does		-.21*		-.44	-.06
	I do participate but for non-religious reason		-.26**		-.57*	-.10*
	I do participate for religious reason		-.28**		-.54	-.08*
	Collective rites (ref: *I do not participate in it and neither does my family*)					
	I do not participate in it but my family does		.08		.03	
	I do participate for non-religious reason and I do participate for religious reason		.19*		.14	
	Religious in-group friends		.13**		-.05	.10**
	Religious out-group friends		-.24**		-.42**	-.26**
	Participation in religious organization (ref: *Never*)					
	Only on special days		.00		.13	
	At least once a month		.00		-.07	
	More than once a week		-.01		.08	
2b & 2c.	**Ethnic ceremonies** (ref: *No knowledge*)					
	I do not participate in it and neither does my family			.08	.31**	
	I do not participate in it but my family does			.05	.24*	
	I do participate			.11	.13	
	Ethnic languages (ref: *Never*)					
	One and two occasions			.02	.09	
	Three and four occasions			-.01	.20*	
	Five and six occasions			.04	.22*	
	Social embededness (ref: *none and some*)					
	Relatively many			-.18*	-.28*	-.10**
	Almost all			-.05	-.27*	-.07**
	All			.02	-.08	-.06
	Participation in ethnic organization (ref: *Never*)					
	Only on special days			-.15*	-.21*	
	At least once a month and once a week			-.16	-.09	
	More than once a week			-.08	-.17	
	R^2	*.19*	*.27*	*.29*	*.60*	*.29*
	R^2 Adj.	*.18*	*.24*	*.17*	*.38*	*.27*

Model 1, 2a, and 2b is without trimming, *= 0 < *p* value < .05 and ** = 0 < *p* value < .01

Table 6. *The support of residential segregation model 3 and 4*

Model	Determinants	Model 3		Model 4	
		Before	After	Before	After
	(Constant)	.64**	.57**	.07	.09
3.	**Ethno-religious definition** (ref: *Javanese Muslims*)				
	Sundanese Muslims	-.01	.04	.03	.05
	Madurese Muslims	.03	-.00	.10	.04
	Ambonese Muslims	.14**	.15**	.13**	.10**
	Buton Muslims	.18**	.19**	.14*	.12**
	Muslims-rest	.10	.10	.10	.14*
	Javanese Christians	-.08*	-.07*	-.01	.01
	Ambonese Christians	-.05	-.03	.01	-.01
	Chinese Christians	-.09	-.07	-.07	-.05
	Batak Christians	-.06	-.07	-.03	-.01
	Christians-rest	-.11	-.11	-.06	-.06
	Rites of passage (ref: I *do not participate in it and neither does my family*)				
	I do not participate in it but my family does	-.09	-.10	-.11	-.10
	I do participate but for non-religious reason	-.10	-.14*	-.12*	-.13*
	I do participate for religious reason	-.07	-.11*	-.10	-.11*
	Religious in-group friends	.08	.11**	.15**	.10**
	Religious out-group friends	-.25**	-.23**	-.13**	-.12**
	Social embededness (ref: *All*)				
	Relatively many	-.09*	-.09**	-.05	-.07
	Almost all	-.06*	-.05*	-.04	-.04
	None and some	-.00	-.00	-.01	-.01
	Gender (ref: *male)*				
	Female	-.01			
	Parents religion (ref: *heterogamy)*				
	Homogamy	.01			
	Household income (ref: *low income*)				
	Middle income	-.03			
	High income	-.03			
	Parents education (ref: *low education*)				
	No education	-.05			
	Middle education	-.03			
	High education	-.02			
	Occupational status (ref: *self employ*)				
	Worker	-.07*	-.06*	-.08*	-.05*
	Free worker	-.04	.00	-.01	-.02
	Unpaid worker	.10	.06	.01	.00
	Occupation status (ref *:farmers*)				
	professionals	-.01	-.01	.07	-.01
	Technicians	-.06	-.06	-.01	-.08
	Clerks	.03	.02	.06	.01
	Sales	.02	.02	.07	.01
	Farmers	-.03	.01	.02	-.02
	Traders	-.09*	-.07**	.01	-.04
	Machine	-.02	.01	.03	.01
	Unskilled	.00	-.02	.06	-.04
	Special	-.01	-.04	.06	-.01
	Absent	.09	.05	.18	.09
4.	**Intermediate variables**				
	Salience religious identity			-.07	
	Salience ethnic identity			.15**	.13**
	Perceived threat			.15**	.16**
	Quantity of contact			-.07	-.10*
	Quality of contact			.02	
	Positive in-group			-.05	
	Negative out-group			.10*	
	Monism			-.00	
	Pluralism			-.13**	-.10**
	Intratextual fundamentalism			.14*	.15**
	Hermeneutic interpretation			-.01	
	Perceived discrimination			.00	
	Memory of violence			-.03	
	Direct violence			-.02	
	Indirect violence			-.01	
	Nationalism			.03	
	Regiocentrism			.03	
	National pride			.06	
	Distrust			.14**	.16**
	Dominance orientation			-.04	
	Equality orientation			-.06	
	R^2	*.35*	*.31*	*.44*	*.44*
	R^2 Adj.	*.30*	*.28*	*.37*	*.41*

*= 0 < *p* value < .05 and ** = 0 < *p* value < .01.

Appendix 4. Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)

Table 1. *VIFs of ethno-religious identification variables*

Determinants	Collinearity Statistics					
	Contact avoidance		Avoidance of future spouse		Support of residential segregation	
	Tolerance	VIF	Tolerance	VIF	Tolerance	VIF
Religious practice	.78	1.28	.77	1.29	.77	1.30
Rites of passage	.60	1.66	.61	1.63	.63	1.60
Collective rites	.58	1.74	.58	1.72	.60	1.68
Religious in-group friends	.81	1.23	.78	1.27	.75	1.34
Religious out-group friends	.85	1.18	.85	1.17	.83	1.20
Participation in religious organization	.67	1.49	.63	1.58	.63	1.58
Ethnic ceremonies	.87	1.15	.87	1.15	.85	1.17
Ethnic languages	.90	1.12	.89	1.12	.89	1.13
Soc. embededness	.81	1.23	.79	1.26	.76	1.32
Participation in ethnic organization	.79	1.27	.75	1.33	.75	1.33

Table 2. *VIFs of Individual determinants*

Determinants	Collinearity Statistics					
	Contact avoidance		Avoidance of future spouse		Support of residential segregation	
	Tolerance	VIF	Tolerance	VIF	Tolerance	VIF
Gender	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Homogamy parents	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Household income	.80	1.26	.79	1.26	.80	1.26
Parents education	.72	1.39	.72	1.38	.72	1.38
Parents occupational status	.95	1.05	.95	1.05	.95	1.05
Parents occupation	.82	1.21	.82	1.21	.82	1.21

Table 3. *VIFs of Intermediate variables*

Determinants	Collinearity Statistics					
	Contact avoidance		Avoidance of future spouse		Support of residential segregation	
	Tolerance	VIF	Tolerance	VIF	Tolerance	VIF
Salience religious identity	.77	1.29	.77	1.29	.77	1.29
Salience ethnic identity	.82	1.22	.82	1.21	.82	1.21
Perceived threat	.66	1.52	.66	1.51	.66	1.51
Quantity contact	.73	1.36	.73	1.36	.73	1.37
Quality of contact	.68	1.46	.68	1.46	.68	1.46
Positive in-group	.54	1.87	.54	1.86	.54	1.85
Negative out-group	.65	1.55	.64	1.55	.65	1.54
Monism	.48	2.07	.48	2.07	.48	2.07
Pluralism	.71	1.41	.71	1.41	.71	1.41
Intratextual fundamentalism	.56	1.80	.56	1.80	.56	1.79
Hermeneutic interpretation	.85	1.18	.85	1.18	.85	1.17
Perceived discrimination	.76	1.31	.76	1.31	.76	1.31
Memory of violence	.69	1.45	.69	1.45	.69	1.45
Direct violence	.52	1.93	.52	1.93	.52	1.92
Indirect violence	.56	1.78	.56	1.77	.57	1.77
Nationalism	.69	1.44	.69	1.44	.70	1.43
Regiocentrism	.85	1.18	.85	1.18	.85	1.17
National pride	.76	1.31	.76	1.31	.77	1.31
Distrust	.71	1.41	.71	1.41	.70	1.42
Dominance orientation	.86	1.16	.86	1.16	.86	1.16
Equality orientation	.80	1.25	.80	1.26	.80	1.25

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SUMMARY IN DUTCH

Hoofdstuk 1: *Introductie*

Deze studie onderzoekt de relatie tussen etno-religieuze identificatie en de vermijding van intergroepscontact tussen moslims en christenen in Ambon en Yogyakarta, rekening houdend met factoren op individueel niveau. Daarmee probeert deze studie het gat in de literatuur te vullen tussen onderzoek dat de nadruk legt op economische en politieke competitie als belangrijkste oorzaken van conflict en onderzoek dat de nadruk legt op vooroordelen en discriminatie als belangrijke bronnen van conflict. De voornaamste hypothesen zijn gebaseerd op de etnische groep conflict theorie die met name werd ontwikkeld bij de analyse van (latente) etno-religieuze conflicten in Westerse landen. Etno-religieuze identificatie wordt gezien als een onderdeel van het zelfconcept dat bouwt op de kennis ontleend aan groepslidmaatschap en de waarde en emotionele betekenis die aan dit groepslidmaatschap wordt toegekend (Tajfel, 1978). Etno-religieuze identificatie is het gevoel van een individu om bij een etno-religieuze groep te behoren, en waarbij de percepties, gevoelens, houdingen en gedrag die bij dit lidmaatschap horen worden gedeeld. Vermijding van intergroepscontact is de mate waarin mensen interactie met mensen buiten de eigen sociale of etno-religieuze groep ontwijken, voortkomend uit de cognitieve en emotionele afstand ten opzichte van hen. Vermijding van intergroepscontact wordt op drie aspecten gemeten: (1) algemene contactvermijding; (2) vermijding van mensen uit andere religieuze groepen als mogelijk toekomstige partner; en (3) steun voor residentiële segregatie.

De centrale onderzoeksvraag is in welke mate er een relatie bestaat tussen etno-religieuze identificatie onder moslims en christenen in Ambon en Yogyakarta en het vermijden van intergroepscontact, rekening

houdend met factoren op het individueel niveau (geslacht, ouders' religie, huishoudinkomen, alsook het onderwijsniveau, het beroep en de beroepsstatus van de ouders) en rekening houdend met intermediaire determinanten zoals saillantie van de identiteit, gepercipieerde groepsdreiging, feitelijk intergroepscontact, religiocentrisme, houdingen ten opzichte van religieuze pluraliteit, religiocentrisme, interpretatie van heilige schriften, gepercipieerde discriminatie, herinnering aan en ervaring met geweld, nationalisme, wantrouwen en sociale dominantie ('social dominance orientation').

Hoofdstuk 2: Conceptueel kader

Contactvermijding tussen etno-religieuze groepen wordt in deze studie geproblematiseerd vanuit drie theoretische kaders: de realistische conflicttheorie, de sociale identiteitstheorie, en de etnische groepsconflicttheorie. De realistische conflicttheorie ziet contactvermijding als deel van de (latente) conflicten tussen sociale groepen die voortkomen uit de competitie over schaarse bronnen die zowel materiële als immateriële goederen en waarden kunnen omvatten. Het kan daarbij bijvoorbeeld gaan om geld, goederen, macht of status. Realistische conflicttheorie stelt dat de schaarste aan bronnen conflict tussen groepen kan veroorzaken en kan resulteren in bijvoorbeeld meer vooroordelen, steun voor discriminatie of contactvermijding. Recentelijk wordt gepercipieerde groepsdreiging als een intermediaire factor gezin tussen competitie over schaarse bronnen tussen groepen enerzijds en (latente) conflicten anderzijds.

De sociale identiteitstheorie beoogt te verklaren dat etno-religieuze identificatie een directe of indirecte invloed heeft op contactvermijding. De sociale identiteitstheorie beantwoordt de vraag waarom mensen hun eigen groep wél en andere groepen niet waarderen. Het belangrijkste standpunt van deze theorie is dat individuen een positief zelfconcept willen ontwikkelen. Sociale (contra-)identificatie is van belang in de constructie van een

positief zelfconcept en komt voort uit processen van sociale categorisering en sociale vergelijking. Individuen ontlenen hun positief zelfconcept aan deze processen en bepalen de relatieve status en waarde van de eigen groep ('in-group') door deze te vergelijken met andere groepen ('out-groups').

Door contactvermijding tussen groepen in een breder perspectief te plaatsen en de positie van het individu in het geheel van het sociale systeem mee te nemen voegt etnische groepsconflicttheorie nieuwe dimensies toe aan de realistische conflicttheorie en de sociale identiteitstheorie. De theorie bevat de cruciale bewering dat "des te sterker de werkelijke competitie tussen etnische groepen op het individuele zowel als het contextuele niveau of des te sterker de waargenomen etnische dreiging, des te meer mechanismen van sociale (contra-)identificatie worden gesteund, leidend tot een sterkere nationalistische houding en discriminerende reacties" (Gijsberts et al. 2004: 18). Aanvullend op deze drie belangrijke theorieën maakt dit onderzoek ook gebruik van andere theorieën en standpunten, door rekening te houden met saillantie van identiteit, feitelijk intergroepscontact, religiositeit, herinneringen aan en ervaringen met geweld, gepercipieerde discriminatie, nationalisme, wantrouwen en vertrouwen, en sociale dominantie ('social dominance orientation').

Hoofdstuk 3: *dataverzameling en meetinstrumenten*

We gebruikten kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve methoden om gegevens te verzamelen en te analyseren. De gegevens zijn verzameld middels enquêtes en interviews. Enquêtes werden afgenomen onder bachelorstudenten die hun eerste studiejaar reeds hadden voltooid in zes universiteiten in Ambon en Yogyakarta. Binnen iedere locatie werden een staatsuniversiteit, een christelijke universiteit en een islamitische universiteit gekozen. Meer specifiek zijn respondenten afkomstig van de volgende instellingen: Gadjah Mada Universiteit, (*Universitas Gadjah Mada, UGM*), de islamitische Staatsuniversiteit Sunan Kalijaga (*Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN Sunan*

Kalijaga) en de christelijke Duta Wacana Universiteit (*Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana, UKDW*) in Yogyakarta; en de Pattimura Universiteit (*Universitas Pattimura, Unpatti*), het islamitische Staatsinstituut van Ambon *(Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN Ambon)* en de Indonesische Christelijke Universiteit in Maluku (*Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku, UKIM*) in Ambon.

Onze steekproef laat zien dat moslims meer contact vermijden dan christenen. Onze respondenten in Ambon zijn meer geneigd om contact met andere etnisch-religieuze groepen te vermijden dan studenten in Yogyakarta. Mensen behorend tot een andere religieuze traditie worden sterk vermeden als mogelijke toekomstige partner. Klasgenoten met een andere etnisch-religieuze achtergrond worden het minst gemeden. Zowel moslims als christenen hebben een sterke etnisch-religieuze identificatie, gebaseerd op metingen van etnische en religieuze praktijken, participatie in religieuze ceremonies en vriendschappen per religie. Islamitische respondenten blijken een sterkere etno-religieuze identificatie te hebben dan christelijke respondenten. De meeste respondenten komen uit de middenklasse en hun ouders zijn veelal werkzaam als arbeider. Gemiddeld hebben de ouders van christelijke respondenten een hogere sociaaleconomische positie (werk en opleiding) dan de ouders van islamitische respondenten. Het aantal mannelijke en vrouwelijke respondenten is nagenoeg gelijk, met een gemiddelde leeftijd van 22 jaar.

Hoofdstuk 4: De sociale locatie van contactvermijding tussen groepen: resultaten van bivariate analyse

Moslims geven aan dat zij Javaans, Sundanees, Madurees, Ambonees of Butonees zijn. Een minderheid valt onder te brengen onder een aantal andere kleine etnische groepen. Bijna de helft van de islamitische respondenten zijn Javaans en nagenoeg een derde is Ambonees. Christelijke respondenten identificeerden zichzelf als Ambonees, Javaans, Chinees, Batak of Toraja.

Sommige van hen kwamen ook van andere, kleinere etnische groepen. Meer dan de helft van onze christelijke respondenten identificeerde zichzelf als Ambonees. We combineerden etniciteit en religie in etno-religieuze zelfdefinitie vanwege de aanmerkelijke overlap tussen etniciteit en religiositeit.

Om contactvermijding te meten bevroegen we de studenten op een aantal indicatoren van contactvermijding. Dit resulteerde in valide en betrouwbare metingen. De meting van contactvermijding maakt gebruik van een rangorde van de meest vermeden tot meest geaccepteerd functierollen voor leden van de andere religieuze groep. Gebaseerd op de resultaten van de enquête vonden we dat moslims het meest geneigd zijn een christelijke burgemeester te vermijden. Daarnaast zijn veel islamitische respondenten terughoudend om christenen als huisgenoot of goede vriend te hebben. Slechts een paar moslims geven aan christelijke buren, politieagenten, ambtenaren, en klasgenoten niet te accepteren. Christenen hebben ook liever geen moslim als burgemeester. Christelijke respondenten geven ook aan terughoudend te zijn om moslims als politieagent of ambtenaar te accepteren. Slechts een paar christenen stelden moslims niet te accepteren als goede vrienden, huisgenoten, buren of klasgenoten. De resultaten van de enquête tonen ook aan dat zowel christenen en moslims in beide onderzoekslocaties mensen uit een andere religieuze vermijden als toekomstige partner. Bovendien is er relatief veel steun voor residentiële segregatie van moslims en christenen.

Gebaseerd op de *bivariate* analyses (inzake etno-religieuze identificatie) vinden we dat onder moslims dat het hebben van vrienden uit de eigen groep positief samenhangt met contactvermijding, terwijl het daadwerkelijk hebben van vrienden uit andere etno-religieuze groepen negatief correleert met contactvermijding. Deelname aan overgangsrituelen en lidmaatschap van religieuze organisaties hangt samen met het vermijden van een toekomstige partner uit een andere religieuze groep, terwijl het hebben van vrienden uit andere etno-religieuze groepen en

deelname in etnische organisaties negatief samenhangt met het vermijden om een partner behorend tot een andere religieuze traditie. Bovendien correleert het hebben van vrienden uit de eigen groep positief en het hebben van vrienden uit andere groepen negatief met de voorkeur voor gesegregeerde woongemeenschappen. Bij christelijke respondenten zien we dat veel vriendschappen binnen de eigen groep positief samenhangt met contactvermijding. Ook correleert participatie in etnische ceremonies positief met het vermijden van een partner uit een andere religie. Tot slot hangen vriendschappen binnen de eigen groep en frequent etnische taalgebruik positief samen met steun voor residentiële segregatie, maar correleert het hebben van vrienden uit andere etno-religieuze groepen negatief met steun voor gescheiden woongemeenschappen.

De bivariate analyses met individuele determinanten tonen aan dat onder moslims een hoger huishoudinkomen en hogere beroepsstatus samenhangen met contactvermijding, terwijl het ouderlijk onderwijsniveau negatief samenhangt met contactvermijding. Mannen zijn minder geneigd levenspartners uit een andere religie te vermijden dan vrouwen. Beroep en beroepsstatus hangen positief samen met steun voor gescheiden woongemeenschappen. Onder christelijke respondenten vinden we ook dat mannen (potentiële) partners uit een andere religie minder vermijden dan vrouwen, en is er eveneens een positieve correlatie met huishoudinkomen en ouderlijk onderwijsniveau.

De *bivariate* analyses met de intermediaire variabelen laten zien dat onder moslims religieuze saillantie, gepercipieerde dreiging, kwaliteit van contact, positieve in-group attitudes, negatieve out-group attitudes, monisme, hermeneutische interpretatie, gepercipieerde discriminatie en wantrouwen allemaal samenhangen met meer contactvermijding. Veel daadwerkelijk intergroepscontact ('quantity of contact') en een pluralistische houding ten opzichte van multireligiositeit gaan evenwel met minder contactvermijding. Bovendien zijn etnische saillantie, gepercipieerde dreiging, positieve in-group attitudes, negatieve out-group attitudes,

monisme, fundamentalisme, en wantrouwen positief gecorreleerd met steun voor residentiële segregatie. Onder christelijke respondenten vinden we een gelijkaardig, zij het minder uitgesproken, beeld. Meer gepercipieerde dreiging, meer negatieve out-group attitudes en meer fundamentalisme zijn de kenmerken van christenen die meer contact vermijden met moslims. De kwaliteit van feitelijk intergroepscontact hangt weinig verassend samen met minder contactvermijding. Wordt het contact met moslims positief gewaardeerd, dan heeft men ook minder problemen met een mogelijke toekomstige partner uit een andere traditie. Ten slotte zijn etnische saillantie, gepercipieerde dreiging, positieve in-group attitudes, negatieve out-group attitudes, monisme, fundamentalisme, hermeneutische interpretatie en wantrouwen positief gecorreleerd aan steun voor residentiële segregatie, terwijl een meer contacten ('quantity of contact') met andere groepen verband houdt met minder steun voor residentiële segregatie.

Hoofdstuk 5: Contactvermijding op het individuele niveau: resultaten van multivariate model testen

Etno-religieuze zelfdefinitie en bepaalde aspecten etno-religieuze identificatie blijken significant te zijn in de verklaring van het vermijden van intergroepscontact. Afgezien van *Sundanese moslims* zijn alle andere islamitische etnische groepen meer geneigd om contact te vermijden met christenen dan de referentiecategorie, *Javaanse moslims*. Alle christelijke etnische groepen scoren evenwel lager op contactvermijding dan de *Javaanse moslims*. Islamitische etnische groepen zijn ook meer geneigd om mensen uit een andere religie hebben meer te vermijden als toekomstige partner dan referentiecategorie van *Javaanse moslims*, met uitzondering van *Sundanese moslims* en *Madurese moslims*. Christelijke etnische groepen zijn juist geneigd om mensen uit een andere religie (i.c. moslims) minder te vermijden als toekomstige partner. Bovendien zijn de islamitische etnische groepen meer de geneigd om gescheiden woongemeenschappen (residentiële segregatie) te steunen dan *Javaanse moslims*. Met uitzondering

van de *Ambonese christenen* vertonen christelijke etnische groepen minder voorkeur voor residentiële segregatie dan *Javaanse moslims*.

Sommige aspecten van religieuze identificatie en een enkel aspect van etnische identificatie hebben aanzienlijke effecten op de vermijding van intergroepscontact. We vinden dat mensen die meer regelmatig aan religieuze activiteiten deelnemen intergroepscontact vermijden. Mensen met meer vrienden uit de 'in-group' en minder vrienden uit de 'out-groups' zijn ook geneigd om contact met mensen van andere etno-religieuze groepen te vermijden. Bovendien zijn mensen die vaker in religieuze praktijken deelnemen en minder vrienden uit andere religies hebben meer geneigd om mensen uit een andere religieuze traditie te vermijden als toekomstige partner. Tot slot, mensen die vaker deelnemen aan overgangsrituelen, meer vrienden uit dezelfde etno-religieuze groep hebben en minder vrienden uit een andere religieuze groep zullen een sterkere voorkeur vertonen voor residentiële segregatie. In het algemeen zijn deze bevindingen consistent met de sociale identiteitstheorie die stelt dat sociale identificatie gepaard gaat met negatieve houdingen ten opzichte van andere groepen en meer positieve houdingen ten opzichte van de eigen groep.

Bepaalde individuele determinanten leveren ook een significante bijdrage aan de verklaring van de vermijding van intergroepscontact. Respondenten met ouders die werken in de handel zijn verrassend genoeg meer geneigd tot contactvermijding dan respondenten uit andere families. Vrouwen zijn meer geneigd iemand uit een andere religie te vermijden als toekomstige partner dan mannen, en respondenten uit huishoudens met een modaal inkomen zijn minder geneigd een toekomstige partner uit een andere religie te vermijden dan respondenten met een hoog huishoudinkomen. Respondenten van families die werken in de handel zijn meer geneigd om mensen die een andere religie hebben te vermijden als toekomstige partner dan respondenten uit boerenfamilies. Studenten uit arbeidersfamilies zijn meer geneigd om residentiële segregatie te steunen dan mensen van families die zelfstandig ondernemer zijn. En mensen van families die in

de handel werkzaam zijn, zijn vaker geneigd om residentiële segregatie te steunen dan mensen van boerenfamilies. Tegen onze verwachtingen in, zijn sommige individuele determinanten niet van belang voor de verklaring van het vermijden van intergroepscontact, zoals ouderlijke religiositeit en onderwijsniveau.

De relatie tussen etno-religieuze identificatie en vermijding van intergroepscontact kan worden uitgelegd aan de hand van verschillende intermediaire determinanten: etnische saillantie, gepercipieerde dreiging, kwaliteit en kwantiteit van contact, negatieve out-group attitudes, monisme, pluraliteit, fundamentalisme, regiocentrisme, en wantrouwen tegenover andere religieuze groepen. Consistent met onze verwachtingen hangt etnische saillantie samen met steun voor residentiële segregatie. Ook gepercipieerde dreiging is van belang: des te groter deze gepercipieerde dreiging is, des te meer contactvermijding en steun voor residentiële segregatie. Op basis van de multivariate analyses kunnen we het volgende in algemene zin zeggen. Ten eerste reduceren meer feitelijk intergroepscontact ('quantity') en een positieve beoordeling van dit contact ('quality') de steun voor residentiële segregatie. Sterkere negatieve houdingen ten opzichte van religieuze andere groepen leiden tot meer contactvermijding. Een religieus pluralistische houding reduceert contactvermijding, terwijl religieus monisme de tendens om mensen uit een andere religie hebben te vermijden als toekomstige partner vergroot. Religieus fundamentalisme versterkt de steun voor residentiële segregatie. Afwijkend van onze hypothese is dat een sterkere regiocentrische houding de neiging om mensen die een andere religie hebben te vermijden als toekomstige partner verkleint. Als laatste, zoals we verwachtten leidt een sterker gevoel van wantrouwen voor mensen uit andere religieuze groepen tot meer contactvermijding en meer afkeer van mensen uit een andere religie als mogelijke toekomstige partner.

Hoofdstuk 6: Conclusie

Dit onderzoek stelt een aantal theoriegestuurde verklaringen voor contactvermijding tussen etno-religieuze groepen in Indonesië voor. We hebben verschillende sociaal relevante onderzoeksvragen gesteld over de relatie tussen etno-religieuze identificatie en het vermijden van intergroepscontact. Dit zijn vragen die tot nu toe niet zo grootschalig onderzocht zijn in de Indonesische context, daarin begrepen een gebied dat veelvuldig door manifest geweld wordt geplaagd. Dit onderzoek levert een bijdrage aan de ontwikkeling van empirische onderzoeksmethoden door de combinatie van kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve benaderingen. In het algemeen was deze triangulatie van gegevens de moeite waard. Bevindingen van de enquêtes werden geïllustreerd met en in groter detail uitgewerkt door de bevindingen uit de interviews. De respondenten maakten in de interviews evenwel geen melding van aanvullende relevante dimensies die we nog niet in de enquête in kaart brachten. Onze combinaties van methoden zorgde voor meer informatie in termen van representatie van respondenten en een gedetailleerde beschrijving van sociale contexten. Dit empirische onderzoek probeert een gat in de literatuur van conflictstudies te dichten, waar eerdere wetenschappelijke literatuur zich voornamelijk richt op economische en politieke strijd. Dit onderzoek heeft daarmee een belangrijke dimensie van latent conflict op het individueel niveau in kaart gebracht, zowel in conflictgebied als in een gebied dat relatief vredig is. ●

Curriculum Vitae

Cahyo Pamungkas was born on 11 September 1975 in the village of Wareng, Purworejo, Central Java, Indonesia. He graduated from the Department of Economics and Development Studies at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta (Indonesia) in 1999. Between 2000 and 2002, he worked at the Economic and Social Institute for Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES) Jakarta. Since 2003, he has worked as a researcher of social sciences at the Research Centre of Regional Resources (PSDR), the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). Between 2003 and 2005, he conducted research on separatism and the formation of nation states in the Philippines and Thailand. In addition, he conducted studies on the relationship between ethno-religious groups in Maluku and Papua. From 2005 to 2006, he received the Asia Public Intellectual (API) fellowship from the Nippon Foundation to do a study on "The Effectiveness of Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in Coping with the Separatism and the Role of National Reconciliation Commission of Thailand in Peace Building." He continued his graduate education and received Master of Science in Sociology in 2008 from the Postgraduate programme of Sociology, the University of Indonesia. His field work in Jayapura for his research thesis entitled "Papua Muslim and special autonomy, contestation of identity among the people of Papua," was funded by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Germany. Between 2005 and 2008, together with his colleagues in LIPI, he made a study on the separatist conflict of West Papua. In 2008, they published a book entitled "Papua Road Map" that became a reference to resolve the conflict. Between December 2010 and December 2014, Cahyo Pamungkas performed his PhD studies at Radboud University Nijmegen (the Netherlands), supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).